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ServerKit is a lightweight, modern server control panel for managing web applications, databases, and services on your VPS or dedicated server. Built with Python/Flask backend and React frontend.

fix(logs): compare whole segments in path guard

Max Freedom Pollard50d64e9d7229
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 4585addd..3f798b6a 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ release history; historical `agent-v*` tags are not panel releases.
official template registry's CI holds every template to the installer's
rules before a merge publishes it.
+### Fixed
+
+- Hold the log viewer to its allowed directories. A folder whose name only
+ begins with an allowed root, such as `/opt-private` next to `/opt`, was
+ treated as though it sat inside that root and could be read, searched and
+ cleared through the Log Files tab.
+
## [1.11.4] - 2026-09-12
Covers the 1.11.1 through 1.11.3 version bumps, which shipped only as dev
diff --git a/backend/app/services/log_service.py b/backend/app/services/log_service.py
index 94aa9968..3113ad04 100644
--- a/backend/app/services/log_service.py
+++ b/backend/app/services/log_service.py
@@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ class LogService:
# Resolve the absolute path to prevent traversal attacks
real_path = os.path.realpath(filepath)
- # Check if the path starts with any allowed directory
+ # Compare whole path segments, the way FileService.is_path_allowed
+ # does. A bare startswith is a text test, not a containment test:
+ # '/opt-private' would pass on the strength of the root '/opt'.
for allowed_dir in cls.ALLOWED_LOG_DIRECTORIES:
- if real_path.startswith(allowed_dir):
+ if real_path == allowed_dir or real_path.startswith(allowed_dir + os.sep):
return True
return False
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_log_path_containment.py b/backend/tests/test_log_path_containment.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..82a856ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_log_path_containment.py
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+"""LogService.is_path_allowed must compare whole path segments.
+
+The guard resolved the requested path with realpath and then asked whether the
+result merely *started with* one of ALLOWED_LOG_DIRECTORIES. That is a text
+test, not a containment test: '/opt-private' starts with the allowed root
+'/opt' without sitting inside it, so a sibling directory that only shares a
+name prefix was accepted as an allowed log location.
+
+FileService guards the same roots and already gets this right at
+file_service.py:96-100, comparing `real_path == root or
+real_path.startswith(root + os.sep)`. These tests hold LogService to the same
+contract.
+
+The sandbox cases monkeypatch the root list onto a tmp_path so they run
+anywhere. The shipped-constant case uses /opt rather than /var/log, because
+realpath('/var/log') is '/private/var/log' on a macOS dev box, which would
+assert the developer's filesystem instead of the guard.
+"""
+import os
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.services.log_service import LogService
+
+
+def roots(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+ """One allowed root, plus a sibling whose name shares its prefix.
+
+ tmp_path is resolved first so the fixture compares like with like: the
+ guard realpaths its argument before matching, and /var is a symlink to
+ /private/var on macOS.
+ """
+ base = os.path.realpath(str(tmp_path))
+ allowed = os.path.join(base, 'logroot')
+ sibling = os.path.join(base, 'logroot-backup')
+ os.makedirs(allowed)
+ os.makedirs(sibling)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(LogService, 'ALLOWED_LOG_DIRECTORIES', [allowed])
+ return {'allowed': allowed, 'sibling': sibling}
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# A name prefix is not containment (the actual bug)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_prefix_sibling_is_not_inside_the_root(roots):
+ assert not LogService.is_path_allowed(roots['sibling'])
+ assert not LogService.is_path_allowed(
+ os.path.join(roots['sibling'], 'app.log'))
+
+
+def test_shipped_roots_reject_a_prefix_sibling():
+ """The literal constants. /opt is a shipped root and resolves to itself on
+ the platforms the panel installs on, so it can be asserted directly."""
+ assert '/opt' in LogService.ALLOWED_LOG_DIRECTORIES
+ assert not LogService.is_path_allowed('/opt-private')
+ assert not LogService.is_path_allowed('/opt-private/creds.txt')
+
+
+def test_clear_log_refuses_a_prefix_sibling(roots):
+ """The guard gates truncation as well as reading, through clear_log.
+
+ The target deliberately does not exist, so the broken guard falls through
+ to 'Log file not found' instead of running truncate against a real file.
+ """
+ result = LogService.clear_log(os.path.join(roots['sibling'], 'app.log'))
+
+ assert result['success'] is False
+ assert result['error'] == 'Access denied: path not in allowed directories'
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Everything genuinely inside a root still resolves
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_paths_inside_the_root_still_pass(roots):
+ """Including one reached through '..', which realpath collapses before the
+ comparison happens."""
+ assert LogService.is_path_allowed(roots['allowed'])
+ assert LogService.is_path_allowed(os.path.join(roots['allowed'], 'app.log'))
+ assert LogService.is_path_allowed(
+ os.path.join(roots['allowed'], 'nested', '..', 'app.log'))