ServerKit is a lightweight, modern server control panel for managing web applications, databases, and services on your VPS or dedicated server. Built with Python/Flask backend and React frontend.
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fix(agent): rate-limit the poll /connect auth path
Juan Denis5598a1c6e230
diff --git a/backend/app/api/agent_poll.py b/backend/app/api/agent_poll.pyindex 243b4608..bd3a687b 100644--- a/backend/app/api/agent_poll.py+++ b/backend/app/api/agent_poll.py@@ -16,14 +16,18 @@ Auth model:which is what authenticates the request — no per-call HMAC."""+import loggingfrom datetime import datetimefrom flask import Blueprint, jsonify, requestfrom app.services.agent_registry import agent_registry+from app.agent_gateway import _check_auth_rate_limitfrom app.utils.ip_utils import is_ip_allowedfrom app.services.anomaly_detection_service import anomaly_detection_service+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)+agent_poll_bp = Blueprint('agent_poll', __name__)@@ -47,6 +51,15 @@ def connect():return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': 'Missing required fields'}), 400ip = _client_ip()++ # Apply the SAME per-IP auth throttle that guards the WebSocket auth path+ # (agent_gateway.on_auth). /connect is the REST-transport equivalent of+ # on_auth, so without this it was an unthrottled bypass an attacker could+ # use for credential-stuffing while the WS path stayed rate-limited.+ if not _check_auth_rate_limit(ip):+ logger.warning("Auth rate limit exceeded for IP: %s (poll/connect)", ip)+ return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': 'Rate limit exceeded. Try again later.'}), 429+server = agent_registry.verify_agent_auth(agent_id, api_key_prefix, signature, timestamp,nonce=nonce, ip_address=ip,diff --git a/backend/tests/test_agent_poll_ratelimit.py b/backend/tests/test_agent_poll_ratelimit.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..da3f157e--- /dev/null+++ b/backend/tests/test_agent_poll_ratelimit.py@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@+"""+Regression test for the poll-transport auth rate-limit bypass (bug #3).++The WebSocket auth path (agent_gateway.on_auth) is throttled per-IP via+_check_auth_rate_limit, but the REST long-poll equivalent+(POST /api/v1/agent/connect) did full HMAC auth WITHOUT the throttle — an+unthrottled credential-stuffing surface. The fix applies the same shared+limiter to /connect.+"""+import pytest++import app.agent_gateway as gw++[email protected](autouse=True)+def _reset_rate_limiter():+ gw._auth_attempts.clear()+ yield+ gw._auth_attempts.clear()+++def _bogus_auth():+ # All required fields present so we pass the 400 "missing fields" check and+ # reach the rate limiter; creds are invalid so auth itself would 401.+ return {+ 'agent_id': 'nope',+ 'api_key_prefix': 'sk_nope12345',+ 'signature': 'x' * 16,+ 'timestamp': 1,+ }+++def test_poll_connect_is_rate_limited(client):+ url = '/api/v1/agent/connect'++ # The first N attempts clear the throttle (and fail auth with 401).+ for _ in range(gw._AUTH_RATE_LIMIT):+ r = client.post(url, json=_bogus_auth())+ assert r.status_code == 401, r.get_data(as_text=True)++ # The next attempt from the same IP is throttled, not auth-checked.+ r = client.post(url, json=_bogus_auth())+ assert r.status_code == 429