ServerKit is a lightweight, modern server control panel for managing web applications, databases, and services on your VPS or dedicated server. Built with Python/Flask backend and React frontend.
Python astracloudflarecontrol-panelcyberpaneldnsfablehosting-control-panelhosting-panelkimi-k3server-managementserverkitubuntu-web-panelwebserver
docs: clarify agent.key + session-token notes; record audit remediation (L2/L4-L7)
Juan Denisb2fad9528a2f
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex 624b613d..1bbecb3b 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -34,9 +34,13 @@ trust boundaries:- **`agent.key` is a host-equivalent secret.** Agent API credentials are storedAES-256-GCM encrypted under a key derived from host-stable identifiers- (hostname + machine ID on Linux, hostname + computer name on Windows). Anyone- who can read this file on the host — or recreate the host-derived key — can- recover the credentials. Protect it like a root/SYSTEM secret.+ (hostname + machine ID on Linux, hostname + computer name on Windows). Because+ that key is derived only from values available on the host itself, the+ encryption is at-rest tamper-resistance / off-host-exfil protection (e.g. a+ leaked backup) — **not** confidentiality against a local root/SYSTEM user, who+ can re-derive the key. Anyone who can read this file on the host can recover+ the credentials. The `0600` file permissions are the real access control;+ protect it like a root/SYSTEM secret.- **Remote command execution is gated.** Arbitrary command execution(`system:exec`) and interactive PTY sessions are controlled by the agent's`Features.Exec` flag, which is **off by default**. Enable it only on serversdiff --git a/backend/app/services/agent_registry.py b/backend/app/services/agent_registry.pyindex a074848f..640556f0 100644--- a/backend/app/services/agent_registry.py+++ b/backend/app/services/agent_registry.py@@ -843,10 +843,13 @@ class AgentRegistry:if ip_address:anomaly_detection_service.track_auth_attempt(server.id, True, ip_address)- # TODO: Implement per-message session token validation. Currently, the session- # token is issued at auth time but not verified on each subsequent message.- # Full session-per-message validation requires protocol changes on both the- # agent (Go) and backend sides.+ # NOTE (accepted limitation, not a bug): the session token is issued at+ # auth time but not re-verified on every subsequent message. This is+ # acceptable under the current model — a WS connection is authenticated+ # by HMAC+nonce at connect and then rides an authenticated TLS channel,+ # and the poll transport re-presents the token on each call. Per-message+ # token validation would add defence in depth but needs protocol changes+ # on both the agent (Go) and panel sides; tracked as a future hardening.return serverdiff --git a/docs/AGENT_AUDIT.md b/docs/AGENT_AUDIT.mdindex 310c7f60..6778d5d9 100644--- a/docs/AGENT_AUDIT.md+++ b/docs/AGENT_AUDIT.md@@ -86,6 +86,52 @@ Severity counts: **3 High, 5 Medium, 7 Low/Informational.**system-management by default, run as root deliberately (revert `User=` in thebuild scripts) or configure passwordless sudo for the account.+### Highs++- **H1 — fixed (verification side).** `updater.go` now fails closed: an update+ with no checksums URL is refused; `matchChecksum` errors when no entry matches+ this platform (was a silent skip); the checksums fetch checks HTTP status; and+ `requireSecureURL` rejects non-HTTPS update/checksum URLs (dev override via+ `SERVERKIT_INSECURE_TLS`). Covered by `internal/updater/updater_test.go`+ (6 tests). **Still recommended:** cryptographic release signing+ (minisign/cosign) with a public key pinned in the agent — that needs the+ project's signing key + a release-pipeline change, so it's the remaining H1+ step. (Packaged installs are already protected: non-root agents can't+ self-update, so updates go through the OS package manager.)+- **H2 — fixed (made honest).** Removed the dead `get_agent_gateway()` calls in+ `agent_plugin_service.py` and `server_template_service.py`. Plugin install now+ reports `STATUS_ERROR` ("Agent-side plugin support is not implemented yet")+ instead of hanging in `installing`; template drift-check/remediate report+ `unknown` + an explanatory `drift_report.error`; local-only ops (disable,+ uninstall, configure) just drop the dead dispatch. Covered by+ `tests/test_agent_features_honest.py` (3 tests). Implementing the feature for+ real (agent handlers + sandbox) remains future work, but it no longer lies.+- **H3 — fixed** (earlier this session): `POST /<id>/agent/update` is now+ `@developer_required`; test in `tests/test_agent_update_authz.py`.++### Lows++- **L1 — fixed.** Pairing `/claim` and `/lookup` now require developer role+ (`tests/test_pairing_authz.py`), matching `POST /servers`.+- **L2 — documented.** `SECURITY.md` now states explicitly that `agent.key`+ encryption is off-host/tamper protection, not confidentiality against local+ root, and that the `0600` perms are the real control.+- **L3 — fixed.** Removed the dead "Add Version" / per-row Edit / Delete buttons+ from `AgentFleet.jsx` (no backend edit/delete route exists); version list+ intact, unused imports cleaned, no new lint errors.+- **L4 — accepted (by design).** Capabilities are OR-merged and not cleared+ until restart on purpose, to avoid feature flicker from transient probe+ failures; reverting would reintroduce that bug.+- **L5 — accepted (documented).** The single-worker requirement is stated in+ `SECURITY.md`/`ARCHITECTURE.md`/`CLAUDE.md` and enforced by `run.py`'s+ `-w 1`; reliable in-process detection of a multi-worker misconfig isn't+ practical, so it stays a documented operational constraint.+- **L6 — accepted (low).** The Windows updater builds a `.bat` via `fmt.Sprintf`+ with local, non-attacker-controlled paths; not worth the churn.+- **L7 — clarified.** The `verify_agent_auth` "TODO" is reworded to an accepted+ limitation (per-message token validation is defence-in-depth, not a bug; the+ channel is TLS-authenticated and connect is HMAC+nonce verified).+---## HIGH