ServerKit is a lightweight, modern server control panel for managing web applications, databases, and services on your VPS or dedicated server. Built with Python/Flask backend and React frontend.
Python astracloudflarecontrol-panelcyberpaneldnsfablehosting-control-panelhosting-panelkimi-k3server-managementserverkitubuntu-web-panelwebserver
fix(api): close IDOR/authz gaps across deployment jobs, vaults, queues, docker, databases
Juan Denisd961bd23f081
diff --git a/backend/app/api/databases.py b/backend/app/api/databases.pyindex 4cc82f9b..5f2481d1 100644--- a/backend/app/api/databases.py+++ b/backend/app/api/databases.py@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@# Bucket: PER-APP (plan 29 #9). The per-app docker DB read (/docker/app/<app_id>)# gates on can_access_app; the bare-container docker routes have no app linkage# and are system-level admin-only, matching their kill/drop siblings.+# The host-level raw routes (engine lists, tables/structure, users/privileges,+# backups list, and the raw query consoles) likewise have no app linkage and are+# admin-only (Decision 7) — per-app managed-database flows go through the+# /docker/app/<app_id> and /managed surfaces instead.import loggingfrom flask import Blueprint, request, jsonify@@ -50,6 +54,7 @@ def get_status():@databases_bp.route('/mysql', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_mysql_databases():"""List MySQL databases.@@ -115,6 +120,7 @@ def drop_mysql_database(name):@databases_bp.route('/mysql/<name>/tables', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_mysql_tables(name):"""Get tables in a MySQL database.@@ -157,6 +163,7 @@ def restore_mysql_database(name):@databases_bp.route('/mysql/users', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_mysql_users():"""List MySQL users.@@ -215,6 +222,7 @@ def drop_mysql_user(username):@databases_bp.route('/mysql/users/<username>/privileges', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_mysql_user_privileges(username):"""Get privileges for a MySQL user.@@ -270,6 +278,7 @@ def revoke_mysql_privileges(username):@databases_bp.route('/postgresql', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_pg_databases():"""List PostgreSQL databases."""databases = DatabaseService.pg_list_databases()@@ -317,6 +326,7 @@ def drop_pg_database(name):@databases_bp.route('/postgresql/<name>/tables', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_pg_tables(name):"""Get tables in a PostgreSQL database."""tables = DatabaseService.pg_get_tables(name)@@ -350,6 +360,7 @@ def restore_pg_database(name):@databases_bp.route('/postgresql/users', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_pg_users():"""List PostgreSQL users."""users = DatabaseService.pg_list_users()@@ -433,6 +444,7 @@ def revoke_pg_privileges(username):@databases_bp.route('/backups', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_backups():"""List all database backups."""db_type = request.args.get('type')@@ -453,6 +465,7 @@ def delete_backup(filename):@databases_bp.route('/mysql/<name>/query', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef execute_mysql_query(name):"""Execute a query on a MySQL database.@@ -493,6 +506,7 @@ def execute_mysql_query(name):@databases_bp.route('/postgresql/<name>/query', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef execute_pg_query(name):"""Execute a query on a PostgreSQL database.@@ -531,6 +545,7 @@ def execute_pg_query(name):@databases_bp.route('/sqlite/query', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef execute_sqlite_query():"""Execute a query on a SQLite database file.@@ -571,6 +586,7 @@ def execute_sqlite_query():@databases_bp.route('/mysql/<name>/tables/<table>/structure', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_mysql_table_structure(name, table):"""Get the structure/schema of a MySQL table."""root_password = request.headers.get('X-DB-Password')@@ -580,6 +596,7 @@ def get_mysql_table_structure(name, table):@databases_bp.route('/postgresql/<name>/tables/<table>/structure', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_pg_table_structure(name, table):"""Get the structure/schema of a PostgreSQL table."""result = DatabaseService.pg_get_table_structure(name, table)@@ -588,6 +605,7 @@ def get_pg_table_structure(name, table):@databases_bp.route('/sqlite/tables/<table>/structure', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_sqlite_table_structure(table):"""Get the structure/schema of a SQLite table.@@ -604,6 +622,7 @@ def get_sqlite_table_structure(table):@databases_bp.route('/sqlite', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_sqlite_databases():"""List SQLite database files found in common locations."""databases = DatabaseService.sqlite_list_databases()@@ -612,6 +631,7 @@ def list_sqlite_databases():@databases_bp.route('/sqlite/tables', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_sqlite_tables():"""Get tables in a SQLite database.@@ -940,6 +960,7 @@ def _process_error_response(result):@databases_bp.route('/mysql/processes', defaults={'engine': 'mysql'}, methods=['GET'])@databases_bp.route('/postgresql/processes', defaults={'engine': 'postgresql'}, methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef list_host_db_processes(engine):"""List live server processes on a host engine."""target = {'engine': engine, 'password': request.headers.get('X-DB-Password')}diff --git a/backend/app/api/deployment_jobs.py b/backend/app/api/deployment_jobs.pyindex 6e6e5c85..d236dfe4 100644--- a/backend/app/api/deployment_jobs.py+++ b/backend/app/api/deployment_jobs.py@@ -1,14 +1,39 @@+# Bucket: PER-APP (plan 29 #9). App-linked job reads gate on the app-grant+# seam (can_access_app); retries require can_operate_app. App-less jobs+# (template installs, simulated deploys) are requester-or-admin only. The+# job list is admin-only globally and app-access-gated when app_id is given."""Deployment job API endpoints."""from flask import Blueprint, current_app, request, jsonify-from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required+from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity+from app.middleware.rbac import app_access_tier+from app.models import User, Applicationfrom app.models.deployment_job import DeploymentJob, DeploymentJobLogfrom app.services.deployment_job_service import DeploymentJobService+from app.services.resource_grant_service import ResourceGrantServicedeployment_jobs_bp = Blueprint('deployment_jobs', __name__)+def _job_visible_to(user, job):+ """Read gate for one job: app-linked jobs follow the app's grant seam;+ app-less jobs belong to their requester (or a panel admin)."""+ if job.app_id:+ app = Application.query.get(job.app_id)+ return app is not None and ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app)+ return user.is_admin or job.requested_by == user.id+++def _job_operable_by(user, job):+ """Operate gate (retry): app-linked jobs need member+ on the app; app-less+ jobs stay requester-or-admin."""+ if job.app_id:+ app = Application.query.get(job.app_id)+ return app is not None and ResourceGrantService.can_operate_app(user, app)+ return user.is_admin or job.requested_by == user.id++@deployment_jobs_bp.route('/simulate', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def get_simulate_info():@@ -51,10 +76,24 @@ def simulate_deployment():@deployment_jobs_bp.route('', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def list_deployment_jobs():+ """List deployment jobs. App-scoped queries require access to that app;+ global queries (no app_id) are restricted to panel admins."""+ current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()+ user = User.query.get(current_user_id)status = request.args.get('status')target_server_id = request.args.get('server_id')app_id = request.args.get('app_id', type=int)limit = request.args.get('limit', 50, type=int)++ if app_id:+ app = Application.query.get(app_id)+ if not app:+ return jsonify({'error': 'Application not found'}), 404+ if not user or app_access_tier(user, app) is None:+ return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403+ elif not user or not user.is_admin:+ return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403+jobs = DeploymentJobService.list_jobs(status=status,target_server_id=target_server_id,@@ -69,12 +108,14 @@ def list_deployment_jobs():def get_deployment_job(job_id):include_logs = request.args.get('logs', 'true').lower() == 'true'include_plan = request.args.get('plan', 'false').lower() == 'true'- job = DeploymentJobService.get_job(- job_id, include_logs=include_logs, include_plan=include_plan- )+ job = DeploymentJob.query.get(job_id)if not job:return jsonify({'error': 'Deployment job not found'}), 404- return jsonify({'job': job}), 200+ user = User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())+ if not user or not _job_visible_to(user, job):+ return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403+ return jsonify({'job': job.to_dict(include_logs=include_logs,+ include_plan=include_plan)}), 200@deployment_jobs_bp.route('/<job_id>/retry', methods=['POST'])@@ -82,7 +123,12 @@ def get_deployment_job(job_id):def retry_deployment_job(job_id):"""Retry a failed deployment job by cloning it and enqueuing a fresh run(plan 51 D8). Only failed jobs may be retried."""- from flask_jwt_extended import get_jwt_identity+ job = DeploymentJob.query.get(job_id)+ if not job:+ return jsonify({'error': 'Deployment job not found'}), 404+ user = User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())+ if not user or not _job_operable_by(user, job):+ return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403result = DeploymentJobService.retry_job(job_id, user_id=get_jwt_identity())if not result.get('success'):# Distinguish "no such job" from a state/enqueue error.@@ -97,6 +143,9 @@ def get_deployment_job_logs(job_id):job = DeploymentJob.query.get(job_id)if not job:return jsonify({'error': 'Deployment job not found'}), 404+ user = User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())+ if not user or not _job_visible_to(user, job):+ return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403after_id = request.args.get('after_id', type=int)query = DeploymentJobLog.query.filter_by(job_id=job_id)diff --git a/backend/app/api/docker.py b/backend/app/api/docker.pyindex d33b06f9..410e7e2e 100644--- a/backend/app/api/docker.py+++ b/backend/app/api/docker.py@@ -49,8 +49,12 @@ def list_containers():@docker_bp.route('/containers/<container_id>', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_container(container_id):- """Get container details."""+ """Get container details.++ Admin-only (Decision 7): raw inspect output includes the container's env+ vars — i.e. app secrets — and there is no container→app linkage to gate on."""container = DockerService.get_container(container_id)if container:return jsonify({'container': container}), 200@@ -174,8 +178,12 @@ def remove_container(container_id):@docker_bp.route('/containers/<container_id>/logs', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()+@admin_requireddef get_container_logs(container_id):- """Get container logs."""+ """Get container logs.++ Admin-only (Decision 7): raw container logs can carry app secrets and there+ is no container→app linkage to gate on; per-app logs go through apps.py."""tail = request.args.get('tail', 100, type=int)since = request.args.get('since')result = DockerService.get_container_logs(container_id, tail, since)diff --git a/backend/app/api/queue_bus.py b/backend/app/api/queue_bus.pyindex 5a2d9024..70e0c715 100644--- a/backend/app/api/queue_bus.py+++ b/backend/app/api/queue_bus.py@@ -34,6 +34,28 @@ def _ensure_group_mutable(group_slug):raise QueueBusError('System queue groups are read-only', 403)+def _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug):+ """Reject message reads/acks against queue groups the caller doesn't own.++ System-owned groups (jobs, notifications, webhook deliveries, ...) carry+ internal payloads and are admin-only over the REST API — otherwise any user+ could pop messages (visibility timeout) and stall internal processing, or+ read/ack/kill them. User-owned groups are limited to the owning user (and+ admins). Internal producers and consumers call ``QueueBusService`` directly+ and are unaffected by this guard.+ """+ group = QueueBusService.get_group(group_slug)+ if not group:+ return # missing group — the service call below raises the 404+ user = _current_user()+ if _is_admin(user):+ return+ if (group.get('owner_type') == 'user' and user is not None+ and group.get('owner_id') == str(user.id)):+ return+ raise QueueBusError('Access denied', 403)++def _handle_error(e):if isinstance(e, QueueBusError):return jsonify({'error': e.message}), e.status_code@@ -228,6 +250,7 @@ def delete_queue(group_slug, queue_slug):@jwt_required()def list_messages(group_slug, queue_slug):try:+ _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)status = request.args.get('status')limit = request.args.get('limit', 100, type=int)offset = request.args.get('offset', 0, type=int)@@ -274,6 +297,7 @@ def send_message(group_slug, queue_slug):@jwt_required()def receive_messages(group_slug, queue_slug):try:+ _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)data = request.get_json() or {}visibility_timeout_ms = data.get('visibility_timeout_ms', 30000)max_messages = data.get('max_messages', 1)@@ -293,6 +317,7 @@ def receive_messages(group_slug, queue_slug):@jwt_required()def get_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):try:+ _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)message = QueueBusService.get_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id)if not message:return jsonify({'error': 'Message not found'}), 404@@ -305,6 +330,7 @@ def get_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):@jwt_required()def complete_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):try:+ _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)message = QueueBusService.complete(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id)return jsonify({'message': message}), 200except Exception as e:@@ -315,6 +341,7 @@ def complete_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):@jwt_required()def fail_message(group_slug, queue_slug, message_id):try:+ _ensure_group_accessible(group_slug)data = request.get_json() or {}message = QueueBusService.fail(group_slug=group_slug,diff --git a/backend/app/api/secrets_webhooks.py b/backend/app/api/secrets_webhooks.pyindex 0267d877..44e96795 100644--- a/backend/app/api/secrets_webhooks.py+++ b/backend/app/api/secrets_webhooks.py@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@"""API endpoints for secrets manager and inbound webhook gateway."""from datetime import datetime-from functools import wrapsfrom flask import Blueprint, requestfrom flask_jwt_extended import get_jwt_identity, jwt_required+from app.middleware.rbac import require_workspace_access, require_workspace_rolefrom app.services.secret_vault_service import SecretService, SecretVaultServicefrom app.services.webhook_gateway_service import WebhookGatewayServicefrom app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService@@ -41,14 +41,63 @@ def _json_or_form() -> dict:return {}-def admin_required(fn):- """Require an admin user (placeholder for role check)."""- @wraps(fn)- @jwt_required()- def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):- # Role checks can be added here when the auth system exposes roles.- return fn(*args, **kwargs)- return wrapper+def _current_user():+ return User.query.get(get_jwt_identity())+++# Workspace roles allowed to mutate vault/webhook resources and to expose secret+# VALUES (reveal / regenerate-secret) — mirroring the admin-gated connection-URI+# reveal in databases.py.+_WS_WRITE_ROLES = ('owner', 'admin')+++def _ws_visible(workspace_id, roles=None):+ """True when the caller is a panel admin or a workspace member (any role for+ reads; owner/admin when `roles` is given)."""+ user = _current_user()+ guard = (require_workspace_role(workspace_id, user, roles) if roles+ else require_workspace_access(workspace_id, user))+ return guard is None+++def _vault_gate(vault_id, roles=None):+ """Resolve a vault and enforce workspace authorization. Sealed-from-open:+ a missing vault AND one the caller can't see both 404."""+ vault = SecretVaultService.get_vault(vault_id)+ if not vault or not _ws_visible(vault.workspace_id, roles):+ return None, ({'error': 'Vault not found'}, 404)+ return vault, None+++def _secret_gate(secret_id, roles=None):+ """Resolve secret -> vault and enforce workspace authorization (404-sealed)."""+ secret = SecretService.get_secret(secret_id)+ if not secret:+ return None, ({'error': 'Secret not found'}, 404)+ vault, err = _vault_gate(secret.vault_id, roles)+ if err:+ return None, ({'error': 'Secret not found'}, 404)+ return secret, None+++def _endpoint_gate(endpoint_id, roles=None):+ """Resolve a webhook endpoint and enforce workspace authorization (404-sealed)."""+ endpoint = WebhookGatewayService.get_endpoint(endpoint_id)+ if not endpoint or not _ws_visible(endpoint.workspace_id, roles):+ return None, ({'error': 'Endpoint not found'}, 404)+ return endpoint, None+++def _delivery_gate(delivery_id, roles=None):+ """Resolve delivery -> endpoint -> workspace and enforce authorization+ (404-sealed)."""+ delivery = WebhookGatewayService.get_delivery(delivery_id)+ if not delivery or not delivery.endpoint:+ return None, ({'error': 'Delivery not found'}, 404)+ endpoint, err = _endpoint_gate(delivery.endpoint.id, roles)+ if err:+ return None, ({'error': 'Delivery not found'}, 404)+ return delivery, None# ---------- Secret Vaults ----------@@ -92,17 +141,20 @@ def create_vault():@bp.route('/vaults/<int:vault_id>', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def get_vault(vault_id):- vault = SecretVaultService.get_vault(vault_id)- if not vault:- return {'error': 'Vault not found'}, 404+ vault, err = _vault_gate(vault_id)+ if err:+ return errreturn {'success': True, 'vault': vault.to_dict()}@bp.route('/vaults/<int:vault_id>', methods=['PATCH'])@jwt_required()def update_vault(vault_id):+ vault, err = _vault_gate(vault_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return errdata = _json_or_form()- result = SecretVaultService.update_vault(vault_id, name=data.get('name'), description=data.get('description'))+ result = SecretVaultService.update_vault(vault.id, name=data.get('name'), description=data.get('description'))if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404 if 'not found' in result.get('error', '').lower() else 409return result@@ -111,7 +163,10 @@ def update_vault(vault_id):@bp.route('/vaults/<int:vault_id>', methods=['DELETE'])@jwt_required()def delete_vault(vault_id):- result = SecretVaultService.delete_vault(vault_id)+ vault, err = _vault_gate(vault_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return err+ result = SecretVaultService.delete_vault(vault.id)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404return result@@ -122,12 +177,18 @@ def delete_vault(vault_id):@bp.route('/vaults/<int:vault_id>/secrets', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def list_secrets(vault_id):- return {'success': True, 'secrets': SecretService.list_secrets(vault_id)}+ vault, err = _vault_gate(vault_id)+ if err:+ return err+ return {'success': True, 'secrets': SecretService.list_secrets(vault.id)}@bp.route('/vaults/<int:vault_id>/secrets', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()def create_secret(vault_id):+ vault, err = _vault_gate(vault_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return errdata = _json_or_form()name = data.get('name')value = data.get('value')@@ -139,7 +200,7 @@ def create_secret(vault_id):expires_at = datetime.fromisoformat(data['expires_at'])except ValueError:return {'error': 'Invalid expires_at format'}, 400- result = SecretService.create_secret(vault_id, name, value, description=data.get('description'), expires_at=expires_at)+ result = SecretService.create_secret(vault.id, name, value, description=data.get('description'), expires_at=expires_at)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 409 if 'already exists' in result.get('error', '').lower() else 400return result, 201@@ -148,26 +209,32 @@ def create_secret(vault_id):@bp.route('/vaults/<int:vault_id>/secrets/bulk', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()def bulk_create_secrets(vault_id):+ vault, err = _vault_gate(vault_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return errdata = _json_or_form()secrets_list = data.get('secrets', [])if not isinstance(secrets_list, list):return {'error': 'secrets must be a list'}, 400- result = SecretService.bulk_create_or_update(vault_id, secrets_list)+ result = SecretService.bulk_create_or_update(vault.id, secrets_list)return result, 207@bp.route('/secrets/<int:secret_id>', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def get_secret(secret_id):- secret = SecretService.get_secret(secret_id)- if not secret:- return {'error': 'Secret not found'}, 404+ secret, err = _secret_gate(secret_id)+ if err:+ return errreturn {'success': True, 'secret': secret.to_dict(mask=True)}@bp.route('/secrets/<int:secret_id>', methods=['PATCH'])@jwt_required()def update_secret(secret_id):+ secret, err = _secret_gate(secret_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return errdata = _json_or_form()expires_at = Noneif data.get('expires_at'):@@ -176,7 +243,7 @@ def update_secret(secret_id):except ValueError:return {'error': 'Invalid expires_at format'}, 400result = SecretService.update_secret(- secret_id,+ secret.id,value=data.get('value'),description=data.get('description'),expires_at=expires_at,@@ -190,7 +257,12 @@ def update_secret(secret_id):@bp.route('/secrets/<int:secret_id>/reveal', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()def reveal_secret(secret_id):- result = SecretService.reveal_secret(secret_id)+ # Secret VALUE exposure is a privileged op (owner/admin workspace role or+ # panel admin), mirroring the admin-gated connection-URI reveal in databases.py.+ secret, err = _secret_gate(secret_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return err+ result = SecretService.reveal_secret(secret.id)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404return result@@ -199,7 +271,10 @@ def reveal_secret(secret_id):@bp.route('/secrets/<int:secret_id>', methods=['DELETE'])@jwt_required()def delete_secret(secret_id):- result = SecretService.delete_secret(secret_id)+ secret, err = _secret_gate(secret_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return err+ result = SecretService.delete_secret(secret.id)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404return result@@ -237,18 +312,21 @@ def create_webhook_endpoint():@bp.route('/webhooks/endpoints/<int:endpoint_id>', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def get_webhook_endpoint(endpoint_id):- endpoint = WebhookGatewayService.get_endpoint(endpoint_id)- if not endpoint:- return {'error': 'Endpoint not found'}, 404+ endpoint, err = _endpoint_gate(endpoint_id)+ if err:+ return errreturn {'success': True, 'endpoint': endpoint.to_dict()}@bp.route('/webhooks/endpoints/<int:endpoint_id>', methods=['PATCH'])@jwt_required()def update_webhook_endpoint(endpoint_id):+ endpoint, err = _endpoint_gate(endpoint_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return errdata = _json_or_form()result = WebhookGatewayService.update_endpoint(- endpoint_id,+ endpoint.id,name=data.get('name'),forward_url=data.get('forward_url'),filter_paths=data.get('filter_paths'),@@ -263,7 +341,11 @@ def update_webhook_endpoint(endpoint_id):@bp.route('/webhooks/endpoints/<int:endpoint_id>/regenerate-secret', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()def regenerate_webhook_secret(endpoint_id):- result = WebhookGatewayService.regenerate_secret(endpoint_id)+ # Returns a new signing secret in plaintext — privileged op like reveal.+ endpoint, err = _endpoint_gate(endpoint_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return err+ result = WebhookGatewayService.regenerate_secret(endpoint.id)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404return result@@ -272,7 +354,10 @@ def regenerate_webhook_secret(endpoint_id):@bp.route('/webhooks/endpoints/<int:endpoint_id>', methods=['DELETE'])@jwt_required()def delete_webhook_endpoint(endpoint_id):- result = WebhookGatewayService.delete_endpoint(endpoint_id)+ endpoint, err = _endpoint_gate(endpoint_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return err+ result = WebhookGatewayService.delete_endpoint(endpoint.id)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404return result@@ -281,15 +366,21 @@ def delete_webhook_endpoint(endpoint_id):@bp.route('/webhooks/endpoints/<int:endpoint_id>/deliveries', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def list_webhook_deliveries(endpoint_id):+ endpoint, err = _endpoint_gate(endpoint_id)+ if err:+ return errlimit = request.args.get('limit', 50, type=int)status = request.args.get('status')- return {'success': True, 'deliveries': WebhookGatewayService.list_deliveries(endpoint_id, limit=limit, status=status)}+ return {'success': True, 'deliveries': WebhookGatewayService.list_deliveries(endpoint.id, limit=limit, status=status)}@bp.route('/webhooks/deliveries/<int:delivery_id>/replay', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()def replay_webhook_delivery(delivery_id):- result = WebhookGatewayService.replay_delivery(delivery_id)+ delivery, err = _delivery_gate(delivery_id, roles=_WS_WRITE_ROLES)+ if err:+ return err+ result = WebhookGatewayService.replay_delivery(delivery.id)if not result.get('success'):return {'error': result.get('error')}, 404return resultdiff --git a/backend/app/api/shared_resources.py b/backend/app/api/shared_resources.pyindex 4f0c66c4..21952fd6 100644--- a/backend/app/api/shared_resources.py+++ b/backend/app/api/shared_resources.py@@ -8,12 +8,19 @@ plus a defense-in-depth pass through :func:`mask_sensitive`.from flask import Blueprint, jsonify, requestfrom flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required+from app.middleware.rbac import (+ get_current_user, require_workspace_access, require_workspace_role,+)+from app.services.resource_grant_service import ResourceGrantServicefrom app.services.shared_resource_service import SharedResourceServicefrom app.models.shared_resource import SharedVariableGroupfrom app.utils.sensitive_data_filter import mask_sensitiveshared_resources_bp = Blueprint('shared_resources', __name__)+# Workspace roles allowed to mutate shared variable groups and attachments.+_WRITE_ROLES = ['owner', 'admin', 'member']+def _bad(msg, code=400):return jsonify({'error': msg}), code@@ -27,6 +34,138 @@ def _require(data, *keys):return None+# ------------------------------------------------------------ authorization++def _scope_workspace_id(scope_type, scope_id):+ """Resolve a group scope to its owning workspace id, or None.++ Hierarchy: Workspace ← Project ← Environment. A dangling or malformed+ scope returns None so callers can deny without leaking what exists.+ """+ from app.models.workspace import Workspace+ from app.models.project import Project+ from app.models.environment import Environment+ try:+ sid = int(scope_id)+ except (TypeError, ValueError):+ return None+ if scope_type == SharedVariableGroup.SCOPE_WORKSPACE:+ ws = Workspace.query.get(sid)+ return ws.id if ws else None+ if scope_type == SharedVariableGroup.SCOPE_PROJECT:+ project = Project.query.get(sid)+ return project.workspace_id if project else None+ if scope_type == SharedVariableGroup.SCOPE_ENVIRONMENT:+ env = Environment.query.get(sid)+ if not env:+ return None+ project = Project.query.get(env.project_id)+ return project.workspace_id if project else None+ return None+++def _resolve_app(resource_type, resource_id):+ """Resolve an app-backed resource (application, wordpress) to its+ Application, or None."""+ from app.models.application import Application+ from app.models.wordpress_site import WordPressSite+ try:+ rid = int(resource_id)+ except (TypeError, ValueError):+ return None+ if resource_type == 'application':+ return Application.query.get(rid)+ if resource_type == 'wordpress':+ site = WordPressSite.query.get(rid)+ return Application.query.get(site.application_id) if site else None+ return None+++def _check_scope(scope_type, scope_id, write=False):+ """Authorize the current user against a variable-group scope.++ Returns None when allowed, else a ``(response, status)`` tuple. Panel+ admins bypass. 'application' scopes gate on can_access_app / can_edit_app;+ workspace/project/environment scopes resolve to the owning workspace and+ gate on membership (read) or write roles (mutation).+ """+ user = get_current_user()+ if user is None:+ return _bad('authentication required', 401)+ if user.is_admin:+ return None+ if scope_type == 'application':+ application = _resolve_app('application', scope_id)+ if application is None:+ return _bad('scope not found', 404)+ allowed = (ResourceGrantService.can_edit_app(user, application) if write+ else ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, application))+ return None if allowed else _bad('access denied', 403)+ workspace_id = _scope_workspace_id(scope_type, scope_id)+ if workspace_id is None:+ return _bad('scope not found', 404)+ if write:+ return require_workspace_role(workspace_id, user, _WRITE_ROLES)+ return require_workspace_access(workspace_id, user)+++def _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=False):+ """Fetch a group and authorize the caller against its scope.++ Returns ``(group, None)`` on success or ``(None, response)`` to return.+ """+ group = SharedResourceService.get_group(group_id)+ if not group:+ return None, _bad('group not found', 404)+ denied = _check_scope(group.scope_type, group.scope_id, write=write)+ if denied:+ return None, denied+ return group, None+++def _check_resource_write(resource_type, resource_id):+ """Authorize attaching/detaching a group to a target resource.++ Attachments inject the group's variables into the target at deploy time,+ so this fails closed: app-backed targets (application, wordpress) require+ operate (member+) access; workspace-owned targets (database, server)+ require a write role in their workspace; types with no ownership seam+ ('service', ...) are admin-only.+ """+ user = get_current_user()+ if user is None:+ return _bad('authentication required', 401)+ if user.is_admin:+ return None+ if resource_type in ('application', 'wordpress'):+ application = _resolve_app(resource_type, resource_id)+ if application is None:+ return _bad('resource not found', 404)+ if not ResourceGrantService.can_operate_app(user, application):+ return _bad('access denied', 403)+ return None+ if resource_type == 'database':+ from app.models.managed_database import ManagedDatabase+ try:+ row = ManagedDatabase.query.get(int(resource_id))+ except (TypeError, ValueError):+ row = None+ if row is None:+ return _bad('resource not found', 404)+ if row.workspace_id is None:+ return _bad('access denied', 403)+ return require_workspace_role(row.workspace_id, user, _WRITE_ROLES)+ if resource_type == 'server':+ from app.models.server import Server+ server = Server.query.get(str(resource_id))+ if server is None:+ return _bad('resource not found', 404)+ if server.workspace_id is None:+ return _bad('access denied', 403)+ return require_workspace_role(server.workspace_id, user, _WRITE_ROLES)+ return _bad('access denied', 403)++# ---------------------------------------------------------------- metadata@shared_resources_bp.route('/resource-types', methods=['GET'])@@ -100,9 +239,20 @@ def remove_tag():@shared_resources_bp.route('/variable-groups', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def list_groups():+ scope_type = request.args.get('scope_type')+ scope_id = request.args.get('scope_id')+ if scope_type and scope_id not in (None, ''):+ denied = _check_scope(scope_type, scope_id)+ if denied:+ return denied+ else:+ # An unscoped listing spans every workspace — panel admins only.+ user = get_current_user()+ if user is None or not user.is_admin:+ return _bad('admin access required', 403)groups = SharedResourceService.list_groups(- scope_type=request.args.get('scope_type'),- scope_id=request.args.get('scope_id'),+ scope_type=scope_type,+ scope_id=scope_id,)return jsonify({'groups': [g.to_dict() for g in groups]})@@ -114,6 +264,9 @@ def create_group():missing = _require(data, 'scope_type', 'scope_id', 'name')if missing:return _bad(f'{missing} is required')+ denied = _check_scope(data['scope_type'], data['scope_id'], write=True)+ if denied:+ return deniedtry:group = SharedResourceService.create_group(data['scope_type'], data['scope_id'], data['name'],@@ -127,9 +280,9 @@ def create_group():@shared_resources_bp.route('/variable-groups/<int:group_id>', methods=['GET'])@jwt_required()def get_group(group_id):- group = SharedResourceService.get_group(group_id)- if not group:- return _bad('group not found', 404)+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id)+ if denied:+ return deniedpayload = group.to_dict(include_variables=True, mask_secrets=True)payload['attachments'] = [a.to_dict() for a in group.attachments]return jsonify(mask_sensitive(payload))@@ -138,10 +291,13 @@ def get_group(group_id):@shared_resources_bp.route('/variable-groups/<int:group_id>', methods=['PUT'])@jwt_required()def update_group(group_id):+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return denieddata = request.get_json() or {}try:group = SharedResourceService.update_group(- group_id, name=data.get('name'), description=data.get('description')+ group.id, name=data.get('name'), description=data.get('description'))except ValueError as e:return _bad(str(e))@@ -153,7 +309,10 @@ def update_group(group_id):@shared_resources_bp.route('/variable-groups/<int:group_id>', methods=['DELETE'])@jwt_required()def delete_group(group_id):- if not SharedResourceService.delete_group(group_id):+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return denied+ if not SharedResourceService.delete_group(group.id):return _bad('group not found', 404)return jsonify({'message': 'group deleted'})@@ -163,12 +322,15 @@ def delete_group(group_id):@shared_resources_bp.route('/variable-groups/<int:group_id>/variables', methods=['POST'])@jwt_required()def add_variable(group_id):+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return denieddata = request.get_json() or {}if data.get('key') in (None, ''):return _bad('key is required')try:var = SharedResourceService.set_variable(- group_id, data['key'], data.get('value', ''),+ group.id, data['key'], data.get('value', ''),is_secret=bool(data.get('is_secret', False)),target_service=data.get('target_service') if 'target_service' in data else None,)@@ -183,13 +345,20 @@ def add_variable(group_id):'/variable-groups/<int:group_id>/variables/<int:variable_id>', methods=['PUT'])@jwt_required()def update_variable(group_id, variable_id):+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return denied+ from app.models.shared_resource import SharedVariable+ existing = SharedVariable.query.get(variable_id)+ if not existing or existing.group_id != group.id:+ return _bad('variable not found', 404)data = request.get_json() or {}_kwargs = {'value': data.get('value'), 'is_secret': data.get('is_secret')}if 'target_service' in data:# Only forward when the client sent it, so it's preserved otherwise._kwargs['target_service'] = data.get('target_service')var = SharedResourceService.update_variable(variable_id, **_kwargs)- if not var or var.group_id != group_id:+ if not var:return _bad('variable not found', 404)return jsonify(var.to_dict(mask_secrets=True))@@ -198,9 +367,12 @@ def update_variable(group_id, variable_id):'/variable-groups/<int:group_id>/variables/<int:variable_id>', methods=['DELETE'])@jwt_required()def delete_variable(group_id, variable_id):+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return deniedfrom app.models.shared_resource import SharedVariablevar = SharedVariable.query.get(variable_id)- if not var or var.group_id != group_id:+ if not var or var.group_id != group.id:return _bad('variable not found', 404)SharedResourceService.delete_variable(variable_id)return jsonify({'message': 'variable deleted'})@@ -215,8 +387,14 @@ def attach_group(group_id):missing = _require(data, 'resource_type', 'resource_id')if missing:return _bad(f'{missing} is required')+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return denied+ denied = _check_resource_write(data['resource_type'], data['resource_id'])+ if denied:+ return deniedatt = SharedResourceService.attach_group(- group_id, data['resource_type'], data['resource_id']+ group.id, data['resource_type'], data['resource_id'])if not att:return _bad('group not found', 404)@@ -230,8 +408,14 @@ def detach_group(group_id):missing = _require(data, 'resource_type', 'resource_id')if missing:return _bad(f'{missing} is required')+ group, denied = _get_scoped_group(group_id, write=True)+ if denied:+ return denied+ denied = _check_resource_write(data['resource_type'], data['resource_id'])+ if denied:+ return deniedremoved = SharedResourceService.detach_group(- group_id, data['resource_type'], data['resource_id']+ group.id, data['resource_type'], data['resource_id'])return jsonify({'detached': removed})diff --git a/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT b/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNTindex d3cf57bc..beb18d70 100644--- a/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT+++ b/backend/tests/BASELINE_COUNT@@ -1 +1 @@-3146+3218diff --git a/backend/tests/test_app_deploy_jobs.py b/backend/tests/test_app_deploy_jobs.pyindex e0a20f16..34055e5c 100644--- a/backend/tests/test_app_deploy_jobs.py+++ b/backend/tests/test_app_deploy_jobs.py@@ -281,11 +281,13 @@ class TestListJobsAppIdFilter:def test_api_filter(self, app, client, auth_headers):with app.app_context():- j1 = _make_job(app_id=11)- _make_job(app_id=22)- j1_id = j1.id- res = client.get('/api/v1/deployment-jobs?app_id=11', headers=auth_headers)+ a1 = _make_app('filter-svc1')+ a2 = _make_app('filter-svc2')+ j1 = _make_job(app_id=a1.id)+ _make_job(app_id=a2.id)+ a1_id, j1_id = a1.id, j1.id+ res = client.get(f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs?app_id={a1_id}', headers=auth_headers)assert res.status_code == 200jobs = res.get_json()['jobs']assert [j['id'] for j in jobs] == [j1_id]- assert jobs[0]['app_id'] == 11+ assert jobs[0]['app_id'] == a1_iddiff --git a/backend/tests/test_deployment_jobs_authz.py b/backend/tests/test_deployment_jobs_authz.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..63533e19--- /dev/null+++ b/backend/tests/test_deployment_jobs_authz.py@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@+"""GHSA-6w78-q5vm-rfmh — deployment-job console endpoints must enforce+app/requester-level authorization, not just authentication.++- GET /api/v1/deployment-jobs?app_id=N (any app's deploy history leaked)+- GET /api/v1/deployment-jobs/<id> (logs may contain build output)+- GET /api/v1/deployment-jobs/<id>/logs (textbook IDOR on the log stream)+- POST /api/v1/deployment-jobs/<id>/retry (unauthorized deploy trigger)++App-linked jobs follow the app-grant seam (can_access_app for reads,+can_operate_app for retries); app-less jobs (template installs, simulated+deploys) are requester-or-admin only. The job list 403s for an app_id the+caller can't reach and is admin-only when no app_id is given (mirrors+deploy.py get_deployment_history).+"""+import pytest+++def job_rbac(app, scoping_rbac):+ """One app-linked failed job (+log) on scoping_rbac's app, plus two+ app-less jobs: one requested by the app owner, one by the foreign user."""+ from types import SimpleNamespace+ from app import db+ from app.models import User+ from app.models.deployment_job import DeploymentJob, DeploymentJobLog++ owner = User.query.filter_by(username='scope_owner').first()+ foreign = User.query.filter_by(username='scope_foreign').first()++ app_job = DeploymentJob(+ id='job-app-linked', kind='app_deploy', status='failed',+ app_id=scoping_rbac.app_id, requested_by=owner.id,+ )+ owner_job = DeploymentJob(+ id='job-owner-appless', kind='template_install', status='failed',+ app_id=None, requested_by=owner.id,+ )+ foreign_job = DeploymentJob(+ id='job-foreign-appless', kind='template_install', status='failed',+ app_id=None, requested_by=foreign.id,+ )+ db.session.add_all([app_job, owner_job, foreign_job])+ db.session.commit()+ db.session.add(DeploymentJobLog(+ job_id=app_job.id, level='info', message='DB_PASSWORD=hunter2'))+ db.session.commit()++ return SimpleNamespace(+ app_job_id=app_job.id, owner_job_id=owner_job.id,+ foreign_job_id=foreign_job.id, s=scoping_rbac,+ )+++def no_enqueue(monkeypatch):+ """Retry enqueues a real job run; stub both enqueue paths out."""+ from app.services.deployment_job_service import DeploymentJobService+ monkeypatch.setattr(DeploymentJobService, '_enqueue_app_deploy',+ classmethod(lambda cls, job: None))+ monkeypatch.setattr(DeploymentJobService, '_enqueue_install',+ classmethod(lambda cls, job: None))+++# --------------------------------------------------------------------- list++def test_list_jobs_app_scoped_requires_access(client, job_rbac):+ """App-scoped listing folds every path to the app (app_access_tier), so+ workspace member/viewer read it too; a foreign caller is denied."""+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs?app_id={s.app_id}'+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'admin'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 200, persona+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_list_jobs_global_admin_only(client, job_rbac):+ s = job_rbac.s+ assert client.get('/api/v1/deployment-jobs', headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/deployment-jobs',+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_list_jobs_unknown_app_404(client, job_rbac):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/deployment-jobs?app_id=999999',+ headers=job_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+++# ------------------------------------------------------------------- detail++def test_job_detail_requires_app_access(client, job_rbac):+ """Reads gate on can_access_app (owner/admin/any grant — workspace+ membership alone does NOT confer it), so only owner and admin pass."""+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.app_job_id}?logs=true'+ for persona in ('owner', 'admin'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 200, persona+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_job_detail_missing_404(client, job_rbac):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/deployment-jobs/no-such-job',+ headers=job_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+++def test_appless_job_detail_requester_or_admin(client, job_rbac):+ """An app-less job belongs to its requester (or a panel admin)."""+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.owner_job_id}'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_appless_job_detail_foreign_own_job(client, job_rbac):+ """The foreign user reads its OWN app-less job; the app owner cannot."""+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.foreign_job_id}'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 403+++# --------------------------------------------------------------------- logs++def test_job_logs_require_app_access(client, job_rbac):+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.app_job_id}/logs'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_job_logs_appless_requester_only(client, job_rbac):+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.owner_job_id}/logs'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_job_logs_missing_404(client, job_rbac):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/deployment-jobs/no-such-job/logs',+ headers=job_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+++# -------------------------------------------------------------------- retry++def test_retry_app_linked_requires_operate_access(client, job_rbac, no_enqueue):+ """Retry is a mutation: can_operate_app (member+). Owner, workspace member+ and panel admin pass; viewer and foreign are denied before any clone."""+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.app_job_id}/retry'+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'admin'):+ assert client.post(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 202, persona+ for persona in ('viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_retry_appless_requester_or_admin(client, job_rbac, no_enqueue):+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.owner_job_id}/retry'+ assert client.post(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 202+ assert client.post(url, headers=s.admin).status_code == 202+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_retry_appless_foreign_own_job(client, job_rbac, no_enqueue):+ s = job_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/deployment-jobs/{job_rbac.foreign_job_id}/retry'+ assert client.post(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 202+ assert client.post(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 403+++def test_retry_missing_404(client, job_rbac, no_enqueue):+ assert client.post('/api/v1/deployment-jobs/no-such-job/retry',+ headers=job_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404diff --git a/backend/tests/test_raw_infra_authz.py b/backend/tests/test_raw_infra_authz.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..fd29dd7c--- /dev/null+++ b/backend/tests/test_raw_infra_authz.py@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@+"""GHSA-6w78-q5vm-rfmh — raw-infrastructure reads must not bypass the per-app+gates. Two surfaces, both admin-only by the Decision 7 precedent (no app linkage+to gate on, so they match their admin-only mutation siblings):++- GET /api/v1/docker/containers/<id> (docker inspect leaks container env+ vars — app secrets)+- GET /api/v1/docker/containers/<id>/logs (raw logs of ANY container)+- /api/v1/databases host-level raw routes (engine lists, tables/structure,+ users/privileges, backups list, and+ the raw mysql/postgresql/sqlite+ query consoles — readonly SELECT+ against ANY database is cross-app+ data exfiltration)++The per-app managed-database flow (GET /databases/docker/app/<app_id>, gated via+can_access_app) must keep working for app members.+"""+from unittest.mock import patch++import pytest++from app.services.database_service import DatabaseService+from app.services.docker_service import DockerService++NON_ADMIN = ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'foreign')+++def _assert_admin_only(client, s, method, url, body=None):+ """Every non-admin persona is 403; the admin passes the gate (the mocked+ service layer answers 200)."""+ kwargs = {'json': body} if body is not None else {}+ for persona in NON_ADMIN:+ resp = getattr(client, method)(url, headers=getattr(s, persona), **kwargs)+ assert resp.status_code == 403, f'{persona} reached {url}'+ resp = getattr(client, method)(url, headers=s.admin, **kwargs)+ assert resp.status_code == 200, f'admin denied {url}: {resp.get_json()}'+++# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #+# docker.py — raw container inspect + logs+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #++def test_container_inspect_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac):+ with patch.object(DockerService, 'get_container',+ return_value={'Id': 'abc123', 'Config': {'Env': ['SECRET=x']}}):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'get', '/api/v1/docker/containers/abc123')+++def test_container_logs_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac):+ with patch.object(DockerService, 'get_container_logs',+ return_value={'success': True, 'logs': 'DB_PASSWORD=hunter2'}):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'get', '/api/v1/docker/containers/abc123/logs')+++def test_container_inspect_requires_auth(client):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/docker/containers/abc123').status_code == 401+++# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #+# databases.py — raw query consoles+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #++def test_mysql_query_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac):+ with patch.object(DatabaseService, 'mysql_execute_query',+ return_value={'success': True, 'rows': []}):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'post',+ '/api/v1/databases/mysql/wordpress/query',+ body={'query': 'SELECT 1'})+++def test_pg_query_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac):+ with patch.object(DatabaseService, 'pg_execute_query',+ return_value={'success': True, 'rows': []}):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'post',+ '/api/v1/databases/postgresql/appdb/query',+ body={'query': 'SELECT 1'})+++def test_sqlite_query_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac):+ with patch.object(DatabaseService, 'sqlite_execute_query',+ return_value={'success': True, 'rows': []}):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'post',+ '/api/v1/databases/sqlite/query',+ body={'path': '/srv/app/db.sqlite', 'query': 'SELECT 1'})+++# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #+# databases.py — host-level metadata reads+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #+[email protected]('url,patch_target', [+ ('/api/v1/databases/mysql', 'mysql_list_databases'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/mysql/appdb/tables', 'mysql_get_tables'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/mysql/users', 'mysql_list_users'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/mysql/users/root/privileges', 'mysql_get_user_privileges'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/postgresql', 'pg_list_databases'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/postgresql/appdb/tables', 'pg_get_tables'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/postgresql/users', 'pg_list_users'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/sqlite', 'sqlite_list_databases'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/sqlite/tables?path=/srv/app/db.sqlite', 'sqlite_get_tables'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/backups', 'list_backups'),+])+def test_host_metadata_reads_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, url, patch_target):+ with patch.object(DatabaseService, patch_target, return_value=[]):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'get', url)++[email protected]('url,patch_target', [+ ('/api/v1/databases/mysql/appdb/tables/users/structure', 'mysql_get_table_structure'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/postgresql/appdb/tables/users/structure', 'pg_get_table_structure'),+ ('/api/v1/databases/sqlite/tables/users/structure?path=/srv/app/db.sqlite',+ 'sqlite_get_table_structure'),+])+def test_table_structure_reads_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, url, patch_target):+ with patch.object(DatabaseService, patch_target,+ return_value={'success': True, 'columns': []}):+ _assert_admin_only(client, scoping_rbac, 'get', url)+++# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #+# Per-app managed-database flow stays member-readable (can_access_app gate)+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #++def test_per_app_databases_keep_can_access_app_gate(client, scoping_rbac):+ """The scoping app is a PHP app, so a caller who PASSES the can_access_app+ gate reaches the docker-type check (400); a foreign caller is denied (403)+ before it. The gate itself must not have hardened into admin-only. (This+ route's pre-existing gate is ResourceGrantService.can_access_app — owner,+ panel admin, or an explicit resource grant; it does not fold bare workspace+ membership, so member/viewer without a grant are 403 by design.)"""+ url = f'/api/v1/databases/docker/app/{scoping_rbac.app_id}'+ for persona in ('owner', 'admin'):+ resp = client.get(url, headers=getattr(scoping_rbac, persona))+ assert resp.status_code == 400, f'{persona}: {resp.status_code}'+ assert client.get(url, headers=scoping_rbac.foreign).status_code == 403+ assert client.get('/api/v1/databases/docker/app/999999',+ headers=scoping_rbac.admin).status_code == 404diff --git a/backend/tests/test_secrets_webhooks_authz.py b/backend/tests/test_secrets_webhooks_authz.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..e1723c75--- /dev/null+++ b/backend/tests/test_secrets_webhooks_authz.py@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@+"""GHSA-6w78-q5vm-rfmh class — secrets_webhooks by-id routes must enforce+workspace authorization, not just authentication.++- GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/vaults/<id> (vault IDOR)+- GET/POST /api/v1/vaults/<id>/secrets[...] (secret list/create IDOR)+- GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/secrets/<id> (secret IDOR)+- POST /api/v1/secrets/<id>/reveal (PLAINTEXT exposure)+- GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/<id> (endpoint IDOR)+- POST /api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/<id>/regenerate-secret+- GET /api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/<id>/deliveries+- POST /api/v1/webhooks/deliveries/<id>/replay++Reads require workspace membership (any role); mutations and secret-VALUE+exposure (reveal / regenerate-secret / replay) require the workspace+owner/admin role or a panel admin. Missing resources AND resources the caller+can't see both answer 404 (sealed-from-open, mirroring workspaces.py).+"""+import pytest+from flask_jwt_extended import create_access_token+from werkzeug.security import generate_password_hash+++def vault_rbac(app, scoping_rbac):+ """One vault + secret + webhook endpoint + delivery, all scoped to+ scoping_rbac's workspace, plus a workspace-'owner' persona (the scoping+ fixture's member/viewer cover the lower workspace roles)."""+ from types import SimpleNamespace+ from app import db+ from app.models import (Secret, SecretVault, User, WebhookDelivery,+ WebhookEndpoint)+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService+ from app.utils.crypto import encrypt_secret++ ws_owner = User(email='[email protected]', username='scope_wsowner',+ password_hash=generate_password_hash('x'),+ role='developer', is_active=True)+ db.session.add(ws_owner)+ db.session.commit()+ WorkspaceService.add_member(scoping_rbac.ws_id, ws_owner.id, role='owner')++ vault = SecretVault(name='scope-vault', slug='scope-vault',+ workspace_id=scoping_rbac.ws_id)+ db.session.add(vault)+ db.session.commit()++ secret = Secret(vault_id=vault.id, name='API_KEY',+ encrypted_value=encrypt_secret('hunter2'))+ db.session.add(secret)++ endpoint = WebhookEndpoint(name='scope-endpoint', slug='scope-endpoint',+ secret='whsec', forward_url='http://forward.local/hook',+ workspace_id=scoping_rbac.ws_id)+ db.session.add(endpoint)+ db.session.commit()++ delivery = WebhookDelivery(endpoint_id=endpoint.id, event_id='evt-1',+ payload='{"a": 1}', status='received')+ db.session.add(delivery)+ db.session.commit()++ return SimpleNamespace(+ vault_id=vault.id, secret_id=secret.id,+ endpoint_id=endpoint.id, delivery_id=delivery.id,+ ws_owner={'Authorization': f'Bearer {create_access_token(identity=ws_owner.id)}'},+ s=scoping_rbac,+ )+++# ------------------------------- reads ----------------------------------- #++def test_vault_read_requires_membership(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/vaults/{vault_rbac.vault_id}'+ for persona in ('ws_owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'admin'):+ headers = getattr(vault_rbac, persona, None) or getattr(s, persona)+ assert client.get(url, headers=headers).status_code == 200, persona+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 404+++def test_vault_read_missing_404(client, vault_rbac):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/vaults/999999',+ headers=vault_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+++def test_secret_list_requires_membership(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/vaults/{vault_rbac.vault_id}/secrets'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.viewer).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 404+++def test_secret_read_requires_membership(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/secrets/{vault_rbac.secret_id}'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'admin'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 200, persona+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 404+++def test_endpoint_read_requires_membership(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/{vault_rbac.endpoint_id}'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.viewer).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 404+++def test_deliveries_read_requires_membership(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/{vault_rbac.endpoint_id}/deliveries'+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.member).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 404+++# --------------------- reveal (plaintext exposure) ------------------------ #++def test_reveal_secret_privileged_only(client, vault_rbac):+ """The most severe finding: plaintext of any secret in any vault was+ returned to any authenticated user. Now owner/admin-level only."""+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/secrets/{vault_rbac.secret_id}/reveal'+ resp = client.post(url, headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner)+ assert resp.status_code == 200+ assert resp.get_json()['secret']['value'] == 'hunter2'+ resp = client.post(url, headers=s.admin)+ assert resp.status_code == 200+ assert resp.get_json()['secret']['value'] == 'hunter2'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ resp = client.post(url, headers=getattr(s, persona))+ assert resp.status_code == 404, persona+ assert 'hunter2' not in resp.get_data(as_text=True)+++# ----------------------------- mutations ---------------------------------- #++def test_vault_update_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/vaults/{vault_rbac.vault_id}'+ assert client.patch(url, json={'description': 'd'},+ headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.patch(url, json={'description': 'x'},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+++def test_vault_delete_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/vaults/{vault_rbac.vault_id}'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.delete(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+ assert client.delete(url, headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+++def test_secret_create_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/vaults/{vault_rbac.vault_id}/secrets'+ body = {'name': 'NEW_KEY', 'value': 'v'}+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 201+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, json={'name': 'OTHER', 'value': 'v'},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+++def test_secret_bulk_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/vaults/{vault_rbac.vault_id}/secrets/bulk'+ body = {'secrets': [{'name': 'BULK_KEY', 'value': 'v'}]}+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 207+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.member).status_code == 404+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 404+++def test_secret_update_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/secrets/{vault_rbac.secret_id}'+ assert client.patch(url, json={'description': 'd'},+ headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.patch(url, json={'value': 'pwned'},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+++def test_secret_delete_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/secrets/{vault_rbac.secret_id}'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.delete(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+ assert client.delete(url, headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+++def test_secret_missing_404(client, vault_rbac):+ assert client.get('/api/v1/secrets/999999',+ headers=vault_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+ assert client.post('/api/v1/secrets/999999/reveal',+ headers=vault_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+++# ------------------------- webhook gateway -------------------------------- #++def test_endpoint_update_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/{vault_rbac.endpoint_id}'+ assert client.patch(url, json={'retry_count': 5},+ headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.patch(url, json={'retry_count': 1},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+++def test_endpoint_regenerate_secret_privileged_only(client, vault_rbac):+ """Returns a new signing secret in plaintext — owner/admin-level only."""+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/{vault_rbac.endpoint_id}/regenerate-secret'+ resp = client.post(url, headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner)+ assert resp.status_code == 200+ assert resp.get_json()['secret']+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+++def test_endpoint_delete_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac):+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/{vault_rbac.endpoint_id}'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.delete(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+ assert client.delete(url, headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+++def test_endpoint_missing_404(client, vault_rbac):+ admin = vault_rbac.s.admin+ assert client.get('/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/999999', headers=admin).status_code == 404+ assert client.get('/api/v1/webhooks/endpoints/999999/deliveries',+ headers=admin).status_code == 404+++def test_delivery_replay_requires_owner_role(client, vault_rbac, monkeypatch):+ """Replay re-fires the payload at the forward URL — mutation-level gate.+ The actual HTTP forward is stubbed out."""+ from app.services.webhook_gateway_service import WebhookGatewayService+ monkeypatch.setattr(WebhookGatewayService, '_forward',+ classmethod(lambda cls, e, d, p, h: {'success': True, 'status': 200, 'body': ''}))+ s = vault_rbac.s+ url = f'/api/v1/webhooks/deliveries/{vault_rbac.delivery_id}/replay'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 404, persona+ assert client.post(url, headers=vault_rbac.ws_owner).status_code == 200+ assert client.post('/api/v1/webhooks/deliveries/999999/replay',+ headers=s.admin).status_code == 404diff --git a/backend/tests/test_shared_queue_authz.py b/backend/tests/test_shared_queue_authz.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..9a397eb3--- /dev/null+++ b/backend/tests/test_shared_queue_authz.py@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@+"""GHSA-6w78-q5vm-rfmh-class — shared variable groups and the queue bus must+enforce scope/ownership-level authorization, not just authentication.++shared_resources (/api/v1/shared/variable-groups...):+ - group reads gate on the group's scope (workspace membership / app access)+ - group + variable mutations gate on workspace write roles (can_edit_app for+ application scope)+ - attach/detach additionally gate on the TARGET resource — attaching a group+ injects its variables into the target at deploy time+ - an unscoped group listing spans every workspace -> panel admins only++queue_bus (/api/v1/queue/groups/<g>/queues/<q>/messages...):+ - receive/complete/fail/list/get on system-owned groups are admin-only+ (payload theft / internal-processing stalls otherwise)+ - user-owned groups are limited to the owning user (and panel admins)+"""+import pytest++G = '/api/v1/shared/variable-groups'+Q = '/api/v1/queue/groups'+++def sr_rbac(app, scoping_rbac):+ """A workspace-scoped variable group (+ one secret var) in scoping_rbac's+ workspace, plus a second application owned by the foreign user."""+ from types import SimpleNamespace+ from app import db+ from app.models import Application, User+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService+ from app.services.shared_resource_service import SharedResourceService as S++ # The scoping fixture's creator has no WorkspaceMember row (production adds+ # one via WorkspaceService.create_workspace); add it so the owner persona+ # resolves to the 'owner' workspace role.+ owner = User.query.filter_by(username='scope_owner').first()+ WorkspaceService.add_member(scoping_rbac.ws_id, owner.id, role='owner')++ foreign = User.query.filter_by(username='scope_foreign').first()+ foreign_app = Application(name='foreign-app', app_type='php',+ user_id=foreign.id, root_path='/srv/foreign')+ db.session.add(foreign_app)+ db.session.commit()++ group = S.create_group('workspace', str(scoping_rbac.ws_id), 'Shared Creds')+ var = S.set_variable(group.id, 'API_TOKEN', 'secret-value', is_secret=True)++ return SimpleNamespace(+ s=scoping_rbac, group_id=group.id, var_id=var.id,+ foreign_app_id=foreign_app.id,+ )+++def qb(app, scoping_rbac):+ """A system-owned queue with one internal message, plus a user-owned queue+ owned by the scoping 'owner' persona with one message."""+ from types import SimpleNamespace+ from app.models import User+ from app.queue_bus.service import QueueBusService++ QueueBusService.reset_broker()++ QueueBusService.ensure_queue('sys-group', 'sys-queue')+ QueueBusService.send('sys-group', 'sys-queue', {'job': 'internal'})++ owner = User.query.filter_by(username='scope_owner').first()+ QueueBusService.create_group('user-group', name='User Group',+ owner_type='user', owner_id=str(owner.id))+ QueueBusService.create_queue('user-group', 'user-queue', name='User Queue')+ QueueBusService.send('user-group', 'user-queue', {'hello': 'world'})++ return SimpleNamespace(s=scoping_rbac)+++# ----------------------------------------------------------- shared resources++def test_get_group_read_personas(client, sr_rbac):+ """Anyone with a path to the workspace reads the (masked) group; a foreign+ caller is denied."""+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}'+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'admin'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 200, persona+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_get_group_missing_404(client, sr_rbac):+ assert client.get(f'{G}/999999', headers=sr_rbac.s.admin).status_code == 404+++def test_update_group_requires_write_role(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}'+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'admin'):+ assert client.put(url, json={'description': 'x'},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 200, persona+ for persona in ('viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.put(url, json={'description': 'x'},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_delete_group_requires_write_role(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}'+ for persona in ('viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.delete(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+ assert client.delete(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+++def test_add_variable_requires_write_role(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}/variables'+ assert client.post(url, json={'key': 'NEW', 'value': '1'},+ headers=s.member).status_code == 201+ for persona in ('viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, json={'key': 'INJECTED', 'value': 'x'},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++def test_update_and_delete_variable_require_write_role(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}/variables/{sr_rbac.var_id}'+ assert client.put(url, json={'value': 'pwned'}, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+ assert client.delete(url, headers=s.viewer).status_code == 403+ assert client.put(url, json={'value': 'changed'}, headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+ assert client.delete(url, headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+++def test_attach_to_workspace_app(client, sr_rbac):+ """Workspace write personas attach a workspace group to an app in the same+ workspace; viewer/foreign cannot (group write or target write fails)."""+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}/attach'+ body = {'resource_type': 'application', 'resource_id': s.app_id}+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.member).status_code == 201+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.viewer).status_code == 403+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_attach_to_foreign_app_denied(client, sr_rbac):+ """Even a workspace owner cannot attach their group to a foreign user's app+ (deploy-time env-var injection into someone else's resource)."""+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}/attach'+ body = {'resource_type': 'application', 'resource_id': sr_rbac.foreign_app_id}+ for persona in ('owner', 'member'):+ assert client.post(url, json=body,+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+ # The panel admin may still wire it up deliberately.+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.admin).status_code == 201+++def test_detach_requires_group_and_target_write(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ body = {'resource_type': 'application', 'resource_id': s.app_id}+ client.post(f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}/attach', json=body, headers=s.owner)+ url = f'{G}/{sr_rbac.group_id}/detach'+ assert client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+ resp = client.post(url, json=body, headers=s.owner)+ assert resp.status_code == 200+ assert resp.get_json()['detached'] is True+++def test_create_group_requires_scope_write(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ body = {'scope_type': 'workspace', 'scope_id': str(s.ws_id), 'name': 'New'}+ assert client.post(G, json=body, headers=s.member).status_code == 201+ assert client.post(G, json=body, headers=s.viewer).status_code == 403+ assert client.post(G, json=body, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_create_group_application_scope_foreign_denied(client, sr_rbac):+ """Application-scoped groups gate on can_edit_app; a foreign caller is+ denied before the service validates the scope."""+ s = sr_rbac.s+ body = {'scope_type': 'application', 'scope_id': str(s.app_id), 'name': 'App'}+ assert client.post(G, json=body, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+ assert client.post(G, json=body, headers=s.viewer).status_code == 403+++def test_list_groups_scoped_requires_membership(client, sr_rbac):+ s = sr_rbac.s+ url = f'{G}?scope_type=workspace&scope_id={s.ws_id}'+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'admin'):+ assert client.get(url, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 200, persona+ assert client.get(url, headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_list_groups_unscoped_admin_only(client, sr_rbac):+ """An unscoped listing spans every workspace — panel admins only (mirrors+ the global deploy-history gate)."""+ s = sr_rbac.s+ assert client.get(G, headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.get(G, headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+++# ------------------------------------------------------------------ queue bus++def test_system_queue_receive_admin_only(client, qb):+ """Non-admins must not pop messages from system queues (visibility-timeout+ theft stalls jobs/notifications/webhook deliveries)."""+ s = qb.s+ url = f'{Q}/sys-group/queues/sys-queue/messages/receive'+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.post(url, json={},+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+ resp = client.post(url, json={}, headers=s.admin)+ assert resp.status_code == 200+ assert resp.get_json()['messages'][0]['payload'] == {'job': 'internal'}+++def test_system_queue_list_and_get_admin_only(client, qb):+ s = qb.s+ base = f'{Q}/sys-group/queues/sys-queue'+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages', headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+ for persona in ('owner', 'member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages',+ headers=getattr(s, persona)).status_code == 403, persona+ msg_id = client.get(f'{base}/messages', headers=s.admin).get_json()['messages'][0]['id']+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}', headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}', headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+++def test_system_queue_complete_and_fail_admin_only(client, qb):+ s = qb.s+ base = f'{Q}/sys-group/queues/sys-queue'+ msg = client.post(f'{base}/messages/receive', json={},+ headers=s.admin).get_json()['messages'][0]+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/{msg["id"]}/complete', json={},+ headers=s.foreign).status_code == 403+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/{msg["id"]}/fail', json={},+ headers=s.owner).status_code == 403+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/{msg["id"]}/complete', json={},+ headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+++def test_user_queue_owner_full_access(client, qb):+ """The owning user keeps the pre-fix behavior on their own groups."""+ s = qb.s+ base = f'{Q}/user-group/queues/user-queue'+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages', headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+ resp = client.post(f'{base}/messages/receive', json={}, headers=s.owner)+ assert resp.status_code == 200+ msg_id = resp.get_json()['messages'][0]['id']+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}', headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}/complete', json={},+ headers=s.owner).status_code == 200+++def test_user_queue_other_users_denied(client, qb):+ """A user-owned group's messages are not readable/ackable by other users."""+ s = qb.s+ base = f'{Q}/user-group/queues/user-queue'+ for persona in ('member', 'viewer', 'foreign'):+ headers = getattr(s, persona)+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages', headers=headers).status_code == 403, persona+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/receive', json={},+ headers=headers).status_code == 403, persona+ msg_id = client.get(f'{base}/messages', headers=s.owner).get_json()['messages'][0]['id']+ for persona in ('member', 'foreign'):+ headers = getattr(s, persona)+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}', headers=headers).status_code == 403, persona+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}/complete', json={},+ headers=headers).status_code == 403, persona+ assert client.post(f'{base}/messages/{msg_id}/fail', json={},+ headers=headers).status_code == 403, persona+ # The panel admin still can.+ assert client.get(f'{base}/messages', headers=s.admin).status_code == 200+++def test_missing_group_still_404(client, qb):+ """The access guard defers to the service's 404 for unknown groups."""+ resp = client.post(f'{Q}/nope/queues/nope/messages/receive', json={},+ headers=qb.s.admin)+ assert resp.status_code == 404