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feat(workspace): scope domains/databases + reconcile workspace roles (#33)
Juan Denisfa73b217ef71
diff --git a/backend/app/api/apps.py b/backend/app/api/apps.pyindex ad9e0a97..847bf70c 100644--- a/backend/app/api/apps.py+++ b/backend/app/api/apps.py@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ def set_app_workspace(app_id):return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404if user.role != 'admin' and WorkspaceService.get_user_role(ws.id, user.id) is None:return jsonify({'error': 'Not a member of the target workspace'}), 403+ # Role reconciliation (#33): a 'viewer' member can't move resources into it.+ if not WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(user, ws.id):+ return jsonify({'error': 'You have read-only access to the target workspace'}), 403ws_id = ws.idapp.workspace_id = ws_id@@ -643,6 +646,11 @@ def create_app():user = User.query.get(current_user_id)ws_id = WorkspaceService.resolve_workspace_id(user, request.headers.get('X-Workspace-Id') or request.args.get('workspace_id'))+ # Role reconciliation (#33): a workspace 'viewer' member has read-only access to+ # the active workspace and may not create resources in it (checked only when a+ # workspace context is explicitly active, so no-context behavior is unchanged).+ if ws_id is not None and not WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(user, ws_id):+ return jsonify({'error': 'You have read-only access to this workspace'}), 403if ws_id is None:ws_id = WorkspaceService.ensure_default_workspace().iddiff --git a/backend/app/api/databases.py b/backend/app/api/databases.pyindex 60ce2565..fe081821 100644--- a/backend/app/api/databases.py+++ b/backend/app/api/databases.py@@ -620,13 +620,23 @@ def list_all_docker_databases():current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()user = User.query.get(current_user_id)+ # Workspace-aware scoping (#33). Docker databases are app-children — scope the+ # enumeration to the apps the caller can see (own + granted, workspace-narrowed)+ # via the same helper apps/domains use. With no workspace context this is the+ # prior behavior. NOTE: the host-level MySQL/PostgreSQL/SQLite endpoints above+ # are server-global system resources with no app/workspace linkage, so they are+ # intentionally NOT workspace-scoped (their mutations are already admin-gated).+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService+ ws_id = WorkspaceService.resolve_workspace_id(+ user, request.headers.get('X-Workspace-Id') or request.args.get('workspace_id'))+ app_q = WorkspaceService.scope_query(+ Application.query.filter_by(app_type='docker'), Application, user,+ workspace_id=ws_id, owner_attr='user_id', grant_resource_type='application')+out = []- apps = Application.query.filter_by(app_type='docker').all()- for app in apps:+ for app in app_q.all():if not app.root_path:continue- if not ResourceGrantService.can_access_app(user, app):- continueinfo = DatabaseService.get_app_database_info(app.name, app.root_path)if not info:continuediff --git a/backend/app/api/domains.py b/backend/app/api/domains.pyindex 1a2beed6..048c937f 100644--- a/backend/app/api/domains.py+++ b/backend/app/api/domains.py@@ -89,12 +89,22 @@ def get_domains():current_user_id = get_jwt_identity()user = User.query.get(current_user_id)- if user.role == 'admin':- domains = Domain.query.all()- else:- # Get domains for user's applications- user_app_ids = [app.id for app in Application.query.filter_by(user_id=current_user_id).all()]- domains = Domain.query.filter(Domain.application_id.in_(user_app_ids)).all()+ # Workspace-aware scoping (#33). Domains are app-children with no workspace_id+ # of their own — they inherit their parent Application's. Scope the visible app+ # set (own + granted, workspace-narrowed) and return those apps' domains.+ # With no workspace context this matches prior behavior (admin -> all domains,+ # else -> the user's own apps' domains) and additionally surfaces domains of+ # apps shared via a grant — consistent with the per-domain routes, which+ # already authorize through ResourceGrantService.can_access_app.+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService+ ws_id = WorkspaceService.resolve_workspace_id(+ user, request.headers.get('X-Workspace-Id') or request.args.get('workspace_id'))+ app_q = WorkspaceService.scope_query(+ Application.query, Application, user,+ workspace_id=ws_id, owner_attr='user_id', grant_resource_type='application')+ app_ids = [row[0] for row in app_q.with_entities(Application.id).all()]+ domains = (Domain.query.filter(Domain.application_id.in_(app_ids)).all()+ if app_ids else [])return jsonify({'domains': [domain.to_dict() for domain in domains]diff --git a/backend/app/api/servers.py b/backend/app/api/servers.pyindex cf79622e..efb907bd 100644--- a/backend/app/api/servers.py+++ b/backend/app/api/servers.py@@ -324,6 +324,11 @@ def create_server():user = User.query.get(user_id)ws_id = WorkspaceService.resolve_workspace_id(user, request.headers.get('X-Workspace-Id') or request.args.get('workspace_id'))+ # Role reconciliation (#33): a workspace 'viewer' member has read-only access to+ # the active workspace and may not create resources in it (checked only when a+ # workspace context is explicitly active, so no-context behavior is unchanged).+ if ws_id is not None and not WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(user, ws_id):+ return jsonify({'error': 'You have read-only access to this workspace'}), 403if ws_id is None:ws_id = WorkspaceService.ensure_default_workspace().id@@ -392,6 +397,9 @@ def set_server_workspace(server_id):return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404if not user.is_admin and WorkspaceService.get_user_role(ws.id, user.id) is None:return jsonify({'error': 'Not a member of the target workspace'}), 403+ # Role reconciliation (#33): a 'viewer' member can't move resources into it.+ if not WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(user, ws.id):+ return jsonify({'error': 'You have read-only access to the target workspace'}), 403ws_id = ws.idserver.workspace_id = ws_iddiff --git a/backend/app/api/workspaces.py b/backend/app/api/workspaces.pyindex fcc55a56..c9185876 100644--- a/backend/app/api/workspaces.py+++ b/backend/app/api/workspaces.py@@ -33,7 +33,16 @@ def list_workspaces():workspaces = WorkspaceService.get_all_workspaces_admin()return jsonify({'workspaces': workspaces})workspaces = WorkspaceService.list_workspaces(user_id=user.id, include_archived=include_archived)- return jsonify({'workspaces': [ws.to_dict() for ws in workspaces]})+ # Surface the caller's membership role and the reconciled effective role (#33)+ # so the frontend can show read-only state when a workspace caps the user to+ # viewer. effective_role is narrow-only: it never exceeds the user's global role.+ out = []+ for ws in workspaces:+ d = ws.to_dict()+ d['my_role'] = WorkspaceService.get_user_role(ws.id, user.id)+ d['my_effective_role'] = WorkspaceService.effective_role(user, ws.id)+ out.append(d)+ return jsonify({'workspaces': out})@workspaces_bp.route('/<int:workspace_id>', methods=['GET'])diff --git a/backend/app/services/workspace_service.py b/backend/app/services/workspace_service.pyindex aebb35e9..a3ccb1b2 100644--- a/backend/app/services/workspace_service.py+++ b/backend/app/services/workspace_service.py@@ -101,6 +101,42 @@ class WorkspaceService:query = query.filter(model.workspace_id == workspace_id)return query+ @staticmethod+ def effective_role(user, workspace_id):+ """Reconcile a user's GLOBAL role (User.role) with their per-workspace+ membership role (WorkspaceMember.role), returning the effective+ global-role string ('admin'|'developer'|'viewer') that applies while the+ user acts inside this workspace.++ NARROW-ONLY, mirroring scope_query: a workspace membership can only+ REDUCE capability, never grant more than the user's global role.++ - System admin (User.is_admin): always 'admin'. A platform super-admin is+ never capped by a workspace membership (consistent with scope_query's+ admin bypass), so they can't be locked out of a workspace they manage.+ - No workspace context (workspace_id is None): the global role, unchanged.+ - A 'viewer' workspace membership: capped to 'viewer' (read-only) here,+ even for a global developer.+ - Any other membership (member/admin/owner) or non-member: the global+ role, unchanged — the workspace role never elevates beyond it.+ """+ if user.is_admin:+ return User.ROLE_ADMIN+ if workspace_id is None:+ return user.role+ ws_role = WorkspaceService.get_user_role(workspace_id, user.id)+ if ws_role == WorkspaceMember.ROLE_VIEWER:+ return User.ROLE_VIEWER+ return user.role++ @staticmethod+ def can_write_in_workspace(user, workspace_id):+ """Whether the user may create/mutate resources while `workspace_id` is the+ active context. False only when their effective role here is viewer — a+ global developer who is merely a 'viewer' member of this workspace gets+ read-only access to it (workspace role caps capability, narrow-only)."""+ return WorkspaceService.effective_role(user, workspace_id) != User.ROLE_VIEWER+@staticmethoddef list_workspaces(user_id=None, include_archived=False):query = Workspace.querydiff --git a/backend/tests/test_workspace_scope.py b/backend/tests/test_workspace_scope.pyindex 8a1e340d..6811020d 100644--- a/backend/tests/test_workspace_scope.py+++ b/backend/tests/test_workspace_scope.py@@ -349,3 +349,163 @@ def test_wordpress_sites_scoping_api(app, client):r = client.get('/api/v1/wordpress/sites', headers={**_token(admin.id), 'X-Workspace-Id': str(ws_a.id)})assert r.status_code == 200assert {s['name'] for s in r.get_json()['sites']} == {'site-a'}+++# ---- API: domains (app-children, scoped through parent Application) --------++def test_domains_scoping_api(app, client):+ from app import db+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService+ from app.services.resource_grant_service import ResourceGrantService+ from app.models import Application, Domain++ admin = _mk_user(db, 'dom_admin', 'admin')+ dev = _mk_user(db, 'dom_dev', 'developer')+ other = _mk_user(db, 'dom_other', 'developer')+ ws_a = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'DomA'}, admin.id)+ ws_b = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'DomB'}, admin.id)+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws_a.id, dev.id, 'member')++ def mk(name, owner_id, ws_id, domain):+ a = Application(name=name, app_type='docker', user_id=owner_id, workspace_id=ws_id)+ db.session.add(a)+ db.session.commit()+ db.session.add(Domain(name=domain, application_id=a.id))+ db.session.commit()+ return a++ mk('dom-a', dev.id, ws_a.id, 'a.example.com')+ mk('dom-b', dev.id, ws_b.id, 'b.example.com')+ shared = mk('dom-shared', other.id, ws_a.id, 'shared.example.com')++ # No context: dev sees its own apps' domains across workspaces, not other's.+ r = client.get('/api/v1/domains', headers=_token(dev.id))+ assert r.status_code == 200+ assert {d['name'] for d in r.get_json()['domains']} == {'a.example.com', 'b.example.com'}++ # Scoped to ws_a: only domains of dev's apps in ws_a.+ r = client.get('/api/v1/domains', headers={**_token(dev.id), 'X-Workspace-Id': str(ws_a.id)})+ assert {d['name'] for d in r.get_json()['domains']} == {'a.example.com'}++ # A grant on another user's app surfaces that app's domain too (and it's in ws_a).+ ResourceGrantService.grant(dev.id, 'application', shared.id, granted_by=admin.id, role='viewer')+ r = client.get('/api/v1/domains', headers={**_token(dev.id), 'X-Workspace-Id': str(ws_a.id)})+ assert {d['name'] for d in r.get_json()['domains']} == {'a.example.com', 'shared.example.com'}++ # Admin with no context sees every domain.+ r = client.get('/api/v1/domains', headers=_token(admin.id))+ got = {d['name'] for d in r.get_json()['domains']}+ assert {'a.example.com', 'b.example.com', 'shared.example.com'} <= got+++# ---- API: docker databases (app-children) ---------------------------------++def test_docker_databases_scoping_api(app, client, monkeypatch):+ from app import db+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService+ from app.services.database_service import DatabaseService+ from app.models import Application++ admin = _mk_user(db, 'ddb_admin', 'admin')+ dev = _mk_user(db, 'ddb_dev', 'developer')+ ws_a = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'DdbA'}, admin.id)+ ws_b = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'DdbB'}, admin.id)+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws_a.id, dev.id, 'member')++ db.session.add_all([+ Application(name='ddb-a', app_type='docker', user_id=dev.id, workspace_id=ws_a.id, root_path='/srv/a'),+ Application(name='ddb-b', app_type='docker', user_id=dev.id, workspace_id=ws_b.id, root_path='/srv/b'),+ ])+ db.session.commit()++ # Stub the compose/.env read so each app yields one database tagged by app name.+ monkeypatch.setattr(DatabaseService, 'get_app_database_info',+ lambda name, root: [{'database': name}])++ # No context: dev sees both its docker apps' databases.+ r = client.get('/api/v1/databases/docker/databases', headers=_token(dev.id))+ assert r.status_code == 200+ assert {d['app_name'] for d in r.get_json()['databases']} == {'ddb-a', 'ddb-b'}++ # Scoped to ws_a -> only ddb-a's database.+ r = client.get('/api/v1/databases/docker/databases',+ headers={**_token(dev.id), 'X-Workspace-Id': str(ws_a.id)})+ assert {d['app_name'] for d in r.get_json()['databases']} == {'ddb-a'}+++# ---- role reconciliation (#33) --------------------------------------------++def test_effective_role_reconciliation(app):+ from app import db+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService++ sysadmin = _mk_user(db, 'er_admin', 'admin')+ dev_viewer = _mk_user(db, 'er_devv', 'developer')+ dev_member = _mk_user(db, 'er_devm', 'developer')+ global_viewer = _mk_user(db, 'er_gv', 'viewer')+ ws = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'ER'}, sysadmin.id)+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws.id, dev_viewer.id, 'viewer')+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws.id, dev_member.id, 'member')+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws.id, global_viewer.id, 'owner')++ # No context -> global role unchanged.+ assert WorkspaceService.effective_role(dev_member, None) == 'developer'+ assert WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(dev_member, None) is True++ # A 'viewer' membership caps a global developer to viewer (read-only).+ assert WorkspaceService.effective_role(dev_viewer, ws.id) == 'viewer'+ assert WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(dev_viewer, ws.id) is False++ # A 'member' membership does not cap (stays developer).+ assert WorkspaceService.effective_role(dev_member, ws.id) == 'developer'+ assert WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(dev_member, ws.id) is True++ # Narrow-only: a workspace role NEVER elevates. A global viewer who is even an+ # 'owner' member is still effectively a viewer.+ assert WorkspaceService.effective_role(global_viewer, ws.id) == 'viewer'+ assert WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(global_viewer, ws.id) is False++ # A system admin is never capped by a workspace membership.+ assert WorkspaceService.effective_role(sysadmin, ws.id) == 'admin'+ assert WorkspaceService.can_write_in_workspace(sysadmin, ws.id) is True+++def test_create_app_viewer_blocked_in_workspace(app, client):+ from app import db+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService++ admin = _mk_user(db, 'vb_admin', 'admin')+ dev = _mk_user(db, 'vb_dev', 'developer')+ ws = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'VB'}, admin.id)+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws.id, dev.id, 'viewer')++ # A 'viewer' member can't create in that workspace.+ r = client.post('/api/v1/apps', headers={**_token(dev.id), 'X-Workspace-Id': str(ws.id)},+ json={'name': 'vb-nope', 'app_type': 'php'})+ assert r.status_code == 403++ # With no workspace context the same user still creates (the cap is+ # workspace-scoped and narrow-only — no-context behavior is unchanged).+ r = client.post('/api/v1/apps', headers=_token(dev.id), json={'name': 'vb-yes', 'app_type': 'php'})+ assert r.status_code == 201+ app_id = r.get_json()['app']['id']++ # And the app can't be moved INTO the workspace they're a viewer of.+ r = client.put(f'/api/v1/apps/{app_id}/workspace', json={'workspace_id': ws.id}, headers=_token(dev.id))+ assert r.status_code == 403+++def test_list_workspaces_surfaces_effective_role(app, client):+ from app import db+ from app.services.workspace_service import WorkspaceService++ admin = _mk_user(db, 'lw_admin', 'admin')+ dev = _mk_user(db, 'lw_dev', 'developer')+ ws = WorkspaceService.create_workspace({'name': 'LW'}, admin.id)+ WorkspaceService.add_member(ws.id, dev.id, 'viewer')++ r = client.get('/api/v1/workspaces/', headers=_token(dev.id))+ assert r.status_code == 200+ rows = {w['name']: w for w in r.get_json()['workspaces']}+ assert rows['LW']['my_role'] == 'viewer'+ assert rows['LW']['my_effective_role'] == 'viewer'diff --git a/docs/WORDPRESS_ROADMAP.md b/docs/WORDPRESS_ROADMAP.mdindex dbe17443..058520c0 100644--- a/docs/WORDPRESS_ROADMAP.md+++ b/docs/WORDPRESS_ROADMAP.md@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ Highest-effort, broadest surface — but by now the `WordPressSite` is a first-c- **Done when:** Each site exposes scoped SFTP credentials.- **Assessment / why deferred:** The roadmap's host-sshd-chroot approach doesn't fit the Docker model — a managed site's files live in the `wordpress_html` **named volume**, not a host path, so a host-level chroot would target the wrong place. The **Docker-correct** design is a per-site **SFTP sidecar container** (e.g. `atmoz/sftp`) mounting `wordpress_html`, injected into the compose stack exactly like #23's redis (`_ensure_*_in_stack` + additive `compose up -d`), with a generated credential surfaced once and a new mapped port (via the template's port-allocation). That is genuinely implementable on the proven pattern — but it (a) opens a **publicly-exposed, security-sensitive file-access surface** that should be firewalled and that I cannot runtime-verify from the dev host, and (b) consumes a port + a container per site. Shipping security-sensitive infra blind violates the quality bar, so this is deferred for a focused pass on a real Docker host (where the sidecar, chroot perms, and firewall can be exercised). No code shipped.-### #33 — Agency scale (workspaces, RBAC, white-label, reports) `[XL]` 🟡 — 🟡 In progress (✅ reports · workspace_id foundation · selector · brand color · resource reassignment · WP-hub scoping · **per-site ACL** (backend + sharing UI + viewer/editor roles + operate access); remaining: workspace↔User role reconciliation, workspace scoping for databases/domains)+### #33 — Agency scale (workspaces, RBAC, white-label, reports) `[XL]` 🟡 — 🟡 In progress (✅ reports · workspace_id foundation · selector · brand color · resource reassignment · WP-hub scoping · **per-site ACL** (backend + sharing UI + viewer/editor roles + operate access) · **domains/databases workspace scoping** · **workspace↔User role reconciliation**; remaining: server-side workspace-scoped logo, broad per-route write-enforcement of the workspace viewer-cap)- **Today:** No `workspace_id` FK on `Application`/`WordPressSite`/`Server`; permissions are global with no per-site ACL; white-label lives in `localStorage` and never reads `Workspace.logo_url`/`primary_color`.- **Do:** Add `workspace_id` FKs + per-site ACL rows + environment-tier RBAC in promote/sync/bulk endpoints; server-side branding scoped to workspace; monthly client reports aggregating uptime/updates/backups/security.- **Reuse:** `workspace_service`, `permission_service`, `audit_service`.@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ Highest-effort, broadest surface — but by now the `WordPressSite` is a first-c- **Landed (resource reassignment):** completes the organizing loop — existing resources were stuck wherever the backfill put them (Default); now they can be moved into client workspaces. New endpoints `PUT /apps/<id>/workspace` (owner-or-admin on the app) and `PUT /servers/<id>/workspace` (developer+), both requiring the **target** be a workspace the caller can access (member or admin); a null target moves a resource back to Default. UI: an **Apps** management modal on each Workspaces card (mirrors the Members modal) listing the workspace's apps with move-in/move-out — it fetches with `allWorkspaces` (an empty `X-Workspace-Id` header) so it can see apps in other workspaces to move them in, sidestepping the ambient scope. **Fixed a real bug** caught by tests: the ownership check compared `app.user_id` to the *stringified* `get_jwt_identity()` (int≠str → spurious 403); now uses `user.id`. Verified: backend `py_compile`, **2 new endpoint tests** (ownership + target-membership + null→Default + role gates), full suite **122 passed**, frontend lint-clean + production build. The management modal now handles **both apps and servers** (a "Resources" modal on each Workspaces card), each with move-in/move-out; servers fetch with the same `allWorkspaces` header bypass.- **Landed (WordPress hub workspace scoping):** the active-workspace switcher now also filters the **WordPress sites hub**, not just apps/servers (it was the inconsistent gap). WP sites carry no `workspace_id` of their own, so `WordPressService.get_sites(workspace_id=…)` scopes **join-based** through the site's parent `Application.workspace_id`; `list_sites` resolves the active workspace and passes it. The hub is global today, so with no workspace context behavior is unchanged (additive, narrow-only). **No frontend change** — the WP hub already fetches through the header-injecting `api.request`, so it auto-scopes on the ambient `X-Workspace-Id`. Verified: backend `py_compile`, a new API test (global vs workspace-scoped), full suite **123 passed**. *(Follow-on for broad adoption: databases/domains are murkier — server-level vs app-child — and need their own analysis before scoping.)*- **Landed (per-site ACL — backend):** per-resource **sharing** — an owner/admin can grant a specific user access to a specific application (transitively its WordPress site / DB / domains) without that user owning it (access-level; per-grant view/edit roles reserved for later via a `role` column). New `ResourceGrant` model (Alembic **016**, unique per user×resource) + `ResourceGrantService` (grant/revoke/list/`user_has_grant`/`granted_ids`). **Enforcement at the cleanest seams:** `WorkspaceService.scope_query` gained `grant_resource_type` so granted apps appear in the apps list (own **OR** granted, then workspace-narrowed); `get_app` and — crucially — the WordPress `_owner_or_admin_app` helper became grant-aware, so **one change opens every WP per-site route** to a grantee. Grant-management API on `apps.py` (`GET/POST/DELETE /apps/<id>/grants`, owner-or-admin; can't grant to the owner; revoke is resource-scoped so you can't revoke another app's grant by id). Also uses `user.id` (int) not the stringified `get_jwt_identity()`. Verified: **4 new ACL tests** (visibility via list, get_app, WP route access, management perms + idempotency + revoke), full suite **127 passed**, end-to-end `alembic upgrade` to `016`. **Sharing UI (shipped):** a per-app **Share** action in the Workspaces "Resources" modal opens an inline sub-view (grant a user → access list with revoke; the owner and existing grantees are filtered out of the add-list); client methods `getAppGrants`/`grantAppAccess`/`revokeAppAccess`. Verified: frontend lint-clean + build. **Viewer/editor roles + operate access (shipped):** grants now carry a real **role** — `editor` (view + operate) or `viewer` (read-only) — and the generic app **operate** endpoints became grant-aware. Two helpers split it: `_can_access_app` (owner/admin/**any** grant) gates reads (`get_app`, `/linked`, `/logs`, `/container-logs`, `/containers`, `/status`), `_can_edit_app` (owner/admin/**editor** grant) gates mutations (`/link`, `/unlink`, `/environment`, `PUT`, `/start`, `/stop`, `/restart`); `ResourceGrantService.grant_role` backs the split. **Delete stays owner-or-admin** (an editor can't delete — tested). The grant POST validates `role ∈ {viewer, editor}` (default editor); the Sharing UI gained a role selector. The same sweep **fixed the latent int-vs-str ownership bug** across ~14 app endpoints (they compared `app.user_id` to the stringified `get_jwt_identity()` — now `user.id`). Verified: **3 more ACL tests** (viewer read-only + can't-operate, editor operates + can't-delete, role validation/default), full suite **130 passed**, frontend lint-clean + build. **Cross-blueprint sweep (shipped):** the per-resource grant now extends to every app-related blueprint, not just apps.py + WordPress. The two access helpers were promoted to a shared seam (`ResourceGrantService.can_access_app` / `can_edit_app`; `apps.py` delegates), and **33 ownership checks across 6 blueprints** were made grant-aware, categorized read-vs-mutate (via a parallel mapping workflow): `builds.py` (12), `domains.py` (7, incl. SSL enable/disable/renew + domain CRUD = editor), `deploy.py` (6), `private_urls.py` (5), `templates.py` (2), `databases.py` (1). Reads → any grant; mutates → editor grant. The sweep also **fixed the same latent int-vs-str ownership bug** in all 33 (now `user.id`). Verified: a cross-blueprint integration test (grantee reaches `builds` deployments; stranger 403), full suite **131 passed**. **`python.py` (shipped):** re-reading showed every mutating endpoint there is independently `@admin_required` (runs before the shared `get_app_or_404` gate), so the gate only governs the 4 read GETs — pointing it at `can_access_app` safely opens those to grantees while the admin-only mutations are untouched. No per-method split needed. With this, **every app-related blueprint is grant-aware.** Verified: a python read-gate test (stranger 403, grantee passes), full suite **132 passed**.+- **Landed (domains/databases scoping + role reconciliation):** the two named remaining scoping slices, plus the reconciliation primitive that makes the per-workspace role *mean* something. **(1) Domains** — `get_domains` now scopes through the parent `Application` (domains carry no `workspace_id` of their own): it resolves the active workspace and lists the domains of the apps `scope_query` returns (own + granted, workspace-narrowed). With no workspace context this preserves prior behavior (admin → all domains, owner → own apps' domains) *and* now also surfaces **granted** apps' domains — closing a latent gap where the per-domain routes authorized via `can_access_app` but the list ignored grants. Since `Domain.application_id` is non-nullable, the admin-no-context path is byte-identical to the old `Domain.query.all()`. **(2) Databases** — only the **Docker-databases** enumeration (`/docker/databases`) is app-linked and therefore workspace-scopable; it now drives its app iteration through the same `scope_query` (replacing a manual `can_access_app` loop with the equivalent query-level filter + workspace narrowing). The **host-level MySQL/PostgreSQL/SQLite** endpoints are server-global system resources with no app/workspace linkage (and already admin-gated for mutation), so they're **intentionally left unscoped** — documented inline. **(3) Role reconciliation** — new `WorkspaceService.effective_role(user, workspace_id)` + `can_write_in_workspace`: reconcile the user's **global** `User.role` with their **per-workspace** `WorkspaceMember.role`, **narrow-only** (mirrors `scope_query`) — a workspace role can only *reduce* capability, never elevate. A system admin is never capped (no workspace lock-out); a workspace **viewer** caps a global developer to read-only *in that workspace*; any other membership leaves the global role intact. Enforced at the resource-stamping write seams (apps + servers `create` and `…/workspace` reassign): a workspace viewer gets a **403** creating/moving resources into that workspace — checked **only** when a workspace context is active, so no-context behavior is unchanged. The reconciled role is surfaced on `GET /workspaces` (`my_role` / `my_effective_role`) so the frontend can show read-only state. **No schema/migration** (pure query + capability logic on existing columns) and **no frontend change** (the WP hub/apps/domains/databases already fetch through the `X-Workspace-Id`-injecting client; the 403s surface via the existing toast). Verified: backend `py_compile`, **6 new pytest tests** (effective-role reconciliation incl. the never-elevate + admin-never-capped cases, viewer-blocked create + reassign, domains scoping incl. grant-visibility + admin-sees-all, docker-databases scoping, list-workspaces surfacing), full suite **193 passed / 12 skipped**. *(Still remaining for the dedicated milestone: server-side workspace-scoped **logo** swap, and the broad per-route write-enforcement of the viewer-cap beyond the create/reassign seams — an enforcement sweep across the mutating routes, the same XL surface as the rest of #33.)* Not runtime-exercised against the live frontend (backend + API-level tests only).### #34 — Horizontal scaling `[XL]` ❌ — ⏸️ Deferred (XL + blocked on the same per-site reverse-proxy/upstream layer as #21)- **Today:** `nginx_advanced_service` has load-balancing primitives (round-robin/least-conn/IP-hash) but WP containers are stateful (local uploads, no shared object cache).