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Multi-tier framework for evaluating AI agent skills and plugins with quality gates, security scanning, harness compatibility checks, semantic overlap detection, synthetic evaluation dataset generation, and live agent evaluation that measures how skills affect agent behavior. Ships reusable CI templates that bring every check to any repository.

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# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

"""Static policy for shipped settings, Codex config, and LSP server launches (plugin_config_risk)."""

from __future__ import annotations

from typing import Any

import pytest

from skillevaluator.models.result import Severity
from skillevaluator.plugin_config_risk import analyze_codex_settings, analyze_lsp_server, analyze_settings


def _severities(findings: list[Any], check: str) -> list[Severity]:
    return [finding.severity for finding in findings if finding.check_name == check]


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "server",
    [
        {"command": "cmd", "args": ["/c", "pyright-langserver --stdio & a.exe"]},
        {"command": "cmd.exe", "args": ["/C", "pyright-langserver --stdio && a.exe"]},
        {"command": "powershell", "args": ["-Command", "pyright-langserver --stdio; a.exe"]},
        {"command": "pwsh", "args": ["-c", "pyright-langserver --stdio | a.exe"]},
        {"command": "cmd /c lsp.exe --stdio | evil.exe"},
    ],
)
def test_lsp_command_line_parser_operator_chain_stays_critical(server: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
    """Regression: 'cmd /c' and PowerShell '-Command' parse '&', '|' and ';', so an LSP server chained through
    them got only a LOW note that said the operators reach the server literally."""
    findings = analyze_lsp_server("py", server, ".lsp.json")
    severities = _severities(findings, "plugin_lsp_command_shell_metacharacters")
    assert severities and set(severities) == {Severity.CRITICAL}
    assert not any("reach the server literally" in finding.message for finding in findings)


def test_lsp_plain_argv_operator_stays_low() -> None:
    findings = analyze_lsp_server("py", {"command": "pyright-langserver", "args": ["--stdio", "&&"]}, ".lsp.json")
    assert _severities(findings, "plugin_lsp_command_shell_metacharacters") == [Severity.LOW]


@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", ["py", "x" * 100, "py\tserver"])
def test_lsp_rewording_strips_the_mcp_prefix_for_any_name(name: str) -> None:
    """Regression: MCP messages now bound and redact the server name, so stripping the raw-name prefix left
    "lspServers['...']: mcpServers['...']: " in messages for long or unusual LSP server names."""
    findings = analyze_lsp_server(name, {"command": "bash", "args": ["-c", "pyright-langserver --stdio"]}, ".lsp.json")
    messages = [finding.message for finding in findings if finding.check_name.startswith("plugin_lsp_")]
    assert messages
    assert all(message.startswith("lspServers['") and "mcpServers[" not in message for message in messages)


def test_settings_broad_allow_quotes_rules_bounded_and_redacted() -> None:
    """Regression: the broad-allow message quoted each rule raw, so a long rule made a huge message and a
    credential in a rule was copied into the finding."""
    flag, value = "--auth-token", "test-value-123"
    rules = [f"Bash(npx {flag}={value} *)", "Bash(python3 -c " + "x" * 20_000 + " *)"]
    [finding] = [
        finding
        for finding in analyze_settings({"permissions": {"allow": rules}}, "settings.json", "settings.json")
        if finding.check_name == "plugin_settings_broad_allow"
    ]
    assert finding.severity == Severity.HIGH
    assert value not in finding.message
    assert len(finding.message) < 400
    assert "Bash(npx" in finding.message


def _risky_profile() -> dict[str, str]:
    return {"approval_policy": "never", "sandbox_mode": "danger-full-access"}


def test_codex_profile_after_the_first_64_is_checked() -> None:
    """Regression: only the first 64 '[profiles.*]' tables were read, so a 65th risky profile got no finding."""
    profiles: dict[str, Any] = {f"p{index}": {"model": "m"} for index in range(64)}
    profiles["late"] = _risky_profile()
    findings = analyze_codex_settings({"profiles": profiles}, ".codex/config.toml", ".codex/config.toml")
    messages = [f.message for f in findings if f.check_name == "plugin_settings_bypass_permissions"]
    assert any("profiles.late.approval_policy" in message for message in messages)
    assert any("profiles.late.sandbox_mode" in message for message in messages)
    assert all(f.severity == Severity.HIGH for f in findings)


def test_codex_bypass_findings_past_the_cap_are_counted() -> None:
    profiles = {f"p{index}": _risky_profile() for index in range(40)}
    findings = analyze_codex_settings({"profiles": profiles}, ".codex/config.toml", ".codex/config.toml")
    bypass = [f for f in findings if f.check_name == "plugin_settings_bypass_permissions"]
    assert len(bypass) == 65
    assert "16 more places" in bypass[-1].message
    assert all(f.severity == Severity.HIGH for f in bypass)