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fix(login): submit the logout form to the page-relative route only

Elian Dorand75998d3fa00
diff --git a/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.spec.ts b/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.spec.ts
index c4244b4c75..276a26a2ce 100644
--- a/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.spec.ts
@@ -43,58 +43,30 @@ describe("logoutCommand", () => {
window.glob = {
...window.glob,
baseApiUrl: "api/",
- csrfToken: "csrf-test-token",
- httpBaseUrl: undefined,
- isElectron: false
+ csrfToken: "csrf-test-token"
};
});
- it("submits a CSRF-protected browser navigation for OIDC redirects", async () => {
+ it("submits a CSRF-protected form navigation to the logout route", () => {
const submit = vi.spyOn(HTMLFormElement.prototype, "submit").mockImplementation(() => {});
- await entrypoints.logoutCommand();
+ entrypoints.logoutCommand();
const form = document.body.querySelector("form");
expect(form).not.toBeNull();
expect(form?.method).toBe("POST");
expect(form?.action).toBe("http://localhost:3000/logout");
- expect(
- form?.querySelector("input[name='x-csrf-token']")?.getAttribute("value")
- ).toBe("csrf-test-token");
+ expect(form?.querySelector("input[name='x-csrf-token']")?.getAttribute("value"))
+ .toBe("csrf-test-token");
expect(submit).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
- });
-
- it("selects the correct logout target for each runtime", async () => {
- const submit = vi.spyOn(HTMLFormElement.prototype, "submit").mockImplementation(() => {});
- const actions: string[] = [];
-
- window.glob.httpBaseUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:37742";
- await entrypoints.logoutCommand();
- actions.push(document.body.querySelector("form")?.action ?? "");
+ // The route resolves against the page like every other request, so a sub-path
+ // deployment keeps its prefix.
document.body.replaceChildren();
- const happyDOM = (window as unknown as {
- happyDOM: { setURL(url: string): void }
- }).happyDOM;
- happyDOM.setURL("trilium-app://app/");
- window.glob.isElectron = true;
- await entrypoints.logoutCommand();
- actions.push(document.body.querySelector("form")?.action ?? "");
-
- document.body.replaceChildren();
- window.glob.isElectron = false;
- window.glob.httpBaseUrl = undefined;
- happyDOM.setURL("http://localhost:3000/");
window.history.replaceState({}, "", "/trilium/");
- await entrypoints.logoutCommand();
- actions.push(document.body.querySelector("form")?.action ?? "");
- happyDOM.setURL("http://localhost:3000/");
-
- expect(actions).toEqual([
- "http://127.0.0.1:37742/logout",
- "trilium-app://app/logout",
- "http://localhost:3000/trilium/logout"
- ]);
- expect(submit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+ entrypoints.logoutCommand();
+ expect(document.body.querySelector("form")?.action)
+ .toBe("http://localhost:3000/trilium/logout");
+ window.history.replaceState({}, "", "/");
});
});
diff --git a/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.ts b/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.ts
index 8ce030a5e8..b5cfeee1ca 100644
--- a/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.ts
+++ b/apps/client/src/components/entrypoints.ts
@@ -99,19 +99,12 @@ export default class Entrypoints extends Component {
utils.reloadFrontendApp();
}
- async logoutCommand() {
- // A browser navigation avoids the cross-origin XHR preflight that OIDC providers reject.
- // Electron keeps the request on its trusted custom protocol.
+ logoutCommand() {
+ // A form submission keeps the OIDC provider's redirect a top-level navigation; an XHR
+ // follows it cross-origin and fails the provider's CORS preflight.
const form = document.createElement("form");
form.method = "POST";
- const httpBaseUrl = window.glob.httpBaseUrl;
- if (window.glob.isElectron) {
- form.action = String(new URL(`${window.glob.baseApiUrl}../logout`, window.location.href).href);
- } else if (httpBaseUrl) {
- form.action = String(new URL("/logout", httpBaseUrl).href);
- } else {
- form.action = String(new URL(`${window.glob.baseApiUrl}../logout`, window.location.href).href);
- }
+ form.action = `${window.glob.baseApiUrl}../logout`;
form.hidden = true;
const csrfToken = document.createElement("input");
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.spec.ts b/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.spec.ts
index 81cfd98c73..572a7537e3 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.spec.ts
@@ -579,17 +579,14 @@ describe("navigation guard", () => {
setupWebContentsSecurity(SECURITY_OPTIONS);
});
- it("allows the app shell root and the logout endpoint", () => {
+ it("only allows the app shell at its root path", () => {
expect(isNavigationAllowed("trilium-app://app/")).toBe(true);
// Root "/?" path is allowed.
expect(isNavigationAllowed("trilium-app://app/?")).toBe(true);
// The extra-window URL: root path with a query string and a hash.
expect(isNavigationAllowed("trilium-app://app/?extraWindow=1#root/abc")).toBe(true);
- // Logout is a form POST dispatched through the trusted custom protocol.
- expect(isNavigationAllowed("trilium-app://app/logout")).toBe(true);
-
- // Other app paths are blocked (in-page SPA routing / hostile).
+ // App shell but non-root path is blocked (in-page SPA routing / hostile).
expect(isNavigationAllowed("trilium-app://app/somewhere")).toBe(false);
// Our scheme but not the app host — only `trilium-app://app` is ever served.
expect(isNavigationAllowed("trilium-app://evil/")).toBe(false);
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.ts b/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.ts
index 74798f218f..2b22146e5f 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/services/web_contents_security.ts
@@ -213,7 +213,9 @@ export function isPermissionAllowedForOrigin(kind: SessionKind, permission: stri
* meta refresh) can proceed, and which `window.open` URLs become extra
* windows. Only the app shell itself is allowed: the `trilium-app://app`
* origin (the sole host ever served — see the loadURL call sites), and only
- * at the root path or the renderer's logout endpoint.
+ * at the root path; the query string (`?extraWindow=1`) and the hash are not
+ * part of the check. Anything deeper is in-page SPA routing (which
+ * `will-navigate` does not fire for) or hostile.
*
* `localhost` was previously allowed too, from the era when the desktop
* renderer was served over `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`. The custom-protocol
@@ -225,9 +227,7 @@ export function isNavigationAllowed(targetUrl: string): boolean {
const parsedUrl = url.parse(targetUrl);
const isAppShell = parsedUrl.protocol === `${TRILIUM_APP_SCHEME}:` && parsedUrl.hostname === TRILIUM_APP_HOST;
- return isAppShell && (!parsedUrl.pathname
- || parsedUrl.pathname === "/"
- || parsedUrl.pathname === "/logout");
+ return isAppShell && (!parsedUrl.pathname || parsedUrl.pathname === "/");
}
/**