"Vibe-Trading: Your Personal Trading Agent"
Python ai-agentalgorithmic-tradingbacktestingfintechllmmcpmulti-agentpythonquantitative-financetrading
"""HTTP guards for the scheduled-runs routes (scheduler unification).
Extracted from ``scheduled_routes.py`` so the system-job mutation rules and
the authorable-job-id rule live in one module instead of growing the routes
file (which is already over the repo's 800-line hard cap). Each guard raises
the ``HTTPException`` the route would have raised; the routes stay thin
one-line calls. The domain predicates and the shared id grammar come from
:mod:`src.scheduling.system_jobs` — this module adds only the HTTP mapping.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException
from src.scheduling.system_jobs import JOB_ID_RULE_MESSAGE, is_safe_job_id, is_system_job_id
def ensure_authorable_job_id(job_id: Optional[str]) -> None:
"""Reject a caller-supplied job id the address-based routes could not serve.
A job whose id the delete/patch routes would refuse (anything outside
:data:`~src.scheduling.system_jobs.SAFE_JOB_ID_RE`, including every
``system:``-prefixed id) can never be cancelled or edited through the
API, so the id is held to that same rule at creation rather than at
first attempted delete. ``None`` (no explicit id) is accepted.
Raises:
HTTPException: 422 when *job_id* is present and not authorable.
"""
if job_id is not None and not is_safe_job_id(job_id):
raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail=JOB_ID_RULE_MESSAGE)
def guard_system_job_mutation(job_id: str, source_type: str) -> None:
"""Refuse to modify a protected system job.
Defense in depth for non-REST callers (CLI, internal services, future
entry points). UNREACHABLE via REST: every system job id carries ':'
(SYSTEM_JOB_ID_PREFIX), which the host path-parameter validation rejects
with a 400 before the store is even read — the REST-visible behavior for
a system job is that 400, not this 403.
Raises:
HTTPException: 403 when the row is a system job by id or source.
"""
if is_system_job_id(job_id) or source_type == "system":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="system jobs cannot be modified")
def guard_system_job_deletion(job_id: str) -> None:
"""Refuse to delete a protected system job.
Defense in depth, same contract as :func:`guard_system_job_mutation`:
via REST the ':' in every system id already fails path-parameter
validation with a 400 before this guard runs.
Raises:
HTTPException: 403 when *job_id* is a system job id.
"""
if is_system_job_id(job_id):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="system jobs cannot be deleted")