"Vibe-Trading: Your Personal Trading Agent"
Python ai-agentalgorithmic-tradingbacktestingfintechllmmcpmulti-agentpythonquantitative-financetrading
fix(redaction): redact Basic Authorization credentials
tbed8e98d0985
diff --git a/agent/src/tools/redaction.py b/agent/src/tools/redaction.pyindex a595de155..5afdf7746 100644--- a/agent/src/tools/redaction.py+++ b/agent/src/tools/redaction.py@@ -427,7 +427,8 @@ _TEXT_VALUE = r"\"[^\"\n]*\"|'[^'\n]*'|[^\s,;{}\[\]()\"']+"#: backreference. The negative lookahead keeps the substitution idempotent (an#: already-redacted value is skipped) and defers ``Bearer <jwt>`` to#: :data:`_TEXT_BEARER_PATTERN`, which would otherwise be consumed as the value-#: and leave the token body visible.+#: and leave the token body visible, and skips a scheme word that+#: :data:`_TEXT_AUTH_SCHEME_PATTERN` already followed with the sentinel.#:#: Every quantifier applies to a bounded character class, with no nesting and#: no overlapping alternatives, so matching stays linear (no ReDoS surface).@@ -441,7 +442,9 @@ _TEXT_KV_PATTERN = re.compile(r"(?:\b|(?<=(?-i:[A-Z0-9])_)|(?<=aws_))"r"(?P<name>" + _TEXT_CREDENTIAL_KEYS + r")\b(?P=q)"r"(?P<sep>\s*[:=]\s*)"- r"(?![\"']?" + re.escape(_REDACTED) + r"[\"']?|bearer\b)"+ r"(?![\"']?" + re.escape(_REDACTED) + r"[\"']?"+ r"|(?:bearer|basic|digest|token|negotiate|ntlm)\s+" + re.escape(_REDACTED) ++ r"|bearer\b)"r"(?P<value>" + _TEXT_VALUE + r")",re.IGNORECASE,)@@ -454,6 +457,18 @@ _TEXT_BEARER_PATTERN = re.compile(re.IGNORECASE,)+#: ``Authorization: Basic <base64>`` and the other non-bearer schemes. The value+#: is ``user:password`` in base64, which the key pattern cannot see: it would+#: redact only the scheme word and leave the credential after it. Matched only+#: directly after an ``authorization`` label, so prose such as "basic+#: information" is untouched. Applied before :data:`_TEXT_KV_PATTERN`.+_TEXT_AUTH_SCHEME_PATTERN = re.compile(+ r"(?P<head>\bauthorization[\"']?\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?)"+ r"(?P<scheme>basic|digest|token|negotiate|ntlm)\s+"+ r"[^\s\"',;{}]+",+ re.IGNORECASE,+)+#: URL userinfo (``scheme://user:password@host``). It is a credential with no#: key label, so the key-based pattern never reaches it. A password may contain#: ``@``, so the match runs to the last ``@`` before a delimiter (whitespace,@@ -511,7 +526,7 @@ def redact_text(text: object) -> str:Used for plain-text tool results, shell output, error messages and loglines where :func:`redact_payload` is a no-op (it only walks structured- keys). Bearer header values and ``key=value`` / ``key: value`` /+ keys). Bearer and Basic header values and ``key=value`` / ``key: value`` /``"key": "value"`` credential pairs are replaced with ``'[redacted]'``,and URL userinfo (``scheme://user:password@host``) becomes``scheme://[redacted]@host``, while the surrounding text — labels, paths,@@ -532,6 +547,7 @@ def redact_text(text: object) -> str:if not s:return ss = _TEXT_BEARER_PATTERN.sub(r"\g<scheme> " + _REDACTED, s)+ s = _TEXT_AUTH_SCHEME_PATTERN.sub(r"\g<head>\g<scheme> " + _REDACTED, s)s = _TEXT_URL_USERINFO_PATTERN.sub(_REDACTED + "@", s)s = _TEXT_KV_PATTERN.sub(_sub_credential_pair, s)# Bare tokens with no key label in front of them.diff --git a/agent/tests/test_redaction.py b/agent/tests/test_redaction.pyindex 00d0fe9ec..1a6daf9d1 100644--- a/agent/tests/test_redaction.py+++ b/agent/tests/test_redaction.py@@ -150,6 +150,16 @@ _CREDENTIAL_SHAPES = (("authorization=raw-token-value", "authorization=[redacted]"),("Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOi.J9-_x==", "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]"),("bearer abc123", "bearer [redacted]"),+ # Basic and other non-bearer schemes: the base64 credential follows the+ # scheme word, so the pair is redacted together, not just the word.+ ("Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz", "Authorization: Basic [redacted]"),+ (+ "Proxy-Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz",+ "Proxy-Authorization: Basic [redacted]",+ ),+ ("authorization=Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz", "authorization=Basic [redacted]"),+ ("Authorization: token ghp_example", "Authorization: token [redacted]"),+ ('{"Authorization": "Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz"}', '{"Authorization": "[redacted]"}'),# Env-style names: the label is a suffix of a longer identifier, so the# leading word boundary used to reject it (``_`` is a word character).("TUSHARE_TOKEN=abc123", "TUSHARE_TOKEN=[redacted]"),@@ -233,6 +243,9 @@ def test_redact_text_is_idempotent(raw: str) -> None:'{"url":"https://api.x.com","email":"[email protected]"}',# A short SSH username is not a credential; keep it readable."git+ssh://[email protected]/org/repo.git",+ # ``basic`` and ``authorization`` alone are prose, not a credential.+ "Show basic information for the backtest",+ "authorization server returned 200 OK",],)def test_redact_text_leaves_benign_output_readable(raw: str) -> None:@@ -251,3 +264,11 @@ def test_redact_text_none_and_empty_and_nonstr_safe() -> None:assert redact_text(None) == ""assert redact_text("") == ""assert redact_text(42) == "42"+++def test_redact_tool_result_scrubs_basic_authorization_in_stdout() -> None:+ """A Basic credential in a JSON result's free-text field must not survive."""+ raw = '{"stdout": "curl -H \'Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz\' https://x"}'+ out = red_mod.redact_tool_result(raw)+ assert "dXNlcjpwYXNz" not in out+ assert "Authorization: Basic [redacted]" in out