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test(channels): cover is_path_within against prefix and symlink escapes

Lanre Shittuf717ec3ecd97
diff --git a/agent/tests/test_channel_utils_is_path_within.py b/agent/tests/test_channel_utils_is_path_within.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ea36d4ae3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/agent/tests/test_channel_utils_is_path_within.py
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Coverage for is_path_within, the containment check that gates workspace-
+restricted file access (e.g. Matrix's outbound attachment upload). It had no
+direct or indirect test anywhere in the suite before this file.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from src.channels.utils import is_path_within
+
+
+class TestIsPathWithin:
+ def test_nested_file_is_within_root(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ nested = root / "sub" / "file.txt"
+ nested.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+ nested.write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
+
+ assert is_path_within(nested, root) is True
+
+ def test_root_itself_is_within_root(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ root.mkdir()
+
+ assert is_path_within(root, root) is True
+
+ def test_sibling_directory_with_matching_prefix_is_not_within_root(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ """A naive string-prefix check would wrongly accept this; relative_to must not."""
+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ root.mkdir()
+ sibling_file = tmp_path / "workspace-evil" / "file.txt"
+ sibling_file.parent.mkdir()
+ sibling_file.write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
+
+ assert is_path_within(sibling_file, root) is False
+
+ def test_traversal_that_escapes_root_is_rejected(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ (root / "sub").mkdir(parents=True)
+ escaped = root / "sub" / ".." / ".." / "outside.txt"
+
+ assert is_path_within(escaped, root) is False
+
+ def test_traversal_that_stays_inside_root_is_accepted(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ (root / "a").mkdir(parents=True)
+ (root / "b").mkdir()
+ (root / "b" / "file.txt").write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
+ wandering = root / "a" / ".." / "b" / "file.txt"
+
+ assert is_path_within(wandering, root) is True
+
+ def test_symlink_pointing_outside_root_is_rejected(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ """resolve() follows the symlink before the containment check, so a
+ link inside the workspace that targets something outside it must
+ not be treated as contained.
+ """
+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ root.mkdir()
+ outside = tmp_path / "outside"
+ outside.mkdir()
+ (outside / "secret.txt").write_text("secret", encoding="utf-8")
+ link = root / "link"
+ link.symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)
+
+ assert is_path_within(link / "secret.txt", root) is False