"Vibe-Trading: Your Personal Trading Agent"
Python ai-agentalgorithmic-tradingbacktestingfintechllmmcpmulti-agentpythonquantitative-financetrading
test(channels): cover is_path_within against prefix and symlink escapes
Lanre Shittuf717ec3ecd97
diff --git a/agent/tests/test_channel_utils_is_path_within.py b/agent/tests/test_channel_utils_is_path_within.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..ea36d4ae3--- /dev/null+++ b/agent/tests/test_channel_utils_is_path_within.py@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@+"""Coverage for is_path_within, the containment check that gates workspace-+restricted file access (e.g. Matrix's outbound attachment upload). It had no+direct or indirect test anywhere in the suite before this file.+"""++from __future__ import annotations++from pathlib import Path++from src.channels.utils import is_path_within+++class TestIsPathWithin:+ def test_nested_file_is_within_root(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"+ nested = root / "sub" / "file.txt"+ nested.parent.mkdir(parents=True)+ nested.write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")++ assert is_path_within(nested, root) is True++ def test_root_itself_is_within_root(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"+ root.mkdir()++ assert is_path_within(root, root) is True++ def test_sibling_directory_with_matching_prefix_is_not_within_root(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """A naive string-prefix check would wrongly accept this; relative_to must not."""+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"+ root.mkdir()+ sibling_file = tmp_path / "workspace-evil" / "file.txt"+ sibling_file.parent.mkdir()+ sibling_file.write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")++ assert is_path_within(sibling_file, root) is False++ def test_traversal_that_escapes_root_is_rejected(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"+ (root / "sub").mkdir(parents=True)+ escaped = root / "sub" / ".." / ".." / "outside.txt"++ assert is_path_within(escaped, root) is False++ def test_traversal_that_stays_inside_root_is_accepted(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"+ (root / "a").mkdir(parents=True)+ (root / "b").mkdir()+ (root / "b" / "file.txt").write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")+ wandering = root / "a" / ".." / "b" / "file.txt"++ assert is_path_within(wandering, root) is True++ def test_symlink_pointing_outside_root_is_rejected(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:+ """resolve() follows the symlink before the containment check, so a+ link inside the workspace that targets something outside it must+ not be treated as contained.+ """+ root = tmp_path / "workspace"+ root.mkdir()+ outside = tmp_path / "outside"+ outside.mkdir()+ (outside / "secret.txt").write_text("secret", encoding="utf-8")+ link = root / "link"+ link.symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)++ assert is_path_within(link / "secret.txt", root) is False