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fix(security): rate limit totp verification

Miguel Ribeiro44e3b62a2e4a
diff --git a/endpoints/db/backup.php b/endpoints/db/backup.php
index 34e94e7..257d0fb 100644
--- a/endpoints/db/backup.php
+++ b/endpoints/db/backup.php
@@ -32,11 +32,23 @@ function addFolderToZip($dir, $zipArchive, $zipdir = '')
}
}
-$zip = new ZipArchive();
-$filename = "backup_" . uniqid() . ".zip";
-$zipname = "../../.tmp/" . $filename;
+// Build the archive OUTSIDE the web root. Previously it was written to
+// ../../.tmp/ with a uniqid()-based name and served statically by nginx, which
+// let anyone who could guess the (timestamp-derived, low-entropy) filename
+// download the full database unauthenticated. The backup is now streamed
+// directly to the authenticated admin below and never persists in a
+// web-accessible location.
+$zipname = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'wallos_backup_');
+if ($zipname === false) {
+ die(json_encode([
+ "success" => false,
+ "message" => translate('cannot_open_zip', $i18n)
+ ]));
+}
-if ($zip->open($zipname, ZipArchive::CREATE) !== TRUE) {
+$zip = new ZipArchive();
+if ($zip->open($zipname, ZipArchive::CREATE | ZipArchive::OVERWRITE) !== TRUE) {
+ @unlink($zipname);
die(json_encode([
"success" => false,
"message" => translate('cannot_open_zip', $i18n)
@@ -46,19 +58,30 @@ if ($zip->open($zipname, ZipArchive::CREATE) !== TRUE) {
addFolderToZip('../../db/', $zip);
addFolderToZip('../../images/uploads/', $zip);
-$numberOfFilesAdded = $zip->numFiles;
-
if ($zip->close() === false) {
+ @unlink($zipname);
die(json_encode([
"success" => false,
"message" => "Failed to finalize the zip file"
]));
-} else {
- flush();
- die(json_encode([
- "success" => true,
- "message" => "Zip file created successfully",
- "numFiles" => $numberOfFilesAdded,
- "file" => $filename
- ]));
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
+
+// Discard any buffered output (e.g. a stray newline from an included file)
+// so it cannot corrupt the binary archive that follows.
+while (ob_get_level() > 0) {
+ ob_end_clean();
+}
+
+// ZipArchive wrote through its own handle after tempnam() created the file at
+// 0 bytes, so clear the stat cache before reading its size for Content-Length.
+clearstatcache(true, $zipname);
+
+$downloadName = 'Wallos-Backup-' . date('Ymd-His') . '.zip';
+header('Content-Type: application/zip');
+header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $downloadName . '"');
+header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($zipname));
+header('Cache-Control: no-store');
+
+readfile($zipname);
+unlink($zipname);
+exit;
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/endpoints/db/import.php b/endpoints/db/import.php
index 85c6176..d7b3192 100644
--- a/endpoints/db/import.php
+++ b/endpoints/db/import.php
@@ -44,6 +44,39 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$zip = new ZipArchive();
if ($zip->open($fileDestination) === true) {
+ // Validate every entry before extracting. ZipArchive::extractTo()
+ // offers no protection against path traversal (Zip Slip), and the
+ // extraction target sits under the web root, so a crafted archive
+ // could otherwise drop an executable script here (RCE).
+ // Extensions the web server may execute if extracted into a
+ // servable path. .tmp/ is denied at the nginx layer as the primary
+ // control; this is defense in depth for other deployments (Apache).
+ $blockedExtensions = [
+ 'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'php7', 'php8', 'phtml', 'pht',
+ 'phps', 'phar', 'shtml', 'cgi', 'pl', 'py', 'sh',
+ 'htaccess', 'htpasswd'
+ ];
+ for ($i = 0; $i < $zip->numFiles; $i++) {
+ $entry = str_replace('\\', '/', $zip->getNameIndex($i));
+
+ if ($entry === '' || $entry[0] === '/' || in_array('..', explode('/', $entry), true)) {
+ $zip->close();
+ emptyRestoreFolder();
+ die(json_encode([
+ "success" => false,
+ "message" => "Invalid backup file: unsafe file path detected."
+ ]));
+ }
+
+ if (in_array(strtolower(pathinfo($entry, PATHINFO_EXTENSION)), $blockedExtensions, true)) {
+ $zip->close();
+ emptyRestoreFolder();
+ die(json_encode([
+ "success" => false,
+ "message" => "Invalid backup file: disallowed file type detected."
+ ]));
+ }
+ }
$zip->extractTo('../../.tmp/restore/');
$zip->close();
} else {
diff --git a/endpoints/db/restore.php b/endpoints/db/restore.php
index f423927..534c901 100644
--- a/endpoints/db/restore.php
+++ b/endpoints/db/restore.php
@@ -27,10 +27,20 @@ if (isset($_FILES['file'])) {
$zip = new ZipArchive();
if ($zip->open($fileDestination) === true) {
// Validate all entries before extracting — ZipArchive::extractTo() does not
- // guarantee protection against path traversal (Zip Slip).
+ // guarantee protection against path traversal (Zip Slip), and the extraction
+ // target sits under the web root, so a crafted archive could otherwise drop
+ // an executable script here (RCE).
+ // Extensions the web server may execute if extracted into a servable path.
+ // .tmp/ is denied at the nginx layer as the primary control; this is defense
+ // in depth for other deployments (Apache).
+ $blockedExtensions = [
+ 'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'php7', 'php8', 'phtml', 'pht',
+ 'phps', 'phar', 'shtml', 'cgi', 'pl', 'py', 'sh',
+ 'htaccess', 'htpasswd'
+ ];
for ($i = 0; $i < $zip->numFiles; $i++) {
$entry = str_replace('\\', '/', $zip->getNameIndex($i));
- if ($entry[0] === '/' || in_array('..', explode('/', $entry), true)) {
+ if ($entry === '' || $entry[0] === '/' || in_array('..', explode('/', $entry), true)) {
$zip->close();
emptyRestoreFolder();
die(json_encode([
@@ -38,6 +48,14 @@ if (isset($_FILES['file'])) {
"message" => "Invalid backup file: unsafe file path detected."
]));
}
+ if (in_array(strtolower(pathinfo($entry, PATHINFO_EXTENSION)), $blockedExtensions, true)) {
+ $zip->close();
+ emptyRestoreFolder();
+ die(json_encode([
+ "success" => false,
+ "message" => "Invalid backup file: disallowed file type detected."
+ ]));
+ }
}
$zip->extractTo('../../.tmp/restore/');
$zip->close();
diff --git a/endpoints/user/enable_totp.php b/endpoints/user/enable_totp.php
index c306003..761dbfa 100644
--- a/endpoints/user/enable_totp.php
+++ b/endpoints/user/enable_totp.php
@@ -103,7 +103,10 @@ if ($action === 'verify') {
$stmt->bindValue(':user_id', $userId, SQLITE3_INTEGER);
$stmt->bindValue(':totp_secret', $secret, SQLITE3_TEXT);
$stmt->bindValue(':backup_codes', json_encode($backupCodes), SQLITE3_TEXT);
- $stmt->bindValue(':last_totp_used', time(), SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ // Store the current TOTP time-step (not a raw timestamp): the code
+ // just verified above counts as used, so it cannot be replayed as the
+ // first login code. totp.php compares against this same step counter.
+ $stmt->bindValue(':last_totp_used', intdiv(time(), 30), SQLITE3_INTEGER);
$stmt->execute();
// Update user totp_enabled
diff --git a/includes/i18n/en.php b/includes/i18n/en.php
index ab3c669..1d48f9c 100644
--- a/includes/i18n/en.php
+++ b/includes/i18n/en.php
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ $i18n = [
"enable_two_factor_authentication" => "Enable Two Factor Authentication",
"2fa_already_enabled" => "Two Factor Authentication is already enabled",
"totp_code_incorrect" => "TOTP code is incorrect",
+ "totp_too_many_attempts" => "Too many failed attempts. Please wait a moment and try again.",
"backup_codes" => "Backup Codes",
"download_backup_codes" => "Download Backup Codes",
"copy_to_clipboard" => "Copy to clipboard",
diff --git a/includes/ssrf_helper.php b/includes/ssrf_helper.php
index cdf4821..77deff3 100644
--- a/includes/ssrf_helper.php
+++ b/includes/ssrf_helper.php
@@ -63,6 +63,80 @@ function is_cgnat_ip($ip) {
&& $long <= ip2long('100.127.255.255');
}
+/**
+ * Extracts the embedded IPv4 address from an IPv6 transition/mapping form.
+ * Covers IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96), NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16)
+ * and Teredo (2001:0000::/32). Returns a dotted-quad string, or null when the
+ * address is not one of these forms.
+ */
+function wallos_extract_embedded_ipv4($ip) {
+ $packed = @inet_pton($ip);
+ if ($packed === false || strlen($packed) !== 16) {
+ return null;
+ }
+ $b = unpack('C16', $packed); // 1-indexed bytes $b[1]..$b[16]
+
+ // IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0:0/96 (high 80 bits zero, then 0xffff)
+ $high80Zero = true;
+ for ($i = 1; $i <= 10; $i++) {
+ if ($b[$i] !== 0) {
+ $high80Zero = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ($high80Zero && $b[11] === 0xff && $b[12] === 0xff) {
+ return "{$b[13]}.{$b[14]}.{$b[15]}.{$b[16]}";
+ }
+
+ // NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 — embedded IPv4 in the last 32 bits
+ if ($b[1] === 0x00 && $b[2] === 0x64 && $b[3] === 0xff && $b[4] === 0x9b) {
+ return "{$b[13]}.{$b[14]}.{$b[15]}.{$b[16]}";
+ }
+
+ // 6to4 2002::/16 — embedded IPv4 in bytes 3-6
+ if ($b[1] === 0x20 && $b[2] === 0x02) {
+ return "{$b[3]}.{$b[4]}.{$b[5]}.{$b[6]}";
+ }
+
+ // Teredo 2001:0000::/32 — client IPv4 in the last 32 bits, bitwise-inverted
+ if ($b[1] === 0x20 && $b[2] === 0x01 && $b[3] === 0x00 && $b[4] === 0x00) {
+ $o1 = ~$b[13] & 0xff;
+ $o2 = ~$b[14] & 0xff;
+ $o3 = ~$b[15] & 0xff;
+ $o4 = ~$b[16] & 0xff;
+ return "{$o1}.{$o2}.{$o3}.{$o4}";
+ }
+
+ return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Determines whether an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) must be treated as
+ * private/reserved for SSRF purposes.
+ *
+ * Extends PHP's filter_var — which does not flag IPv6 transition ranges — by
+ * also rejecting NAT64/6to4/Teredo/IPv4-mapped forms. Those can encode an
+ * internal IPv4 destination (e.g. the cloud metadata address) and otherwise
+ * pass the guard. Any such transition form is treated as unsafe by default; a
+ * legitimate destination has no reason to be reached through a transition
+ * relay, and admins can still permit specific hosts via the allowlist.
+ */
+function wallos_ip_is_private_or_reserved($ip) {
+ if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false
+ || is_cgnat_ip($ip)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ // filter_var (above) misses IPv6 transition prefixes; catch them here.
+ // wallos_extract_embedded_ipv4() returns null for plain IPv4 and for
+ // ordinary public IPv6, so only transition forms are blocked here.
+ if (wallos_extract_embedded_ipv4($ip) !== null) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* Validates a webhook URL against SSRF attacks and checks the admin allowlist.
* If validation fails, it kills the script and outputs a JSON error response.
@@ -98,7 +172,7 @@ function validate_webhook_url_for_ssrf($url, $db, $i18n, $userId = null) {
$ipWithPort = $port ? $ip . ':' . $port : $ip;
// Check if it's a private IP
- $is_private = filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false || is_cgnat_ip($ip);
+ $is_private = wallos_ip_is_private_or_reserved($ip);
if ($is_private) {
if ($userId != 1) {
@@ -148,8 +222,7 @@ function validate_smtp_host($host, $port, $db) {
// DNS failure — gethostbyname returns the input unchanged on failure
if ($ip === $host && filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) === false) return false;
- $is_private = filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false
- || is_cgnat_ip($ip);
+ $is_private = wallos_ip_is_private_or_reserved($ip);
if ($is_private) {
$allowlist = wallos_get_effective_ssrf_allowlist($db)['allowlist'];
@@ -195,8 +268,7 @@ function validate_oidc_endpoint_url($url, $db) {
$targetPort = $port ?: ($scheme === 'https' ? 443 : 80);
- $is_private = filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false
- || is_cgnat_ip($ip);
+ $is_private = wallos_ip_is_private_or_reserved($ip);
if ($is_private) {
$allowlist = wallos_get_effective_ssrf_allowlist($db)['allowlist'];
@@ -248,8 +320,7 @@ function is_url_safe_for_ssrf($url, $db, $userId = null) {
$hostWithPort = $port ? $urlHost . ':' . $port : $urlHost;
$ipWithPort = $port ? $ip . ':' . $port : $ip;
- $is_private = filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false
- || is_cgnat_ip($ip);
+ $is_private = wallos_ip_is_private_or_reserved($ip);
if ($is_private) {
if ($userId != 1) {
diff --git a/migrations/000054.php b/migrations/000054.php
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa910a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/migrations/000054.php
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<?php
+
+// This migration adds brute-force protection state to the "totp" table.
+// It adds a "failed_attempts" column (consecutive failed 2FA verifications)
+// and a "lockout_until" column (unix timestamp until which verification is
+// blocked). Both are keyed per account so the lockout survives session resets.
+
+$failedAttemptsColumn = $db->query("SELECT * FROM pragma_table_info('totp') WHERE name='failed_attempts'");
+if ($failedAttemptsColumn->fetchArray(SQLITE3_ASSOC) === false) {
+ $db->exec('ALTER TABLE totp ADD COLUMN failed_attempts INTEGER DEFAULT 0');
+}
+
+$lockoutUntilColumn = $db->query("SELECT * FROM pragma_table_info('totp') WHERE name='lockout_until'");
+if ($lockoutUntilColumn->fetchArray(SQLITE3_ASSOC) === false) {
+ $db->exec('ALTER TABLE totp ADD COLUMN lockout_until INTEGER DEFAULT 0');
+}
+
+$db->exec('UPDATE totp SET failed_attempts = 0 WHERE failed_attempts IS NULL');
+$db->exec('UPDATE totp SET lockout_until = 0 WHERE lockout_until IS NULL');
+
+?>
diff --git a/nginx.conf b/nginx.conf
index e2bb6a1..b73123f 100644
--- a/nginx.conf
+++ b/nginx.conf
@@ -30,14 +30,9 @@ http {
index index.php;
}
- location ~ \.php$ {
- root /var/www/html;
- fastcgi_pass 127.0.0.1:9000;
- fastcgi_index index.php;
- fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME $document_root$fastcgi_script_name;
- include fastcgi_params;
- }
-
+ # Deny rules must precede the generic \.php$ handler below. nginx evaluates
+ # regex locations in order and uses the first match, so these have to come
+ # first — otherwise \.php$ matches and executes PHP under .tmp/, logos/, etc.
location ~ \.db$ {
deny all;
return 403;
@@ -48,7 +43,10 @@ http {
return 403;
}
- location ~* \.tmp/.*\.php$ {
+ # Block all direct access to the temp working directory. Nothing there is
+ # ever meant to be served (backups, restore staging, etc.). The prefix
+ # match outranks the \.php$ regex below, so extracted PHP is unreachable.
+ location ^~ /.tmp/ {
deny all;
return 403;
}
@@ -57,6 +55,14 @@ http {
deny all;
return 403;
}
+
+ location ~ \.php$ {
+ root /var/www/html;
+ fastcgi_pass 127.0.0.1:9000;
+ fastcgi_index index.php;
+ fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME $document_root$fastcgi_script_name;
+ include fastcgi_params;
+ }
}
include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
diff --git a/nginx.default.conf b/nginx.default.conf
index 8ea5d0c..7f7e063 100644
--- a/nginx.default.conf
+++ b/nginx.default.conf
@@ -8,6 +8,32 @@ server {
try_files $uri $uri/ /index.php?$args;
}
+ # Deny rules must precede the generic \.php$ handler below. nginx evaluates
+ # regex locations in order and uses the first match, so these have to come
+ # first — otherwise \.php$ matches and executes PHP under .tmp/, logos/, etc.
+ location ~ \.db$ {
+ deny all;
+ return 403;
+ }
+
+ location ~* images/uploads/logos/.*\.php$ {
+ deny all;
+ return 403;
+ }
+
+ # Block all direct access to the temp working directory. Nothing there is
+ # ever meant to be served (backups, restore staging, etc.). The prefix
+ # match outranks the \.php$ regex below, so extracted PHP is unreachable.
+ location ^~ /.tmp/ {
+ deny all;
+ return 403;
+ }
+
+ location ~* ^/includes/.*\.php$ {
+ deny all;
+ return 403;
+ }
+
location ~ \.php$ {
include fastcgi_params;
fastcgi_pass unix:/var/run/php-fpm.sock; # Adjust the path if necessary
diff --git a/scripts/admin.js b/scripts/admin.js
index 60803aa..3acf873 100644
--- a/scripts/admin.js
+++ b/scripts/admin.js
@@ -102,28 +102,33 @@ function backupDB() {
"X-CSRF-Token": window.csrfToken,
},
})
- .then(response => response.json())
- .then(data => {
- if (data.success) {
- const link = document.createElement("a");
- const filename = data.file;
- link.href = ".tmp/" + filename;
-
- const date = new Date();
- const year = date.getFullYear();
- const month = String(date.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0");
- const day = String(date.getDate()).padStart(2, "0");
- const hours = String(date.getHours()).padStart(2, "0");
- const minutes = String(date.getMinutes()).padStart(2, "0");
- const timestamp = `${year}${month}${day}-${hours}${minutes}`;
- link.download = `Wallos-Backup-${timestamp}.zip`;
-
- document.body.appendChild(link);
- link.click();
- document.body.removeChild(link);
- } else {
+ .then(async response => {
+ const contentType = response.headers.get("content-type") || "";
+ // Success streams the zip; any failure returns a JSON error body.
+ if (!response.ok || !contentType.includes("application/zip")) {
+ const data = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
showErrorMessage(data.message || translate("backup_failed"));
+ return;
}
+
+ const blob = await response.blob();
+ const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+ const link = document.createElement("a");
+ link.href = url;
+
+ const date = new Date();
+ const year = date.getFullYear();
+ const month = String(date.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0");
+ const day = String(date.getDate()).padStart(2, "0");
+ const hours = String(date.getHours()).padStart(2, "0");
+ const minutes = String(date.getMinutes()).padStart(2, "0");
+ const timestamp = `${year}${month}${day}-${hours}${minutes}`;
+ link.download = `Wallos-Backup-${timestamp}.zip`;
+
+ document.body.appendChild(link);
+ link.click();
+ document.body.removeChild(link);
+ URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
})
.catch(error => {
console.error(error);
diff --git a/totp.php b/totp.php
index a9d0895..f2f638e 100644
--- a/totp.php
+++ b/totp.php
@@ -44,16 +44,37 @@ $demoMode = getenv('DEMO_MODE');
$cookieExpire = time() + (30 * 24 * 60 * 60);
$invalidTotp = false;
+$totpLocked = false;
if (isset($_POST['one-time-code'])) {
$totp_code = $_POST['one-time-code'];
- $statement = $db->prepare('SELECT totp_secret, backup_codes FROM totp WHERE user_id = :id');
+ // Brute-force protection: after too many consecutive failed verifications,
+ // lock the account for a short period. State is persisted per account (not
+ // per session) so it cannot be reset by re-doing the password step.
+ $maxTotpAttempts = 5;
+ $totpLockoutSeconds = 30;
+
+ $statement = $db->prepare('SELECT totp_secret, backup_codes, failed_attempts, lockout_until FROM totp WHERE user_id = :id');
$statement->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
$result = $statement->execute();
$row = $result->fetchArray(SQLITE3_ASSOC);
$totp_secret = $row['totp_secret'];
$backupCodes = json_decode($row['backup_codes'], true);
+ $failedAttempts = (int) ($row['failed_attempts'] ?? 0);
+ $lockoutUntil = (int) ($row['lockout_until'] ?? 0);
+
+ $totpLocked = $lockoutUntil > time();
+
+ // Interpret last_totp_used as a TOTP time-step counter (used to reject reuse
+ // of an already-consumed code). Legacy installs stored a raw unix timestamp
+ // here, which is far larger than any current step, so normalise those by
+ // dividing by the period.
+ $currentStep = intdiv(time(), 30);
+ $lastUsedStep = (int) ($row['last_totp_used'] ?? 0);
+ if ($lastUsedStep > $currentStep) {
+ $lastUsedStep = intdiv($lastUsedStep, 30);
+ }
require_once 'libs/OTPHP/FactoryInterface.php';
require_once 'libs/OTPHP/Factory.php';
@@ -68,33 +89,88 @@ if (isset($_POST['one-time-code'])) {
require_once 'libs/constant_time_encoding/EncoderInterface.php';
require_once 'libs/constant_time_encoding/Base32.php';
- $clock = new OTPHP\InternalClock();
+ $valid = false;
+
+ if ($totpLocked) {
+ // Account is temporarily locked out; do not evaluate the submitted code.
+ $invalidTotp = true;
+ } else {
+ $clock = new OTPHP\InternalClock();
+
+ $totp = OTPHP\TOTP::createFromSecret($totp_secret, $clock);
+ $totp->setPeriod(30);
+
+ // Verify the code ourselves so we know which time-step matched. The
+ // library's verify() only returns a boolean, but we need the step to
+ // reject reuse of an already-consumed code (replay). This mirrors the
+ // library's leeway logic: check the previous, current and next step.
+ $totpPeriod = 30;
+ $totpLeeway = 15;
+ $now = time();
+ $matchedStep = null;
+ foreach ([$now - $totpLeeway, $now, $now + $totpLeeway] as $candidate) {
+ if ($candidate < 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (hash_equals($totp->at($candidate), (string) $totp_code)) {
+ $matchedStep = intdiv($candidate, $totpPeriod);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
- $totp = OTPHP\TOTP::createFromSecret($totp_secret, $clock);
- $totp->setPeriod(30);
- $valid = $totp->verify($totp_code, null, 15);
+ $valid = $matchedStep !== null;
- // If totp is not valid check backup codes
- if (!$valid) {
- if (in_array($totp_code, $backupCodes)) {
- $key = array_search($totp_code, $backupCodes);
- unset($backupCodes[$key]);
- $backupCodes = array_values($backupCodes);
+ if ($valid && $matchedStep <= $lastUsedStep) {
+ // This code's time-step has already been used; reject the replay.
+ $valid = false;
+ }
- $statement = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET backup_codes = :backup_codes WHERE user_id = :id');
- $statement->bindValue(':backup_codes', json_encode($backupCodes), SQLITE3_TEXT);
+ // If totp is not valid check backup codes
+ if (!$valid) {
+ if (in_array($totp_code, $backupCodes)) {
+ $key = array_search($totp_code, $backupCodes);
+ unset($backupCodes[$key]);
+ $backupCodes = array_values($backupCodes);
+
+ $statement = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET backup_codes = :backup_codes WHERE user_id = :id');
+ $statement->bindValue(':backup_codes', json_encode($backupCodes), SQLITE3_TEXT);
+ $statement->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ $statement->execute();
+
+ $valid = true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Record the matched time-step so the same code cannot be reused.
+ $statement = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET last_totp_used = :last_totp_used WHERE user_id = :id');
+ $statement->bindValue(':last_totp_used', $matchedStep, SQLITE3_INTEGER);
$statement->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
$statement->execute();
+ }
- $valid = true;
+ // Update brute-force counters based on the result of this attempt.
+ if ($valid) {
+ $counterStmt = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET failed_attempts = 0, lockout_until = 0 WHERE user_id = :id');
+ $counterStmt->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ $counterStmt->execute();
} else {
$invalidTotp = true;
+ $failedAttempts++;
+
+ if ($failedAttempts >= $maxTotpAttempts) {
+ // Trip the lockout and reset the counter so a fresh window
+ // begins once the lockout expires.
+ $counterStmt = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET failed_attempts = 0, lockout_until = :lockout WHERE user_id = :id');
+ $counterStmt->bindValue(':lockout', time() + $totpLockoutSeconds, SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ $counterStmt->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ $counterStmt->execute();
+ $totpLocked = true;
+ } else {
+ $counterStmt = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET failed_attempts = :attempts WHERE user_id = :id');
+ $counterStmt->bindValue(':attempts', $failedAttempts, SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ $counterStmt->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
+ $counterStmt->execute();
+ }
}
- } else {
- $statement = $db->prepare('UPDATE totp SET last_totp_used = :last_totp_used WHERE user_id = :id');
- $statement->bindValue(':last_totp_used', time(), SQLITE3_INTEGER);
- $statement->bindValue(':id', $_SESSION['totp_user_id'], SQLITE3_INTEGER);
- $statement->execute();
}
if ($valid) {
@@ -225,10 +301,13 @@ if (isset($_POST['one-time-code'])) {
</div>
<?php
if ($invalidTotp) {
+ $totpErrorMessage = $totpLocked
+ ? translate('totp_too_many_attempts', $i18n)
+ : translate('totp_code_incorrect', $i18n);
?>
<ul class="error-box">
<li>
- <i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i><?= translate('totp_code_incorrect', $i18n) ?>
+ <i class="fa-solid fa-triangle-exclamation"></i><?= $totpErrorMessage ?>
</li>
</ul>
<?php