A comprehensive Windows security auditing and threat detection toolkit. Features 58 production-ready PowerShell functions organized into 14 modules for enterprise-grade security assessment, compliance validation, and incident response.
PowerShell
function Find-ADBackdoors {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Detects potential backdoors and persistence mechanisms in Active Directory
.DESCRIPTION
Scans for AD backdoors including AdminSDHolder abuse, DCSync permissions,
SIDHistory manipulation, and other persistence mechanisms
.PARAMETER CheckAdminSDHolder
Check for AdminSDHolder tampering
.PARAMETER CheckDCSync
Check for DCSync permissions
.PARAMETER CheckSIDHistory
Check for SIDHistory abuse
.PARAMETER CheckDelegation
Check for dangerous delegations
.PARAMETER Domain
Target domain
.EXAMPLE
Find-ADBackdoors -CheckAdminSDHolder -CheckDCSync -CheckSIDHistory
Find-ADBackdoors -CheckDelegation -Domain "contoso.com"
.OUTPUTS
PSCustomObject with backdoor findings
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter()]
[switch]$CheckAdminSDHolder,
[Parameter()]
[switch]$CheckDCSync,
[Parameter()]
[switch]$CheckSIDHistory,
[Parameter()]
[switch]$CheckDelegation,
[Parameter()]
[string]$Domain
)
begin {
Write-Host "=== AD BACKDOOR DETECTION ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
if (-not (Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name ActiveDirectory)) {
throw "ActiveDirectory module required"
}
Import-Module ActiveDirectory -ErrorAction Stop
if (-not $Domain) {
$Domain = (Get-ADDomain).DNSRoot
}
Write-Host "Domain: $Domain" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host "Start Time: $(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss')" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$results = [PSCustomObject]@{
ScanDate = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
Domain = $Domain
Backdoors = @{
AdminSDHolder = @()
DCSync = @()
SIDHistory = @()
DangerousDelegations = @()
}
Summary = @{
TotalBackdoors = 0
CriticalFindings = 0
HighFindings = 0
}
Recommendations = @()
}
}
process {
try {
# 1. Check AdminSDHolder
if ($CheckAdminSDHolder) {
Write-Host "`n[1/4] Checking AdminSDHolder..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
# Get AdminSDHolder object
$adminSDHolder = Get-ADObject -Filter {Name -eq "AdminSDHolder"} -SearchBase "CN=System,$((Get-ADDomain -Server $Domain).DistinguishedName)" -Properties ntSecurityDescriptor -Server $Domain
if ($adminSDHolder) {
# Check users with AdminCount=1 who shouldn't have it
$adminCountUsers = Get-ADUser -Filter {AdminCount -eq 1} -Properties AdminCount, MemberOf -Server $Domain
# Get actual privileged group members
$privilegedGroups = @(
'Domain Admins',
'Enterprise Admins',
'Schema Admins',
'Administrators',
'Account Operators',
'Backup Operators',
'Server Operators',
'Print Operators'
)
$legitimatePrivilegedUsers = @()
foreach ($groupName in $privilegedGroups) {
try {
$group = Get-ADGroup -Filter "Name -eq '$groupName'" -Server $Domain -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($group) {
$members = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $group -Recursive -Server $Domain -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($members) {
$legitimatePrivilegedUsers += $members.SamAccountName
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Could not check group: $groupName"
}
}
# Find suspicious AdminCount users
foreach ($user in $adminCountUsers) {
if ($user.SamAccountName -notin $legitimatePrivilegedUsers) {
$results.Backdoors.AdminSDHolder += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'Critical'
Username = $user.SamAccountName
DisplayName = $user.Name
Issue = 'AdminCount=1 but not in privileged groups'
Description = 'Possible AdminSDHolder abuse for persistence'
}
$results.Summary.CriticalFindings++
Write-Host " [!] Suspicious: $($user.SamAccountName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
if ($results.Backdoors.AdminSDHolder.Count -eq 0) {
Write-Host " No AdminSDHolder abuse detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Error checking AdminSDHolder: $_"
}
}
# 2. Check DCSync Permissions
if ($CheckDCSync) {
Write-Host "`n[2/4] Checking DCSync permissions..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
# Get domain root
$domainDN = (Get-ADDomain -Server $Domain).DistinguishedName
$domainObject = Get-ADObject -Identity $domainDN -Properties ntSecurityDescriptor -Server $Domain
# DCSync requires these rights:
# - DS-Replication-Get-Changes (GUID: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
# - DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (GUID: 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2)
$acl = $domainObject.ntSecurityDescriptor
$dcsyncRights = @(
'1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', # DS-Replication-Get-Changes
'1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' # DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
)
foreach ($ace in $acl.Access) {
if ($ace.ObjectType -in $dcsyncRights) {
# Resolve SID to account
try {
$aceSid = $ace.IdentityReference
if ($aceSid -isnot [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]) {
$aceSid = $aceSid.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
}
$account = Get-ADObject -Filter "objectSid -eq '$aceSid'" -Server $Domain -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($account) {
# Check if it's a legitimate DC or admin account
$isLegitimate = $account.Name -match "Domain Controllers|Enterprise Admins|Domain Admins|^Administrators$"
if (-not $isLegitimate) {
$results.Backdoors.DCSync += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'Critical'
Account = $account.Name
AccountType = $account.ObjectClass
Permission = 'DCSync'
Issue = 'Non-standard account has DCSync permissions'
Description = 'Can replicate password hashes from domain'
}
$results.Summary.CriticalFindings++
Write-Host " [!] DCSync: $($account.Name)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Could not resolve SID: $($ace.IdentityReference)"
}
}
}
if ($results.Backdoors.DCSync.Count -eq 0) {
Write-Host " No suspicious DCSync permissions found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Error checking DCSync permissions: $_"
}
}
# 3. Check SIDHistory
if ($CheckSIDHistory) {
Write-Host "`n[3/4] Checking SIDHistory abuse..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
# Find users with SIDHistory
$usersWithSIDHistory = Get-ADUser -Filter {SIDHistory -like "*"} -Properties SIDHistory, MemberOf -Server $Domain
foreach ($user in $usersWithSIDHistory) {
# SIDHistory is legitimate in migration scenarios, but can be abused
$sidHistoryCount = $user.SIDHistory.Count
# Check if any SID in history is from a privileged group
foreach ($sid in $user.SIDHistory) {
try {
$sidObject = Get-ADObject -Filter "objectSid -eq '$sid'" -Server $Domain -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($sidObject) {
$results.Backdoors.SIDHistory += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'High'
Username = $user.SamAccountName
SIDHistoryObject = $sidObject.Name
SIDHistoryCount = $sidHistoryCount
Issue = 'User has SIDHistory attribute set'
Description = 'Can be used for privilege escalation'
}
$results.Summary.HighFindings++
Write-Host " [!] SIDHistory: $($user.SamAccountName) -> $($sidObject.Name)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Could not resolve SID: $sid"
}
}
}
if ($results.Backdoors.SIDHistory.Count -eq 0) {
Write-Host " No SIDHistory abuse detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Error checking SIDHistory: $_"
}
}
# 4. Check Dangerous Delegations
if ($CheckDelegation) {
Write-Host "`n[4/4] Checking dangerous delegations..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
# Check for unconstrained delegation
$unconstrainedDelegation = Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true} -Properties TrustedForDelegation, PrimaryGroupID -Server $Domain
foreach ($computer in $unconstrainedDelegation) {
# Domain Controllers are expected to have this (PrimaryGroupID 516 = RWDC, 521 = RODC);
# matching on the computer name would miss DCs with arbitrary names and
# falsely excuse non-DCs whose names merely contain "DC"
if ($computer.PrimaryGroupID -notin @(516, 521)) {
$results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'High'
Object = $computer.Name
ObjectType = 'Computer'
DelegationType = 'Unconstrained'
Issue = 'Computer has unconstrained delegation enabled'
Description = 'Can impersonate any user to any service'
}
$results.Summary.HighFindings++
Write-Host " [!] Unconstrained Delegation: $($computer.Name)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
# Check for constrained delegation with protocol transition
$constrainedDelegation = Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -like "*"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, TrustedToAuthForDelegation -Server $Domain
foreach ($object in $constrainedDelegation) {
if ($object.TrustedToAuthForDelegation) {
$results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'Medium'
Object = $object.Name
ObjectType = $object.ObjectClass
DelegationType = 'Constrained with Protocol Transition'
DelegateTo = $object.'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo' -join ', '
Issue = 'Protocol transition enabled'
Description = 'Can obtain service tickets without user credentials'
}
Write-Host " [!] Protocol Transition: $($object.Name)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
if ($results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations.Count -eq 0) {
Write-Host " No dangerous delegations found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Error checking delegations: $_"
}
}
# Calculate total backdoors
$results.Summary.TotalBackdoors =
$results.Backdoors.AdminSDHolder.Count +
$results.Backdoors.DCSync.Count +
$results.Backdoors.SIDHistory.Count +
$results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations.Count
# Generate recommendations
if ($results.Backdoors.AdminSDHolder.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Recommendations += "Review and remove AdminCount attribute from non-privileged accounts"
$results.Recommendations += "Investigate how AdminCount was set on these accounts"
}
if ($results.Backdoors.DCSync.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Recommendations += "Remove DCSync permissions from non-administrative accounts immediately"
$results.Recommendations += "Audit replication activities"
}
if ($results.Backdoors.SIDHistory.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Recommendations += "Clear SIDHistory for accounts not in active migration"
$results.Recommendations += "Monitor SIDHistory changes"
}
if ($results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Recommendations += "Review and restrict delegation configurations"
$results.Recommendations += "Use constrained delegation instead of unconstrained"
}
$results.Recommendations += "Implement regular AD security audits"
$results.Recommendations += "Enable advanced audit policies for privilege use"
$results.Recommendations += "Monitor for Golden Ticket indicators"
}
catch {
Write-Error "Error during backdoor detection: $_"
throw
}
}
end {
Write-Host "`n=== SCAN COMPLETE ===" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "`nBackdoor Summary:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " Total Backdoors Found: $($results.Summary.TotalBackdoors)" -ForegroundColor $(
if ($results.Summary.TotalBackdoors -gt 0) { 'Red' } else { 'Green' }
)
Write-Host " Critical Findings: $($results.Summary.CriticalFindings)" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host " High Findings: $($results.Summary.HighFindings)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
if ($results.Backdoors.AdminSDHolder.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "`nAdminSDHolder Abuse: $($results.Backdoors.AdminSDHolder.Count)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
if ($results.Backdoors.DCSync.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "DCSync Permissions: $($results.Backdoors.DCSync.Count)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
if ($results.Backdoors.SIDHistory.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "SIDHistory Abuse: $($results.Backdoors.SIDHistory.Count)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
if ($results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "Dangerous Delegations: $($results.Backdoors.DangerousDelegations.Count)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
if ($results.Recommendations.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "`nRecommendations:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$results.Recommendations | ForEach-Object {
Write-Host " ! $_" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
if ($results.Summary.TotalBackdoors -gt 0) {
Write-Host "`n[!!!] BACKDOORS DETECTED - IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED [!!!]" -ForegroundColor Red -BackgroundColor Black
}
return $results
}
}