A comprehensive Windows security auditing and threat detection toolkit. Features 58 production-ready PowerShell functions organized into 14 modules for enterprise-grade security assessment, compliance validation, and incident response.
PowerShell
function Find-DefenseEvasion {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Detects defense-evasion and security-tampering activity
.DESCRIPTION
Scans for indicators that attackers attempted to blind or weaken host defenses:
AMSI bypass patterns in PowerShell script-block logging (4104), ETW tampering,
Windows Defender tampering (exclusions, disabled real-time monitoring, 5001/5007
events), event log tampering (1102/104/4719), and optional heuristic log-gap
analysis across major logs
.PARAMETER Hours
Number of hours to look back in event logs (default: 24)
.PARAMETER IncludeLogGapAnalysis
Perform heuristic analysis of time gaps between consecutive events in major logs
.EXAMPLE
Find-DefenseEvasion
Find-DefenseEvasion -Hours 48 -IncludeLogGapAnalysis
.OUTPUTS
PSCustomObject with EvasionFindings, Summary, Recommendations, and per-check status
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter()]
[int]$Hours = 24,
[Parameter()]
[switch]$IncludeLogGapAnalysis
)
begin {
Write-Host "Scanning for defense-evasion and tampering activity (last $Hours hours)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$results = [PSCustomObject]@{
ScanDate = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
ComputerName = $env:COMPUTERNAME
TimeRange = "$Hours hours"
EvasionFindings = @()
Summary = [PSCustomObject]@{
TotalFindings = 0
Critical = 0
High = 0
Medium = 0
Low = 0
Info = 0
ChecksRun = 0
}
CheckStatus = [PSCustomObject]@{
ScriptBlockLogQuery = 'Unknown'
AmsiProviderCheck = 'Unknown'
AmsiPatternScan = 'Unknown'
EtwPatternScan = 'Unknown'
PowerShellLoggingGpo= 'Unknown'
DefenderPreferences = 'Unknown'
DefenderStatus = 'Unknown'
DefenderEvents = 'Unknown'
SecurityLogCleared = 'Unknown'
SystemLogCleared = 'Unknown'
AuditPolicyChanged = 'Unknown'
LogGapAnalysis = 'NotRequested'
}
Recommendations = @()
}
$startTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-$Hours)
function Get-EventDataValue {
param(
[Parameter()]
$WinEvent,
[Parameter()]
[string]$Name
)
try {
if ($null -eq $WinEvent) { return $null }
$xml = [xml]$WinEvent.ToXml()
if ($null -eq $xml -or $null -eq $xml.Event -or $null -eq $xml.Event.EventData) { return $null }
$data = $xml.Event.EventData.Data
if ($null -eq $data) { return $null }
$item = @($data | Where-Object { $null -ne $_.Name -and $_.Name -eq $Name } | Select-Object -First 1)
if ($item.Count -eq 0) { return $null }
$node = $item[0]
if ($node.PSObject.Properties['#text']) { return $node.'#text' }
return [string]$node
}
catch {
return $null
}
}
function Get-EventMessage {
param(
[Parameter()]
$WinEvent
)
if ($null -eq $WinEvent) { return $null }
if ($WinEvent.PSObject.Properties['Message'] -and $WinEvent.Message) { return [string]$WinEvent.Message }
return $null
}
function Get-EventTimestamp {
param(
[Parameter()]
$WinEvent
)
if ($null -eq $WinEvent) { return $null }
if ($WinEvent.PSObject.Properties['TimeCreated']) { return $WinEvent.TimeCreated }
return $null
}
function Get-MessageSnippet {
param(
[Parameter()]
[string]$Message,
[Parameter()]
[int]$MaxLength = 200
)
if ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($Message)) { return '' }
if ($Message.Length -gt $MaxLength) {
return ($Message.Substring(0, $MaxLength) + '...')
}
return $Message
}
# AMSI bypass indicator patterns (T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools)
$amsiPatterns = @(
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'AmsiScanBuffer patch/reference'; Pattern = 'AmsiScanBuffer'; Combo = $null; Severity = 'High' }
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'amsiInitFailed forced'; Pattern = 'amsiInitFailed'; Combo = $null; Severity = 'High' }
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'amsi.dll memory patch'; Pattern = 'amsi\.dll'; Combo = '(?i)(patch|VirtualProtect|WriteProcessMemory|Marshal)'; Severity = 'High' }
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'Reflection-based amsiUtils tamper'; Pattern = '\[Ref\]\.Assembly\.GetType'; Combo = '(?i)amsiUtils'; Severity = 'High' }
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'Marshal::Copy near AMSI'; Pattern = 'Marshal::Copy'; Combo = '(?i)amsi'; Severity = 'Medium' }
)
# ETW tamper indicator patterns (T1562.006 - Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking)
$etwPatterns = @(
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'EtwEventWrite patch'; Pattern = 'EtwEventWrite'; Combo = '(?i)(patch|VirtualProtect|Marshal|GetProcAddress)'; Severity = 'High' }
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name = 'Generic ETW patch reference'; Pattern = '(?i)etw'; Combo = '(?i)patch'; Severity = 'Medium' }
)
$scriptBlockEvents = $null
}
process {
try {
# Shared query: PowerShell script-block logging events (4104)
try {
$scriptBlockEvents = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
ID = 4104
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$results.CheckStatus.ScriptBlockLogQuery = 'OK'
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query PowerShell Operational log (4104): $_"
$results.CheckStatus.ScriptBlockLogQuery = 'Unknown'
}
# 1a. AMSI provider registration (informational baseline)
Write-Verbose "Checking AMSI provider registration..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$amsiProviderPath = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers'
$providerKeyExists = $false
try { $providerKeyExists = Test-Path $amsiProviderPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue } catch { $providerKeyExists = $false }
if ($providerKeyExists) {
$providers = @(Get-ChildItem -Path $amsiProviderPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = 'Info'
Evidence = "AMSI provider registration present with $($providers.Count) provider(s) - AMSI appears registered (informational baseline)"
Timestamp = $null
}
}
else {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = 'Info'
Evidence = 'AMSI provider registry key not found - AMSI providers absent or AMSI unavailable on this host (informational baseline)'
Timestamp = $null
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.AmsiProviderCheck = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not check AMSI provider registration: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.AmsiProviderCheck = 'Unknown'
}
# 1b. AMSI bypass patterns in script-block logs
Write-Verbose "Scanning script blocks for AMSI bypass patterns..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
if ($results.CheckStatus.ScriptBlockLogQuery -eq 'OK') {
foreach ($evt in $scriptBlockEvents) {
$msg = Get-EventMessage -WinEvent $evt
if ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($msg)) { continue }
foreach ($indicator in $amsiPatterns) {
$matched = $false
if ($msg -match $indicator.Pattern) {
if ($null -eq $indicator.Combo -or $msg -match $indicator.Combo) {
$matched = $true
}
}
if ($matched) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = $indicator.Severity
Evidence = "AMSI bypass indicator '$($indicator.Name)' in PowerShell script block (4104): $(Get-MessageSnippet -Message $msg)"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
break
}
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.AmsiPatternScan = 'OK'
}
else {
$results.CheckStatus.AmsiPatternScan = 'Unknown'
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Error scanning script blocks for AMSI bypass patterns: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.AmsiPatternScan = 'Unknown'
}
# 2a. ETW tamper patterns in script-block logs
Write-Verbose "Scanning script blocks for ETW tamper patterns..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
if ($results.CheckStatus.ScriptBlockLogQuery -eq 'OK') {
foreach ($evt in $scriptBlockEvents) {
$msg = Get-EventMessage -WinEvent $evt
if ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($msg)) { continue }
foreach ($indicator in $etwPatterns) {
$matched = $false
if ($msg -match $indicator.Pattern) {
if ($null -eq $indicator.Combo -or $msg -match $indicator.Combo) {
$matched = $true
}
}
if ($matched) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.006'
Severity = $indicator.Severity
Evidence = "ETW tamper indicator '$($indicator.Name)' in PowerShell script block (4104): $(Get-MessageSnippet -Message $msg)"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
break
}
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.EtwPatternScan = 'OK'
}
else {
$results.CheckStatus.EtwPatternScan = 'Unknown'
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Error scanning script blocks for ETW tamper patterns: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.EtwPatternScan = 'Unknown'
}
# 2b. PowerShell script-block logging GPO state (current-state check; cannot establish when it changed)
Write-Verbose "Checking PowerShell logging GPO state..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$gpoPath = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging'
$gpoExists = $false
try { $gpoExists = Test-Path $gpoPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue } catch { $gpoExists = $false }
if ($gpoExists) {
$gpo = Get-ItemProperty -Path $gpoPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$sblEnabled = $null
if ($null -ne $gpo -and $gpo.PSObject.Properties['EnableScriptBlockLogging']) {
$sblEnabled = $gpo.EnableScriptBlockLogging
}
if ($null -ne $sblEnabled -and 0 -eq [int]$sblEnabled) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.002'
Severity = 'Medium'
Evidence = 'PowerShell script-block logging explicitly disabled via GPO (EnableScriptBlockLogging=0) - current-state check, change time unknown'
Timestamp = $null
}
}
elseif ($null -ne $sblEnabled -and 1 -eq [int]$sblEnabled) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.002'
Severity = 'Info'
Evidence = 'PowerShell script-block logging enabled via GPO (informational baseline)'
Timestamp = $null
}
}
}
else {
Write-Verbose "PowerShell logging GPO key not present (default state)"
}
$results.CheckStatus.PowerShellLoggingGpo = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not check PowerShell logging GPO state: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.PowerShellLoggingGpo = 'Unknown'
}
# 3a. Defender preference tampering
Write-Verbose "Checking Windows Defender preferences..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$mpPref = Get-MpPreference -ErrorAction Stop
$results.CheckStatus.DefenderPreferences = 'OK'
$exclusionPaths = @()
$exclusionProcesses = @()
$exclusionExtensions = @()
if ($null -ne $mpPref) {
if ($mpPref.PSObject.Properties['ExclusionPath'] -and $null -ne $mpPref.ExclusionPath) { $exclusionPaths = @($mpPref.ExclusionPath) }
if ($mpPref.PSObject.Properties['ExclusionProcess'] -and $null -ne $mpPref.ExclusionProcess) { $exclusionProcesses = @($mpPref.ExclusionProcess) }
if ($mpPref.PSObject.Properties['ExclusionExtension'] -and $null -ne $mpPref.ExclusionExtension) { $exclusionExtensions = @($mpPref.ExclusionExtension) }
}
$totalExclusions = $exclusionPaths.Count + $exclusionProcesses.Count + $exclusionExtensions.Count
if ($totalExclusions -gt 0) {
$exclSeverity = 'Medium'
if ($totalExclusions -gt 3) { $exclSeverity = 'High' }
$evidenceParts = @()
if ($exclusionPaths.Count -gt 0) { $evidenceParts += "Paths: $($exclusionPaths -join ', ')" }
if ($exclusionProcesses.Count -gt 0) { $evidenceParts += "Processes: $($exclusionProcesses -join ', ')" }
if ($exclusionExtensions.Count -gt 0) { $evidenceParts += "Extensions: $($exclusionExtensions -join ', ')" }
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = $exclSeverity
Evidence = "Windows Defender exclusions configured ($totalExclusions total) - $($evidenceParts -join '; ')"
Timestamp = $null
}
}
if ($null -ne $mpPref -and $mpPref.PSObject.Properties['DisableRealtimeMonitoring'] -and $mpPref.DisableRealtimeMonitoring -eq $true) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring is set to true in Defender preferences'
Timestamp = $null
}
}
if ($null -ne $mpPref -and $mpPref.PSObject.Properties['DisableBehaviorMonitoring'] -and $mpPref.DisableBehaviorMonitoring -eq $true) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring is set to true in Defender preferences'
Timestamp = $null
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query Windows Defender preferences: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.DefenderPreferences = 'Unknown'
}
# 3b. Defender real-time protection status
Write-Verbose "Checking Windows Defender real-time protection status..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$mpStatus = Get-MpComputerStatus -ErrorAction Stop
if ($null -ne $mpStatus -and $mpStatus.PSObject.Properties['RealTimeProtectionEnabled'] -and $mpStatus.RealTimeProtectionEnabled -eq $false) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = 'Windows Defender real-time protection is currently disabled'
Timestamp = $null
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.DefenderStatus = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query Windows Defender computer status: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.DefenderStatus = 'Unknown'
}
# 3c. Defender Operational events 5001 (real-time protection disabled) / 5007 (configuration changed)
Write-Verbose "Checking Defender Operational log for tampering events..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$defenderEvents = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational'
ID = 5001, 5007
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
foreach ($evt in $defenderEvents) {
$msg = Get-EventMessage -WinEvent $evt
$eventId = $null
if ($null -ne $evt -and $evt.PSObject.Properties['Id']) { $eventId = $evt.Id }
if (5001 -eq $eventId) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = "Defender event 5001 - real-time protection disabled: $(Get-MessageSnippet -Message $msg)"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
}
elseif (5007 -eq $eventId) {
$sev = 'Medium'
$desc = 'Defender configuration changed'
$exclusionPath = $null
if ($null -ne $evt.PSObject.Properties['Properties'] -and $null -ne $evt.Properties) {
foreach ($prop in $evt.Properties) {
if ($null -ne $prop -and $null -ne $prop.Value -and
$prop.Value -is [string] -and $prop.Value -match '(?i)\\Exclusions\\') {
$exclusionPath = $prop.Value
break
}
}
}
if ($null -ne $exclusionPath) {
$sev = 'High'
$desc = 'Defender exclusion changed'
}
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.001'
Severity = $sev
Evidence = "Defender event 5007 - ${desc}: $(Get-MessageSnippet -Message $msg)"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.DefenderEvents = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query Defender Operational log: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.DefenderEvents = 'Unknown'
}
# 4a. Security log cleared (1102)
Write-Verbose "Checking for Security log cleared events (1102)..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$clearedSecurity = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 1102
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
foreach ($evt in $clearedSecurity) {
$subjectUser = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'SubjectUserName'
$subjectDomain = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'SubjectDomainName'
$who = 'Unknown'
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($subjectUser)) {
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($subjectDomain)) { $who = "$subjectDomain\$subjectUser" }
else { $who = $subjectUser }
}
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1070.001'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = "Security event log was cleared (event 1102) by '$who'"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.SecurityLogCleared = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query Security log for 1102 events: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.SecurityLogCleared = 'Unknown'
}
# 4b. System log cleared (104)
Write-Verbose "Checking for System log cleared events (104)..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$clearedSystem = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'System'
ID = 104
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
foreach ($evt in $clearedSystem) {
$subjectUser = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'SubjectUserName'
$subjectDomain = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'SubjectDomainName'
$who = 'Unknown'
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($subjectUser)) {
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($subjectDomain)) { $who = "$subjectDomain\$subjectUser" }
else { $who = $subjectUser }
}
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1070.001'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = "System event log was cleared (event 104) by '$who'"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.SystemLogCleared = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query System log for 104 events: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.SystemLogCleared = 'Unknown'
}
# 4c. Audit policy changed (4719)
Write-Verbose "Checking for audit policy change events (4719)..."
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$auditChanges = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 4719
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
foreach ($evt in $auditChanges) {
$subjectUser = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'SubjectUserName'
$subjectDomain = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'SubjectDomainName'
$category = Get-EventDataValue -WinEvent $evt -Name 'CategoryId'
$who = 'Unknown'
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($subjectUser)) {
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($subjectDomain)) { $who = "$subjectDomain\$subjectUser" }
else { $who = $subjectUser }
}
$catText = 'Unknown category'
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($category)) { $catText = "category $category" }
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1562.002'
Severity = 'High'
Evidence = "System audit policy was changed (event 4719, $catText) by '$who'"
Timestamp = Get-EventTimestamp -WinEvent $evt
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.AuditPolicyChanged = 'OK'
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not query Security log for 4719 events: $_"
$results.CheckStatus.AuditPolicyChanged = 'Unknown'
}
# 5. Log-gap analysis (heuristic)
if ($IncludeLogGapAnalysis) {
Write-Verbose "Performing heuristic log-gap analysis..."
$gapLogs = @('Security', 'System', 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational')
$gapStatus = 'OK'
foreach ($logName in $gapLogs) {
try {
$results.Summary.ChecksRun++
$logEvents = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = $logName
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$timedEvents = @($logEvents | Where-Object {
$null -ne $_ -and $_.PSObject.Properties['TimeCreated'] -and $null -ne $_.TimeCreated
})
if ($timedEvents.Count -lt 5) {
Write-Verbose "Not enough events in '$logName' for gap analysis ($($timedEvents.Count) events)"
continue
}
$sorted = @($timedEvents | Sort-Object -Property TimeCreated)
$maxGapHours = 0.0
$gapStart = $null
$gapEnd = $null
$gapIndex = -1
for ($i = 1; $i -lt $sorted.Count; $i++) {
$gapHours = ($sorted[$i].TimeCreated - $sorted[$i - 1].TimeCreated).TotalHours
if ($gapHours -gt $maxGapHours) {
$maxGapHours = $gapHours
$gapStart = $sorted[$i - 1].TimeCreated
$gapEnd = $sorted[$i].TimeCreated
$gapIndex = $i
}
}
$activeBefore = ($gapIndex -ge 2)
$activeAfter = (($sorted.Count - $gapIndex) -ge 2)
if ($maxGapHours -gt 2 -and $activeBefore -and $activeAfter) {
$results.EvasionFindings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Technique = 'T1070'
Severity = 'Low'
Evidence = "Suspicious gap (heuristic): largest gap of $([math]::Round($maxGapHours, 2)) hours with no events in '$logName' between $gapStart and $gapEnd during an otherwise-active period - may indicate log tampering or service downtime"
Timestamp = $gapEnd
}
}
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not perform gap analysis on '$logName': $_"
$gapStatus = 'Unknown'
}
}
$results.CheckStatus.LogGapAnalysis = $gapStatus
}
}
catch {
Write-Error "Error during defense-evasion scan: $_"
throw
}
}
end {
# Summarize findings by severity
$allFindings = @($results.EvasionFindings)
$results.Summary.TotalFindings = $allFindings.Count
$results.Summary.Critical = @($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Severity -eq 'Critical' }).Count
$results.Summary.High = @($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Severity -eq 'High' }).Count
$results.Summary.Medium = @($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Severity -eq 'Medium' }).Count
$results.Summary.Low = @($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Severity -eq 'Low' }).Count
$results.Summary.Info = @($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Severity -eq 'Info' }).Count
# Build recommendations
$recommendations = @(
'Enable and centrally forward PowerShell script-block logging (4104), Defender Operational, and Security/System logs to a tamper-resistant SIEM'
'Enable Windows Defender Tamper Protection to prevent unauthorized changes to exclusions and real-time monitoring'
'Alert on event IDs 1102 (Security log cleared), 104 (System log cleared), and 4719 (audit policy changed) as high-priority detections'
)
if (@($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Technique -eq 'T1562.001' -and $_.Severity -in @('High', 'Medium') }).Count -gt 0) {
$recommendations += 'Investigate AMSI/Defender tampering findings: review the flagged script blocks and validate every Defender exclusion against change records'
}
if (@($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Technique -eq 'T1562.006' }).Count -gt 0) {
$recommendations += 'Investigate ETW tampering indicators and consider deploying ETW-based tamper detection (e.g., monitoring for EtwEventWrite patching)'
}
if (@($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Technique -eq 'T1070.001' }).Count -gt 0) {
$recommendations += 'Treat cleared event logs as a potential intrusion in progress: identify the clearing account, review activity around the clear time, and verify log-forwarding coverage'
}
if (@($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Technique -eq 'T1562.002' }).Count -gt 0) {
$recommendations += 'Review audit policy and PowerShell logging GPO changes; re-enable logging and investigate who disabled it'
}
if (@($allFindings | Where-Object { $_.Technique -eq 'T1070' }).Count -gt 0) {
$recommendations += 'Log-gap findings are heuristic only: corroborate gaps with service uptime and SIEM ingestion health before treating them as tampering'
}
$results.Recommendations = $recommendations
Write-Host "`nDefense-evasion scan complete!" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "Total findings: $($results.Summary.TotalFindings)" -ForegroundColor $(if ($results.Summary.TotalFindings -gt 0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' })
Write-Host " High: $($results.Summary.High)" -ForegroundColor $(if ($results.Summary.High -gt 0) { 'Red' } else { 'Green' })
Write-Host " Medium: $($results.Summary.Medium)" -ForegroundColor $(if ($results.Summary.Medium -gt 0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' })
Write-Host " Low: $($results.Summary.Low)" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " Info: $($results.Summary.Info)" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Checks run: $($results.Summary.ChecksRun)" -ForegroundColor Cyan
return $results
}
}