A comprehensive Windows security auditing and threat detection toolkit. Features 58 production-ready PowerShell functions organized into 14 modules for enterprise-grade security assessment, compliance validation, and incident response.
PowerShell
function Find-SuspiciousAuthentication {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Detects suspicious authentication events and patterns
.DESCRIPTION
Analyzes Windows Security event logs for suspicious authentication activities including
brute force attempts, unusual logon patterns, NewCredentials (runas /netonly) logons,
NTLM network logon usage, credential dumping, and privilege escalation
.PARAMETER Hours
Number of hours to look back in event logs (default: 24)
.PARAMETER IncludeSuccessful
Include successful authentications in analysis
.PARAMETER ExportPath
Path to export detailed results
.EXAMPLE
Find-SuspiciousAuthentication
Find-SuspiciousAuthentication -Hours 48 -IncludeSuccessful -ExportPath "C:\Audits"
.OUTPUTS
PSCustomObject with authentication analysis results
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter()]
[int]$Hours = 24,
[Parameter()]
[switch]$IncludeSuccessful,
[Parameter()]
[string]$ExportPath
)
begin {
Write-Host "Analyzing authentication events (last $Hours hours)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$results = [PSCustomObject]@{
AnalysisDate = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
TimeRange = "$Hours hours"
FailedLogons = @()
AccountLockouts = @()
PrivilegeEscalations = @()
UnusualLogons = @()
ExplicitCredentials = @()
NewCredentialLogons = @()
NtlmNetworkLogonIndicators = @()
BruteForceIndicators = @()
Statistics = @{
TotalFailedLogons = 0
TotalLockouts = 0
TotalPrivilegeUse = 0
TotalExplicitCreds = 0
TotalNewCredentialLogons = 0
NtlmNetworkLogonAccounts = 0
UniqueFailedAccounts = 0
UniqueSourceIPs = 0
}
}
$startTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-$Hours)
$getEventValue = {
param($EventData, [string]$Name)
if ($null -eq $EventData) { return $null }
$node = $EventData | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq $Name }
if ($null -ne $node) { return $node.InnerText }
return $null
}
}
process {
try {
# Event IDs to analyze
# 4625 - Failed logon
# 4740 - Account lockout
# 4672 - Special privileges assigned
# 4648 - Logon with explicit credentials
# 4624 - Successful logon
# 4634 - Logoff
# 1. Analyze Failed Logons (Event ID 4625)
Write-Verbose "Analyzing failed logon attempts..."
$failedLogons = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 4625
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
if ($failedLogons.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Statistics.TotalFailedLogons = $failedLogons.Count
foreach ($event in $failedLogons) {
if ($null -eq $event) { continue }
try {
$xml = [xml]$event.ToXml()
$eventData = $xml.Event.EventData.Data
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Skipping unreadable event: $_"
continue
}
$targetAccount = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetUserName'
$targetDomain = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetDomainName'
$workstation = & $getEventValue $eventData 'WorkstationName'
$sourceIP = & $getEventValue $eventData 'IpAddress'
$logonType = & $getEventValue $eventData 'LogonType'
$status = & $getEventValue $eventData 'Status'
$subStatus = & $getEventValue $eventData 'SubStatus'
$results.FailedLogons += [PSCustomObject]@{
TimeCreated = $event.TimeCreated
Account = "$targetDomain\$targetAccount"
Workstation = $workstation
SourceIP = $sourceIP
LogonType = $logonType
FailureReason = switch ($subStatus) {
'0xC0000064' { 'User name does not exist' }
'0xC000006A' { 'Correct user name but wrong password' }
'0xC000006D' { 'Bad user name or password' }
'0xC000006E' { 'Account restriction' }
'0xC000006F' { 'Logon outside allowed time' }
'0xC0000070' { 'Workstation restriction' }
'0xC0000071' { 'Password expired' }
'0xC0000072' { 'Account disabled' }
'0xC0000193' { 'Account expiration' }
'0xC0000224' { 'Password must change' }
'0xC0000234' { 'Account locked out' }
default { "Unknown ($subStatus)" }
}
}
}
# Detect brute force patterns
$failuresByAccount = $results.FailedLogons | Group-Object -Property Account
foreach ($group in $failuresByAccount) {
if ($group.Count -ge 5) {
$timeSpan = ($group.Group | Measure-Object -Property TimeCreated -Maximum -Minimum)
$duration = ($timeSpan.Maximum - $timeSpan.Minimum).TotalMinutes
$results.BruteForceIndicators += [PSCustomObject]@{
Account = $group.Name
FailureCount = $group.Count
TimeSpan = [math]::Round($duration, 2)
SourceIPs = ($group.Group.SourceIP | Select-Object -Unique) -join ', '
Severity = if ($group.Count -ge 10) { 'High' } elseif ($group.Count -ge 5) { 'Medium' } else { 'Low' }
}
}
}
# Calculate statistics safely
try {
$failedArray = @($results.FailedLogons)
if ($failedArray.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Statistics.UniqueFailedAccounts = (@($failedArray.Account | Select-Object -Unique)).Count
$results.Statistics.UniqueSourceIPs = (@($failedArray | Where-Object { -not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($_.SourceIP) -and $_.SourceIP -ne '-' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty SourceIP -Unique)).Count
}
} catch {
Write-Verbose "Could not calculate unique statistics"
}
}
# 2. Account Lockouts (Event ID 4740)
Write-Verbose "Checking account lockouts..."
$lockouts = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 4740
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
if ($lockouts.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Statistics.TotalLockouts = $lockouts.Count
foreach ($event in $lockouts) {
if ($null -eq $event) { continue }
try {
$xml = [xml]$event.ToXml()
$eventData = $xml.Event.EventData.Data
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Skipping unreadable event: $_"
continue
}
$targetAccount = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetUserName'
$callerComputer = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetDomainName'
$results.AccountLockouts += [PSCustomObject]@{
TimeCreated = $event.TimeCreated
Account = $targetAccount
CallerComputer = $callerComputer
}
}
}
# 3. Special Privileges Assigned (Event ID 4672)
Write-Verbose "Analyzing privilege escalations..."
$privEvents = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 4672
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
if ($privEvents.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Statistics.TotalPrivilegeUse = $privEvents.Count
# Look for unusual privilege assignments
foreach ($event in $privEvents) {
if ($null -eq $event) { continue }
try {
$xml = [xml]$event.ToXml()
$eventData = $xml.Event.EventData.Data
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Skipping unreadable event: $_"
continue
}
$subjectAccount = & $getEventValue $eventData 'SubjectUserName'
$subjectDomain = & $getEventValue $eventData 'SubjectDomainName'
$privileges = & $getEventValue $eventData 'PrivilegeList'
# Flag if not a well-known admin account
if ($subjectAccount -notmatch '(SYSTEM|LOCAL SERVICE|NETWORK SERVICE|Administrator|DWM-\d+|UMFD-\d+)') {
$results.PrivilegeEscalations += [PSCustomObject]@{
TimeCreated = $event.TimeCreated
Account = "$subjectDomain\$subjectAccount"
Privileges = $privileges
}
}
}
}
# 4. Explicit Credentials Usage (Event ID 4648)
Write-Verbose "Checking explicit credential usage..."
$explicitCreds = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 4648
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
if ($explicitCreds.Count -gt 0) {
$results.Statistics.TotalExplicitCreds = $explicitCreds.Count
foreach ($event in $explicitCreds) {
if ($null -eq $event) { continue }
try {
$xml = [xml]$event.ToXml()
$eventData = $xml.Event.EventData.Data
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Skipping unreadable event: $_"
continue
}
$subjectAccount = & $getEventValue $eventData 'SubjectUserName'
$targetAccount = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetUserName'
$targetServer = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetServerName'
$processName = & $getEventValue $eventData 'ProcessName'
$results.ExplicitCredentials += [PSCustomObject]@{
TimeCreated = $event.TimeCreated
SourceAccount = $subjectAccount
TargetAccount = $targetAccount
TargetServer = $targetServer
Process = $processName
}
}
}
# 5. Successful Logons Analysis (Event ID 4624)
Write-Verbose "Analyzing successful logons..."
$successfulLogons = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Security'
ID = 4624
StartTime = $startTime
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($successfulLogons) {
$ntlmNetworkByAccount = @{}
foreach ($event in $successfulLogons) {
if ($null -eq $event) { continue }
try {
$xml = [xml]$event.ToXml()
$eventData = $xml.Event.EventData.Data
}
catch {
Write-Verbose "Skipping unreadable event: $_"
continue
}
$targetAccount = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetUserName'
$targetDomain = & $getEventValue $eventData 'TargetDomainName'
$logonType = & $getEventValue $eventData 'LogonType'
$sourceIP = & $getEventValue $eventData 'IpAddress'
$workstation = & $getEventValue $eventData 'WorkstationName'
$authPackage = & $getEventValue $eventData 'AuthenticationPackageName'
$processName = & $getEventValue $eventData 'ProcessName'
# LogonType 9 = NewCredentials (runas /netonly) - pass-the-hash / explicit credential reuse indicator
if ($logonType -eq '9' -and $targetAccount -and $targetAccount -notmatch '\$$') {
$results.NewCredentialLogons += [PSCustomObject]@{
TimeCreated = $event.TimeCreated
Account = "$targetDomain\$targetAccount"
Workstation = $workstation
SourceIP = $sourceIP
Process = $processName
Severity = 'Medium'
Indicator = 'NewCredentials logon (runas /netonly style) - possible pass-the-hash or explicit credential reuse'
}
}
# NTLM network logons where Kerberos is normally expected - aggregated per account to keep noise down
if ($logonType -eq '3' -and $authPackage -eq 'NTLM' -and $targetAccount -and
$targetAccount -notmatch '\$$' -and $targetAccount -ne 'ANONYMOUS LOGON') {
$accountKey = "$targetDomain\$targetAccount"
if (-not $ntlmNetworkByAccount.ContainsKey($accountKey)) {
$ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey] = [PSCustomObject]@{
Account = $accountKey
Count = 0
SourceIPs = @()
LastSeen = $event.TimeCreated
}
}
$ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey].Count++
if ($sourceIP -and $sourceIP -ne '-' -and $ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey].SourceIPs -notcontains $sourceIP) {
$ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey].SourceIPs += $sourceIP
}
if ($null -ne $event.TimeCreated -and $event.TimeCreated -gt $ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey].LastSeen) {
$ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey].LastSeen = $event.TimeCreated
}
}
if ($IncludeSuccessful) {
# Flag unusual logon types or times
$hour = $event.TimeCreated.Hour
$isUnusual = $false
$reason = ""
# Check for after-hours logon (outside 7 AM - 7 PM)
if ($hour -lt 7 -or $hour -ge 19) {
$isUnusual = $true
$reason = "After-hours logon"
}
# Type 10 = RemoteInteractive (RDP)
if ($logonType -eq '10' -and $sourceIP -ne '127.0.0.1' -and $sourceIP -ne '-') {
$isUnusual = $true
$reason += "; Remote desktop logon from $sourceIP"
}
# Type 3 = Network logon to admin shares
if ($logonType -eq '3' -and $targetAccount -match 'admin') {
$isUnusual = $true
$reason += "; Network logon with admin account"
}
if ($isUnusual) {
$results.UnusualLogons += [PSCustomObject]@{
TimeCreated = $event.TimeCreated
Account = $targetAccount
LogonType = $logonType
SourceIP = $sourceIP
Workstation = $workstation
Reason = $reason.TrimStart('; ')
}
}
}
}
$results.Statistics.TotalNewCredentialLogons = @($results.NewCredentialLogons).Count
foreach ($accountKey in $ntlmNetworkByAccount.Keys) {
$ntlmInfo = $ntlmNetworkByAccount[$accountKey]
$results.NtlmNetworkLogonIndicators += [PSCustomObject]@{
Account = $ntlmInfo.Account
LogonCount = $ntlmInfo.Count
SourceIPs = ($ntlmInfo.SourceIPs -join ', ')
LastSeen = $ntlmInfo.LastSeen
Severity = 'Low'
Indicator = 'NTLM network logon where Kerberos is normally expected (informational)'
}
}
$results.Statistics.NtlmNetworkLogonAccounts = @($results.NtlmNetworkLogonIndicators).Count
}
}
catch {
Write-Error "Error during authentication analysis: $_"
throw
}
}
end {
# Display summary
Write-Host "`nAuthentication Analysis Complete!" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "`n=== Statistics ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Failed logon attempts: $($results.Statistics.TotalFailedLogons)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host "Account lockouts: $($results.Statistics.TotalLockouts)" -ForegroundColor $(if ($results.Statistics.TotalLockouts -gt 0) { 'Red' } else { 'Green' })
Write-Host "Privilege escalations: $($results.PrivilegeEscalations.Count)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host "Explicit credential usage: $($results.Statistics.TotalExplicitCreds)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host "NewCredentials (type 9) logons: $($results.Statistics.TotalNewCredentialLogons)" -ForegroundColor $(if ($results.Statistics.TotalNewCredentialLogons -gt 0) { 'Red' } else { 'Green' })
Write-Host "Accounts with NTLM network logons: $($results.Statistics.NtlmNetworkLogonAccounts)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host "Brute force indicators: $($results.BruteForceIndicators.Count)" -ForegroundColor $(if ($results.BruteForceIndicators.Count -gt 0) { 'Red' } else { 'Green' })
if ($IncludeSuccessful) {
Write-Host "Unusual successful logons: $($results.UnusualLogons.Count)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
# Export if requested
if ($ExportPath) {
if (-not (Test-Path $ExportPath)) {
New-Item -Path $ExportPath -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
}
$exportFile = Join-Path -Path $ExportPath -ChildPath "AuthenticationAnalysis_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').json"
$results | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5 | Out-File -FilePath $exportFile -Encoding UTF8
Write-Host "`nResults exported to: $exportFile" -ForegroundColor Cyan
}
return $results
}
}