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A comprehensive Windows security auditing and threat detection toolkit. Features 58 production-ready PowerShell functions organized into 14 modules for enterprise-grade security assessment, compliance validation, and incident response.

PowerShell

v1.6.0: Locale-invariant auditing — APIs/GUIDs/SIDs replace localized text parsing

Okan YILDIZ1a2aa9943444
diff --git a/Analysis/Get-RegistryAnalysis.ps1 b/Analysis/Get-RegistryAnalysis.ps1
index 8729279..7088287 100644
--- a/Analysis/Get-RegistryAnalysis.ps1
+++ b/Analysis/Get-RegistryAnalysis.ps1
@@ -274,8 +274,16 @@ function Get-RegistryAnalysis {
$acl = Get-Acl -Path $keyPath -ErrorAction Stop
# Check for overly permissive access
+ $permissiveSids = @('S-1-1-0', 'S-1-5-32-545', 'S-1-5-11')
foreach ($access in $acl.Access) {
- if ($access.IdentityReference -match '(Everyone|Users|Authenticated Users)' -and
+ $isPermissiveIdentity = $false
+ foreach ($sid in $permissiveSids) {
+ if (Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $access.IdentityReference -Sid $sid) {
+ $isPermissiveIdentity = $true
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ if ($isPermissiveIdentity -and
$access.RegistryRights -match '(FullControl|Write|Modify)') {
$results.PermissionIssues += [PSCustomObject]@{
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index abc1065..ea7988f 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -7,6 +7,30 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased]
+## [1.6.0] - 2026-10-26
+
+### Added
+
+- Locale-invariant Windows support: new internal helpers in `Private/` replace all localized console-output parsing with APIs, GUIDs and SIDs, so the module produces correct results on non-English Windows (Turkish, German, French, ...):
+ - `Get-AuditPolicyTable`: advanced audit policy via `AuditQuerySystemPolicy` P/Invoke (GUID-keyed, privilege-failure aware), falling back to `auditpol /backup` fixed-header CSV parsing (numeric Setting Value, German-fixture tested) and GUID-addressed `auditpol /get` with honest "unknown" instead of guessing from localized text. Includes the full 59-subcategory GUID map (MS-GPAC).
+ - `Get-LocalPasswordPolicy`: password/lockout policy via `NetUserModalsGet` (levels 0+3, non-admin, locale-invariant) with an elevated `secedit /export` fallback that also covers `PasswordComplexity`/`ClearTextPassword`.
+ - `Get-WlanProfileList`: WLAN profiles via `wlanapi.dll` P/Invoke instead of localized `netsh wlan show profiles` output; missing WLAN service/feature is "not applicable", not an error.
+ - Identity helpers: `Get-AdminGroupMembers` (SID-first with ADSI fallback, 32-bit-PowerShell and unresolvable-SID safe), `Get-LocalUserByRid` (RID 500/501 instead of localized names), `Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid`, `Get-WellKnownSid`.
+- Locale regression test suite (`tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1`): English/German (ANSI cp1252) auditpol fixture equivalence tests and a static "no text readers" guard that fails the build if localized-output parsing (`auditpol /get`, `net accounts`, name-based group/user lookups, string identities in ACL rules) ever re-enters the codebase.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Silent false PASS on non-English Windows across compliance checks: `Guest`/`Administrator` account checks (PCI 7.1.1, CIS 2.3.1.1/2.3.1.5, NIST AC-2) and `Administrators` group membership checks (Invoke-SecurityAssessment, Get-MultiSystemAudit, Invoke-EnterpriseSecurityScan) failed closed-by-accident (lookup exception swallowed → "0 admins"/"disabled" → pass). All now SID/RID-based and report an honest "unable to determine" state on lookup failure.
+- Audit policy checks (PCI 10.2.1/10.3.1, NIST AU-2/AU-12, CIS 17.1.1/17.2.1/17.5.1) and password policy checks (PCI 8.2.3/8.2.4, NIST IA-2/IA-5) never matched on localized `auditpol`/`net accounts` output.
+- `Enable-AuditPolicies`: `auditpol /set` now uses subcategory GUIDs (worked only on English Windows before); post-change verification no longer parses localized text; file/registry SACLs for "Everyone" use SID `S-1-1-0` (audit rules were silently never applied on non-English systems).
+- ACL lockdowns of the scheduled-scan script (embeds the webhook secret) and of memory dumps (potentially credential-bearing) threw `IdentityNotMappedException` on non-English Windows and left the files world-readable — now SID-based (`S-1-5-18`, `S-1-5-32-544`) with post-`Set-Acl` verification for dump files.
+- `Get-SecurityMisconfigurations` world-writable check and `Get-RegistryAnalysis` permissive-ACL check matched localized identity names ('Everyone'/'Users') and never fired on non-English systems — now SID-based.
+- `Find-DefenseEvasion` Defender 5007 severity keyed off localized event message text — now uses the structured registry-path property.
+- `Get-FileSystemJournal`: elevation/permission detection now uses `$LASTEXITCODE` instead of English error text; localized fsutil output produces an explicit warning instead of silently empty forensic evidence; timestamp parsing is invariant-culture only.
+- `Test-SystemIntegrity`: SFC/DISM verdicts no longer rely on localized English sentences — exit codes plus locale-stable CBS.log `[SR]`/`Cannot repair` markers are primary.
+- `Set-SecurityBaseline`: `net accounts`/`bcdedit` failures are now surfaced via `$LASTEXITCODE` warnings instead of silently passing.
+- `Find-APTIndicators`: service matching uses the non-localized service `Name` only, not the SCM-localized `DisplayName`.
+
## [1.5.0] - 2026-10-25
### Added
diff --git a/Compliance/Test-CISBenchmark.ps1 b/Compliance/Test-CISBenchmark.ps1
index 191e77d..0fe975f 100644
--- a/Compliance/Test-CISBenchmark.ps1
+++ b/Compliance/Test-CISBenchmark.ps1
@@ -231,48 +231,71 @@ function Test-CISBenchmark {
try {
# CIS 17.1.1 - Audit Credential Validation
- $auditResult = auditpol /get /subcategory:"Credential Validation" 2>$null
- $auditStatus = if ($auditResult -match "Success and Failure") { "Success and Failure" } else { "Not Configured" }
-
+ $auditTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'Credential Validation', 'Application Group Management', 'Account Lockout'
+ $credentialValidationGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Credential Validation'
+ $credentialValidation = $null
+ if ($null -ne $credentialValidationGuid) {
+ $credentialValidationKey = ($credentialValidationGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ $credentialValidation = $auditTable[$credentialValidationKey]
+ }
+
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'CIS-17.1.1'
ControlName = 'Audit Credential Validation'
Category = 'AuditPolicy'
Expected = 'Success and Failure'
- Actual = $auditStatus
- Status = if ($auditStatus -eq "Success and Failure") { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $credentialValidation -or $null -eq $credentialValidation.Value) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($credentialValidation.Success -and $credentialValidation.Failure) { 'Success and Failure' }
+ elseif ($credentialValidation.Success) { 'Success' }
+ elseif ($credentialValidation.Failure) { 'Failure' } else { 'No Auditing' }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $credentialValidation -or $null -eq $credentialValidation.Value) { 'Manual' }
+ elseif ($credentialValidation.Value -eq 3) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
Severity = 'High'
Remediation = 'Configure to audit Success and Failure'
}
$results.Controls += $control
-
+
# CIS 17.2.1 - Audit Application Group Management
- $auditResult = auditpol /get /subcategory:"Application Group Management" 2>$null
- $auditStatus = if ($auditResult -match "Success and Failure") { "Success and Failure" } else { "Not Configured" }
-
+ $appGroupGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Application Group Management'
+ $appGroupManagement = $null
+ if ($null -ne $appGroupGuid) {
+ $appGroupKey = ($appGroupGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ $appGroupManagement = $auditTable[$appGroupKey]
+ }
+
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'CIS-17.2.1'
ControlName = 'Audit Application Group Management'
Category = 'AuditPolicy'
Expected = 'Success and Failure'
- Actual = $auditStatus
- Status = if ($auditStatus -eq "Success and Failure") { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $appGroupManagement -or $null -eq $appGroupManagement.Value) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($appGroupManagement.Success -and $appGroupManagement.Failure) { 'Success and Failure' }
+ elseif ($appGroupManagement.Success) { 'Success' }
+ elseif ($appGroupManagement.Failure) { 'Failure' } else { 'No Auditing' }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $appGroupManagement -or $null -eq $appGroupManagement.Value) { 'Manual' }
+ elseif ($appGroupManagement.Value -eq 3) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
Severity = 'Medium'
Remediation = 'Configure to audit Success and Failure'
}
$results.Controls += $control
-
+
# CIS 17.5.1 - Audit Account Lockout
- $auditResult = auditpol /get /subcategory:"Account Lockout" 2>$null
- $auditStatus = if ($auditResult -match "Success|Failure") { "Configured" } else { "Not Configured" }
-
+ $accountLockoutGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Account Lockout'
+ $accountLockout = $null
+ if ($null -ne $accountLockoutGuid) {
+ $accountLockoutKey = ($accountLockoutGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ $accountLockout = $auditTable[$accountLockoutKey]
+ }
+
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'CIS-17.5.1'
ControlName = 'Audit Account Lockout'
Category = 'AuditPolicy'
Expected = 'Success'
- Actual = $auditStatus
- Status = if ($auditStatus -eq "Configured") { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $accountLockout -or $null -eq $accountLockout.Value) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($accountLockout.Value -ge 1 -and $accountLockout.Value -le 3) { 'Configured' } else { 'Not Configured' }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $accountLockout -or $null -eq $accountLockout.Value) { 'Manual' }
+ elseif ($accountLockout.Value -ge 1 -and $accountLockout.Value -le 3) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
Severity = 'Medium'
Remediation = 'Configure to audit Success'
}
@@ -289,30 +312,34 @@ function Test-CISBenchmark {
try {
# CIS 2.3.1.1 - Accounts: Administrator account status
- $adminUser = Get-LocalUser -Name "Administrator" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
- $adminDisabled = if ($adminUser) { $adminUser.Enabled } else { $false }
+ $adminUser = Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ $adminKnown = ($null -ne $adminUser) -and ($null -ne $adminUser.Enabled)
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'CIS-2.3.1.1'
ControlName = 'Accounts: Administrator account status'
Category = 'SecurityOptions'
Expected = 'Disabled'
- Actual = if ($adminDisabled -eq $false) { 'Disabled' } else { 'Enabled' }
- Status = if ($adminDisabled -eq $false) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
+ Actual = if (-not $adminKnown) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($adminUser.Enabled) { 'Enabled' } else { 'Disabled' }
+ Status = if (-not $adminKnown) { 'Manual' }
+ elseif ($adminUser.Enabled) { 'Fail' } else { 'Pass' }
Severity = 'High'
Remediation = 'Disable the built-in Administrator account'
}
$results.Controls += $control
-
+
# CIS 2.3.1.5 - Accounts: Guest account status
- $guestUser = Get-LocalUser -Name "Guest" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
- $guestDisabled = if ($guestUser) { $guestUser.Enabled } else { $false }
+ $guestUser = Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 501 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ $guestKnown = ($null -ne $guestUser) -and ($null -ne $guestUser.Enabled)
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'CIS-2.3.1.5'
ControlName = 'Accounts: Guest account status'
Category = 'SecurityOptions'
Expected = 'Disabled'
- Actual = if ($guestDisabled -eq $false) { 'Disabled' } else { 'Enabled' }
- Status = if ($guestDisabled -eq $false) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }
+ Actual = if (-not $guestKnown) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($guestUser.Enabled) { 'Enabled' } else { 'Disabled' }
+ Status = if (-not $guestKnown) { 'Manual' }
+ elseif ($guestUser.Enabled) { 'Fail' } else { 'Pass' }
Severity = 'High'
Remediation = 'Disable the Guest account'
}
diff --git a/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1 b/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1
index 76a471a..50ed949 100644
--- a/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1
+++ b/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1
@@ -95,19 +95,22 @@ function Test-NISTCompliance {
try {
# AC-2: Account Management
- $guestUser = Get-LocalUser -Name "Guest" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
- $guestDisabled = ($null -eq $guestUser) -or ($guestUser.Enabled -eq $false)
- $adminUser = Get-LocalUser -Name "Administrator" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
- $adminDisabled = ($null -eq $adminUser) -or ($adminUser.Enabled -eq $false)
-
+ $guestUser = Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 501 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ $guestKnown = ($null -ne $guestUser) -and ($null -ne $guestUser.Enabled)
+ $guestDisabled = $guestKnown -and ($guestUser.Enabled -eq $false)
+ $adminUser = Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ $adminKnown = ($null -ne $adminUser) -and ($null -ne $adminUser.Enabled)
+ $adminDisabled = $adminKnown -and ($adminUser.Enabled -eq $false)
+
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'AC-2'
ControlName = 'Account Management'
ControlFamily = 'AccessControl'
Description = 'Guest and default Administrator accounts should be disabled'
Expected = 'Guest and Administrator accounts disabled'
- Actual = "Guest: $(if($guestDisabled){'Disabled'}else{'Enabled'}), Admin: $(if($adminDisabled){'Disabled'}else{'Enabled'})"
- Status = if ($guestDisabled -and $adminDisabled) { 'Compliant' }
+ Actual = "Guest: $(if(-not $guestKnown){'Unknown'}elseif($guestDisabled){'Disabled'}else{'Enabled'}), Admin: $(if(-not $adminKnown){'Unknown'}elseif($adminDisabled){'Disabled'}else{'Enabled'})"
+ Status = if (-not $guestKnown -or -not $adminKnown) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($guestDisabled -and $adminDisabled) { 'Compliant' }
elseif ($guestDisabled -or $adminDisabled) { 'PartiallyCompliant' }
else { 'NonCompliant' }
Impact = 'High'
@@ -177,17 +180,24 @@ function Test-NISTCompliance {
try {
# AU-2: Audit Events
- $auditLogons = auditpol /get /subcategory:"Logon" 2>$null
- $auditConfigured = $auditLogons -match "Success and Failure|Success|Failure"
-
+ $logonGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Logon'
+ $logonAuditValue = $null
+ if ($null -ne $logonGuid) {
+ $logonTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'Logon'
+ $logonKey = ($logonGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ if ($logonTable.ContainsKey($logonKey)) { $logonAuditValue = $logonTable[$logonKey].Value }
+ }
+
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'AU-2'
ControlName = 'Audit Events'
ControlFamily = 'AuditAccountability'
Description = 'System must audit significant security events'
Expected = 'Audit policies configured'
- Actual = if ($auditConfigured) { "Configured" } else { "Not configured" }
- Status = if ($auditConfigured) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $logonAuditValue) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($logonAuditValue -ge 1 -and $logonAuditValue -le 3) { "Configured" } else { "Not configured" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $logonAuditValue) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($logonAuditValue -ge 1 -and $logonAuditValue -le 3) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
Impact = 'High'
Remediation = 'Enable audit policies for security events'
}
@@ -216,7 +226,7 @@ function Test-NISTCompliance {
$acl = Get-Acl $logPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$protected = @()
if ($acl) {
- $protected = @($acl.Access | Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -match "Users" -and $_.FileSystemRights -match "FullControl|Modify|Write" })
+ $protected = @($acl.Access | Where-Object { (Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid 'S-1-5-32-545') -and $_.FileSystemRights -match "FullControl|Modify|Write" })
}
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
@@ -234,17 +244,24 @@ function Test-NISTCompliance {
}
# AU-12: Audit Generation
- $auditProcessCreation = auditpol /get /subcategory:"Process Creation" 2>$null
- $processAuditConfigured = $auditProcessCreation -match "Success"
-
+ $processCreationGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Process Creation'
+ $processAuditEntry = $null
+ if ($null -ne $processCreationGuid) {
+ $processTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'Process Creation'
+ $processKey = ($processCreationGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ if ($processTable.ContainsKey($processKey)) { $processAuditEntry = $processTable[$processKey] }
+ }
+
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
ControlID = 'AU-12'
ControlName = 'Audit Generation'
ControlFamily = 'AuditAccountability'
Description = 'System must generate audit records for defined events'
Expected = 'Process creation auditing enabled'
- Actual = if ($processAuditConfigured) { "Enabled" } else { "Disabled" }
- Status = if ($processAuditConfigured) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $processAuditEntry -or $null -eq $processAuditEntry.Value) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($processAuditEntry.Success) { "Enabled" } else { "Disabled" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $processAuditEntry -or $null -eq $processAuditEntry.Value) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($processAuditEntry.Success) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
Impact = 'Medium'
Remediation = 'Enable process creation auditing'
}
@@ -261,48 +278,42 @@ function Test-NISTCompliance {
try {
# IA-2: Identification and Authentication
- $passwordPolicy = net accounts 2>$null
- $minPasswordLengthLine = $passwordPolicy | Select-String "Minimum password length" | Select-Object -First 1
-
- if ($minPasswordLengthLine) {
- $minPasswordLength = $minPasswordLengthLine.ToString().Split(':')[1].Trim()
+ $passwordPolicy = Get-LocalPasswordPolicy
+ $minPasswordLength = $passwordPolicy.MinPasswordLength
- $control = [PSCustomObject]@{
- ControlID = 'IA-2'
- ControlName = 'Identification and Authentication'
- ControlFamily = 'IdentificationAuthentication'
- Description = 'System must uniquely identify and authenticate users'
- Expected = 'Minimum password length >= 14 characters'
- Actual = "$minPasswordLength characters"
- Status = if ([int]$minPasswordLength -ge 14) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
- Impact = 'High'
- Remediation = 'Set minimum password length to 14 characters'
- }
- $results.Controls += $control
+ $control = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ ControlID = 'IA-2'
+ ControlName = 'Identification and Authentication'
+ ControlFamily = 'IdentificationAuthentication'
+ Description = 'System must uniquely identify and authenticate users'
+ Expected = 'Minimum password length >= 14 characters'
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $minPasswordLength) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ else { "$minPasswordLength characters" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $minPasswordLength) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($minPasswordLength -ge 14) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
+ Impact = 'High'
+ Remediation = 'Set minimum password length to 14 characters'
}
+ $results.Controls += $control
# IA-5: Authenticator Management
- $maxPasswordAgeLine = $passwordPolicy | Select-String "Maximum password age" | Select-Object -First 1
-
- if ($maxPasswordAgeLine) {
- $maxPasswordAge = $maxPasswordAgeLine.ToString().Split(':')[1].Trim().Split(' ')[0]
- $maxAgeDays = 0
- $maxAgeIsNumeric = [int]::TryParse($maxPasswordAge, [ref]$maxAgeDays)
+ $maxAgeDays = $passwordPolicy.MaxPasswordAgeDays
- $control = [PSCustomObject]@{
- ControlID = 'IA-5'
- ControlName = 'Authenticator Management'
- ControlFamily = 'IdentificationAuthentication'
- Description = 'Authenticators must be managed securely'
- Expected = 'Maximum password age <= 60 days'
- Actual = "$maxPasswordAge days"
- Status = if ($maxAgeIsNumeric -and $maxAgeDays -le 60 -and $maxAgeDays -gt 0) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
- Impact = 'High'
- Remediation = 'Set maximum password age to 60 days or less'
- }
- $results.Controls += $control
+ $control = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ ControlID = 'IA-5'
+ ControlName = 'Authenticator Management'
+ ControlFamily = 'IdentificationAuthentication'
+ Description = 'Authenticators must be managed securely'
+ Expected = 'Maximum password age <= 60 days'
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $maxAgeDays) { 'Unable to determine' }
+ elseif ($maxAgeDays -eq -1) { 'Never expires' } else { "$maxAgeDays days" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $maxAgeDays) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($maxAgeDays -gt 0 -and $maxAgeDays -le 60) { 'Compliant' } else { 'NonCompliant' }
+ Impact = 'High'
+ Remediation = 'Set maximum password age to 60 days or less'
}
-
+ $results.Controls += $control
+
# IA-8: Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)
$regTest = Test-RegistryValue -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa' `
-Name 'LimitBlankPasswordUse' -ExpectedValue 1
diff --git a/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1 b/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1
index dd6a77a..662e0b6 100644
--- a/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1
+++ b/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1
@@ -208,64 +208,61 @@ function Test-PCI-DSS {
try {
# Req 7.1: Limit access to system components
- $guestUser = Get-LocalUser -Name "Guest" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
- $guestDisabled = ($null -eq $guestUser) -or ($guestUser.Enabled -eq $false)
-
+ $guestUser = Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 501 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ $guestKnown = ($null -ne $guestUser) -and ($null -ne $guestUser.Enabled)
+ $guestDisabled = $guestKnown -and ($guestUser.Enabled -eq $false)
+
$req = [PSCustomObject]@{
RequirementID = '7.1.1'
RequirementName = 'Access Limitations'
Category = 'AccessControl'
Description = 'Unnecessary accounts must be disabled'
Expected = 'Guest account disabled'
- Actual = if ($guestDisabled) { "Disabled" } else { "Enabled" }
- Status = if ($guestDisabled) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
+ Actual = if (-not $guestKnown) { 'Unable to determine (insufficient privileges or unsupported platform)' }
+ elseif ($guestDisabled) { "Disabled" } else { "Enabled" }
+ Status = if (-not $guestKnown) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($guestDisabled) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
Priority = 'High'
Remediation = 'Disable Guest and other unnecessary accounts'
}
$results.Requirements += $req
# Req 8.2: User identification and authentication
- $passwordPolicy = net accounts 2>$null
- $minPasswordLengthLine = $passwordPolicy | Select-String "Minimum password length" | Select-Object -First 1
-
- if ($minPasswordLengthLine) {
- $minPasswordLength = $minPasswordLengthLine.ToString().Split(':')[1].Trim()
+ $passwordPolicy = Get-LocalPasswordPolicy
+ $minPasswordLength = $passwordPolicy.MinPasswordLength
- $req = [PSCustomObject]@{
- RequirementID = '8.2.3'
- RequirementName = 'Password Complexity'
- Category = 'AccessControl'
- Description = 'Passwords must meet minimum complexity'
- Expected = 'Minimum 12 characters (or 8 if MFA)'
- Actual = "$minPasswordLength characters"
- Status = if ([int]$minPasswordLength -ge 12) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
- Priority = 'Critical'
- Remediation = 'Set minimum password length to 12 characters'
- }
- $results.Requirements += $req
+ $req = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ RequirementID = '8.2.3'
+ RequirementName = 'Password Complexity'
+ Category = 'AccessControl'
+ Description = 'Passwords must meet minimum complexity'
+ Expected = 'Minimum 12 characters (or 8 if MFA)'
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $minPasswordLength) { 'Unable to determine (insufficient privileges or unsupported platform)' }
+ else { "$minPasswordLength characters" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $minPasswordLength) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($minPasswordLength -ge 12) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
+ Priority = 'Critical'
+ Remediation = 'Set minimum password length to 12 characters'
}
+ $results.Requirements += $req
# Req 8.2.4: Change passwords every 90 days
- $maxPasswordAgeLine = $passwordPolicy | Select-String "Maximum password age" | Select-Object -First 1
-
- if ($maxPasswordAgeLine) {
- $maxPasswordAge = $maxPasswordAgeLine.ToString().Split(':')[1].Trim().Split(' ')[0]
- $maxAgeDays = 0
- $maxAgeIsNumeric = [int]::TryParse($maxPasswordAge, [ref]$maxAgeDays)
+ $maxAgeDays = $passwordPolicy.MaxPasswordAgeDays
- $req = [PSCustomObject]@{
- RequirementID = '8.2.4'
- RequirementName = 'Password Change Frequency'
- Category = 'AccessControl'
- Description = 'Passwords must be changed periodically'
- Expected = '90 days or less'
- Actual = "$maxPasswordAge days"
- Status = if ($maxAgeIsNumeric -and $maxAgeDays -le 90 -and $maxAgeDays -gt 0) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
- Priority = 'High'
- Remediation = 'Set maximum password age to 90 days'
- }
- $results.Requirements += $req
+ $req = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ RequirementID = '8.2.4'
+ RequirementName = 'Password Change Frequency'
+ Category = 'AccessControl'
+ Description = 'Passwords must be changed periodically'
+ Expected = '90 days or less'
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $maxAgeDays) { 'Unable to determine (insufficient privileges or unsupported platform)' }
+ elseif ($maxAgeDays -eq -1) { 'Never expires' } else { "$maxAgeDays days" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $maxAgeDays) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($maxAgeDays -gt 0 -and $maxAgeDays -le 90) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
+ Priority = 'High'
+ Remediation = 'Set maximum password age to 90 days'
}
+ $results.Requirements += $req
# Req 8.3: Multi-factor authentication
$req = [PSCustomObject]@{
@@ -292,34 +289,48 @@ function Test-PCI-DSS {
try {
# Req 10.2: Audit logs for all users
- $auditLogons = auditpol /get /subcategory:"Logon" 2>$null
- $logonAuditEnabled = $auditLogons -match "Success and Failure"
-
+ $logonGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Logon'
+ $logonAuditValue = $null
+ if ($null -ne $logonGuid) {
+ $logonTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'Logon'
+ $logonKey = ($logonGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ if ($logonTable.ContainsKey($logonKey)) { $logonAuditValue = $logonTable[$logonKey].Value }
+ }
+
$req = [PSCustomObject]@{
RequirementID = '10.2.1'
RequirementName = 'User Access Logging'
Category = 'Monitoring'
Description = 'All access to system components must be logged'
Expected = 'Logon auditing: Success and Failure'
- Actual = if ($logonAuditEnabled) { "Enabled" } else { "Not configured" }
- Status = if ($logonAuditEnabled) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $logonAuditValue) { 'Unable to determine (insufficient privileges or unsupported platform)' }
+ elseif ($logonAuditValue -eq 3) { "Enabled" } else { "Not configured" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $logonAuditValue) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($logonAuditValue -eq 3) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
Priority = 'Critical'
Remediation = 'Enable audit policy for Logon events'
}
$results.Requirements += $req
-
+
# Req 10.3: Audit trail content
- $auditObjectAccess = auditpol /get /subcategory:"File System" 2>$null
- $objectAuditEnabled = $auditObjectAccess -match "Success|Failure"
-
+ $fileSystemGuid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'File System'
+ $objectAuditValue = $null
+ if ($null -ne $fileSystemGuid) {
+ $fileSystemTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'File System'
+ $fileSystemKey = ($fileSystemGuid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ if ($fileSystemTable.ContainsKey($fileSystemKey)) { $objectAuditValue = $fileSystemTable[$fileSystemKey].Value }
+ }
+
$req = [PSCustomObject]@{
RequirementID = '10.3.1'
RequirementName = 'Audit Trail Details'
Category = 'Monitoring'
Description = 'Logs must contain sufficient detail'
Expected = 'File system auditing enabled'
- Actual = if ($objectAuditEnabled) { "Enabled" } else { "Not configured" }
- Status = if ($objectAuditEnabled) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
+ Actual = if ($null -eq $objectAuditValue) { 'Unable to determine (insufficient privileges or unsupported platform)' }
+ elseif ($objectAuditValue -ge 1) { "Enabled" } else { "Not configured" }
+ Status = if ($null -eq $objectAuditValue) { 'NotApplicable' }
+ elseif ($objectAuditValue -ge 1 -and $objectAuditValue -le 3) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
Priority = 'High'
Remediation = 'Enable file system object access auditing'
}
diff --git a/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1 b/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1
index f6f4db4..068007a 100644
--- a/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1
+++ b/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1
@@ -49,27 +49,44 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
# Run SFC scan
Write-Host "Running System File Checker (SFC)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$sfcOutput = & sfc /scannow 2>&1 | Out-String
-
- # Parse SFC results
- if ($sfcOutput -match "Windows Resource Protection found corrupt files") {
+ $sfcExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
+
+ # SFC output text is fully localized; the exit code and the CBS.log
+ # '[SR]'/'Cannot repair' tokens (written in English by the SFC engine
+ # regardless of UI language) are the locale-invariant sources
+ $cbsLogPath = "$env:windir\Logs\CBS\CBS.log"
+ $cbsLogAvailable = Test-Path $cbsLogPath
+ $cannotRepairLines = @()
+ if ($cbsLogAvailable) {
+ $cannotRepairLines = @(Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
+ Where-Object { $_ -match '\[SR\]' -and $_ -match 'Cannot repair' })
+ }
+
+ if ($sfcExitCode -ne 0) {
+ $results.SFCResult = "SFC could not complete scan - may need to run in Safe Mode"
+ Write-Warning "SFC could not complete the scan (exit code $sfcExitCode)"
+ }
+ elseif ($cannotRepairLines.Count -gt 0 -or
+ (-not $cbsLogAvailable -and $sfcOutput -match "Windows Resource Protection found corrupt files")) {
$results.SFCResult = "Corrupt files found"
-
- # Get CBS log details (with error handling)
- $cbsLogPath = "$env:windir\Logs\CBS\CBS.log"
- if (Test-Path $cbsLogPath) {
- $cbsLog = Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
+
+ if ($cannotRepairLines.Count -gt 0) {
+ $results.CorruptedFiles = $cannotRepairLines
+ }
+ elseif ($cbsLogAvailable) {
+ $cbsLog = Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_ -match "corrupt" -or $_ -match "repaired" }
if ($cbsLog) {
$results.CorruptedFiles = $cbsLog
}
}
-
+
if ($RepairFiles) {
Write-Host "Attempting to repair corrupt files..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$results.RepairAttempted = $true
}
}
- elseif ($sfcOutput -match "Windows Resource Protection did not find any integrity violations") {
+ elseif ($cbsLogAvailable -or $sfcOutput -match "Windows Resource Protection did not find any integrity violations") {
$results.SFCResult = "No integrity violations found"
Write-Host "SFC: No integrity violations found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
@@ -84,30 +101,52 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
# Run DISM if detailed scan requested
if ($DetailedScan) {
Write-Host "Running DISM health check..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
-
+
# Check image health
$dismCheck = & dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /CheckHealth 2>&1 | Out-String
-
- if ($dismCheck -match "No component store corruption detected") {
- $results.DISMResult = "Healthy"
- Write-Host "DISM: System image is healthy" -ForegroundColor Green
+ $dismCheckExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
+
+ # DISM output text is fully localized and CheckHealth returns 0 for
+ # both 'healthy' and 'repairable', so the exit code alone cannot
+ # separate those; servicing-stack CBS.log markers ('[SR]'/'Cannot
+ # repair', component-store corruption) are written in English
+ $storeCorruptionLines = @()
+ if ($cbsLogAvailable) {
+ $storeCorruptionLines = @(Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
+ Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)component store' -and $_ -match '(?i)corrupt' })
+ }
+
+ $repairable = ($storeCorruptionLines.Count -gt 0) -or ($dismCheck -match "The component store is repairable")
+
+ if ($dismCheckExitCode -ne 0) {
+ $results.DISMResult = "DISM CheckHealth failed (exit code $dismCheckExitCode) - review CBS.log"
+ Write-Warning "DISM CheckHealth failed with exit code $dismCheckExitCode"
}
- elseif ($dismCheck -match "The component store is repairable") {
+ elseif ($repairable) {
$results.DISMResult = "Repairable corruption detected"
-
+
if ($RepairFiles) {
Write-Host "Attempting DISM repair..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
- $dismRepair = & dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /RestoreHealth 2>&1 | Out-String
-
- if ($dismRepair -match "The restore operation completed successfully") {
+ $null = & dism /Online /Cleanup-Image /RestoreHealth 2>&1 | Out-String
+ $dismRepairExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
+
+ if ($dismRepairExitCode -eq 0) {
$results.RepairSuccessful = $true
$results.DISMResult = "Repaired successfully"
Write-Host "DISM repair completed successfully" -ForegroundColor Green
}
+ else {
+ $results.DISMResult = "Repair failed (exit code $dismRepairExitCode) - review CBS.log"
+ Write-Warning "DISM RestoreHealth failed with exit code $dismRepairExitCode"
+ }
}
}
+ elseif ($dismCheck -match "No component store corruption detected") {
+ $results.DISMResult = "Healthy"
+ Write-Host "DISM: System image is healthy" -ForegroundColor Green
+ }
else {
- $results.DISMResult = "Check completed"
+ $results.DISMResult = "Check completed - review CBS.log"
}
}
diff --git a/Detection/Find-DefenseEvasion.ps1 b/Detection/Find-DefenseEvasion.ps1
index 86a08e3..ec33231 100644
--- a/Detection/Find-DefenseEvasion.ps1
+++ b/Detection/Find-DefenseEvasion.ps1
@@ -410,7 +410,17 @@ function Find-DefenseEvasion {
elseif (5007 -eq $eventId) {
$sev = 'Medium'
$desc = 'Defender configuration changed'
- if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($msg) -and $msg -match '(?i)exclusion') {
+ $exclusionPath = $null
+ if ($null -ne $evt.PSObject.Properties['Properties'] -and $null -ne $evt.Properties) {
+ foreach ($prop in $evt.Properties) {
+ if ($null -ne $prop -and $null -ne $prop.Value -and
+ $prop.Value -is [string] -and $prop.Value -match '(?i)\\Exclusions\\') {
+ $exclusionPath = $prop.Value
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ($null -ne $exclusionPath) {
$sev = 'High'
$desc = 'Defender exclusion changed'
}
diff --git a/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1 b/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1
index d139d4a..a974be9 100644
--- a/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1
+++ b/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1
@@ -191,8 +191,18 @@ function Get-MultiSystemAudit {
}
# Admin accounts
- $admins = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
- if ($admins.Count -le 2) {
+ $admins = @()
+ $adminLookupSucceeded = $false
+ if (Get-Command Get-AdminGroupMembers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ $admins = @(Get-AdminGroupMembers)
+ $adminLookupSucceeded = ((Get-Variable -Name AdminGroupLookupSucceeded -Scope Script -ValueOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) -eq $true)
+ }
+ if (-not $adminLookupSucceeded) {
+ $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Severity = 'Low'
+ Finding = 'Unable to determine administrator count'
+ }
+ } elseif ($admins.Count -le 2) {
$score += 15
} else {
$findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
@@ -267,8 +277,18 @@ function Get-MultiSystemAudit {
}
# Admin accounts
- $admins = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
- if ($admins.Count -le 2) {
+ $admins = @()
+ $adminLookupSucceeded = $false
+ if (Get-Command Get-AdminGroupMembers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ $admins = @(Get-AdminGroupMembers)
+ $adminLookupSucceeded = ((Get-Variable -Name AdminGroupLookupSucceeded -Scope Script -ValueOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) -eq $true)
+ }
+ if (-not $adminLookupSucceeded) {
+ $findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Severity = 'Low'
+ Finding = 'Unable to determine administrator count'
+ }
+ } elseif ($admins.Count -le 2) {
$score += 15
} else {
$findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
diff --git a/Enterprise/Invoke-EnterpriseSecurityScan.ps1 b/Enterprise/Invoke-EnterpriseSecurityScan.ps1
index a0d3236..f712257 100644
--- a/Enterprise/Invoke-EnterpriseSecurityScan.ps1
+++ b/Enterprise/Invoke-EnterpriseSecurityScan.ps1
@@ -329,15 +329,25 @@ function Invoke-EnterpriseSecurityScan {
# Additional checks for Standard/Comprehensive scans
if ($ScanType -in @('Standard', 'Comprehensive')) {
# Check for admin accounts
- $adminCount = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Count
- $result.Details.AdminAccounts = $adminCount
+ $adminAccounts = @()
+ $adminLookupSucceeded = $false
+ if (Get-Command Get-AdminGroupMembers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ $adminAccounts = @(Get-AdminGroupMembers)
+ $adminLookupSucceeded = ((Get-Variable -Name AdminGroupLookupSucceeded -Scope Script -ValueOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) -eq $true)
+ }
+ if ($adminLookupSucceeded) {
+ $adminCount = $adminAccounts.Count
+ $result.Details.AdminAccounts = $adminCount
- if ($adminCount -gt 3) {
- $result.Findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
- Severity = 'Medium'
- Category = 'Accounts'
- Finding = "$adminCount administrator accounts (excessive)"
+ if ($adminCount -gt 3) {
+ $result.Findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Severity = 'Medium'
+ Category = 'Accounts'
+ Finding = "$adminCount administrator accounts (excessive)"
+ }
}
+ } else {
+ $result.Details.AdminAccounts = 'Unknown'
}
# Check for suspicious services
diff --git a/Enterprise/Invoke-SecurityAssessment.ps1 b/Enterprise/Invoke-SecurityAssessment.ps1
index 10ba55b..ba66f28 100644
--- a/Enterprise/Invoke-SecurityAssessment.ps1
+++ b/Enterprise/Invoke-SecurityAssessment.ps1
@@ -378,12 +378,9 @@ function Invoke-SecurityAssessment {
}
}
- # WiFi security (if applicable; netsh absent on non-Windows or Server Core - guard the lookup)
- $wifiProfiles = $null
- if (Get-Command netsh -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
- $wifiProfiles = netsh wlan show profiles | Select-String "All User Profile"
- }
- if ($wifiProfiles) {
+ # WiFi security (if applicable)
+ $wifiProfiles = @(Get-WlanProfileList)
+ if ($wifiProfiles.Count -gt 0) {
$networkSecurity.CategoryScore += 10
$networkSecurity.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
Check = 'WiFi Profiles'
@@ -478,17 +475,25 @@ function Invoke-SecurityAssessment {
}
}
- # Password policy (net.exe absent on non-Windows - guard the lookup)
- $passwordPolicy = $null
- if (Get-Command net -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
- $passwordPolicy = net accounts
- }
- $accountSecurity.CategoryScore += 20
- $accountSecurity.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
- Check = 'Password Policy'
- Status = 'Info'
- Score = 20
- Details = 'Configured'
+ # Password policy
+ $passwordPolicy = Get-LocalPasswordPolicy
+ if ($null -ne $passwordPolicy -and $passwordPolicy.Source -ne 'Unavailable') {
+ $minLengthText = if ($null -eq $passwordPolicy.MinPasswordLength) { 'unknown' } else { "$($passwordPolicy.MinPasswordLength)" }
+ $maxAgeText = if ($null -eq $passwordPolicy.MaxPasswordAgeDays) { 'unknown' } elseif ($passwordPolicy.MaxPasswordAgeDays -lt 0) { 'never' } else { "$($passwordPolicy.MaxPasswordAgeDays) days" }
+ $accountSecurity.CategoryScore += 20
+ $accountSecurity.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Check = 'Password Policy'
+ Status = 'Info'
+ Score = 20
+ Details = "Min length: $minLengthText, Max age: $maxAgeText"
+ }
+ } else {
+ $accountSecurity.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Check = 'Password Policy'
+ Status = 'Warning'
+ Score = 0
+ Details = 'Unable to determine password policy'
+ }
}
# Accounts without passwords
@@ -518,8 +523,15 @@ function Invoke-SecurityAssessment {
}
# Administrator group members
- $admins = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
- if ($admins.Count -le 2) {
+ $admins = @(Get-AdminGroupMembers)
+ if ($script:AdminGroupLookupSucceeded -ne $true) {
+ $accountSecurity.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Check = 'Administrator Group Size'
+ Status = 'Warning'
+ Score = 0
+ Details = 'Unable to enumerate administrators'
+ }
+ } elseif ($admins.Count -le 2) {
$accountSecurity.CategoryScore += 20
$accountSecurity.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
Check = 'Administrator Group Size'
@@ -728,12 +740,12 @@ try {
}
}
- # Audit logging (auditpol absent on non-Windows - guard the lookup)
- $auditPolicy = $null
- if (Get-Command auditpol -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
- $auditPolicy = auditpol /get /category:* 2>&1
- }
- if ($auditPolicy -match 'Success') {
+ # Audit logging
+ $auditTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable
+ $auditEntries = if ($null -ne $auditTable) { @($auditTable.Values) } else { @() }
+ $auditedCount = @($auditEntries | Where-Object { $_.Success -or $_.Failure }).Count
+ $knownCount = @($auditEntries | Where-Object { $null -ne $_.Value }).Count
+ if ($auditedCount -gt 0) {
$dataProtection.CategoryScore += 15
$dataProtection.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
Check = 'Audit Logging'
@@ -741,6 +753,13 @@ try {
Score = 15
Details = 'Configured'
}
+ } elseif ($knownCount -eq 0) {
+ $dataProtection.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Check = 'Audit Logging'
+ Status = 'Warning'
+ Score = 0
+ Details = 'Unable to determine'
+ }
} else {
$dataProtection.Checks += [PSCustomObject]@{
Check = 'Audit Logging'
diff --git a/Enterprise/Register-ScheduledSecurityScan.ps1 b/Enterprise/Register-ScheduledSecurityScan.ps1
index 2afa10b..f394d27 100644
--- a/Enterprise/Register-ScheduledSecurityScan.ps1
+++ b/Enterprise/Register-ScheduledSecurityScan.ps1
@@ -684,7 +684,11 @@ exit 0
foreach ($existingRule in @($scriptAcl.Access)) {
$null = $scriptAcl.RemoveAccessRule($existingRule)
}
- foreach ($identity in @('NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM', 'BUILTIN\Administrators')) {
+ $aclIdentities = @(
+ (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-18')),
+ (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-544'))
+ )
+ foreach ($identity in $aclIdentities) {
$accessRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule(
$identity,
[System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemRights]::FullControl,
diff --git a/Forensics/Export-MemoryDump.ps1 b/Forensics/Export-MemoryDump.ps1
index b9212ff..01b9018 100644
--- a/Forensics/Export-MemoryDump.ps1
+++ b/Forensics/Export-MemoryDump.ps1
@@ -84,16 +84,17 @@ function Export-MemoryDump {
# in Register-ScheduledSecurityScan)
function Protect-DumpFile {
param([Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$Path)
- if ($env:OS -ne 'Windows_NT') { return }
+ if ($env:OS -ne 'Windows_NT') { return $true }
+ $requiredSids = @('S-1-5-18', 'S-1-5-32-544')
try {
$fileAcl = Get-Acl -Path $Path -ErrorAction Stop
$fileAcl.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
foreach ($existingRule in @($fileAcl.Access)) {
$null = $fileAcl.RemoveAccessRule($existingRule)
}
- foreach ($identity in @('NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM', 'BUILTIN\Administrators')) {
+ foreach ($sidString in $requiredSids) {
$accessRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule(
- $identity,
+ (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($sidString)),
[System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemRights]::FullControl,
[System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow)
$fileAcl.AddAccessRule($accessRule)
@@ -102,7 +103,23 @@ function Export-MemoryDump {
}
catch {
Write-Warning "Could not restrict permissions on '$Path'; the dump may contain credentials and may be readable by other local users: $_"
+ return $false
}
+
+ $appliedAcl = Get-Acl -Path $Path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ if ($null -eq $appliedAcl) {
+ Write-Warning "ACL verification FAILED on '$Path': could not re-read the ACL; the dump may contain credentials and may be readable by other local users."
+ return $false
+ }
+ $missingSids = @($requiredSids | Where-Object {
+ $sid = $_
+ -not @($appliedAcl.Access | Where-Object { Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid $sid }).Count
+ })
+ if ($missingSids.Count -gt 0) {
+ Write-Warning "ACL verification FAILED on '$Path': missing access rules for SID(s) $($missingSids -join ', '); the dump may contain credentials and may be readable by other local users."
+ return $false
+ }
+ return $true
}
}
@@ -365,7 +382,7 @@ public class ProcessDump {
if ($result.Success -and (Test-Path $dumpFilePath)) {
$dumpFile = Get-Item $dumpFilePath
$result.FileSize = $dumpFile.Length
- Protect-DumpFile -Path $dumpFilePath
+ $null = Protect-DumpFile -Path $dumpFilePath
$fileSizeMB = [Math]::Round($dumpFile.Length / 1MB, 2)
Write-Host "`n[SUCCESS] Memory dump created!" -ForegroundColor Green
@@ -382,7 +399,7 @@ public class ProcessDump {
Compress-Archive -Path $dumpFilePath -DestinationPath $zipPath -CompressionLevel Optimal
if (Test-Path $zipPath) {
- Protect-DumpFile -Path $zipPath
+ $null = Protect-DumpFile -Path $zipPath
$zipFile = Get-Item $zipPath
$zipSizeMB = [Math]::Round($zipFile.Length / 1MB, 2)
$compressionRatio = [Math]::Round((1 - ($zipFile.Length / $dumpFile.Length)) * 100, 1)
diff --git a/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1 b/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1
index b213174..d7c0375 100644
--- a/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1
+++ b/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1
@@ -113,11 +113,17 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
try {
$rawLines = @(Get-FsutilOutput -Arguments @('usn', 'readjournal', "$drive`:"))
+ $fsutilExitCode = $script:FsutilLastExitCode
- $denied = @($rawLines | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)administrative privileges|access is denied|requires elevation' })
- if ($denied.Count -gt 0) {
- Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal. Rerun from an elevated prompt."
- $result.Notes += "USN journal read failed: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -ne 0) {
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal (exit code 5). Rerun from an elevated prompt."
+ $result.Notes += "USN journal read failed: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil usn readjournal failed with exit code $fsutilExitCode."
+ $result.Notes += "USN journal read failed: fsutil exited with code $fsutilExitCode."
+ }
}
else {
$journalRecords = @(ConvertFrom-UsnJournalOutput -Lines $rawLines -MaxRecords $MaxRecords)
@@ -223,11 +229,17 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
try {
$ntfsLines = @(Get-FsutilOutput -Arguments @('fsinfo', 'ntfsinfo', "$drive`:"))
+ $fsutilExitCode = $script:FsutilLastExitCode
- $denied = @($ntfsLines | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)administrative privileges|access is denied|requires elevation' })
- if ($denied.Count -gt 0) {
- Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to volume metadata. Rerun from an elevated prompt."
- $result.Notes += "MFT summary collection failed: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -ne 0) {
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to volume metadata (exit code 5). Rerun from an elevated prompt."
+ $result.Notes += "MFT summary collection failed: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil fsinfo ntfsinfo failed with exit code $fsutilExitCode."
+ $result.Notes += "MFT summary collection failed: fsutil exited with code $fsutilExitCode."
+ }
}
else {
$volumeInfo = @{}
@@ -242,6 +254,14 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
}
$mftValidBytes = $null
+ if ($volumeInfo.Count -gt 0) {
+ $expectedFields = @('Mft Valid Data Length', 'Bytes Per FileRecord Segment', 'Mft Start Lcn', 'Mft2 Start Lcn', 'Mft Zone Start', 'Mft Zone End')
+ $matchedFields = @($expectedFields | Where-Object { $volumeInfo.ContainsKey($_) })
+ if ($matchedFields.Count -eq 0) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil ntfsinfo returned data but none of the expected volume fields were recognized; localized fsutil output cannot be mapped (English locale required). MFT summary values will be null."
+ $result.Notes += "MFT summary values unavailable: localized fsutil ntfsinfo output cannot be parsed; English locale is required."
+ }
+ }
if ($volumeInfo.ContainsKey('Mft Valid Data Length')) {
$mftValidBytes = ConvertFrom-JournalNumericText -Text $volumeInfo['Mft Valid Data Length']
}
@@ -300,10 +320,16 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
try {
Write-Host " Reading USN journal for creation-record comparison..." -ForegroundColor Gray
$rawLines = @(Get-FsutilOutput -Arguments @('usn', 'readjournal', "$drive`:"))
- $denied = @($rawLines | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)administrative privileges|access is denied|requires elevation' })
- if ($denied.Count -gt 0) {
- Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal; journal comparison will be skipped."
- $result.Notes += "USN journal comparison skipped: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ $fsutilExitCode = $script:FsutilLastExitCode
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -ne 0) {
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal (exit code 5); journal comparison will be skipped."
+ $result.Notes += "USN journal comparison skipped: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil usn readjournal failed with exit code $fsutilExitCode; journal comparison will be skipped."
+ $result.Notes += "USN journal comparison skipped: fsutil exited with code $fsutilExitCode."
+ }
}
else {
$creationRecords = @(ConvertFrom-UsnJournalOutput -Lines $rawLines -MaxRecords $MaxRecords |
@@ -487,6 +513,7 @@ function Get-FsutilOutput {
)
$output = @(& fsutil @Arguments 2>&1)
+ $script:FsutilLastExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
return @($output | ForEach-Object { "$_" })
}
@@ -566,6 +593,13 @@ function ConvertFrom-UsnJournalOutput {
$records += (New-UsnJournalRecord -Fields $current)
}
+ if ($records.Count -eq 0) {
+ $contentLines = @($Lines | Where-Object { $null -ne $_ -and $_ -notmatch '^\s*$' })
+ if ($contentLines.Count -gt 0) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil returned USN journal output but no records could be parsed; localized fsutil output is not supported (English locale required for USN journal parsing)."
+ }
+ }
+
return @($records)
}
@@ -607,11 +641,8 @@ function New-UsnJournalRecord {
if ([datetime]::TryParse($timeStampText, [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture, [System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::None, [ref]$parsedDate)) {
$timeStamp = $parsedDate
}
- elseif ([datetime]::TryParse($timeStampText, [ref]$parsedDate)) {
- $timeStamp = $parsedDate
- }
else {
- Write-Verbose "Could not parse journal time stamp: $timeStampText"
+ Write-Verbose "Could not parse journal time stamp '$timeStampText' with the invariant culture; localized fsutil timestamps require an English locale. TimeStamp is set to null."
}
}
diff --git a/Hardening/Enable-AuditPolicies.ps1 b/Hardening/Enable-AuditPolicies.ps1
index f09bbdd..ee072f4 100644
--- a/Hardening/Enable-AuditPolicies.ps1
+++ b/Hardening/Enable-AuditPolicies.ps1
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
Comprehensive = @{
'Account Logon' = @('Credential Validation', 'Kerberos Authentication Service', 'Kerberos Service Ticket Operations')
'Account Management' = @('User Account Management', 'Security Group Management', 'Computer Account Management', 'Distribution Group Management', 'Application Group Management')
- 'Detailed Tracking' = @('Process Creation', 'Process Termination', 'DPAPI Activity', 'RPC Events', 'PNP Activity')
+ 'Detailed Tracking' = @('Process Creation', 'Process Termination', 'DPAPI Activity', 'RPC Events', 'Plug and Play Events')
'Logon/Logoff' = @('Logon', 'Logoff', 'Account Lockout', 'Special Logon', 'Other Logon/Logoff Events', 'Network Policy Server')
'Object Access' = @('File System', 'Registry', 'Kernel Object', 'SAM', 'Handle Manipulation', 'File Share', 'Filtering Platform Packet Drop', 'Filtering Platform Connection')
'Policy Change' = @('Audit Policy Change', 'Authentication Policy Change', 'Authorization Policy Change', 'MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change', 'Filtering Platform Policy Change')
@@ -89,6 +89,14 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
'System' = @('Security State Change', 'Security System Extension', 'System Integrity', 'IPsec Driver', 'Other System Events')
}
}
+
+ foreach ($level in @($auditSettings.Keys)) {
+ foreach ($category in @($auditSettings[$level].Keys)) {
+ $auditSettings[$level][$category] = @($auditSettings[$level][$category] | ForEach-Object {
+ @{ Name = $_; Guid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name $_ }
+ })
+ }
+ }
}
process {
@@ -103,23 +111,27 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
foreach ($subcategory in $selectedSettings[$category]) {
try {
+ if ($null -eq $subcategory.Guid) {
+ Write-Warning " - Skipped: $($subcategory.Name) (no GUID in subcategory map)"
+ continue
+ }
# Enable both Success and Failure auditing
- if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($subcategory, "Enable audit policy")) {
- $result = & auditpol /set /subcategory:"$subcategory" /success:enable /failure:enable 2>&1
+ if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($subcategory.Name, "Enable audit policy")) {
+ $result = & auditpol /set /subcategory:"$($subcategory.Guid)" /success:enable /failure:enable 2>&1
if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) {
- $results.PoliciesConfigured += $subcategory
- Write-Host " + $subcategory" -ForegroundColor Green
+ $results.PoliciesConfigured += $subcategory.Name
+ Write-Host " + $($subcategory.Name)" -ForegroundColor Green
}
else {
- $results.Errors += "Failed to configure: $subcategory - $result"
- Write-Warning " - Failed: $subcategory"
+ $results.Errors += "Failed to configure: $($subcategory.Name) - $result"
+ Write-Warning " - Failed: $($subcategory.Name)"
}
}
}
catch {
- $results.Errors += "Error configuring $subcategory : $_"
- Write-Warning " - Error: $subcategory"
+ $results.Errors += "Error configuring $($subcategory.Name) : $_"
+ Write-Warning " - Error: $($subcategory.Name)"
}
}
@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
if ($results.AuditCategories.ContainsKey($categoryKey)) {
$results.AuditCategories[$categoryKey] = @{
Configured = $true
- Subcategories = $selectedSettings[$category]
+ Subcategories = @($selectedSettings[$category] | ForEach-Object { $_.Name })
}
}
}
@@ -221,7 +233,7 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
# Create audit rule for Everyone - Track both Success and Failure
$auditRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAuditRule(
- "Everyone",
+ (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-1-0')),
"Delete,DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles,ChangePermissions,TakeOwnership",
"ContainerInherit,ObjectInherit",
"None",
@@ -264,7 +276,7 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
$acl = Get-Acl $regKey
$auditRule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.RegistryAuditRule(
- "Everyone",
+ (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-1-0')),
"SetValue,CreateSubKey,Delete",
"ContainerInherit",
"None",
@@ -314,8 +326,29 @@ function Enable-AuditPolicies {
# Verify current audit policy
Write-Host "`nVerifying configuration..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
- $verifyResult = auditpol /get /category:* | Out-String
- Write-Verbose $verifyResult
+ $auditTable = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Force
+ $verifiedPolicies = 0
+ $unverifiedPolicies = @()
+ foreach ($category in $selectedSettings.Keys) {
+ foreach ($subcategory in $selectedSettings[$category]) {
+ if ($null -eq $subcategory.Guid) { continue }
+ $guidKey = ($subcategory.Guid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ if ($auditTable.ContainsKey($guidKey) -and $null -ne $auditTable[$guidKey].Value -and
+ $auditTable[$guidKey].Value -ge 1 -and $auditTable[$guidKey].Value -le 3) {
+ $verifiedPolicies++
+ }
+ else {
+ $unverifiedPolicies += $subcategory.Name
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Write-Host " Verified: $verifiedPolicies subcategories with auditing enabled" -ForegroundColor White
+ if ($unverifiedPolicies.Count -gt 0) {
+ Write-Host " Unverified: $($unverifiedPolicies.Count)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
+ foreach ($name in $unverifiedPolicies) {
+ Write-Host " - $name" -ForegroundColor Yellow
+ }
+ }
Write-Host "`nRecommendations:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " 1. Monitor Security event log regularly" -ForegroundColor White
diff --git a/Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1 b/Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1
index a21590d..e734b1c 100644
--- a/Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1
+++ b/Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1
@@ -269,11 +269,17 @@ function Set-SecurityBaseline {
# Configure account lockout policy
net accounts /lockoutthreshold:5 /lockoutduration:30 /lockoutwindow:30 | Out-Null
+ if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
+ Write-Warning " Account lockout policy configuration failed (net accounts exit code $LASTEXITCODE)"
+ }
$results.Changes += "Account lockout policy configured (5 attempts, 30 min lockout)"
# Password policy
if ($BaselineLevel -in @('Recommended', 'Strict')) {
net accounts /minpwlen:12 /maxpwage:90 /minpwage:1 /uniquepw:5 | Out-Null
+ if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
+ Write-Warning " Password policy configuration failed (net accounts exit code $LASTEXITCODE)"
+ }
$results.Changes += "Password policy: 12 char minimum, 90 day max age"
}
@@ -311,6 +317,9 @@ function Set-SecurityBaseline {
# Enable DEP (Data Execution Prevention)
bcdedit /set nx AlwaysOn | Out-Null
+ if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
+ Write-Warning " DEP configuration failed (bcdedit exit code $LASTEXITCODE)"
+ }
$results.Changes += "DEP enabled"
# Disable unnecessary services
diff --git a/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1 b/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6cb18d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+ Locale-invariant advanced audit policy helpers (private).
+.DESCRIPTION
+ Get-AuditPolicyTable resolves per-subcategory audit policy settings keyed by
+ subcategory GUID (GUIDs are locale-invariant; canonical English names come
+ from the static map below). Resolution order:
+ 1. AuditQuerySystemPolicy API (advapi32)
+ 2. auditpol /backup CSV (elevated)
+ 3. auditpol /get CSV (English Inclusion text only, non-admin)
+ 4. Unavailable (all Values $null)
+.NOTES
+ GUID map verified against MS-GPAC and dsccommunity/AuditPolicyDsc
+ ($AuditSubcategoryToGUIDHash, edited from "auditpol /list /subcategory:* /v").
+#>
+
+$script:AuditSubcategoryMap = @{
+ 'Security State Change' = '{0CCE9210-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Security System Extension' = '{0CCE9211-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'System Integrity' = '{0CCE9212-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'IPsec Driver' = '{0CCE9213-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other System Events' = '{0CCE9214-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Logon' = '{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Logoff' = '{0CCE9216-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Account Lockout' = '{0CCE9217-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'IPsec Main Mode' = '{0CCE9218-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'IPsec Quick Mode' = '{0CCE9219-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'IPsec Extended Mode' = '{0CCE921A-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Special Logon' = '{0CCE921B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other Logon/Logoff Events' = '{0CCE921C-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Network Policy Server' = '{0CCE9243-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'User / Device Claims' = '{0CCE9247-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Group Membership' = '{0CCE9249-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'File System' = '{0CCE921D-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Registry' = '{0CCE921E-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Kernel Object' = '{0CCE921F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'SAM' = '{0CCE9220-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Certification Services' = '{0CCE9221-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Application Generated' = '{0CCE9222-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Handle Manipulation' = '{0CCE9223-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'File Share' = '{0CCE9224-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Filtering Platform Packet Drop' = '{0CCE9225-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Filtering Platform Connection' = '{0CCE9226-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other Object Access Events' = '{0CCE9227-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Detailed File Share' = '{0CCE9244-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Removable Storage' = '{0CCE9245-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Central Policy Staging' = '{0CCE9246-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Sensitive Privilege Use' = '{0CCE9228-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Non Sensitive Privilege Use' = '{0CCE9229-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other Privilege Use Events' = '{0CCE922A-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Process Creation' = '{0CCE922B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Process Termination' = '{0CCE922C-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'DPAPI Activity' = '{0CCE922D-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'RPC Events' = '{0CCE922E-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Plug and Play Events' = '{0CCE9248-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Token Right Adjusted Events' = '{0CCE924A-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Audit Policy Change' = '{0CCE922F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Authentication Policy Change' = '{0CCE9230-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Authorization Policy Change' = '{0CCE9231-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change' = '{0CCE9232-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Filtering Platform Policy Change' = '{0CCE9233-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other Policy Change Events' = '{0CCE9234-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'User Account Management' = '{0CCE9235-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Computer Account Management' = '{0CCE9236-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Security Group Management' = '{0CCE9237-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Distribution Group Management' = '{0CCE9238-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Application Group Management' = '{0CCE9239-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other Account Management Events' = '{0CCE923A-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Directory Service Access' = '{0CCE923B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Directory Service Changes' = '{0CCE923C-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Directory Service Replication' = '{0CCE923D-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Detailed Directory Service Replication' = '{0CCE923E-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Credential Validation' = '{0CCE923F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Kerberos Service Ticket Operations' = '{0CCE9240-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Other Account Logon Events' = '{0CCE9241-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ 'Kerberos Authentication Service' = '{0CCE9242-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+}
+
+$script:AuditPolicyTableCache = $null
+
+function Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([string])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter()]
+ [string]$Name
+ )
+
+ if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($Name)) { return $null }
+ if ($script:AuditSubcategoryMap.ContainsKey($Name)) {
+ return $script:AuditSubcategoryMap[$Name]
+ }
+ foreach ($key in $script:AuditSubcategoryMap.Keys) {
+ if ($key -ieq $Name) { return $script:AuditSubcategoryMap[$key] }
+ }
+ return $null
+}
+
+function ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv {
+ <#
+ .SYNOPSIS
+ Parses an 'auditpol /backup' CSV into a locale-invariant GUID -> value map (private).
+ .DESCRIPTION
+ Returns a hashtable keyed by lowercase subcategory GUID (no braces) with the
+ numeric Setting Value (0-3) for each row. Locale-dependent columns (header
+ row, subcategory names, inclusion text) are never interpreted: the header
+ row is skipped positionally and replaced by fixed English headers
+ (WinLogKit PR #58 / AuditPolicyDsc pattern), rows are matched by GUID and
+ numeric value only (which also drops the Option: rows), and when both
+ System and per-user rows exist the System rows win. Accepts either a file
+ -Path or raw -Lines (first line = header in both cases).
+ #>
+ [CmdletBinding(DefaultParameterSetName = 'Path')]
+ [OutputType([hashtable])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'Path')]
+ [ValidateNotNullOrEmpty()]
+ [string]$Path,
+
+ [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'Lines')]
+ [AllowEmptyCollection()]
+ [AllowEmptyString()]
+ [string[]]$Lines
+ )
+
+ $values = @{}
+
+ $rawLines = @()
+ if ($PSCmdlet.ParameterSetName -eq 'Path') {
+ # Backup file is ANSI/system codepage on localized Windows: read WITHOUT
+ # -Encoding (forcing UTF8 corrupts it, salt#68354).
+ $rawLines = @(Get-Content -LiteralPath $Path)
+ }
+ else {
+ $rawLines = @($Lines)
+ }
+
+ $dataLines = @($rawLines | Select-Object -Skip 1 |
+ Where-Object { -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($_) })
+ if ($dataLines.Count -eq 0) { return $values }
+
+ $rows = @($dataLines | ConvertFrom-Csv -Header 'Machine', 'Target', 'Subcategory', 'Guid', 'Inclusion', 'Exclusion', 'Value')
+ $guidPattern = '^[0-9A-Fa-f]{8}(-[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}){3}-[0-9A-Fa-f]{12}$'
+ $candidates = @()
+ foreach ($row in $rows) {
+ $rowGuid = ''
+ if ($null -ne $row.Guid) { $rowGuid = ($row.Guid -replace '[{}]', '').Trim() }
+ $rowValue = ''
+ if ($null -ne $row.Value) { $rowValue = $row.Value.Trim() }
+ # GUID/Value filters drop the Option: rows
+ if ($rowGuid -match $guidPattern -and $rowValue -match '^[0-3]$') {
+ $candidates += $row
+ }
+ }
+ # Localized Windows may localize the Target column
+ $systemRows = @($candidates | Where-Object { $_.Target -eq 'System' })
+ if ($systemRows.Count -gt 0) { $effective = $systemRows } else { $effective = $candidates }
+ $seen = @{}
+ foreach ($row in $effective) {
+ $key = (($row.Guid -replace '[{}]', '').Trim()).ToLowerInvariant()
+ if ($seen.ContainsKey($key)) { continue }
+ $seen[$key] = $true
+ $values[$key] = [int]($row.Value.Trim())
+ }
+ return $values
+}
+
+function Get-AuditPolicyTable {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([hashtable])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter()]
+ [string[]]$Subcategory,
+
+ [Parameter()]
+ [switch]$Force
+ )
+
+ $subsetRequested = ($PSBoundParameters.ContainsKey('Subcategory') -and
+ $null -ne $Subcategory -and $Subcategory.Count -gt 0)
+
+ if (-not $subsetRequested -and -not $Force -and $null -ne $script:AuditPolicyTableCache) {
+ return $script:AuditPolicyTableCache
+ }
+
+ if ($subsetRequested) {
+ $names = @($Subcategory)
+ }
+ else {
+ $names = @($script:AuditSubcategoryMap.Keys)
+ }
+
+ # Table keyed by lowercase GUID without braces
+ $guidToName = @{}
+ foreach ($name in $names) {
+ $guid = Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name $name
+ if ($null -eq $guid) {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: unknown subcategory name '$name' (skipped)"
+ continue
+ }
+ $key = ($guid -replace '[{}]', '').ToLowerInvariant()
+ $guidToName[$key] = $name
+ }
+
+ $table = @{}
+ foreach ($key in $guidToName.Keys) {
+ $table[$key] = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Guid = ('{' + $key.ToUpperInvariant() + '}')
+ Name = $guidToName[$key]
+ Value = $null
+ Success = $false
+ Failure = $false
+ Source = 'Unavailable'
+ }
+ }
+
+ $isWindowsHost = $false
+ try {
+ $isWindowsHost = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation]::IsOSPlatform(
+ [System.Runtime.InteropServices.OSPlatform]::Windows)
+ }
+ catch {
+ # RuntimeInformation missing on old .NET Framework (PS 5.1)
+ $isWindowsHost = ($env:OS -eq 'Windows_NT')
+ }
+ if (-not $isWindowsHost) {
+ Write-Verbose 'Get-AuditPolicyTable: not a Windows host; audit policy not applicable'
+ if (-not $subsetRequested) { $script:AuditPolicyTableCache = $table }
+ return $table
+ }
+
+ $resolved = $false
+ $auditpol = $null
+
+ # --- Strategy 1: AuditQuerySystemPolicy API (HardeningLens pattern) ---
+ if (-not ([bool]('AuditPolicyNative' -as [type]))) {
+ $auditPolicyNativeSource = @'
+using System;
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+public static class AuditPolicyNative {
+ [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
+ public struct AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION {
+ public Guid AuditSubCategoryGuid;
+ public UInt32 AuditingInformation;
+ public Guid AuditCategoryGuid;
+ }
+ [DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
+ [return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.U1)]
+ private static extern bool AuditQuerySystemPolicy([In] Guid[] pSubCategoryGuids, UInt32 PolicyCount, out IntPtr ppAuditPolicy);
+ [DllImport("advapi32.dll")] private static extern void AuditFree(IntPtr buffer);
+ public static AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION[] QueryPolicies(Guid[] guids, out int win32Error) {
+ win32Error = 0;
+ IntPtr buffer = IntPtr.Zero;
+ if (!AuditQuerySystemPolicy(guids, (UInt32)guids.Length, out buffer)) {
+ win32Error = Marshal.GetLastWin32Error();
+ return null;
+ }
+ try {
+ AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION[] result = new AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION[guids.Length];
+ IntPtr current = buffer;
+ int size = Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION));
+ for (int i = 0; i < guids.Length; i++) {
+ result[i] = (AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION)Marshal.PtrToStructure(current, typeof(AUDIT_POLICY_INFORMATION));
+ current = new IntPtr(current.ToInt64() + size);
+ }
+ return result;
+ } finally { AuditFree(buffer); }
+ }
+}
+'@
+ try {
+ Add-Type -TypeDefinition $auditPolicyNativeSource -ErrorAction Stop
+ }
+ catch {
+ # Add-Type -TypeDefinition is blocked under Constrained Language Mode (JEA)
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: Add-Type AuditPolicyNative failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ([bool]('AuditPolicyNative' -as [type])) {
+ try {
+ $guidList = New-Object 'System.Collections.Generic.List[guid]'
+ foreach ($key in $guidToName.Keys) { $guidList.Add([guid]$key) }
+ $win32Error = 0
+ $policies = [AuditPolicyNative]::QueryPolicies($guidList.ToArray(), [ref]$win32Error)
+ if ($null -ne $policies) {
+ for ($i = 0; $i -lt $policies.Count; $i++) {
+ $key = $policies[$i].AuditSubCategoryGuid.ToString()
+ if (-not $table.ContainsKey($key)) { continue }
+ # POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_SUCCESS=1, FAILURE=2, NONE=4; 4 and 0 both mean No Auditing
+ $raw = [int]$policies[$i].AuditingInformation
+ $success = [bool]($raw -band 1)
+ $failure = [bool]($raw -band 2)
+ $value = 0
+ if ($success) { $value += 1 }
+ if ($failure) { $value += 2 }
+ $entry = $table[$key]
+ $entry.Value = $value
+ $entry.Success = $success
+ $entry.Failure = $failure
+ $entry.Source = 'Api'
+ $resolved = $true
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ # 5 = ACCESS_DENIED, 1314 = PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD: fall through to next strategy
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: AuditQuerySystemPolicy failed (win32 $win32Error)"
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: API strategy failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ # --- Strategy 2: auditpol /backup CSV (elevated) ---
+ if (-not $resolved) {
+ $auditpol = Get-Command 'auditpol.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ if ($null -eq $auditpol) {
+ $auditpol = Get-Command 'auditpol' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ }
+ if ($null -ne $auditpol) {
+ $tempFile = Join-Path -Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) -ChildPath ('wsa-audit-{0}.csv' -f [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+ try {
+ $null = & $auditpol.Source '/backup' "/file:$tempFile" 2>&1
+ if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0 -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tempFile)) {
+ $backupValues = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $tempFile
+ foreach ($key in $backupValues.Keys) {
+ if (-not $table.ContainsKey($key)) { continue }
+ $value = $backupValues[$key]
+ $entry = $table[$key]
+ $entry.Value = $value
+ $entry.Success = [bool]($value -band 1)
+ $entry.Failure = [bool]($value -band 2)
+ $entry.Source = 'BackupCsv'
+ $resolved = $true
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: auditpol /backup failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE); elevation required"
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: backup CSV strategy failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ finally {
+ if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tempFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ Remove-Item -LiteralPath $tempFile -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ # --- Strategy 3: auditpol /get CSV (non-admin, English text only) ---
+ if (-not $resolved -and $null -ne $auditpol) {
+ try {
+ $output = @(& $auditpol.Source '/get' '/category:*' '/r' 2>$null)
+ if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0 -and $output.Count -gt 1) {
+ $lines = @($output | Select-Object -Skip 1 |
+ Where-Object { -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($_) })
+ $rows = @($lines | ConvertFrom-Csv -Header 'Machine', 'Target', 'Subcategory', 'Guid', 'Inclusion', 'Exclusion')
+ foreach ($row in $rows) {
+ if ($null -eq $row.Guid) { continue }
+ $key = (($row.Guid -replace '[{}]', '').Trim()).ToLowerInvariant()
+ if (-not $table.ContainsKey($key)) { continue }
+ $inclusion = ''
+ if ($null -ne $row.Inclusion) { $inclusion = $row.Inclusion.Trim() }
+ # Interpret ONLY canonical English text; localized text stays honestly unknown
+ $value = $null
+ if ($inclusion -ieq 'Success and Failure') { $value = 3 }
+ elseif ($inclusion -ieq 'Success') { $value = 1 }
+ elseif ($inclusion -ieq 'Failure') { $value = 2 }
+ elseif ($inclusion -ieq 'No Auditing') { $value = 0 }
+ $entry = $table[$key]
+ if ($null -ne $value) {
+ $entry.Value = $value
+ $entry.Success = [bool]($value -band 1)
+ $entry.Failure = [bool]($value -band 2)
+ }
+ $entry.Source = 'GetQuery'
+ $resolved = $true
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: auditpol /get failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)"
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AuditPolicyTable: get CSV strategy failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (-not $resolved) {
+ Write-Verbose 'Get-AuditPolicyTable: all resolution strategies failed; returning Unavailable table'
+ }
+
+ if (-not $subsetRequested) {
+ $script:AuditPolicyTableCache = $table
+ }
+ return $table
+}
diff --git a/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1 b/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e874a69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+ Locale-invariant local password/lockout policy helper (private).
+.DESCRIPTION
+ Get-LocalPasswordPolicy queries the local SAM account policy via
+ NetUserModalsGet (netapi32, levels 0 and 3). When elevated, it merges
+ PasswordComplexity/ClearTextPassword (and serves as full fallback) from a
+ secedit /export INF whose [System Access] keys are English on all locales.
+ NEVER calls 'net accounts' (localized output).
+.NOTES
+ Struct layouts verified from lmaccess.h (USER_MODALS_INFO_0/3).
+ NetApi ages are seconds; USER_MODALS_INFO_3 duration/observation window are
+ MINUTES per lmaccess.h (some sources wrongly say seconds). TIMEQ_FOREVER
+ (0xFFFFFFFF) maps to -1 ("never" / "until admin unlocks").
+#>
+
+function Get-LocalPasswordPolicy {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([PSCustomObject])]
+ param()
+
+ $policy = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ MinPasswordLength = $null
+ MaxPasswordAgeDays = $null
+ MinPasswordAgeDays = $null
+ PasswordHistoryLength = $null
+ LockoutThreshold = $null
+ LockoutDurationMinutes = $null
+ LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = $null
+ ForceLogoffHours = $null
+ PasswordComplexity = $null
+ ClearTextPassword = $null
+ Source = 'Unavailable'
+ }
+
+ $isWindowsHost = $false
+ try {
+ $isWindowsHost = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation]::IsOSPlatform(
+ [System.Runtime.InteropServices.OSPlatform]::Windows)
+ }
+ catch {
+ # RuntimeInformation missing on old .NET Framework (PS 5.1)
+ $isWindowsHost = ($env:OS -eq 'Windows_NT')
+ }
+ if (-not $isWindowsHost) {
+ Write-Verbose 'Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: not a Windows host; local SAM policy not applicable'
+ return $policy
+ }
+
+ # --- Primary: NetUserModalsGet levels 0 and 3 ---
+ $netApiOk = $false
+ if (-not ([bool]('NetApiModals' -as [type]))) {
+ $netApiModalsSource = @'
+using System;
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+public static class NetApiModals {
+ [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
+ public struct USER_MODALS_INFO_0 {
+ public uint usrmod0_min_passwd_len;
+ public uint usrmod0_max_passwd_age; // seconds
+ public uint usrmod0_min_passwd_age; // seconds
+ public uint usrmod0_force_logoff; // seconds; 0xFFFFFFFF = TIMEQ_FOREVER
+ public uint usrmod0_password_hist_len;
+ }
+ [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
+ public struct USER_MODALS_INFO_3 {
+ public uint usrmod3_lockout_duration; // minutes
+ public uint usrmod3_lockout_observation_window; // minutes
+ public uint usrmod3_lockout_threshold;
+ }
+ [DllImport("netapi32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
+ private static extern uint NetUserModalsGet(string server, int level, out IntPtr bufPtr);
+ [DllImport("netapi32.dll")] private static extern uint NetApiBufferFree(IntPtr bufPtr);
+ public static USER_MODALS_INFO_0 GetLevel0(out uint netError) {
+ IntPtr buf = IntPtr.Zero;
+ netError = NetUserModalsGet(null, 0, out buf);
+ if (netError != 0) { return new USER_MODALS_INFO_0(); }
+ try { return (USER_MODALS_INFO_0)Marshal.PtrToStructure(buf, typeof(USER_MODALS_INFO_0)); }
+ finally { NetApiBufferFree(buf); }
+ }
+ public static USER_MODALS_INFO_3 GetLevel3(out uint netError) {
+ IntPtr buf = IntPtr.Zero;
+ netError = NetUserModalsGet(null, 3, out buf);
+ if (netError != 0) { return new USER_MODALS_INFO_3(); }
+ try { return (USER_MODALS_INFO_3)Marshal.PtrToStructure(buf, typeof(USER_MODALS_INFO_3)); }
+ finally { NetApiBufferFree(buf); }
+ }
+}
+'@
+ try {
+ Add-Type -TypeDefinition $netApiModalsSource -ErrorAction Stop
+ }
+ catch {
+ # Add-Type -TypeDefinition is blocked under Constrained Language Mode (JEA)
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: Add-Type NetApiModals failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ([bool]('NetApiModals' -as [type])) {
+ $level0Error = [uint32]0
+ try {
+ $modals0 = [NetApiModals]::GetLevel0([ref]$level0Error)
+ if ($level0Error -eq 0) {
+ $policy.MinPasswordLength = [int]$modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_len
+ if ($modals0.usrmod0_max_passwd_age -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays = [int][math]::Round($modals0.usrmod0_max_passwd_age / 86400)
+ }
+ if ($modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_age -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays = [int][math]::Round($modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_age / 86400)
+ }
+ if ($modals0.usrmod0_force_logoff -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ $policy.ForceLogoffHours = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $policy.ForceLogoffHours = [int][math]::Round($modals0.usrmod0_force_logoff / 3600)
+ }
+ $policy.PasswordHistoryLength = [int]$modals0.usrmod0_password_hist_len
+ $netApiOk = $true
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: NetUserModalsGet level 0 failed (netError $level0Error)"
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: NetApi level 0 failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+
+ $level3Error = [uint32]0
+ try {
+ $modals3 = [NetApiModals]::GetLevel3([ref]$level3Error)
+ if ($level3Error -eq 0) {
+ # Minutes per lmaccess.h; reported as-is even when threshold is 0
+ # (lockout disabled). TIMEQ_FOREVER duration = until admin unlocks.
+ if ($modals3.usrmod3_lockout_duration -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes = [int]$modals3.usrmod3_lockout_duration
+ }
+ if ($modals3.usrmod3_lockout_observation_window -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = [int]$modals3.usrmod3_lockout_observation_window
+ }
+ $policy.LockoutThreshold = [int]$modals3.usrmod3_lockout_threshold
+ $netApiOk = $true
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: NetUserModalsGet level 3 failed (netError $level3Error)"
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: NetApi level 3 failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+
+ if ($netApiOk) { $policy.Source = 'NetApi' }
+ }
+
+ # --- Secedit (elevated): full fallback, or merge of the two NetApi cannot see ---
+ $isAdmin = $false
+ try {
+ $isAdmin = ([Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal][Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()
+ ).IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)
+ }
+ catch {
+ $isAdmin = $false
+ }
+
+ $needSecedit = (-not $netApiOk) -or ($null -eq $policy.PasswordComplexity)
+ $seceditData = $null
+ if ($needSecedit -and $isAdmin) {
+ $secedit = Get-Command 'secedit.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ if ($null -eq $secedit) {
+ $secedit = Get-Command 'secedit' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ }
+ if ($null -ne $secedit) {
+ $tempFile = Join-Path -Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) -ChildPath ('wsa-secpol-{0}.inf' -f [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+ try {
+ $null = & $secedit.Source '/export' '/cfg' $tempFile '/quiet' 2>&1
+ if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0 -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tempFile)) {
+ # INF is UTF-16 with BOM; Get-Content auto-detects.
+ # [System Access] keys are English on all locales.
+ $seceditData = @{}
+ $inSection = $false
+ foreach ($line in (Get-Content -LiteralPath $tempFile)) {
+ $trimmed = $line.Trim()
+ if ($trimmed -match '^\[') {
+ $inSection = ($trimmed -ieq '[System Access]')
+ continue
+ }
+ if ($inSection -and $trimmed -match '^([^=]+)=(.*)$') {
+ $seceditData[$Matches[1].Trim()] = $Matches[2].Trim()
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: secedit /export failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)"
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: secedit fallback failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ finally {
+ if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tempFile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ Remove-Item -LiteralPath $tempFile -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ($null -ne $seceditData) {
+ if (-not $netApiOk) {
+ # INF ages are already in days; -1 sentinel = never
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('MinimumPasswordLength') -and $seceditData['MinimumPasswordLength'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.MinPasswordLength = [int]$seceditData['MinimumPasswordLength']
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('MaximumPasswordAge') -and $seceditData['MaximumPasswordAge'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays = [int]$seceditData['MaximumPasswordAge']
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('MinimumPasswordAge') -and $seceditData['MinimumPasswordAge'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays = [int]$seceditData['MinimumPasswordAge']
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('PasswordHistorySize') -and $seceditData['PasswordHistorySize'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.PasswordHistoryLength = [int]$seceditData['PasswordHistorySize']
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('LockoutBadCount') -and $seceditData['LockoutBadCount'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.LockoutThreshold = [int]$seceditData['LockoutBadCount']
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('LockoutDuration') -and $seceditData['LockoutDuration'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes = [int]$seceditData['LockoutDuration']
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('ResetLockoutCount') -and $seceditData['ResetLockoutCount'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = [int]$seceditData['ResetLockoutCount']
+ }
+ $policy.Source = 'Secedit'
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('PasswordComplexity') -and $seceditData['PasswordComplexity'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.PasswordComplexity = ([int]$seceditData['PasswordComplexity'] -eq 1)
+ }
+ if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('ClearTextPassword') -and $seceditData['ClearTextPassword'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
+ $policy.ClearTextPassword = ([int]$seceditData['ClearTextPassword'] -eq 1)
+ }
+ if ($netApiOk) { $policy.Source = 'NetApi+Secedit' }
+ }
+
+ if ($policy.Source -eq 'Unavailable') {
+ Write-Verbose 'Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: all resolution strategies failed; returning Unavailable'
+ }
+ return $policy
+}
diff --git a/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1 b/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01d29c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+ Locale-invariant WLAN profile list helper (private).
+.DESCRIPTION
+ Get-WlanProfileList enumerates Wi-Fi profiles via wlanapi.dll. Profiles and
+ interface descriptions come straight from the API, so no locale parsing is
+ involved. Returns an empty array (NOT an error) when: not Windows,
+ wlanapi.dll missing, WlanSvc stopped (WlanOpenHandle error 1062 or any
+ nonzero), or zero interfaces.
+.NOTES
+ P/Invoke signatures verbatim from ManagedWifi (Apache-2.0). All enumeration
+ and marshaling happens inside C# to avoid the PS 5.1 binder picking wrong
+ PtrToStructure overloads; every list buffer is freed with WlanFreeMemory.
+#>
+
+function Get-WlanProfileList {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([PSCustomObject[]])]
+ param()
+
+ $result = @()
+
+ # Cheap pre-check so macOS/Linux dev boxes degrade silently
+ $isWindowsHost = $false
+ try {
+ $isWindowsHost = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation]::IsOSPlatform(
+ [System.Runtime.InteropServices.OSPlatform]::Windows)
+ }
+ catch {
+ # RuntimeInformation missing on old .NET Framework (PS 5.1)
+ $isWindowsHost = ($env:OS -eq 'Windows_NT')
+ }
+ if (-not $isWindowsHost) {
+ Write-Verbose 'Get-WlanProfileList: not a Windows host; WLAN not applicable'
+ return $result
+ }
+
+ if (-not ([bool]('WlanNative' -as [type]))) {
+ $wlanNativeSource = @'
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+public static class WlanNative {
+ [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
+ public struct WLAN_INTERFACE_INFO {
+ public Guid InterfaceGuid;
+ [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.ByValTStr, SizeConst = 256)]
+ public string InterfaceDescription;
+ public int isState;
+ }
+ [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
+ public struct WLAN_PROFILE_INFO {
+ [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.ByValTStr, SizeConst = 256)]
+ public string strProfileName;
+ public uint dwFlags;
+ }
+ [DllImport("wlanapi.dll")]
+ public static extern int WlanOpenHandle(uint clientVersion, IntPtr pReserved, out uint negotiatedVersion, out IntPtr clientHandle);
+ [DllImport("wlanapi.dll")]
+ public static extern int WlanEnumInterfaces(IntPtr clientHandle, IntPtr pReserved, out IntPtr ppInterfaceList);
+ [DllImport("wlanapi.dll")]
+ public static extern int WlanGetProfileList(IntPtr clientHandle, [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.LPStruct)] Guid interfaceGuid, IntPtr pReserved, out IntPtr ppProfileList);
+ [DllImport("wlanapi.dll")]
+ public static extern void WlanFreeMemory(IntPtr pMemory);
+ [DllImport("wlanapi.dll")]
+ public static extern int WlanCloseHandle(IntPtr clientHandle, IntPtr pReserved);
+ public class WlanProfile {
+ public string Name;
+ public uint Flags;
+ public string InterfaceDescription;
+ }
+ public static WlanProfile[] GetProfiles(out int win32Error) {
+ win32Error = 0;
+ List<WlanProfile> profiles = new List<WlanProfile>();
+ IntPtr clientHandle = IntPtr.Zero;
+ uint negotiatedVersion = 0;
+ int err = WlanOpenHandle(2, IntPtr.Zero, out negotiatedVersion, out clientHandle);
+ if (err != 0) { win32Error = err; return null; }
+ try {
+ IntPtr pInterfaceList;
+ err = WlanEnumInterfaces(clientHandle, IntPtr.Zero, out pInterfaceList);
+ if (err != 0) { win32Error = err; return null; }
+ try {
+ // List header is { uint dwNumberOfItems; uint dwIndex; } then the item array
+ int interfaceCount = Marshal.ReadInt32(pInterfaceList);
+ int interfaceSize = Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(WLAN_INTERFACE_INFO));
+ IntPtr currentInterface = new IntPtr(pInterfaceList.ToInt64() + 8);
+ for (int i = 0; i < interfaceCount; i++) {
+ WLAN_INTERFACE_INFO iface = (WLAN_INTERFACE_INFO)Marshal.PtrToStructure(currentInterface, typeof(WLAN_INTERFACE_INFO));
+ currentInterface = new IntPtr(currentInterface.ToInt64() + interfaceSize);
+ IntPtr pProfileList;
+ int profileErr = WlanGetProfileList(clientHandle, iface.InterfaceGuid, IntPtr.Zero, out pProfileList);
+ if (profileErr != 0) { continue; }
+ try {
+ int profileCount = Marshal.ReadInt32(pProfileList);
+ int profileSize = Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(WLAN_PROFILE_INFO));
+ IntPtr currentProfile = new IntPtr(pProfileList.ToInt64() + 8);
+ for (int j = 0; j < profileCount; j++) {
+ WLAN_PROFILE_INFO info = (WLAN_PROFILE_INFO)Marshal.PtrToStructure(currentProfile, typeof(WLAN_PROFILE_INFO));
+ currentProfile = new IntPtr(currentProfile.ToInt64() + profileSize);
+ WlanProfile profile = new WlanProfile();
+ profile.Name = info.strProfileName;
+ profile.Flags = info.dwFlags;
+ profile.InterfaceDescription = iface.InterfaceDescription;
+ profiles.Add(profile);
+ }
+ } finally { WlanFreeMemory(pProfileList); }
+ }
+ } finally { WlanFreeMemory(pInterfaceList); }
+ } finally { WlanCloseHandle(clientHandle, IntPtr.Zero); }
+ return profiles.ToArray();
+ }
+}
+'@
+ try {
+ Add-Type -TypeDefinition $wlanNativeSource -ErrorAction Stop
+ }
+ catch {
+ # Add-Type -TypeDefinition is blocked under Constrained Language Mode (JEA)
+ Write-Verbose "Get-WlanProfileList: Add-Type WlanNative failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ return $result
+ }
+ }
+
+ try {
+ $win32Error = 0
+ $profiles = [WlanNative]::GetProfiles([ref]$win32Error)
+ if ($null -eq $profiles) {
+ # 1062 = WlanSvc not running; any nonzero is 'not applicable', not an error
+ Write-Verbose "Get-WlanProfileList: WLAN API unavailable (win32 $win32Error)"
+ return $result
+ }
+ foreach ($profile in $profiles) {
+ $flags = [uint32]$profile.Flags
+ $result += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = $profile.Name
+ Flags = $flags
+ IsGroupPolicy = [bool]($flags -band 1)
+ IsPerUser = [bool]($flags -band 2)
+ InterfaceDescription = $profile.InterfaceDescription
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ # wlanapi.dll missing etc.: 'not applicable', not an error
+ Write-Verbose "Get-WlanProfileList: enumeration failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ $result = @()
+ }
+
+ return $result
+}
diff --git a/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1 b/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e53ea3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+ Locale-invariant identity helpers (private).
+.DESCRIPTION
+ SID-based lookups that survive non-English Windows, 32-bit PowerShell on
+ 64-bit Windows (LocalAccounts module missing), domain controllers (no local
+ SAM), and unresolvable SIDs (AzureAD-joined machines, PowerShell#2996).
+ All functions degrade to empty/$null/$false instead of throwing.
+#>
+
+# False = last admin-group lookup failed (unknown), NOT 'zero admins'
+$script:AdminGroupLookupSucceeded = $false
+
+function Get-WellKnownSid {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([hashtable])]
+ param()
+
+ return @{
+ Administrators = 'S-1-5-32-544'
+ Users = 'S-1-5-32-545'
+ Guests = 'S-1-5-32-546'
+ BackupOperators = 'S-1-5-32-551'
+ RemoteDesktopUsers = 'S-1-5-32-555'
+ System = 'S-1-5-18'
+ LocalService = 'S-1-5-19'
+ NetworkService = 'S-1-5-20'
+ Everyone = 'S-1-1-0'
+ AuthenticatedUsers = 'S-1-5-11'
+ }
+}
+
+function Get-AdminGroupMembers {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([PSCustomObject[]])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter()]
+ [string]$Sid = 'S-1-5-32-544'
+ )
+
+ $script:AdminGroupLookupSucceeded = $false
+ $members = @()
+
+ # Preferred: LocalAccounts module, addressed by SID (locale-invariant).
+ # NOTE: module is missing in 32-bit PowerShell on 64-bit Windows.
+ if (Get-Command 'Get-LocalGroupMember' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ try {
+ $sidObject = [Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]$Sid
+ $raw = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -SID $sidObject -ErrorAction Stop)
+ foreach ($member in $raw) {
+ $memberName = $null
+ $memberSid = $null
+ $memberClass = $null
+ if ($null -ne $member) {
+ if ($member.PSObject.Properties['Name']) { $memberName = $member.Name }
+ if ($member.PSObject.Properties['SID'] -and $null -ne $member.SID) {
+ $memberSid = $member.SID.Value
+ }
+ if ($member.PSObject.Properties['ObjectClass']) { $memberClass = $member.ObjectClass }
+ }
+ $members += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = $memberName
+ SID = $memberSid
+ ObjectClass = $memberClass
+ }
+ }
+ $script:AdminGroupLookupSucceeded = $true
+ return $members
+ }
+ catch {
+ # Includes the known 'Failed to compare two elements' bug on
+ # unresolvable SIDs (AzureAD-joined machines, PowerShell#2996)
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: Get-LocalGroupMember failed, trying ADSI: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ # Fallback: ADSI WinNT provider. SID -> localized group name, then enumerate.
+ try {
+ $groupName = ([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]$Sid).Translate(
+ [Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value.Split('\')[-1]
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: cannot translate SID $Sid : $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ return $members
+ }
+
+ try {
+ $group = ([ADSI]"WinNT://./$groupName,group")
+ $rawMembers = @($group.psbase.Invoke('Members'))
+ foreach ($member in $rawMembers) {
+ $memberName = $null
+ $memberSid = $null
+ $memberClass = $null
+ try {
+ $memberName = $member.GetType().InvokeMember('Name', 'GetProperty', $null, $member, $null)
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: member Name unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ try {
+ $memberClass = $member.GetType().InvokeMember('Class', 'GetProperty', $null, $member, $null)
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: member Class unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ $members += [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = $memberName
+ SID = $memberSid
+ ObjectClass = $memberClass
+ }
+ }
+ $script:AdminGroupLookupSucceeded = $true
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: ADSI enumeration failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ $members = @()
+ }
+
+ return $members
+}
+
+function Get-LocalUserByRid {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([PSCustomObject])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
+ [int]$Rid
+ )
+
+ $suffix = "-$Rid"
+
+ # Preferred: LocalAccounts module (missing in 32-bit PowerShell on 64-bit Windows)
+ if (Get-Command 'Get-LocalUser' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ try {
+ $user = @(Get-LocalUser -ErrorAction Stop |
+ Where-Object { $null -ne $_.SID -and $_.SID.Value.EndsWith($suffix) } |
+ Select-Object -First 1)
+ if ($user.Count -gt 0 -and $null -ne $user[0]) {
+ return [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = $user[0].Name
+ SID = $user[0].SID.Value
+ Enabled = $user[0].Enabled
+ Description = $user[0].Description
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalUserByRid: Get-LocalUser failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ # Fallback: CIM Win32_UserAccount (SID values are locale-invariant)
+ if (Get-Command 'Get-CimInstance' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
+ try {
+ $account = @(Get-CimInstance -ClassName 'Win32_UserAccount' -Filter 'LocalAccount=True' -ErrorAction Stop |
+ Where-Object { $null -ne $_.SID -and $_.SID.EndsWith($suffix) } |
+ Select-Object -First 1)
+ if ($account.Count -gt 0 -and $null -ne $account[0]) {
+ $enabled = $null
+ if ($account[0].PSObject.Properties['Disabled'] -and $null -ne $account[0].Disabled) {
+ $enabled = (-not $account[0].Disabled)
+ }
+ return [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = $account[0].Name
+ SID = $account[0].SID
+ Enabled = $enabled
+ Description = $account[0].Description
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalUserByRid: CIM query failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ # Last resort: ADSI WinNT provider, RID extracted from objectSID bytes
+ try {
+ $computer = [ADSI]'WinNT://.'
+ foreach ($child in @($computer.psbase.Children)) {
+ $schemaClass = $null
+ try {
+ $schemaClass = $child.GetType().InvokeMember('SchemaClassName', 'GetProperty', $null, $child, $null)
+ }
+ catch {
+ continue
+ }
+ if ($schemaClass -ne 'User') { continue }
+ try {
+ $sidBytes = [byte[]]($child.GetType().InvokeMember('objectSID', 'GetProperty', $null, $child, $null))
+ $userSid = (New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($sidBytes, 0)).Value
+ if ($userSid.EndsWith($suffix)) {
+ $userName = $child.GetType().InvokeMember('Name', 'GetProperty', $null, $child, $null)
+ $userFlags = 0
+ $description = $null
+ try {
+ $userFlags = [int]($child.GetType().InvokeMember('UserFlags', 'GetProperty', $null, $child, $null))
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalUserByRid: UserFlags unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ try {
+ $description = $child.GetType().InvokeMember('Description', 'GetProperty', $null, $child, $null)
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalUserByRid: Description unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ # ADS_UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE = 0x2
+ return [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = $userName
+ SID = $userSid
+ Enabled = (-not [bool]($userFlags -band 0x2))
+ Description = $description
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalUserByRid: ADSI user unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-LocalUserByRid: ADSI enumeration failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
+
+ return $null
+}
+
+function Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([bool])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter()]
+ $IdentityReference,
+
+ [Parameter()]
+ [string]$Sid
+ )
+
+ if ($null -eq $IdentityReference -or [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($Sid)) { return $false }
+
+ try {
+ if ($IdentityReference -is [Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]) {
+ return ($IdentityReference.Value -eq $Sid)
+ }
+
+ $ntAccount = $null
+ if ($IdentityReference -is [Security.Principal.NTAccount]) {
+ $ntAccount = $IdentityReference
+ }
+ elseif ($IdentityReference -is [string]) {
+ # Some ACLs carry unresolved SIDs as plain strings
+ if ($IdentityReference -eq $Sid) { return $true }
+ try {
+ $ntAccount = New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount($IdentityReference)
+ }
+ catch {
+ $ntAccount = $null
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ($null -ne $ntAccount) {
+ try {
+ return ($ntAccount.Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value -eq $Sid)
+ }
+ catch {
+ # Untranslatable name; fall through to raw string equality
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ([string]$IdentityReference -eq $Sid)
+ }
+ catch {
+ return $false
+ }
+}
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 83ced11..8648ebb 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
[![PowerShell](https://img.shields.io/badge/PowerShell-5.1%2B-blue.svg)](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell)
[![Windows](https://img.shields.io/badge/Windows-10%2F11%2FServer%202016%2B-blue.svg)](https://www.microsoft.com/windows)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green.svg)](LICENSE)
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-1.5.0-orange.svg)](https://github.com/okanyildiz/WindowsSecurityAudit/releases)
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-1.6.0-orange.svg)](https://github.com/okanyildiz/WindowsSecurityAudit/releases)
[![Functions](https://img.shields.io/badge/Functions-72-brightgreen.svg)](https://github.com/okanyildiz/WindowsSecurityAudit)
[![Modules](https://img.shields.io/badge/Modules-14-blue.svg)](https://github.com/okanyildiz/WindowsSecurityAudit)
[![CI](https://github.com/okanyildiz/WindowsSecurityAudit/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/okanyildiz/WindowsSecurityAudit/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
@@ -698,7 +698,24 @@ The Reporting module transforms raw security data into actionable intelligence t
The full feature set is documented in the module tables above — this section only covers what changed per release, newest first:
-### 🆕 v1.5.0 — Fleet Scans, Sysmon Analytics, SIEM Streaming & Smart Alerts
+### 🆕 v1.6.0 — Full Non-English Windows Support (Locale-Invariant Auditing)
+
+**A correctness overhaul, not just a feature:** every check that parsed localized console output (`auditpol`, `net accounts`, `netsh`, `fsutil`, SFC/DISM) or matched localized identity names (`Administrators`, `Guest`, `Everyone`, `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`) has been rewritten to use **APIs, GUIDs and SIDs** — the module now produces correct results on Turkish, German, French and any other Windows display language, and reports an honest *"unable to determine"* instead of a silent wrong PASS when data is unreachable.
+
+**New internal data sources (`Private/`, 4 helpers):**
+
+| Helper | Replaces | How |
+|--------|----------|-----|
+| **`Get-AuditPolicyTable`** | localized `auditpol /get` text parsing | `AuditQuerySystemPolicy` P/Invoke (GUID-keyed) → elevated `auditpol /backup` fixed-header CSV (numeric Setting Value) → GUID-addressed `/get` with honest unknowns; full **59-subcategory GUID map** (MS-GPAC) |
+| **`Get-LocalPasswordPolicy`** | localized `net accounts` parsing | `NetUserModalsGet` levels 0+3 (non-admin, binary API) with elevated `secedit /export` fallback for `PasswordComplexity` |
+| **`Get-WlanProfileList`** | localized `netsh wlan show profiles` | `wlanapi.dll` P/Invoke; missing WLAN service/feature = "not applicable", not an error |
+| **Identity helpers** | name-based group/user/ACL lookups | SID-first (`S-1-5-32-544`, RID 500/501, `S-1-1-0`…) with ADSI fallback; safe under 32-bit PowerShell and AzureAD unresolvable SIDs |
+
+**27 call sites migrated across 16 files** — compliance frameworks (CIS/NIST/PCI-DSS), enterprise assessment & fleet scans, audit-policy hardening (GUID-based `/set` — `Enable-AuditPolicies` previously only worked on English Windows), registry/ACL analysis, defense-evasion detection, SFC/DISM integrity, memory-dump and scheduled-scan **ACL lockdowns (these silently failed on non-English systems, leaving credential-bearing files world-readable)**.
+
+**Regression armor:** new `tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1` — English/German (ANSI cp1252) auditpol fixture equivalence tests, plus a static **"no text readers" guard** that fails CI if localized-output parsing ever re-enters the codebase.
+
+### v1.5.0 — Fleet Scans, Sysmon Analytics, SIEM Streaming & Smart Alerts
**3 new functions** — bringing the toolkit to **72 functions across 14 modules**:
@@ -980,13 +997,15 @@ We work with Fortune 500 companies, government agencies, and organizations of al
## 🚀 Roadmap
-### Version 1.6 (Next)
-- [ ] **Locale-invariant parsing** — make `auditpol` / `net accounts` parsing robust on non-English Windows
-- [ ] **Raw $MFT record parsing** — go beyond fsutil summary output for full file-system timelines
-- [ ] **JEA endpoint support** — run remote scans through Just Enough Administration constrained endpoints
+### Version 1.7 (Next)
+- [ ] **Raw $MFT record parsing** — go beyond fsutil summary output for full file-system timelines (locale-invariant `FSCTL_READ_USN_JOURNAL` P/Invoke replaces fsutil text parsing)
+- [ ] **JEA endpoint support** — run remote scans through Just Enough Administration constrained endpoints (CLM-safe: precompiled helpers, no Add-Type dependency)
- [ ] **Alert webhook DPAPI protection** — encrypt stored webhook URLs at rest
- [ ] **SIEM streaming auth profiles** — named credential profiles and OAuth flows for Send-SiemEvent
+### Version 1.6 (Released)
+- [x] **Locale-invariant auditing** — all `auditpol` / `net accounts` / `netsh` / `fsutil` / SFC-DISM parsing and name-based identity lookups replaced by APIs, GUIDs and SIDs; correct results on non-English Windows with honest "unable to determine" states
+
### Version 2.0 (Future)
- [ ] Web-based GUI dashboard
- [ ] REST API for remote management
diff --git a/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1 b/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1
index 1bf7b48..d08a301 100644
--- a/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1
+++ b/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function Find-APTIndicators {
# Skip whitelisted services
$isWhitelisted = $false
foreach ($legit in $legitimateServices) {
- if ($service.Name -like "*$legit*" -or $service.DisplayName -like "*$legit*") {
+ if ($service.Name -like "*$legit*") {
$isWhitelisted = $true
break
}
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ function Find-APTIndicators {
# Check for actual malicious names
foreach ($malName in $knownMaliciousNames) {
- if ($service.Name -match $malName -or $service.DisplayName -match $malName) {
+ if ($service.Name -match $malName) {
$suspiciousScore += 70
$reasons += "CRITICAL: Name matches known malware: $malName"
}
diff --git a/Vulnerability/Get-SecurityMisconfigurations.ps1 b/Vulnerability/Get-SecurityMisconfigurations.ps1
index 95bccd3..90fc31b 100644
--- a/Vulnerability/Get-SecurityMisconfigurations.ps1
+++ b/Vulnerability/Get-SecurityMisconfigurations.ps1
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ function Get-SecurityMisconfigurations {
try {
$acl = Get-Acl $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$everyoneWrite = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
- $_.IdentityReference -eq 'Everyone' -and
+ (Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid 'S-1-1-0') -and
$_.FileSystemRights -match 'Write|FullControl|Modify'
}
diff --git a/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1 b/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1
index da06520..9ccc936 100644
--- a/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1
+++ b/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
@{
RootModule = 'WindowsSecurityAudit.psm1'
- ModuleVersion = '1.5.0'
+ ModuleVersion = '1.6.0'
GUID = 'a8d7c4e5-3b2f-4e8a-9c1d-6f5a8b9d2e7c'
Author = 'Okan YILDIZ'
CompanyName = 'okanyildiz'
diff --git a/WindowsSecurityAudit.psm1 b/WindowsSecurityAudit.psm1
index f4e8601..addde7f 100644
--- a/WindowsSecurityAudit.psm1
+++ b/WindowsSecurityAudit.psm1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Set-StrictMode -Version Latest
# Module variables
$script:ModuleRoot = $PSScriptRoot
-$script:ModuleVersion = '1.5.0'
+$script:ModuleVersion = '1.6.0'
# Import all function files
$Public = @(Get-ChildItem -Path "$PSScriptRoot\Core\*.ps1" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
diff --git a/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1 b/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59624da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+#Requires -Modules @{ ModuleName = 'Pester'; ModuleVersion = '5.0.0' }
+
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+ Locale-regression tests for the Private/ locale-invariant helpers.
+.DESCRIPTION
+ Cross-platform tests (run green on macOS and on the Windows CI lint job):
+
+ * Fixture equivalence (WinLogKit PR #58 pattern): the English and German
+ (ANSI/cp1252, localized header + names + inclusion text) auditpol /backup
+ fixtures in tests/fixtures/ must parse to IDENTICAL GUID -> Value maps via
+ ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv. Junk Option: rows and blank lines are
+ filtered by the GUID regex; System rows win over per-user rows.
+ * Static regression guard ('no text readers'): locale-fragile parsing patterns
+ are forbidden in every module file. All legacy call sites were migrated to the
+ Private/ helpers in v1.6.0, so the forbidden lists below carry NO grandfather
+ entries — any occurrence anywhere fails the build.
+ * Helper contract/degradation on non-Windows hosts: Get-AuditPolicyTable,
+ Get-LocalPasswordPolicy, Get-WlanProfileList and Get-LocalUserByRid degrade
+ to Unavailable/empty/$null instead of throwing; Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid
+ and Get-WellKnownSid honor their SID contracts on every platform.
+
+ Two documented seams do NOT exist yet and their tests are skipped on purpose:
+ the auditpol /get CSV parse is still inline in Get-AuditPolicyTable (strategy 3,
+ honest-unknown on localized inclusion text), and the NetApi seconds->days /
+ TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) -> -1 conversions are inline behind the C#
+ NetUserModalsGet interop in Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1. Extract pure parser
+ seams first, then unskip.
+
+ The module targets Windows PowerShell 5.1+, so only APIs available in
+ 5.1 are used here (no null-coalescing/ternary operators, no ForEach-Object -Parallel).
+#>
+
+BeforeDiscovery {
+ $script:ModuleRoot = Split-Path -Parent $PSScriptRoot
+ $script:ModuleName = 'WindowsSecurityAudit'
+
+ # Locale-fragile patterns that must never appear. All legacy call sites were
+ # migrated to the Private/ helpers in v1.6.0 — any match anywhere fails the guard.
+ $script:ForbiddenReaders = @(
+ @{
+ Name = "raw 'auditpol /get' text parsing (localized Inclusion columns)"
+ Regex = 'auditpol(\.exe)?\s+/get\b'
+ Grandfathered = @()
+ }
+ @{
+ Name = "'Minimum password length' label parsing of 'net accounts' output"
+ Regex = 'Select-String\s+["''][^"'']*[Pp]assword\s+[Ll]ength'
+ Grandfathered = @()
+ }
+ @{
+ Name = 'name-based Get-LocalGroupMember -Group with a string literal'
+ Regex = 'Get-LocalGroupMember\b[^\n|]*-Group\s+["'']'
+ Grandfathered = @()
+ }
+ @{
+ Name = 'name-based Get-LocalUser -Name Guest/Administrator'
+ Regex = 'Get-LocalUser\b[^\n|]*-Name\s+["''](Guest|Administrator)["'']'
+ Grandfathered = @()
+ }
+ @{
+ Name = 'string identities (Everyone / NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM / BUILTIN\Administrators) in FileSystemAccessRule'
+ Regex = 'FileSystemAccessRule\(\s*["''](Everyone|NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM|BUILTIN\\Administrators)["'']'
+ Grandfathered = @()
+ }
+ @{
+ Name = "IdentityReference matched against '(Everyone' style name patterns"
+ Regex = 'IdentityReference\b[^\n]*-match\s+["''][^"'']*\(?Everyone'
+ Grandfathered = @()
+ }
+ )
+}
+
+BeforeAll {
+ $script:ModuleRoot = Split-Path -Parent $PSScriptRoot
+ $script:ModuleName = 'WindowsSecurityAudit'
+ $script:ModulePath = Join-Path -Path $script:ModuleRoot -ChildPath "$script:ModuleName.psm1"
+ $script:FixturePath = Join-Path -Path $PSScriptRoot -ChildPath 'fixtures'
+ $script:EnFixture = Join-Path -Path $script:FixturePath -ChildPath 'auditpol-backup-en.csv'
+ $script:DeFixture = Join-Path -Path $script:FixturePath -ChildPath 'auditpol-backup-de.csv'
+
+ Import-Module -Name $script:ModulePath -Force -DisableNameChecking
+
+ $script:IsWindowsHost = $false
+ try {
+ $script:IsWindowsHost = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation]::IsOSPlatform(
+ [System.Runtime.InteropServices.OSPlatform]::Windows)
+ }
+ catch {
+ # RuntimeInformation missing on old .NET Framework (PS 5.1)
+ $script:IsWindowsHost = ($env:OS -eq 'Windows_NT')
+ }
+
+ # Every module .ps1 file except the tests folder and Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1
+ # (the one file allowed to touch auditpol /get output, covered by fixtures instead)
+ $script:GuardedFiles = @(
+ Get-ChildItem -Path $script:ModuleRoot -Filter '*.ps1' -Recurse -File |
+ Where-Object {
+ $_.FullName -notmatch '[\\/]\.git[\\/]' -and
+ $_.FullName -notmatch '[\\/]tests[\\/]' -and
+ $_.FullName -ne (Join-Path -Path $script:ModuleRoot -ChildPath 'Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1')
+ } |
+ ForEach-Object {
+ $relative = $_.FullName.Substring($script:ModuleRoot.Length) -replace '^[\\/]+', '' -replace '[\\/]', '/'
+ [PSCustomObject]@{ FullName = $_.FullName; RelativePath = $relative }
+ }
+ )
+}
+
+AfterAll {
+ Remove-Module -Name $script:ModuleName -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+}
+
+Describe 'ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv fixture equivalence (WinLogKit PR #58 pattern)' {
+ It 'parses the German ANSI/cp1252 fixture without throwing (salt#68354)' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:DeFixture -ScriptBlock {
+ param($deFixture)
+ { ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $deFixture } | Should -Not -Throw
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'pins the English fixture to the expected GUID -> Value map' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:EnFixture -ScriptBlock {
+ param($enFixture)
+ $expected = @{
+ '0cce9210-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 3 # Security State Change
+ '0cce9212-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 3 # System Integrity
+ '0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 3 # Logon
+ '0cce9216-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 1 # Logoff
+ '0cce921b-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 1 # Special Logon
+ '0cce921d-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 0 # File System (No Auditing)
+ '0cce9228-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 2 # Sensitive Privilege Use (Failure)
+ '0cce922b-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 1 # Process Creation
+ '0cce923b-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 2 # Directory Service Access
+ '0cce923f-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030' = 3 # Credential Validation
+ }
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $enFixture
+ $map.Count | Should -Be $expected.Count
+ foreach ($key in @($expected.Keys)) {
+ $map.ContainsKey($key) | Should -BeTrue -Because "GUID $key must be parsed"
+ $map[$key] | Should -Be $expected[$key] -Because "numeric Setting Value is locale-invariant ($key)"
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'produces IDENTICAL GUID -> Value maps from the English and the localized German fixture' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:EnFixture, $script:DeFixture -ScriptBlock {
+ param($enFixture, $deFixture)
+ $enMap = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $enFixture
+ $deMap = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $deFixture
+ $deMap.Count | Should -Be $enMap.Count
+ $enKeys = @($enMap.Keys | Sort-Object)
+ $deKeys = @($deMap.Keys | Sort-Object)
+ ($deKeys -join ',') | Should -Be ($enKeys -join ',') -Because 'subcategory GUIDs are locale-invariant'
+ foreach ($key in $enKeys) {
+ $deMap[$key] | Should -Be $enMap[$key] -Because "localized names/inclusion text must not change the numeric value ($key)"
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'filters the Option:CrashOnAuditFail junk row and blank lines via the GUID regex' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:EnFixture -ScriptBlock {
+ param($enFixture)
+ # The fixture carries 10 real subcategory rows plus one Option: row
+ # (no GUID), one blank line and one per-user row: exactly 10 survive
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $enFixture
+ $map.Count | Should -Be 10 -Because 'the Option: junk row, the blank line and the per-user row must not add entries'
+ @($map.Keys | Where-Object { $_ -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{8}(-[0-9a-f]{4}){3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$' }).Count |
+ Should -Be 0 -Because 'every surviving key must be a bare GUID'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'lets System rows win over per-user rows for the same GUID' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:EnFixture, $script:DeFixture -ScriptBlock {
+ param($enFixture, $deFixture)
+ # Both fixtures carry a per-user Logon row (value 1) after the System row (value 3)
+ $enMap = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $enFixture
+ $deMap = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $deFixture
+ $enMap['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 3 -Because 'the System row must win over the per-user SID row'
+ $deMap['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 3 -Because 'the System row must win over the per-user SID row'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'falls back to per-user rows only when no System rows exist' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $lines = @(
+ 'Machine Name,Policy Target,Subcategory,Subcategory GUID,Inclusion Setting,Exclusion Setting,Setting Value'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1001,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1'
+ )
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines $lines
+ $map['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 1 -Because 'with no System row present the per-user row is the only source'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'accepts raw -Lines with the same result as -Path' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:EnFixture -ScriptBlock {
+ param($enFixture)
+ $fromPath = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Path $enFixture
+ # No -Encoding, exactly like the production read of the backup file
+ $fromLines = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines @(Get-Content -LiteralPath $enFixture)
+ $fromLines.Count | Should -Be $fromPath.Count
+ foreach ($key in @($fromPath.Keys)) {
+ $fromLines[$key] | Should -Be $fromPath[$key]
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'returns an empty map for content without a header and data rows' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines @('header only')
+ $map.Count | Should -Be 0
+ }
+ }
+
+ # SKIPPED (no parse seam): the auditpol /get CSV parse (6 columns, no numeric
+ # value, English-only Inclusion text) is still inline in Get-AuditPolicyTable
+ # (strategy 3) and the change under test allowed extracting only the BackupCsv
+ # strategy. Once a ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyGetCsv-style seam exists, add a German
+ # /r fixture ('Erfolg und Fehler') asserting Value stays $null (honest unknown)
+ # instead of being guessed from localized text.
+ It 'never guesses values from localized auditpol /get inclusion text' -Skip {
+ }
+}
+
+Describe 'No locale-fragile text readers (static regression guard)' {
+ It 'no new file uses <Name>' -ForEach $script:ForbiddenReaders {
+ $offenders = @(
+ foreach ($file in $script:GuardedFiles) {
+ if ($_.Grandfathered -contains $file.RelativePath) { continue }
+ $content = Get-Content -Path $file.FullName -Raw
+ if ($null -ne $content -and $content -match $_.Regex) { $file.RelativePath }
+ }
+ )
+ $offenders.Count | Should -Be 0 -Because ("locale-fragile pattern '{0}' is forbidden module-wide since v1.6.0 (use the Private/ locale-invariant helpers): {1}" -f $_.Name, ($offenders -join ', '))
+ }
+
+ It "'net accounts' appears only in Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1 (legit /set usage)" {
+ # Invocation context only: the doc comment in Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
+ # ('NEVER calls net accounts') is documentation, not an invocation
+ $regex = '(?m)(=|\||;|\{|\()\s*net(\.exe)?\s+accounts\b|^[ \t]*net(\.exe)?\s+accounts\b'
+ $allowed = @(
+ 'Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1' # legit /set (write) usage
+ )
+ $offenders = @(
+ foreach ($file in $script:GuardedFiles) {
+ if ($allowed -contains $file.RelativePath) { continue }
+ $content = Get-Content -Path $file.FullName -Raw
+ if ($null -ne $content -and $content -match $regex) { $file.RelativePath }
+ }
+ )
+ $offenders.Count | Should -Be 0 -Because ("'net accounts' output is localized; reads must go through Get-LocalPasswordPolicy, writes belong to Set-SecurityBaseline: {0}" -f ($offenders -join ', '))
+ }
+}
+
+Describe 'Private helper contract and degradation' {
+ Context 'non-Windows hosts (macOS/Linux dev boxes and CI)' {
+ It 'Get-AuditPolicyTable returns 59 entries, all Source=Unavailable with null Values' {
+ if ($script:IsWindowsHost) {
+ Set-ItResult -Skipped -Because 'on Windows the table resolves real data via Api/BackupCsv instead of degrading'
+ return
+ }
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $table = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Force
+ $table.Count | Should -Be 59 -Because 'one entry per known audit subcategory GUID'
+ $entries = @($table.Values)
+ @($entries | Where-Object { $_.Source -ne 'Unavailable' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+ @($entries | Where-Object { $null -ne $_.Value }).Count | Should -Be 0
+ @($entries | Where-Object { $_.Success -or $_.Failure }).Count | Should -Be 0
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'Get-LocalPasswordPolicy degrades to Source=Unavailable' {
+ if ($script:IsWindowsHost) {
+ Set-ItResult -Skipped -Because 'on Windows the SAM policy resolves via NetApi/Secedit instead of degrading'
+ return
+ }
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $policy = Get-LocalPasswordPolicy
+ $policy.Source | Should -Be 'Unavailable'
+ $policy.MinPasswordLength | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'Get-WlanProfileList returns an empty array' {
+ if ($script:IsWindowsHost) {
+ Set-ItResult -Skipped -Because 'on Windows the WLAN API may return real profiles'
+ return
+ }
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $profiles = @(Get-WlanProfileList)
+ $profiles.Count | Should -Be 0
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 500 returns null instead of throwing' {
+ if ($script:IsWindowsHost) {
+ Set-ItResult -Skipped -Because 'on Windows RID 500 (built-in Administrator) exists and resolves'
+ return
+ }
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ { Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 500 } | Should -Not -Throw
+ Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 500 | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Context 'platform-independent identity helpers' {
+ It 'Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid matches a raw unresolved SID string against the same SID' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference 'S-1-1-0' -Sid 'S-1-1-0' | Should -BeTrue
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid rejects a raw SID string against a different SID' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference 'S-1-1-0' -Sid 'S-1-5-32-544' | Should -BeFalse
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid returns false for null input' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $null -Sid 'S-1-1-0' | Should -BeFalse
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'Get-WellKnownSid contains the documented mappings' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $sids = Get-WellKnownSid
+ $sids.Administrators | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-544'
+ $sids.Users | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-545'
+ $sids.Guests | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-546'
+ $sids.BackupOperators | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-551'
+ $sids.RemoteDesktopUsers | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-555'
+ $sids.System | Should -Be 'S-1-5-18'
+ $sids.LocalService | Should -Be 'S-1-5-19'
+ $sids.NetworkService | Should -Be 'S-1-5-20'
+ $sids.Everyone | Should -Be 'S-1-1-0'
+ $sids.AuthenticatedUsers | Should -Be 'S-1-5-11'
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ # SKIPPED (no parse seam): the NetApi seconds -> days conversion and the
+ # TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) -> -1 mapping live inline behind the C#
+ # NetUserModalsGet interop in Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1 and cannot execute
+ # on non-Windows hosts. Extract a pure conversion helper first, then unskip.
+ It 'converts NetApi seconds to days and TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) to -1' -Skip {
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/auditpol-backup-de.csv b/tests/fixtures/auditpol-backup-de.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fec2aba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fixtures/auditpol-backup-de.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Computername,Richtlinienziel,Unterkategorie,Unterkategorie-GUID,Einbeziehungseinstellung,Ausschlusseinstellung,Einstellungswert
+WSA-TEST01,System,�nderung des Sicherheitszustands,{0CCE9210-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg und Fehler,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Systemintegrit�t,{0CCE9212-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg und Fehler,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Anmelden,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg und Fehler,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Abmelden,{0CCE9216-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg,,1
+
+WSA-TEST01,System,Spezielle Anmeldung,{0CCE921B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg,,1
+WSA-TEST01,System,Dateisystem,{0CCE921D-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Keine �berwachung,,0
+WSA-TEST01,System,Verwendung sensibler Rechte,{0CCE9228-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Fehler,,2
+WSA-TEST01,System,Prozesserstellung,{0CCE922B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg,,1
+WSA-TEST01,System,Verzeichnisdienstzugriff,{0CCE923B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Fehler,,2
+WSA-TEST01,System,Anmeldeinformations�berpr�fung,{0CCE923F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg und Fehler,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Option:CrashOnAuditFail,,Erfolg,,0
+WSA-TEST01,S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1001,Anmelden,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Erfolg,,1
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/auditpol-backup-en.csv b/tests/fixtures/auditpol-backup-en.csv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e28219a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fixtures/auditpol-backup-en.csv
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Machine Name,Policy Target,Subcategory,Subcategory GUID,Inclusion Setting,Exclusion Setting,Setting Value
+WSA-TEST01,System,Security State Change,{0CCE9210-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,System Integrity,{0CCE9212-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Logoff,{0CCE9216-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1
+
+WSA-TEST01,System,Special Logon,{0CCE921B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1
+WSA-TEST01,System,File System,{0CCE921D-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},No Auditing,,0
+WSA-TEST01,System,Sensitive Privilege Use,{0CCE9228-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Failure,,2
+WSA-TEST01,System,Process Creation,{0CCE922B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1
+WSA-TEST01,System,Directory Service Access,{0CCE923B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Failure,,2
+WSA-TEST01,System,Credential Validation,{0CCE923F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3
+WSA-TEST01,System,Option:CrashOnAuditFail,,Success,,0
+WSA-TEST01,S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1001,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1