Skip to content

A comprehensive Windows security auditing and threat detection toolkit. Features 58 production-ready PowerShell functions organized into 14 modules for enterprise-grade security assessment, compliance validation, and incident response.

PowerShell

Post-review hardening for v1.6.0 (3 senior reviewers: 2 FIX-FIRST + 1 SHIP)

Okan YILDIZd7b57c8ee5a6
diff --git a/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1 b/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1
index 50ed949..7d60c0c 100644
--- a/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1
+++ b/Compliance/Test-NISTCompliance.ps1
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ function Test-NISTCompliance {
$acl = Get-Acl $logPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$protected = @()
if ($acl) {
- $protected = @($acl.Access | Where-Object { (Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid 'S-1-5-32-545') -and $_.FileSystemRights -match "FullControl|Modify|Write" })
+ $protected = @($acl.Access | Where-Object { ((Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid 'S-1-5-32-545') -or (Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid 'S-1-5-11') -or (Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $_.IdentityReference -Sid 'S-1-1-0')) -and $_.FileSystemRights -match "FullControl|Modify|Write" })
}
$control = [PSCustomObject]@{
diff --git a/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1 b/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1
index 662e0b6..ee44355 100644
--- a/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1
+++ b/Compliance/Test-PCI-DSS.ps1
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ function Test-PCI-DSS {
Description = 'Logs must contain sufficient detail'
Expected = 'File system auditing enabled'
Actual = if ($null -eq $objectAuditValue) { 'Unable to determine (insufficient privileges or unsupported platform)' }
- elseif ($objectAuditValue -ge 1) { "Enabled" } else { "Not configured" }
+ elseif ($objectAuditValue -ge 1 -and $objectAuditValue -le 3) { "Enabled" } else { "Not configured" }
Status = if ($null -eq $objectAuditValue) { 'NotApplicable' }
elseif ($objectAuditValue -ge 1 -and $objectAuditValue -le 3) { 'InPlace' } else { 'NotInPlace' }
Priority = 'High'
diff --git a/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1 b/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1
index 068007a..bda31f9 100644
--- a/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1
+++ b/Core/Test-SystemIntegrity.ps1
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
try {
# Run SFC scan
Write-Host "Running System File Checker (SFC)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
+ $scanStart = Get-Date
$sfcOutput = & sfc /scannow 2>&1 | Out-String
$sfcExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
@@ -57,9 +58,12 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
$cbsLogPath = "$env:windir\Logs\CBS\CBS.log"
$cbsLogAvailable = Test-Path $cbsLogPath
$cannotRepairLines = @()
+ $cbsTimestampsParseable = $false
if ($cbsLogAvailable) {
- $cannotRepairLines = @(Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
- Where-Object { $_ -match '\[SR\]' -and $_ -match 'Cannot repair' })
+ $cbsTail = @(Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
+ $cbsTailFilter = Select-CbsTailForCurrentScan -Lines $cbsTail -Since $scanStart
+ $cbsTimestampsParseable = $cbsTailFilter.TimestampsParseable
+ $cannotRepairLines = @($cbsTailFilter.Lines | Where-Object { $_ -match '\[SR\]' -and $_ -match 'Cannot repair' })
}
if ($sfcExitCode -ne 0) {
@@ -69,6 +73,9 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
elseif ($cannotRepairLines.Count -gt 0 -or
(-not $cbsLogAvailable -and $sfcOutput -match "Windows Resource Protection found corrupt files")) {
$results.SFCResult = "Corrupt files found"
+ if (-not $cbsTimestampsParseable -and $cannotRepairLines.Count -gt 0) {
+ $results.SFCResult = "Corrupt files found (possible stale CBS.log entries)"
+ }
if ($cannotRepairLines.Count -gt 0) {
$results.CorruptedFiles = $cannotRepairLines
@@ -111,9 +118,12 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
# separate those; servicing-stack CBS.log markers ('[SR]'/'Cannot
# repair', component-store corruption) are written in English
$storeCorruptionLines = @()
+ $dismTimestampsParseable = $false
if ($cbsLogAvailable) {
- $storeCorruptionLines = @(Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
- Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)component store' -and $_ -match '(?i)corrupt' })
+ $dismTail = @(Get-Content $cbsLogPath -Tail 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
+ $dismTailFilter = Select-CbsTailForCurrentScan -Lines $dismTail -Since $scanStart
+ $dismTimestampsParseable = $dismTailFilter.TimestampsParseable
+ $storeCorruptionLines = @($dismTailFilter.Lines | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)component store' -and $_ -match '(?i)corrupt' })
}
$repairable = ($storeCorruptionLines.Count -gt 0) -or ($dismCheck -match "The component store is repairable")
@@ -124,6 +134,9 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
}
elseif ($repairable) {
$results.DISMResult = "Repairable corruption detected"
+ if (-not $dismTimestampsParseable -and $storeCorruptionLines.Count -gt 0) {
+ $results.DISMResult = "Repairable corruption detected (possible stale CBS.log entries)"
+ }
if ($RepairFiles) {
Write-Host "Attempting DISM repair..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
@@ -179,4 +192,43 @@ function Test-SystemIntegrity {
end {
return $results
}
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
+
+function Select-CbsTailForCurrentScan {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ param(
+ [Parameter()]
+ [AllowEmptyCollection()]
+ [string[]]$Lines = @(),
+
+ [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
+ [datetime]$Since
+ )
+
+ $windowStart = $Since.AddMinutes(-5)
+ $currentScanLines = @()
+ $timestampsParseable = $false
+
+ foreach ($line in $Lines) {
+ if ($null -eq $line) { continue }
+ if ($line -match '^(?<ts>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})') {
+ try {
+ $lineTime = [datetime]::ParseExact($Matches.ts, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss', [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture)
+ $timestampsParseable = $true
+ if ($lineTime -ge $windowStart) {
+ $currentScanLines += $line
+ }
+ } catch { }
+ }
+ }
+
+ $filteredLines = @($Lines)
+ if ($timestampsParseable) {
+ $filteredLines = @($currentScanLines)
+ }
+
+ [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Lines = $filteredLines
+ TimestampsParseable = $timestampsParseable
+ }
+}
diff --git a/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1 b/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1
index a974be9..11efd40 100644
--- a/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1
+++ b/Enterprise/Get-MultiSystemAudit.ps1
@@ -192,12 +192,19 @@ function Get-MultiSystemAudit {
# Admin accounts
$admins = @()
- $adminLookupSucceeded = $false
- if (Get-Command Get-AdminGroupMembers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
- $admins = @(Get-AdminGroupMembers)
- $adminLookupSucceeded = ((Get-Variable -Name AdminGroupLookupSucceeded -Scope Script -ValueOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) -eq $true)
+ $lookupOk = $false
+ try {
+ $admins = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -SID ([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]'S-1-5-32-544') -ErrorAction Stop)
+ $lookupOk = $true
+ } catch {
+ try {
+ $adminGroupName = ([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]'S-1-5-32-544').Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value.Split('\')[-1]
+ $group = ([ADSI]"WinNT://./$adminGroupName,group")
+ $admins = @($group.psbase.Invoke('Members'))
+ $lookupOk = $true
+ } catch { $lookupOk = $false }
}
- if (-not $adminLookupSucceeded) {
+ if (-not $lookupOk) {
$findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'Low'
Finding = 'Unable to determine administrator count'
@@ -278,12 +285,19 @@ function Get-MultiSystemAudit {
# Admin accounts
$admins = @()
- $adminLookupSucceeded = $false
- if (Get-Command Get-AdminGroupMembers -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
- $admins = @(Get-AdminGroupMembers)
- $adminLookupSucceeded = ((Get-Variable -Name AdminGroupLookupSucceeded -Scope Script -ValueOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) -eq $true)
+ $lookupOk = $false
+ try {
+ $admins = @(Get-LocalGroupMember -SID ([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]'S-1-5-32-544') -ErrorAction Stop)
+ $lookupOk = $true
+ } catch {
+ try {
+ $adminGroupName = ([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]'S-1-5-32-544').Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value.Split('\')[-1]
+ $group = ([ADSI]"WinNT://./$adminGroupName,group")
+ $admins = @($group.psbase.Invoke('Members'))
+ $lookupOk = $true
+ } catch { $lookupOk = $false }
}
- if (-not $adminLookupSucceeded) {
+ if (-not $lookupOk) {
$findings += [PSCustomObject]@{
Severity = 'Low'
Finding = 'Unable to determine administrator count'
diff --git a/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1 b/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1
index d7c0375..1048675 100644
--- a/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1
+++ b/Forensics/Get-FileSystemJournal.ps1
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
$fsutilExitCode = $script:FsutilLastExitCode
if ($fsutilExitCode -ne 0) {
- if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
- Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal (exit code 5). Rerun from an elevated prompt."
- $result.Notes += "USN journal read failed: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 1 -or $fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal (exit code $fsutilExitCode); fsutil requires elevation or access denied. Rerun from an elevated prompt."
+ $result.Notes += "USN journal read failed: fsutil requires elevation or access denied."
}
else {
Write-Warning "fsutil usn readjournal failed with exit code $fsutilExitCode."
@@ -232,9 +232,9 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
$fsutilExitCode = $script:FsutilLastExitCode
if ($fsutilExitCode -ne 0) {
- if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
- Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to volume metadata (exit code 5). Rerun from an elevated prompt."
- $result.Notes += "MFT summary collection failed: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 1 -or $fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to volume metadata (exit code $fsutilExitCode); fsutil requires elevation or access denied. Rerun from an elevated prompt."
+ $result.Notes += "MFT summary collection failed: fsutil requires elevation or access denied."
}
else {
Write-Warning "fsutil fsinfo ntfsinfo failed with exit code $fsutilExitCode."
@@ -322,9 +322,9 @@ function Get-FileSystemJournal {
$rawLines = @(Get-FsutilOutput -Arguments @('usn', 'readjournal', "$drive`:"))
$fsutilExitCode = $script:FsutilLastExitCode
if ($fsutilExitCode -ne 0) {
- if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
- Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal (exit code 5); journal comparison will be skipped."
- $result.Notes += "USN journal comparison skipped: fsutil requires administrative privileges."
+ if ($fsutilExitCode -eq 1 -or $fsutilExitCode -eq 5) {
+ Write-Warning "fsutil denied access to the USN journal (exit code $fsutilExitCode); fsutil requires elevation or access denied; journal comparison will be skipped."
+ $result.Notes += "USN journal comparison skipped: fsutil requires elevation or access denied."
}
else {
Write-Warning "fsutil usn readjournal failed with exit code $fsutilExitCode; journal comparison will be skipped."
diff --git a/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1 b/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1
index 6cb18d4..b6d2bd0 100644
--- a/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1
+++ b/Private/Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1
@@ -78,6 +78,29 @@ $script:AuditSubcategoryMap = @{
$script:AuditPolicyTableCache = $null
+function Copy-AuditPolicyTable {
+ <#
+ .SYNOPSIS
+ Clones an audit policy table (new hashtable + shallow-cloned entry objects).
+ .DESCRIPTION
+ Cache entries are PSCustomObjects returned by reference; without a clone a
+ caller mutating .Value/.Source would corrupt the session cache. Entries
+ contain only scalars, so a shallow .PSObject.Copy() per entry suffices.
+ #>
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([hashtable])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
+ [hashtable]$Table
+ )
+
+ $copy = @{}
+ foreach ($key in $Table.Keys) {
+ $copy[$key] = $Table[$key].PSObject.Copy()
+ }
+ return $copy
+}
+
function Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid {
[CmdletBinding()]
[OutputType([string])]
@@ -106,9 +129,10 @@ function ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv {
row, subcategory names, inclusion text) are never interpreted: the header
row is skipped positionally and replaced by fixed English headers
(WinLogKit PR #58 / AuditPolicyDsc pattern), rows are matched by GUID and
- numeric value only (which also drops the Option: rows), and when both
- System and per-user rows exist the System rows win. Accepts either a file
- -Path or raw -Lines (first line = header in both cases).
+ numeric value only (which also drops the Option: rows), and rows are
+ merged per GUID: the System row wins when present, otherwise the per-user
+ row for that GUID is used (per-user-only subcategories are not dropped).
+ Accepts either a file -Path or raw -Lines (first line = header in both cases).
#>
[CmdletBinding(DefaultParameterSetName = 'Path')]
[OutputType([hashtable])]
@@ -152,14 +176,27 @@ function ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv {
$candidates += $row
}
}
- # Localized Windows may localize the Target column
- $systemRows = @($candidates | Where-Object { $_.Target -eq 'System' })
- if ($systemRows.Count -gt 0) { $effective = $systemRows } else { $effective = $candidates }
+ # Localized Windows may localize the Target column.
+ # auditpol emits the System row before the per-user rows, but the merge below
+ # is order-independent: per GUID the System row wins when present, otherwise
+ # the per-user row for THAT GUID is used (per-user-only subcategories must
+ # not be dropped just because other GUIDs have System rows).
$seen = @{}
- foreach ($row in $effective) {
+ $seenFromSystem = @{}
+ foreach ($row in $candidates) {
$key = (($row.Guid -replace '[{}]', '').Trim()).ToLowerInvariant()
- if ($seen.ContainsKey($key)) { continue }
+ $isSystemRow = ($row.Target -eq 'System')
+ if ($seen.ContainsKey($key)) {
+ # First-wins among same-target duplicates; a later System row
+ # overrides an already-recorded per-user row for the same GUID.
+ if ($isSystemRow -and -not $seenFromSystem[$key]) {
+ $values[$key] = [int]($row.Value.Trim())
+ $seenFromSystem[$key] = $true
+ }
+ continue
+ }
$seen[$key] = $true
+ $seenFromSystem[$key] = $isSystemRow
$values[$key] = [int]($row.Value.Trim())
}
return $values
@@ -180,7 +217,8 @@ function Get-AuditPolicyTable {
$null -ne $Subcategory -and $Subcategory.Count -gt 0)
if (-not $subsetRequested -and -not $Force -and $null -ne $script:AuditPolicyTableCache) {
- return $script:AuditPolicyTableCache
+ # Clone on read: callers must not be able to mutate the cached entries
+ return (Copy-AuditPolicyTable -Table $script:AuditPolicyTableCache)
}
if ($subsetRequested) {
@@ -225,7 +263,7 @@ function Get-AuditPolicyTable {
}
if (-not $isWindowsHost) {
Write-Verbose 'Get-AuditPolicyTable: not a Windows host; audit policy not applicable'
- if (-not $subsetRequested) { $script:AuditPolicyTableCache = $table }
+ if (-not $subsetRequested) { $script:AuditPolicyTableCache = Copy-AuditPolicyTable -Table $table }
return $table
}
@@ -394,7 +432,9 @@ public static class AuditPolicyNative {
}
if (-not $subsetRequested) {
- $script:AuditPolicyTableCache = $table
+ # Cache keeps its own copy so caller mutations of the returned table
+ # cannot corrupt the session cache
+ $script:AuditPolicyTableCache = Copy-AuditPolicyTable -Table $table
}
return $table
}
diff --git a/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1 b/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
index e874a69..d1c5ee8 100644
--- a/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
+++ b/Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<#
+<#
.SYNOPSIS
Locale-invariant local password/lockout policy helper (private).
.DESCRIPTION
@@ -7,13 +7,91 @@
PasswordComplexity/ClearTextPassword (and serves as full fallback) from a
secedit /export INF whose [System Access] keys are English on all locales.
NEVER calls 'net accounts' (localized output).
+ ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals holds all pure unit/sentinel conversion logic so
+ it can be tested off-Windows (no P/Invoke, no OS calls).
.NOTES
Struct layouts verified from lmaccess.h (USER_MODALS_INFO_0/3).
- NetApi ages are seconds; USER_MODALS_INFO_3 duration/observation window are
- MINUTES per lmaccess.h (some sources wrongly say seconds). TIMEQ_FOREVER
- (0xFFFFFFFF) maps to -1 ("never" / "until admin unlocks").
+ ALL NetApi time fields are SECONDS: USER_MODALS_INFO_0 max/min password age
+ and force-logoff, and USER_MODALS_INFO_3 lockout duration and observation
+ window (Microsoft Learn: usrmod3_lockout_duration "Specifies, in seconds...";
+ usrmod3_lockout_observation_window "...in seconds").
+ TIMEQ_FOREVER ([uint32]::MaxValue) maps to -1 ("never" / "until admin unlocks").
+ Sentinel checks MUST compare against [uint32]::MaxValue, never 0xFFFFFFFF:
+ PowerShell parses the literal 0xFFFFFFFF as [int] -1, so
+ '[uint32]4294967295 -eq 0xFFFFFFFF' is $false and the branch never fires.
#>
+function ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals {
+ [CmdletBinding()]
+ [OutputType([PSCustomObject])]
+ param(
+ [Parameter()]
+ $Modals0,
+
+ [Parameter()]
+ $Modals3
+ )
+
+ $converted = [PSCustomObject]@{
+ MinPasswordLength = $null
+ MaxPasswordAgeDays = $null
+ MinPasswordAgeDays = $null
+ PasswordHistoryLength = $null
+ ForceLogoffHours = $null
+ LockoutThreshold = $null
+ LockoutDurationMinutes = $null
+ LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = $null
+ }
+
+ if ($null -ne $Modals0) {
+ $converted.MinPasswordLength = [int]$Modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_len
+
+ # USER_MODALS_INFO_0 ages are seconds; TIMEQ_FOREVER = [uint32]::MaxValue.
+ if ($Modals0.usrmod0_max_passwd_age -eq [uint32]::MaxValue) {
+ $converted.MaxPasswordAgeDays = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $converted.MaxPasswordAgeDays = [int][math]::Round($Modals0.usrmod0_max_passwd_age / 86400)
+ }
+ if ($Modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_age -eq [uint32]::MaxValue) {
+ $converted.MinPasswordAgeDays = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $converted.MinPasswordAgeDays = [int][math]::Round($Modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_age / 86400)
+ }
+ if ($Modals0.usrmod0_force_logoff -eq [uint32]::MaxValue) {
+ $converted.ForceLogoffHours = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $converted.ForceLogoffHours = [int][math]::Round($Modals0.usrmod0_force_logoff / 3600)
+ }
+ $converted.PasswordHistoryLength = [int]$Modals0.usrmod0_password_hist_len
+ }
+
+ if ($null -ne $Modals3) {
+ # USER_MODALS_INFO_3 lockout duration and observation window are SECONDS
+ # (Microsoft Learn), so divide by 60 to report minutes. TIMEQ_FOREVER
+ # ([uint32]::MaxValue) duration = "until admin unlocks" -> -1, checked
+ # BEFORE the seconds-to-minutes conversion.
+ # Reported even when threshold is 0 (lockout disabled).
+ if ($Modals3.usrmod3_lockout_duration -eq [uint32]::MaxValue) {
+ $converted.LockoutDurationMinutes = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $converted.LockoutDurationMinutes = [int][math]::Round($Modals3.usrmod3_lockout_duration / 60)
+ }
+ if ($Modals3.usrmod3_lockout_observation_window -eq [uint32]::MaxValue) {
+ $converted.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = -1
+ }
+ else {
+ $converted.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = [int][math]::Round($Modals3.usrmod3_lockout_observation_window / 60)
+ }
+ $converted.LockoutThreshold = [int]$Modals3.usrmod3_lockout_threshold
+ }
+
+ return $converted
+}
+
function Get-LocalPasswordPolicy {
[CmdletBinding()]
[OutputType([PSCustomObject])]
@@ -49,6 +127,8 @@ function Get-LocalPasswordPolicy {
# --- Primary: NetUserModalsGet levels 0 and 3 ---
$netApiOk = $false
+ $modals0 = $null
+ $modals3 = $null
if (-not ([bool]('NetApiModals' -as [type]))) {
$netApiModalsSource = @'
using System;
@@ -64,8 +144,8 @@ public static class NetApiModals {
}
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
public struct USER_MODALS_INFO_3 {
- public uint usrmod3_lockout_duration; // minutes
- public uint usrmod3_lockout_observation_window; // minutes
+ public uint usrmod3_lockout_duration; // seconds; 0xFFFFFFFF = TIMEQ_FOREVER
+ public uint usrmod3_lockout_observation_window; // seconds; 0xFFFFFFFF = TIMEQ_FOREVER
public uint usrmod3_lockout_threshold;
}
[DllImport("netapi32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
@@ -99,28 +179,9 @@ public static class NetApiModals {
if ([bool]('NetApiModals' -as [type])) {
$level0Error = [uint32]0
try {
- $modals0 = [NetApiModals]::GetLevel0([ref]$level0Error)
+ $level0 = [NetApiModals]::GetLevel0([ref]$level0Error)
if ($level0Error -eq 0) {
- $policy.MinPasswordLength = [int]$modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_len
- if ($modals0.usrmod0_max_passwd_age -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays = -1
- }
- else {
- $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays = [int][math]::Round($modals0.usrmod0_max_passwd_age / 86400)
- }
- if ($modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_age -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays = -1
- }
- else {
- $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays = [int][math]::Round($modals0.usrmod0_min_passwd_age / 86400)
- }
- if ($modals0.usrmod0_force_logoff -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- $policy.ForceLogoffHours = -1
- }
- else {
- $policy.ForceLogoffHours = [int][math]::Round($modals0.usrmod0_force_logoff / 3600)
- }
- $policy.PasswordHistoryLength = [int]$modals0.usrmod0_password_hist_len
+ $modals0 = $level0
$netApiOk = $true
}
else {
@@ -133,23 +194,9 @@ public static class NetApiModals {
$level3Error = [uint32]0
try {
- $modals3 = [NetApiModals]::GetLevel3([ref]$level3Error)
+ $level3 = [NetApiModals]::GetLevel3([ref]$level3Error)
if ($level3Error -eq 0) {
- # Minutes per lmaccess.h; reported as-is even when threshold is 0
- # (lockout disabled). TIMEQ_FOREVER duration = until admin unlocks.
- if ($modals3.usrmod3_lockout_duration -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes = -1
- }
- else {
- $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes = [int]$modals3.usrmod3_lockout_duration
- }
- if ($modals3.usrmod3_lockout_observation_window -eq 0xFFFFFFFF) {
- $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = -1
- }
- else {
- $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = [int]$modals3.usrmod3_lockout_observation_window
- }
- $policy.LockoutThreshold = [int]$modals3.usrmod3_lockout_threshold
+ $modals3 = $level3
$netApiOk = $true
}
else {
@@ -160,7 +207,18 @@ public static class NetApiModals {
Write-Verbose "Get-LocalPasswordPolicy: NetApi level 3 failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
- if ($netApiOk) { $policy.Source = 'NetApi' }
+ if ($netApiOk) {
+ $converted = ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals -Modals0 $modals0 -Modals3 $modals3
+ $policy.MinPasswordLength = $converted.MinPasswordLength
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays = $converted.MaxPasswordAgeDays
+ $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays = $converted.MinPasswordAgeDays
+ $policy.PasswordHistoryLength = $converted.PasswordHistoryLength
+ $policy.ForceLogoffHours = $converted.ForceLogoffHours
+ $policy.LockoutThreshold = $converted.LockoutThreshold
+ $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes = $converted.LockoutDurationMinutes
+ $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes = $converted.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes
+ $policy.Source = 'NetApi'
+ }
}
# --- Secedit (elevated): full fallback, or merge of the two NetApi cannot see ---
@@ -247,7 +305,11 @@ public static class NetApiModals {
if ($seceditData.ContainsKey('ClearTextPassword') -and $seceditData['ClearTextPassword'] -match '^-?\d+$') {
$policy.ClearTextPassword = ([int]$seceditData['ClearTextPassword'] -eq 1)
}
- if ($netApiOk) { $policy.Source = 'NetApi+Secedit' }
+ # Only claim '+Secedit' when the merge actually contributed one of the
+ # two fields NetApi cannot see; an INF lacking both leaves Source='NetApi'.
+ if ($netApiOk -and (($null -ne $policy.PasswordComplexity) -or ($null -ne $policy.ClearTextPassword))) {
+ $policy.Source = 'NetApi+Secedit'
+ }
}
if ($policy.Source -eq 'Unavailable') {
diff --git a/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1 b/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1
index 01d29c6..4d56466 100644
--- a/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1
+++ b/Private/Get-WlanProfileList.ps1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<#
+<#
.SYNOPSIS
Locale-invariant WLAN profile list helper (private).
.DESCRIPTION
@@ -130,14 +130,14 @@ public static class WlanNative {
Write-Verbose "Get-WlanProfileList: WLAN API unavailable (win32 $win32Error)"
return $result
}
- foreach ($profile in $profiles) {
- $flags = [uint32]$profile.Flags
+ foreach ($wlanProfile in $profiles) {
+ $flags = [uint32]$wlanProfile.Flags
$result += [PSCustomObject]@{
- Name = $profile.Name
+ Name = $wlanProfile.Name
Flags = $flags
IsGroupPolicy = [bool]($flags -band 1)
IsPerUser = [bool]($flags -band 2)
- InterfaceDescription = $profile.InterfaceDescription
+ InterfaceDescription = $wlanProfile.InterfaceDescription
}
}
}
diff --git a/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1 b/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1
index 2e53ea3..3e128f6 100644
--- a/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1
+++ b/Private/IdentityHelpers.ps1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<#
+<#
.SYNOPSIS
Locale-invariant identity helpers (private).
.DESCRIPTION
@@ -103,6 +103,13 @@ function Get-AdminGroupMembers {
catch {
Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: member Class unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
+ try {
+ $memberSidBytes = [byte[]]($member.GetType().InvokeMember('objectSID', 'GetProperty', $null, $member, $null))
+ $memberSid = (New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($memberSidBytes, 0)).Value
+ }
+ catch {
+ Write-Verbose "Get-AdminGroupMembers: member objectSID unreadable: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+ }
$members += [PSCustomObject]@{
Name = $memberName
SID = $memberSid
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 8648ebb..b09fb38 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ A single, cohesive PowerShell module that consolidates essential security functi
<td>✅ Open Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
+<td><strong>Non-English Windows</strong></td>
+<td>✅ Fully locale-invariant (API/GUID/SID)</td>
+<td>✅ Varies</td>
+<td>❌ Often parses English-only output</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td>✅ Community + Pro</td>
<td>✅ Vendor Support</td>
@@ -236,7 +242,11 @@ WindowsSecurityAudit/
│ ├── Invoke-SecurityRemediation.ps1
│ └── Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1
│
-├── 📁 Private/ # Internal functions (hidden)
+├── 📁 Private/ # Internal locale-invariant data sources (hidden)
+│ ├── Get-AuditPolicyTable.ps1 # Audit policy via AuditQuerySystemPolicy/GUID CSV
+│ ├── Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1 # Password policy via NetUserModalsGet
+│ ├── Get-WlanProfileList.ps1 # WLAN profiles via wlanapi.dll
+│ └── IdentityHelpers.ps1 # SID-first group/user/ACL resolution
│
├── 📁 Reporting/ # Reporting (4 functions)
│ ├── Get-SecurityMetrics.ps1
@@ -251,8 +261,11 @@ WindowsSecurityAudit/
│ ├── Invoke-IncidentResponse.ps1
│ └── Send-SiemEvent.ps1
│
-├── 📁 tests/ # Pester tests (413 tests)
-│ └── WindowsSecurityAudit.Tests.ps1
+├── 📁 tests/ # Pester tests (498 tests)
+│ ├── WindowsSecurityAudit.Tests.ps1 # Public API surface (425 tests)
+│ ├── Smoke.Windows.Tests.ps1 # Real-Windows execution smoke tests (48)
+│ ├── Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1 # EN/DE fixture equivalence + no-text-readers guard (25)
+│ └── fixtures/ # auditpol EN/DE (cp1252) CSV fixtures
│
├── 📁 ThreatHunting/ # Threat Hunting (7 functions)
│ ├── Export-AttackNavigatorLayer.ps1
@@ -286,6 +299,7 @@ WindowsSecurityAudit/
### Minimum Requirements
- **Operating System**: Windows 10 1809+ / Windows Server 2016+
- **PowerShell**: Version 5.1 (Windows PowerShell) or PowerShell 7+
+- **Display Language**: Any — all checks are locale-invariant since v1.6.0 (API/GUID/SID-based; correct results on Turkish, German, French and every other Windows UI language)
- **Memory**: 4GB RAM (8GB recommended for enterprise scanning)
- **Storage**: 1GB for module + 10GB for reports and logs
- **Processor**: 2 cores minimum (4+ cores recommended)
@@ -823,8 +837,8 @@ The full feature set is documented in the module tables above — this section o
**Quality infrastructure:**
-- 🧪 **Pester test suite** (`tests/WindowsSecurityAudit.Tests.ps1`) covering the public API surface (now 333 tests)
-- ⚙️ **GitHub Actions CI** (`.github/workflows/ci.yml`) on windows-latest: PSScriptAnalyzer Error gate, module import verified under both **PowerShell 7 (pwsh)** and **Windows PowerShell 5.1**, plus the full Pester suite
+- 🧪 **Pester test suite** (`tests/`) covering the public API surface plus real-Windows smoke tests and locale-regression fixtures (now 498 tests)
+- ⚙️ **GitHub Actions CI** (`.github/workflows/ci.yml`) on windows-latest: PSScriptAnalyzer Error gate, module import verified under both **PowerShell 7 (pwsh)** and **Windows PowerShell 5.1**, plus the full Pester suite and a real-Windows smoke job
### 📦 Already in the Toolbox (v1.0.0)
diff --git a/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1 b/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1
index d08a301..1bf7b48 100644
--- a/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1
+++ b/ThreatHunting/Find-APTIndicators.ps1
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ function Find-APTIndicators {
# Skip whitelisted services
$isWhitelisted = $false
foreach ($legit in $legitimateServices) {
- if ($service.Name -like "*$legit*") {
+ if ($service.Name -like "*$legit*" -or $service.DisplayName -like "*$legit*") {
$isWhitelisted = $true
break
}
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ function Find-APTIndicators {
# Check for actual malicious names
foreach ($malName in $knownMaliciousNames) {
- if ($service.Name -match $malName) {
+ if ($service.Name -match $malName -or $service.DisplayName -match $malName) {
$suspiciousScore += 70
$reasons += "CRITICAL: Name matches known malware: $malName"
}
diff --git a/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1 b/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1
index 9ccc936..3bfd3a8 100644
--- a/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1
+++ b/WindowsSecurityAudit.psd1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
Author = 'Okan YILDIZ'
CompanyName = 'okanyildiz'
Copyright = '(c) 2026 Okan YILDIZ. All rights reserved.'
- Description = 'Windows Security Audit Module'
+ Description = 'Comprehensive Windows security audit and DFIR toolkit: 72 functions across 14 categories — threat hunting (MITRE ATT&CK mapping, lateral movement, LOLBins, data exfiltration), compliance (CIS Benchmark, NIST 800-53, PCI-DSS), vulnerability management (NVD CVE matching, CPE resolution, EOL software), forensics (artifact collection, memory dumps, USN journal, Sysmon analytics), SIEM integration (Splunk HEC, Microsoft Sentinel, CEF/NDJSON), threat intelligence feeds (abuse.ch, AbuseIPDB, MISP, TAXII/STIX), Active Directory security, hardening baselines and automated remediation. Runs on Windows PowerShell 5.1+ and PowerShell 7. Fully locale-invariant since v1.6.0: all checks use APIs, GUIDs and SIDs instead of parsing localized console output, producing correct results on non-English Windows (Turkish, German, French, ...). Zero external dependencies. Free and open source — support development: https://buymeacoffee.com/okanyildizr'
PowerShellVersion = '5.1'
FunctionsToExport = '*'
CmdletsToExport = @()
diff --git a/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1 b/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1
index 59624da..8bd1795 100644
--- a/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1
+++ b/tests/Locale.Regression.Tests.ps1
@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@
to Unavailable/empty/$null instead of throwing; Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid
and Get-WellKnownSid honor their SID contracts on every platform.
- Two documented seams do NOT exist yet and their tests are skipped on purpose:
+ One documented seam does NOT exist yet and its test is skipped on purpose:
the auditpol /get CSV parse is still inline in Get-AuditPolicyTable (strategy 3,
- honest-unknown on localized inclusion text), and the NetApi seconds->days /
- TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) -> -1 conversions are inline behind the C#
- NetUserModalsGet interop in Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1. Extract pure parser
- seams first, then unskip.
+ honest-unknown on localized inclusion text). The NetApi seconds->days /
+ TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) -> -1 conversion seam now EXISTS as the pure
+ ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals helper in Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1 and
+ is covered by the tests below.
The module targets Windows PowerShell 5.1+, so only APIs available in
5.1 are used here (no null-coalescing/ternary operators, no ForEach-Object -Parallel).
@@ -37,36 +37,51 @@ BeforeDiscovery {
# Locale-fragile patterns that must never appear. All legacy call sites were
# migrated to the Private/ helpers in v1.6.0 — any match anywhere fails the guard.
+ # Every regex carries BadSamples: representative offending snippets the regex
+ # MUST match, pinned by the guard self-test below so a regex can never
+ # silently rot into a dead guard.
$script:ForbiddenReaders = @(
@{
Name = "raw 'auditpol /get' text parsing (localized Inclusion columns)"
Regex = 'auditpol(\.exe)?\s+/get\b'
Grandfathered = @()
+ BadSamples = @(
+ '$output = auditpol /get /category:* /r'
+ '$output = auditpol.exe /get /subcategory:"Logon"'
+ )
}
@{
Name = "'Minimum password length' label parsing of 'net accounts' output"
- Regex = 'Select-String\s+["''][^"'']*[Pp]assword\s+[Ll]ength'
+ Regex = 'Select-String\b(\s+-Pattern)?\s+["''][^"'']*[Pp]assword\s+[Ll]ength'
Grandfathered = @()
+ BadSamples = @(
+ 'Select-String ''Minimum password length'''
+ 'Select-String -Pattern ''Minimum password length'''
+ )
}
@{
Name = 'name-based Get-LocalGroupMember -Group with a string literal'
Regex = 'Get-LocalGroupMember\b[^\n|]*-Group\s+["'']'
Grandfathered = @()
+ BadSamples = @('Get-LocalGroupMember -Group ''Administrators''')
}
@{
Name = 'name-based Get-LocalUser -Name Guest/Administrator'
Regex = 'Get-LocalUser\b[^\n|]*-Name\s+["''](Guest|Administrator)["'']'
Grandfathered = @()
+ BadSamples = @('Get-LocalUser -Name ''Guest''')
}
@{
Name = 'string identities (Everyone / NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM / BUILTIN\Administrators) in FileSystemAccessRule'
Regex = 'FileSystemAccessRule\(\s*["''](Everyone|NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM|BUILTIN\\Administrators)["'']'
Grandfathered = @()
+ BadSamples = @('New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule(''Everyone'', ''FullControl'', ''Allow'')')
}
@{
Name = "IdentityReference matched against '(Everyone' style name patterns"
Regex = 'IdentityReference\b[^\n]*-match\s+["''][^"'']*\(?Everyone'
Grandfathered = @()
+ BadSamples = @('$rule.IdentityReference -match ''^(Everyone|BUILTIN)''')
}
)
}
@@ -81,6 +96,20 @@ BeforeAll {
Import-Module -Name $script:ModulePath -Force -DisableNameChecking
+ # Invocation-context guard for 'net accounts' reads (leading = | ; { ( & or
+ # line start). Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1 is allowed (legit /set writes).
+ # Defined in BeforeAll (not BeforeDiscovery): run-phase script state is fresh,
+ # so runtime references from It blocks need run-phase initialization.
+ $script:NetAccountsGuard = @{
+ Name = "'net accounts' invocation outside Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1"
+ Regex = '(?m)(=|\||;|\{|\(|&)\s*net(\.exe)?\s+accounts\b|^[ \t]*net(\.exe)?\s+accounts\b'
+ Allowed = @('Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1')
+ BadSamples = @(
+ '$x = net accounts'
+ '$x = & net accounts'
+ )
+ }
+
$script:IsWindowsHost = $false
try {
$script:IsWindowsHost = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformation]::IsOSPlatform(
@@ -192,6 +221,60 @@ Describe 'ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv fixture equivalence (WinLogKit PR #58
}
}
+ It 'merges per-GUID: a per-user-only GUID survives next to a GUID where the System row wins' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $lines = @(
+ 'Machine Name,Policy Target,Subcategory,Subcategory GUID,Inclusion Setting,Exclusion Setting,Setting Value'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,System,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1001,Logoff,{0CCE9216-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1'
+ )
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines $lines
+ $map.Count | Should -Be 2 -Because 'a GUID with only per-user rows must not be dropped just because another GUID has a System row'
+ $map['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 3 -Because 'the System row wins for Logon'
+ $map['0cce9216-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 1 -Because 'Logoff has only the per-user row, so it is the source'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'lets the System row win even when the per-user row comes first (reordered rows)' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $lines = @(
+ 'Machine Name,Policy Target,Subcategory,Subcategory GUID,Inclusion Setting,Exclusion Setting,Setting Value'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1001,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,System,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3'
+ )
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines $lines
+ $map.Count | Should -Be 1
+ $map['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 3 -Because 'row order must not matter: System wins regardless of position'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'drops rows whose Setting Value is outside the 0-3 range' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $lines = @(
+ 'Machine Name,Policy Target,Subcategory,Subcategory GUID,Inclusion Setting,Exclusion Setting,Setting Value'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,System,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,5'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,System,Logoff,{0CCE9216-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1'
+ )
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines $lines
+ $map.Count | Should -Be 1 -Because "'5' is not a valid audit setting value (0-3) and the row must be rejected"
+ $map.ContainsKey('0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030') | Should -BeFalse
+ $map['0cce9216-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 1
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'lets the first System row win when duplicate System rows exist for one GUID' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $lines = @(
+ 'Machine Name,Policy Target,Subcategory,Subcategory GUID,Inclusion Setting,Exclusion Setting,Setting Value'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,System,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success and Failure,,3'
+ 'WSA-TEST01,System,Logon,{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030},Success,,1'
+ )
+ $map = ConvertFrom-AuditPolicyBackupCsv -Lines $lines
+ $map.Count | Should -Be 1
+ $map['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'] | Should -Be 3 -Because 'the first System row for a GUID wins'
+ }
+ }
+
It 'accepts raw -Lines with the same result as -Path' {
InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ArgumentList $script:EnFixture -ScriptBlock {
param($enFixture)
@@ -237,10 +320,8 @@ Describe 'No locale-fragile text readers (static regression guard)' {
It "'net accounts' appears only in Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1 (legit /set usage)" {
# Invocation context only: the doc comment in Private/Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1
# ('NEVER calls net accounts') is documentation, not an invocation
- $regex = '(?m)(=|\||;|\{|\()\s*net(\.exe)?\s+accounts\b|^[ \t]*net(\.exe)?\s+accounts\b'
- $allowed = @(
- 'Hardening/Set-SecurityBaseline.ps1' # legit /set (write) usage
- )
+ $regex = $script:NetAccountsGuard.Regex
+ $allowed = $script:NetAccountsGuard.Allowed
$offenders = @(
foreach ($file in $script:GuardedFiles) {
if ($allowed -contains $file.RelativePath) { continue }
@@ -250,6 +331,18 @@ Describe 'No locale-fragile text readers (static regression guard)' {
)
$offenders.Count | Should -Be 0 -Because ("'net accounts' output is localized; reads must go through Get-LocalPasswordPolicy, writes belong to Set-SecurityBaseline: {0}" -f ($offenders -join ', '))
}
+
+ It 'guard regex still matches its representative bad samples: <Name>' -ForEach $script:ForbiddenReaders {
+ foreach ($sample in $_.BadSamples) {
+ $sample -match $_.Regex | Should -BeTrue -Because "a guard regex that no longer matches its own bad sample is a dead guard (sample: $sample)"
+ }
+ }
+
+ It "guard regex still matches its representative bad samples: net accounts invocation" {
+ foreach ($sample in $script:NetAccountsGuard.BadSamples) {
+ $sample -match $script:NetAccountsGuard.Regex | Should -BeTrue -Because "a guard regex that no longer matches its own bad sample is a dead guard (sample: $sample)"
+ }
+ }
}
Describe 'Private helper contract and degradation' {
@@ -339,12 +432,160 @@ Describe 'Private helper contract and degradation' {
$sids.AuthenticatedUsers | Should -Be 'S-1-5-11'
}
}
+
+ It 'Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid matches a SecurityIdentifier object input against its SID string' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ # On non-Windows .NET the whole System.Security.Principal.Windows
+ # surface (including every SecurityIdentifier constructor) throws
+ # PlatformNotSupportedException, so the object cannot be built there;
+ # the assertion itself runs wherever the type is constructible.
+ $sidObject = $null
+ try {
+ $sidObject = [System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]'S-1-5-32-544'
+ }
+ catch {
+ Set-ItResult -Skipped -Because 'SecurityIdentifier cannot be constructed on this platform (Windows Principal functionality is not supported)'
+ return
+ }
+ Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $sidObject -Sid 'S-1-5-32-544' | Should -BeTrue
+ Test-IdentityReferenceIsSid -IdentityReference $sidObject -Sid 'S-1-1-0' | Should -BeFalse
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Context 'Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid name resolution' {
+ It 'resolves subcategory names case-insensitively' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'logon' | Should -Be '{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Logon' | Should -Be '{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'returns null for an unknown subcategory name' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ Get-AuditSubcategoryGuid -Name 'Not A Real Subcategory' | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Context 'Get-AuditPolicyTable subset selection and cache behavior' {
+ It 'returns exactly the requested subcategories' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $table = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'Logon', 'Logoff'
+ $table.Count | Should -Be 2
+ $table.ContainsKey('0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030') | Should -BeTrue
+ $table.ContainsKey('0cce9216-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030') | Should -BeTrue
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'skips unknown names in -Subcategory' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $table = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Subcategory 'Logon', 'Logoff', 'Not A Real Subcategory'
+ $table.Count | Should -Be 2 -Because 'unknown subcategory names are skipped, not fatal'
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'serves equivalent content from the cache on repeated calls without -Force' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $first = Get-AuditPolicyTable
+ $second = Get-AuditPolicyTable
+ $second.Count | Should -Be $first.Count
+ $firstKeys = @($first.Keys | Sort-Object)
+ (@($second.Keys | Sort-Object) -join ',') | Should -Be ($firstKeys -join ',')
+ foreach ($key in $firstKeys) {
+ $second[$key].Value | Should -Be $first[$key].Value
+ $second[$key].Success | Should -Be $first[$key].Success
+ $second[$key].Failure | Should -Be $first[$key].Failure
+ $second[$key].Source | Should -Be $first[$key].Source
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'never lets callers corrupt the cache (clone-on-read)' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $table = Get-AuditPolicyTable
+ $entry = $table['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030']
+ $originalValue = $entry.Value
+ $entry.Value = 999
+ $fresh = Get-AuditPolicyTable
+ $fresh['0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'].Value |
+ Should -Be $originalValue -Because 'mutating a returned table must not corrupt the cached table'
+ # Hygiene: rebuild the cache so no later test inherits state from this one
+ $null = Get-AuditPolicyTable -Force
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Context 'Get-LocalUserByRid RID suffix matching' {
+ It 'does not match a user whose SID merely ends with the RID digits (RID 500 vs ...-1500)' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ # Get-LocalUser does not exist on non-Windows hosts and Pester can
+ # only mock existing commands, so define a stub first. The SID is a
+ # duck-typed .Value holder because SecurityIdentifier constructors
+ # throw PlatformNotSupportedException off Windows; the code under
+ # test only ever touches $_.SID.Value.
+ function Get-LocalUser { }
+ Mock Get-LocalUser {
+ @(
+ [PSCustomObject]@{
+ Name = 'Rid1500User'
+ SID = [PSCustomObject]@{ Value = 'S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1500' }
+ Enabled = $true
+ Description = ''
+ }
+ )
+ }
+ Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 500 | Should -BeNullOrEmpty -Because 'SID ...-1500 must not match RID 500 (suffix match includes the dash)'
+ $hit = Get-LocalUserByRid -Rid 1500
+ $hit.Name | Should -Be 'Rid1500User' -Because 'the mock wiring must actually be exercised (positive control)'
+ }
+ }
}
- # SKIPPED (no parse seam): the NetApi seconds -> days conversion and the
- # TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) -> -1 mapping live inline behind the C#
- # NetUserModalsGet interop in Get-LocalPasswordPolicy.ps1 and cannot execute
- # on non-Windows hosts. Extract a pure conversion helper first, then unskip.
- It 'converts NetApi seconds to days and TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) to -1' -Skip {
+ Context 'ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals pure conversion seam' {
+ It 'converts NetApi seconds to days/hours/minutes and TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) to -1' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $modals0 = @{
+ usrmod0_min_passwd_len = [uint32]7
+ usrmod0_max_passwd_age = [uint32]3628800 # 42 days, in seconds
+ usrmod0_min_passwd_age = [uint32]86400 # 1 day, in seconds
+ usrmod0_force_logoff = [uint32]::MaxValue # TIMEQ_FOREVER
+ usrmod0_password_hist_len = [uint32]5
+ }
+ $modals3 = @{
+ usrmod3_lockout_duration = [uint32]1800 # 30 minutes, in seconds
+ usrmod3_lockout_observation_window = [uint32]600 # 10 minutes, in seconds
+ usrmod3_lockout_threshold = [uint32]5
+ }
+ $policy = ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals -Modals0 $modals0 -Modals3 $modals3
+ $policy.MinPasswordLength | Should -Be 7
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays | Should -Be 42
+ $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays | Should -Be 1
+ $policy.PasswordHistoryLength | Should -Be 5
+ $policy.ForceLogoffHours | Should -Be -1 -Because 'TIMEQ_FOREVER (0xFFFFFFFF) maps to -1'
+ $policy.LockoutThreshold | Should -Be 5
+ $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes | Should -Be 30
+ $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes | Should -Be 10
+ }
+ }
+
+ It 'maps a TIMEQ_FOREVER lockout duration to -1 and null Modals0 to null fields' {
+ InModuleScope -ModuleName $script:ModuleName -ScriptBlock {
+ $modals3 = @{
+ usrmod3_lockout_duration = [uint32]::MaxValue # TIMEQ_FOREVER: until admin unlocks
+ usrmod3_lockout_observation_window = [uint32]600
+ usrmod3_lockout_threshold = [uint32]0
+ }
+ $policy = ConvertTo-PolicyFromModals -Modals0 $null -Modals3 $modals3
+ $policy.LockoutDurationMinutes | Should -Be -1
+ $policy.LockoutObservationWindowMinutes | Should -Be 10
+ $policy.LockoutThreshold | Should -Be 0
+ $policy.MinPasswordLength | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ $policy.MaxPasswordAgeDays | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ $policy.MinPasswordAgeDays | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ $policy.PasswordHistoryLength | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ $policy.ForceLogoffHours | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+ }
+ }
}
}