A self-hosted UPI & COD payment gateway with zero per-transaction platform fees, universal JavaScript checkout integration, dynamic QR payments, WhatsApp OTP authentication, and automated payment verification.
JavaScript
fix(security): separate the device-credential and blind-index keys, fail closed on loopback
rishabh3a35c98bdc39
diff --git a/packages/common/src/secrets.js b/packages/common/src/secrets.jsindex dbe22d9..67494c1 100644--- a/packages/common/src/secrets.js+++ b/packages/common/src/secrets.js@@ -59,11 +59,32 @@ export const getCoinStoreWebhookSecret = () => resolveSecret('coin_store_webhook*/export const getInternalServiceToken = () => resolveSecret('internal_service_token', 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TOKEN');+/**+ * Key used to sign device credentials and device challenges.+ *+ * Deliberately separate from the internal service token: that token is transmitted by the+ * checkout portal on every internal render, so sharing a key with it would mean a leaked+ * internal token could be used to mint a valid device credential for any device id.+ */+export const getDeviceCredentialKey = () => resolveSecret('device_credential_key', 'DEVICE_CREDENTIAL_KEY');++/**+ * Key used to index high-entropy secrets for lookup (session tokens, device tokens).+ * Separate from the internal service token so a leaked internal token cannot be used to+ * compute stored indexes.+ */+export const getBlindIndexKey = () => resolveSecret('blind_index_key', 'BLIND_INDEX_KEY');+/** True when a socket remoteAddress is loopback (IPv4 or IPv6). */function isLoopbackRemoteAddress(remoteAddress) {- if (!remoteAddress || typeof remoteAddress !== 'string') return true;+ // Fail closed: an absent or malformed address is NOT loopback. Returning true here would+ // let any request that hides its peer address satisfy the internal-service check.+ if (!remoteAddress || typeof remoteAddress !== 'string') return false;const addr = remoteAddress.trim().toLowerCase();- return addr === '127.0.0.1' || addr === '::1' || addr === '::ffff:127.0.0.1';+ if (!addr) return false;+ if (addr === '::1' || addr === '::ffff:127.0.0.1') return true;+ // 127.0.0.0/8+ return /^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(addr);}/** True only when the caller proves it is a trusted co-located internal service. */@@ -87,7 +108,7 @@ export function issueDeviceCredential(deviceId) {const nonce = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');const issuedAt = String(Date.now());const mac = crypto- .createHmac('sha256', getInternalServiceToken())+ .createHmac('sha256', getDeviceCredentialKey()).update(`devcred:v1:${deviceId}:${nonce}:${issuedAt}`).digest('hex');return `devtok_${deviceId}.${nonce}.${issuedAt}.${mac}`;@@ -112,7 +133,7 @@ export function verifyDeviceCredential(deviceId, token) {const [nonce, issuedAt, presentedMac] = parts;if (!nonce || !issuedAt || !presentedMac) return false;const expectedMac = crypto- .createHmac('sha256', getInternalServiceToken())+ .createHmac('sha256', getDeviceCredentialKey()).update(`devcred:v1:${deviceId}:${nonce}:${issuedAt}`).digest('hex');return safeEqual(presentedMac, expectedMac);@@ -123,7 +144,7 @@ const consumedDeviceChallenges = new Map();function deviceChallengeMac(deviceId, nonce, expiresAt) {return crypto- .createHmac('sha256', getInternalServiceToken())+ .createHmac('sha256', getDeviceCredentialKey()).update(`devchal:v1:${deviceId}:${nonce}:${expiresAt}`).digest('hex');}@@ -215,10 +236,14 @@ export function decryptAtRest(stored) {* Keyed digest for high-entropy secrets that are only ever looked up, never read back* (session tokens, device tokens). Unlike a plain hash this is not brute-forceable from a* database dump, because the key lives outside the database.+ *+ * The key is dedicated to this purpose rather than shared with the internal service token:+ * that token travels in a request header on every internal render, so a shared key would+ * leak the indexing secret wherever those headers are logged.*/export function blindIndex(value, namespace = 'token') {if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') return null;- const digest = crypto.createHmac('sha256', getInternalServiceToken())+ const digest = crypto.createHmac('sha256', getBlindIndexKey()).update(`${namespace}:${value}`).digest('hex');return `${namespace}_v1_${digest}`;@@ -226,11 +251,19 @@ export function blindIndex(value, namespace = 'token') {/*** Compares a presented secret against a stored blind index in constant time.+ *+ * Rows written before the key was separated were indexed with the internal service token,+ * so that key is still accepted for existing rows; the row is re-indexed on first use.*/export function blindIndexMatches(value, storedIndex, namespace = 'token') {+ if (!value || !storedIndex) return false;const candidate = blindIndex(value, namespace);- if (!candidate || !storedIndex) return false;- return safeEqual(candidate, storedIndex);+ if (candidate && safeEqual(candidate, storedIndex)) return true;+ // Legacy index produced with the previous key.+ const legacy = crypto.createHmac('sha256', getInternalServiceToken())+ .update(`${namespace}:${value}`)+ .digest('hex');+ return safeEqual(`${namespace}_v1_${legacy}`, storedIndex);}/** True when the request's `Authorization: Bearer` value matches any of the given tokens. */