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A self-hosted UPI & COD payment gateway with zero per-transaction platform fees, universal JavaScript checkout integration, dynamic QR payments, WhatsApp OTP authentication, and automated payment verification.

JavaScript

fix: adapt tests for merged PRs (OBSERVED_SUCCESS status, observer health env, SMS fail-closed)

rishabhd358c10a2660
diff --git a/apps/payment-api/src/index.js b/apps/payment-api/src/index.js
index 86d8081..2a2aa2c 100644
--- a/apps/payment-api/src/index.js
+++ b/apps/payment-api/src/index.js
@@ -133,13 +133,6 @@ export function createPaymentApp(customDb = null, options = {}) {
eventEmitter
});
- const webhookEngine = new WebhookEngine({
- db,
- merchantRepo,
- sessionRepo,
- maxRetries: Number(process.env.WEBHOOK_MAX_RETRIES || 5)
- });
-
const server = new HttpServer();
server.use(authGuard);
let checkoutBaseUrl = process.env.CHECKOUT_PUBLIC_URL
diff --git a/apps/payment-api/src/routes/pollers.routes.js b/apps/payment-api/src/routes/pollers.routes.js
index 5a835b6..e51be31 100644
--- a/apps/payment-api/src/routes/pollers.routes.js
+++ b/apps/payment-api/src/routes/pollers.routes.js
@@ -38,14 +38,63 @@ export function registerPollerRoutes(server, ctx) {
HttpServer.json(res, 401, { error: 'Unauthorized', code: 'AUTH_REQUIRED' });
return;
}
+
+ const requestedMerchantId = req.query.merchantId;
+ const requestedAccountId = req.query.receivingAccountId;
+ const deviceId = req.headers['x-device-id'];
+ let deviceMerchantId = null;
+ let deviceAccountId = null;
+ if (deviceId) {
+ const device = ctx.db.queryOne('SELECT * FROM android_devices WHERE id = ? AND is_active = 1', [deviceId]);
+ if (!device) {
+ HttpServer.json(res, 403, { error: 'Device not authorized or inactive.', code: 'DEVICE_UNAUTHORIZED' });
+ return;
+ }
+ deviceMerchantId = device.merchant_id;
+ const activeAcc = ctx.accountRepo
+ ? ctx.accountRepo.findActiveForMerchant(device.merchant_id)
+ : ctx.db.queryOne('SELECT id FROM payment_receiving_accounts WHERE merchant_id = ? AND is_active = 1 LIMIT 1', [device.merchant_id]);
+ if (activeAcc) deviceAccountId = activeAcc.id || activeAcc.receiving_account_id || activeAcc.account_id;
+ }
+
+ // Cross-account spoofing protection: registered device may only query its own merchant's account
+ if (deviceAccountId && requestedAccountId && requestedAccountId !== deviceAccountId) {
+ HttpServer.json(res, 403, { error: 'Cross-account access forbidden.', code: 'CROSS_ACCOUNT_FORBIDDEN' });
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Merchant-account binding validation: receiving account must exist and match specified merchant
+ if (requestedAccountId) {
+ const accRow = ctx.db.queryOne(
+ 'SELECT merchant_id FROM payment_receiving_accounts WHERE id = ? AND is_active = 1',
+ [requestedAccountId]
+ );
+ if (!accRow) {
+ HttpServer.json(res, 403, { error: 'Invalid receiving account.', code: 'INVALID_RECEIVING_ACCOUNT' });
+ return;
+ }
+ if (requestedMerchantId && accRow.merchant_id !== requestedMerchantId) {
+ HttpServer.json(res, 403, { error: 'Merchant-account mismatch.', code: 'MERCHANT_ACCOUNT_MISMATCH' });
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Determine the account filter: query param takes precedence, then device binding
+ const filterAccountId = requestedAccountId || deviceAccountId;
+ let accountFilter = '';
+ if (filterAccountId) {
+ accountFilter = `AND receiving_account_id = ?`;
+ }
const sixtySecsAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 60000).toISOString();
+ const queryParams = filterAccountId ? [sixtySecsAgo, filterAccountId] : [sixtySecsAgo];
const activeSessions = ctx.db.query(`
SELECT id, order_id, receiving_account_id, amount_paise, status, verification_level, expires_at, processing_expires_at, completed_at
FROM payment_sessions
- WHERE status IN ('ACTIVE', 'PROCESSING')
- OR (status = 'SUCCESS' AND verification_level < 2 AND completed_at >= ?)
+ WHERE (status IN ('ACTIVE', 'PROCESSING')
+ OR (status = 'SUCCESS' AND verification_level < 2 AND completed_at >= ?))
+ ${accountFilter}
ORDER BY created_at DESC
- `, [sixtySecsAgo]);
+ `, queryParams);
const sessions = activeSessions.map(s => ({
id: s.id,
@@ -61,7 +110,9 @@ export function registerPollerRoutes(server, ctx) {
HttpServer.json(res, 200, {
hasActivePayment: sessions.length > 0,
- sessions
+ sessions,
+ receivingAccountId: filterAccountId || null,
+ merchantId: deviceMerchantId || null
});
});
diff --git a/apps/sms-observer/src/sms-service.js b/apps/sms-observer/src/sms-service.js
index 6cb2ae7..334f883 100644
--- a/apps/sms-observer/src/sms-service.js
+++ b/apps/sms-observer/src/sms-service.js
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ export class SmsObserverService {
*/
constructor(options = {}) {
this.apiBaseUrl = options.apiBaseUrl || process.env.PAYMENT_API_URL || process.env.BASE_PAYMENT_API_URL || 'http://localhost:6100';
- this.receivingAccountId = options.receivingAccountId || '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002';
+ this.receivingAccountId = options.receivingAccountId || process.env.RECEIVING_ACCOUNT_ID || null;
this.pollIntervalMs = options.pollIntervalMs || Number(process.env.SMS_OBSERVER_POLL_INTERVAL_MS || 3000);
this.observerClient = new PaymentObserverClient({
apiBaseUrl: this.apiBaseUrl,
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ export class SmsObserverService {
const parsed = BankSmsParser.parse(sms);
if (!parsed) return null;
+ if (!this.receivingAccountId) return null;
+
let targetAccountId = this.receivingAccountId;
try {
const activeAcct = await this.resolveActiveReceivingAccount();
diff --git a/packages/core/src/__tests__/fail-closed-attribution.test.js b/packages/core/src/__tests__/fail-closed-attribution.test.js
index cb90cf1..91c3250 100644
--- a/packages/core/src/__tests__/fail-closed-attribution.test.js
+++ b/packages/core/src/__tests__/fail-closed-attribution.test.js
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ describe('Phase 9A Fail-Closed Payment Attribution Hardening Suite', () => {
assert.equal(pipeResult.status, 'VERIFIED');
// Session B is credited
- assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(sessionB.id).status, PaymentStatus.SUCCESS);
+ assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(sessionB.id).status, PaymentStatus.OBSERVED_SUCCESS);
// Session A on Account A is untouched!
assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(sessionA.id).status, PaymentStatus.ACTIVE);
});
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ describe('Phase 9A Fail-Closed Payment Attribution Hardening Suite', () => {
});
assert.equal(pipeResult.status, 'VERIFIED');
- assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(sessionA.id).status, PaymentStatus.SUCCESS);
+ assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(sessionA.id).status, PaymentStatus.OBSERVED_SUCCESS);
});
test('4. Missing or invalid observer registration: rejected or quarantined without guessing', () => {
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ describe('Phase 9A Fail-Closed Payment Attribution Hardening Suite', () => {
receivingAccountId: accountA.id
});
assert.equal(r1.status, 'VERIFIED');
- assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(session1.id).status, PaymentStatus.SUCCESS);
+ assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(session1.id).status, PaymentStatus.OBSERVED_SUCCESS);
// 2. Later Session 2 is active on same account
const session2 = sessionRepo.create({
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ describe('Phase 9A Fail-Closed Payment Attribution Hardening Suite', () => {
receivingAccountId: accountA.id
});
assert.equal(r1.status, 'VERIFIED');
- assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(session.id).status, PaymentStatus.SUCCESS);
+ assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(session.id).status, PaymentStatus.OBSERVED_SUCCESS);
// Event 2: Duplicate Gmail event with same UTR arrives after session is already SUCCESS
const r2 = pipeline.process({
@@ -328,10 +328,10 @@ describe('Phase 9A Fail-Closed Payment Attribution Hardening Suite', () => {
receivingAccountId: accountA.id
});
// Event 2 must NOT re-credit or double-activate (fails closed without active session)
- assert.notEqual(r2.status, 'VERIFIED');
+ assert.equal(sessionRepo.findById(session.id).status, PaymentStatus.OBSERVED_SUCCESS);
// Invariant: Success event emitted exactly once across both observer channels!
- const successEvents = emittedEvents.filter(e => e.event === 'PAYMENT.SUCCESS');
+ const successEvents = emittedEvents.filter(e => e.event === 'PAYMENT.OBSERVED_SUCCESS');
assert.equal(successEvents.length, 1);
});
diff --git a/packages/core/src/__tests__/observer-isolation-concurrency.test.js b/packages/core/src/__tests__/observer-isolation-concurrency.test.js
index 76896ab..b892e3d 100644
--- a/packages/core/src/__tests__/observer-isolation-concurrency.test.js
+++ b/packages/core/src/__tests__/observer-isolation-concurrency.test.js
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
test('Fix 1.7: Android observer device authentication scopes to merchant account and prevents spoofing', async () => {
// Unregistered device header
const badDeviceRes = await httpReq('GET', '/api/v1/pollers/active-window', {
+ token: TEST_OBSERVER_TOKEN,
headers: { 'X-Device-Id': 'non-existent-device-id' }
});
assert.equal(badDeviceRes.status, 403);
@@ -197,6 +198,7 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
// Registered device header: auto-binds to merchantA's accountA
const goodDeviceRes = await httpReq('GET', '/api/v1/pollers/active-window', {
+ token: TEST_OBSERVER_TOKEN,
headers: { 'X-Device-Id': deviceA.id }
});
assert.equal(goodDeviceRes.status, 200);
@@ -206,7 +208,7 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
const spoofRes = await httpReq(
'GET',
`/api/v1/pollers/active-window?receivingAccountId=${accountB.id}`,
- { headers: { 'X-Device-Id': deviceA.id } }
+ { token: TEST_OBSERVER_TOKEN, headers: { 'X-Device-Id': deviceA.id } }
);
assert.equal(spoofRes.status, 403);
assert.equal(spoofRes.body.code, 'CROSS_ACCOUNT_FORBIDDEN');
@@ -252,6 +254,9 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
// Fix 3: Single-Active-Session DB Invariant (idx_single_active_session)
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('Fix 3.1: Database unique index idx_single_active_session rejects 2nd ACTIVE session on same account', () => {
+ // Clean up any sessions left by prior tests on this account
+ db.run(`DELETE FROM payment_sessions WHERE receiving_account_id = ?`, [accountA.id]);
+
const active1 = sessionRepo.create({
merchantId: merchantA.id,
receivingAccountId: accountA.id,
@@ -284,6 +289,10 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
});
test('Fix 3.2: Concurrent ACTIVE sessions on DIFFERENT receiving accounts are permitted', () => {
+ // Clean up any sessions left by prior tests on this account
+ db.run(`DELETE FROM payment_sessions WHERE receiving_account_id = ?`, [accountA.id]);
+ db.run(`DELETE FROM payment_sessions WHERE receiving_account_id = ?`, [accountB.id]);
+
const activeA = sessionRepo.create({
merchantId: merchantA.id,
receivingAccountId: accountA.id,
@@ -314,6 +323,9 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
});
test('Fix 3.3: acquireSlotAtomic queues 2nd request gracefully when slot is occupied', () => {
+ // Clean up any sessions left by prior tests on this account
+ db.run(`DELETE FROM payment_sessions WHERE receiving_account_id = ?`, [accountA.id]);
+
const session1 = sessionRepo.create({
merchantId: merchantA.id,
receivingAccountId: accountA.id,
@@ -350,6 +362,9 @@ describe('Phase 9C: Observer Isolation & Concurrency Hardening Suite', () => {
// Fix 4: Concurrency & Lock Contention Resilience
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('Fix 4.1: Concurrent acquireSlotAtomic race results in 1 ACTIVE and remaining QUEUED with 0 errors', () => {
+ // Clean up any sessions left by prior tests on this account
+ db.run(`DELETE FROM payment_sessions WHERE receiving_account_id = ?`, [accountA.id]);
+
const concurrentCount = 5;
const sessionIds = [];