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docs(claude): share goes to the API host and honors Metadata-only

shukieshah11bedf717425
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 076fd85d..3e221c8d 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Do not recreate or depend on removed `asymptote` mirror trees. Keep new work foc
- Beacon is visibility-first endpoint telemetry for local AI agent runtimes, not a hosted policy service or general endpoint protection product.
- Preserve the local-only default. The public Beacon build must not require a hosted account, remote policy fetch, hosted dashboard, or external network dependency during normal hook execution, and hooks themselves never touch the network.
-- `beacon login` is the account-identity channel for interactive users and is required by the interactive `beacon endpoint install` wizard. It uses browser PKCE against beacon.sh and stores the scoped CLI token only in `~/.beacon/auth/session.json` (0600 under a 0700 directory). Signing in alone never starts forwarding. User-mode `beacon endpoint connect` may send that token once to `POST /api/cli/enroll/account` to authorize minting a separate device ingest key, and `beacon mcp token create` may send it to `POST /api/cli/mcp/tokens` (scope `mcp:token:create`, listed on the sign-in page) to mint a personal MCP token that is printed once to stdout and never written to a file, and `beacon share` may send it (scope `traces:write`, also on the sign-in page) to `PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST /v1/traces/{external_id}/events/batch` and `GET /v1/traces/{external_id}` on the session's own base URL to upload a shared trace the person chose to publish, as a `beacon.trace.v1` summary and its events (`cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go`; a `bcn_api_` API key from `--key` or `BEACON_API_KEY` may stand in for it, precedence `--key`, then a current sign-in carrying the scope, then the environment). These are explicit, user-initiated requests with redirects refused. Hooks, plugins and background jobs never make them, with one exception: the git pre-push hook, only when the person opted in with `beacon git setup --share-sessions` (public needs confirmation), may make the three share requests during a push the person started, within the hook's budget and never failing the push. Never copy the account token into endpoint config, Vector, hook environments, logs, or command output. System/root/package/MDM/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run installs stay noninteractive and account-free.
+- `beacon login` is the account-identity channel for interactive users and is required by the interactive `beacon endpoint install` wizard. It uses browser PKCE against beacon.sh and stores the scoped CLI token only in `~/.beacon/auth/session.json` (0600 under a 0700 directory). Signing in alone never starts forwarding. User-mode `beacon endpoint connect` may send that token once to `POST /api/cli/enroll/account` to authorize minting a separate device ingest key, and `beacon mcp token create` may send it to `POST /api/cli/mcp/tokens` (scope `mcp:token:create`, listed on the sign-in page) to mint a personal MCP token that is printed once to stdout and never written to a file, and `beacon share` may send it (scope `traces:write`, also on the sign-in page) to `PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST /v1/traces/{external_id}/events/batch` and `GET /v1/traces/{external_id}` on the Beacon API host (`https://api.beacon.sh` for a beacon.sh sign-in, other hosts unchanged, `BEACON_API_URL` overrides) to upload a shared trace the person chose to publish, as a `beacon.trace.v1` summary and its events (`cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go`; a `bcn_api_` API key from `--key` or `BEACON_API_KEY` may stand in for it, precedence `--key`, then a current sign-in carrying the scope, then the environment). These are explicit, user-initiated requests with redirects refused. Hooks, plugins and background jobs never make them, with one exception: the git pre-push hook, only when the person opted in with `beacon git setup --share-sessions` (public needs confirmation), may make the three share requests during a push the person started, within the hook's budget and never failing the push. Never copy the account token into endpoint config, Vector, hook environments, logs, or command output. System/root/package/MDM/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run installs stay noninteractive and account-free.
- Beacon Cloud forwarding (`cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/asymptote`, `beacon endpoint connect`, `beacon endpoint asymptote`) is Vector-shaped: Beacon writes local JSONL, Vector ships runtime lines only from the connection point forward and reads inventory from the beginning to establish the endpoint's current baseline, plus the one bounded exception of the session backfill (below), and the `bcn_device_*` key stays only in `<BaseDir>/asymptote/vector-secrets.json` via Vector's secret backend. The onboarding wizard preselects Beacon Cloud, and confirming it connects this endpoint in the same command once the local install has succeeded; an endpoint that is already enrolled is never re-enrolled, because enrollment rotates the device key. Standard mode ships locally sanitized retained content; metadata-only uses local Vector transforms to remove prompts, responses, reasoning, tool arguments/results, tool descriptions/definitions, retrieval queries/documents, evaluation explanations, agent descriptions, stop sequences, approval/policy reasons, command output, raw fields, diffs, inventory content, and MCP definitions before buffering/upload. Every text-shaped event field must be classified in `metadata_fields_test.go` (`metadataOnlyRemoved`, each with its own `del()` in `pack/metadata-transforms.toml`, or `metadataOnlyKept`); a new field fails that test until it is, and `BEACON_TEST_VECTOR_BIN` runs the transform on an event with every field set. `vector.toml` is not rendered only at connect: `asymptote.ReconcileForwarder` re-renders it in place for a connected endpoint from the current pack with the enrollment's ingest URL and recorded privacy mode, validates it with the forwarder's own Vector exactly as connect does, atomically replaces it, and restarts the forwarder only when the content changed and the forwarder is running (a stopped one reads the new config when it next starts). It never enrolls, reads or rewrites the secrets file, makes a network request, or touches `vector-data/` (checkpoints stay, so pack changes must keep source ids and fingerprinting stable), and a rejected config is a warning that keeps the old one; it is a no-op when not connected, after an incomplete connect, without an installed unit, or where `ForwarderManager` is unsupported (supervised mode). `lifecycle.Install` runs it last when services are started (so install, repair and the Linux package upgrade), repair's teardown keeps the forwarder (`UninstallOptions.KeepManagedIngest`) instead of disconnecting it, and the macOS postinstall, which installs with `--no-start`, runs the hidden `beacon endpoint asymptote reconcile --system`. Keep the ingest URL `https://`, the wire contract aligned with `beacon-ingest` (`/v1/ingest/{runtime,inventory}` and `/v1/ingest/health`), and do not add another endpoint network channel. The cloud-sandbox shuttle is the bounded exception: only with `BEACON_ORIGIN=cloud`, it can upload new runtime lines to GCS, S3, or the same Beacon ingest contract because no Vector/service manager/browser/persistent disk exists there.
- Session backfill (`cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_backfill.go`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#session-backfill` and `docs/cli/endpoint-connect.mdx#session-backfill`): after every successful install (user or system mode), every session-store collector runs once with `CollectOptions.Since` (30 days; `sessionwindow.Recent` keeps those sessions, newest first, and never touches the cursors of the rest) and a shared `writer.Budget` (24 MiB, at most 12 MiB per runtime through `Budget.Sub`; a refused append returns `writer.ErrBudgetSpent`, the collector stops with cursors past only what was written, and a manual sync reads the rest). A new session-store collector takes both fields, reads its store only through `internal/sessionfs` (a test parses every collector package to enforce it), and joins `endpointBackfillRunners` and that test's list. Every connect, first or re-connect, user or system, runs the same sweep before enrollment (skipped when install just ran it) and, before the forwarder starts, `asymptote.StageBackfill` copies the window's `harness.collection_method=poll` lines into `cloud-backfill.jsonl` beside the runtime log, which the `beacon_backfill` Vector source (fingerprinted `device_and_inode`, so each atomically restaged copy is a new file) reads from the beginning into the runtime sink through the same privacy transform. Live hook/OTLP/plugin history before the connection point stays local. Re-connects restage, so a resend of already-shipped lines is expected and rests on the deterministic `event.id`; a privacy-mode change clears the checkpoints and the restage renames the new-mode copy over the old one (kept until then so the copy is always a new inode; deleted instead when nothing restages), and `disconnect` removes it. System mode runs the collectors under `withUserHome` for the active console user (`activeConsoleUser`), with cursors under the system base directory, and reports a skip when nobody is logged in; root is reading a home the console user controls, so the sweep runs under `sessionfs.Confine` (an `os.Root` on that home, files owned by the home's owner only, non-blocking opens that refuse FIFOs/devices, SQLite read from a private snapshot under `<SystemBaseDir>/state/backfill-snapshots`, retried until the database size/change counter and WAL header are unchanged across the copy, and refused past `sessionfs.MaxSnapshotBytes` (512 MiB with its WAL) with the runtime's sync command named in the report), and refused paths read as absent and are listed in the report. User-mode sync and backfill stay unconfined. The wizard's confirm screen names the upload (`WizardOptions.BackfillDays`). Dry-run, `--no-backfill` and `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` skip all of it; the cmd tests run with `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` set in `TestMain`.
- `beacon endpoint install` has a full-screen onboarding wizard on interactive user TTYs. It signs in, preselects Beacon Cloud, requires an explicit choice to opt out to Local, and asks Managed users to choose Standard or Metadata-only privacy. Signing in alone still moves no telemetry. Confirming Beacon Cloud does: the confirm screen states that it installs Beacon and starts forwarding, and names what the selected privacy mode sends, so that screen is the consent point. The managed destination is recorded only after enrollment succeeds, so a failed enrollment leaves a working local install, prints `beacon endpoint connect` as the retry, and re-offers the question on the next install. The onboarding record is written only after `lifecycle.Install` returns, because a profile written first left a failed install looking onboarded and silently skipped the wizard on the retry. Explicit `install --connect` is unchanged. The wizard is skipped for system/root/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run or `BEACON_ONBOARDING=0`; those unattended paths must never gain an account or browser dependency. Legacy `BEACON_ONBOARDING_EMAIL`/`USAGE` submissions remain only for fleet compatibility. After the destination, the wizard shows an agent tools screen; every row is preselected (opt-out, space toggles). Beacon Cloud MCP is offered only with Beacon Cloud and runs the `beacon mcp connect` flow (`connectCloudMCP` with `yes`, OAuth, detected harnesses) only after the endpoint is connected (or already was), via `finishCloudSetup`; a failed enrollment skips it and names the retry. The Beacon Agent Skills are offered for either destination and installed user-wide into `~/.agents/skills` and, when Claude Code is set up, `~/.claude/skills` (`cli/beacon/internal/agentskills`, `beacon skills install|uninstall`; a `.beacon-managed` marker decides what Beacon may replace or remove; install and repair refresh only copies Beacon already wrote). Both run after `lifecycle.Install` returns and warn rather than fail. The answers are recorded as `onboarding.cloud_mcp`/`agent_skills`. Implementation lives in `cli/beacon/internal/onboarding`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_onboarding.go`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_install.go` and `cli/beacon/cmd/agent_tools.go`; keep `docs/cli/endpoint-onboarding.mdx` and `docs/cli/skills.mdx` in sync.
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Supported runtime surfaces today:
- Token usage and runtime-reported cost capture across spans, logs, and metric datapoints, normalized into `gen_ai.usage`, with attribution rollups served by the dashboard token view (`/api/tokens`) and the `beacon token-usage` report command for local and CI logs. Every report row carries three costs (`cli/beacon/internal/tokens/cost.go`): `cost_usd` (runtime-reported, unchanged), `estimated_cost_usd` (list price of every priced token, from `internal/pricing`, computed after dedup and cumulative resolution) and `effective_cost_usd` with `cost_source` (per endpoint/harness/session scope, reported cost wins wholesale when the scope has any; otherwise the estimate; session-less events per event), plus `unpriced_events`/`unpriced_tokens` and a report-level `pricing` block (catalog provenance, per-model key, match, base rates, bands applied, fallbacks, unpriced models). Long-context bands apply only to events `requestScoped` classifies as one model request; it defaults to aggregate, so a new capture path is priced at base rates until it is added there with a test. Lens data (`LensDataV1`) carries no estimate.
- Local threat detection via `beacon scan`, which runs the open Threat Rules format (`spec/threat-rules`; CEL match conditions over the endpoint event schema, with embedded conformance fixtures) over the runtime JSONL. The engine (`pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules`) ships in the binary; the rule corpus is external data loaded from a local store (`~/.beacon/endpoint/rules`) managed by `beacon rules`, so the corpus can grow without enlarging the binary. `scan` is read-only and offline; only the explicit, user-initiated `beacon rules pull <url>` reaches the network, over `https://` only (plain http just for loopback, no redirect off https), size-capped, and verified first when `--sha256` is given. A small frozen baseline is embedded so `scan` works before any rules are installed, and it stays active alongside the store: a store rule replaces a baseline rule only by id (`rulestore.LoadActiveSkipping`), so installing one rule never silently switches the baseline off; only `--rules <dir>` runs a directory alone.
- Session handoff via `beacon handoff list|export|resume` (`cli/beacon/internal/handoff`, `cli/beacon/cmd/handoff*.go`; docs in `docs/cli/handoff.mdx` and `docs/concepts/session-handoff.mdx`). Every runtime is one entry in the registry in `cli/beacon/internal/handoff/runtimes.go`: its session source, the names it answers to, and the commands that reopen it or start it from a brief; `TestRegistryIsConsistent` checks the entries. Handoff reads the session stores of Claude Code, Codex CLI, OpenCode, Cline, Pi, Prime Agent, Factory Droid, GitHub Copilot CLI, Hermes Agent, DeepSeek Harness, fx, Grok Build, OpenClaw Gateway and Cursor read-only and never touches the network. Oh My Pi, Gemini CLI, Qwen Code, Kiro, Antigravity CLI, Devin CLI, Muse Code, OpenHands and goose have no store Beacon reads: their sessions come from the runtime log, and they take a brief as the target of `--agent`. `resume` reopens a session natively with its runtime's own command when it can, and otherwise writes a brief to `~/.beacon/endpoint/handoffs` (0700/0600) and starts a new session pointed at it. DeepSeek Harness cannot be started, and Hermes Agent and fx only reopen their own sessions, so their sessions continue in another runtime. fx, Grok Build and Cursor find a session by the directory they run in, so they are reopened natively only in the session's own directory. The brief is passed by absolute path, never inlined on a command line. Every launch keeps the runtime's approvals on: Beacon never passes a flag that turns them off, names the approval mode that asks where a CLI takes one (Cline always gets `--auto-approve false`, because Cline defaults to approving every tool call), and removes or overrides environment switches that would approve everything (`COPILOT_ALLOW_ALL`, `COPILOT_PLAN_THEN_AUTOPILOT`, `HERMES_YOLO_MODE`, `GOOSE_MODE`); `--print` shows them under `env`. Briefs run every event through `SanitizeEvent`, and quoted content goes in fences longer than any backtick run it contains, with inline fields reduced to one line, so quoted content cannot forge brief structure. A new session's first prompt ends with the `[beacon-handoff from=<harness> session=<id>]` marker (`pkg/asymptoteobserve/handoff.go`). The hook and plugin prompt paths and the session-store mappers record a `session.handoff` event with `handoff.{source_harness,source_session_id}` when they see it; that is an observed claim, not a verified identity.
-- Session sharing via `beacon share` and `beacon share refresh` (`cli/beacon/cmd/share.go`; docs in `docs/cli/share.mdx`, with the workflow guides in `docs/sharing/` kept in sync). It publishes one session the person names (or the most recent in a directory) to beacon.sh as a shared trace that is a `beacon.trace.v1` trace, the projection the dashboard uses: `BuildShareBundle` (sanitize, scrub, then `TraceEventFromEvent`/`TraceBuilder`), the wire types (`ShareTraceV1` summary body, `ShareEventsBatchV1` of `TraceEventV1`s, `ShareTraceStateV1` with `last_event_id`), `ShareExternalID` (`<harness>:<session-id>`, or a sha256 form), `ShareRelation` and `ShareEventsAfter` live in `pkg/asymptoteobserve/share.go`, and the client in `cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go` (`PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST .../events/batch` capped at `ShareMaxEventsPerBatch`, `GET`). The chat view is derived on beacon.sh with `TraceMessages` (`pkg/asymptoteobserve/tracemessages.go`), which pairs a tool invocation and its completion by `tool_call_id` and writes a call reported twice once; messages are never uploaded. Sessions resolve through the handoff registry (store first, then the runtime log). Every event goes through `SanitizeEvent` and session-directory/home paths are rewritten in every projected field before projection, and the shared summary drops the working directory and repository path and names the project by `project.name`. `--print` shows the exact `{external_id, trace, events}` payload with no network, `public` needs confirmation (refused without a terminal unless `--yes`), a re-share upserts by stable event id, and a refresh sends only `ShareEventsAfter` the server's `last_event_id` (re-sending it and any tool call still open). After an upload it writes one `session.shared` event (`event.fidelity=inferred`, no collection method) carrying `shared_url`, `visibility`, `shared_at`/`last_refreshed_at` in raw, which the trace list reads as the sharing state; the projection skips that event. It never runs from hooks or in the background, except the opted-in pre-push sharing below. With no selector (or `--current`) it shares the session it runs inside: `BEACON_SESSION_ID`/`BEACON_HARNESS` (the Claude Code SessionStart hook appends both as `export` lines to `$CLAUDE_ENV_FILE`, plain identifiers only; a child runtime inherits them, so without `--harness` they are refused, naming both sessions, when the named session ran outside this directory and its parents or another runtime worked here more recently: `shareEnvContradiction`), then the active-session record (only when the entry was seen at least as recently as the directory's newest session, since OTLP-only and poll runtimes never write it), then the directory's most recent session. The record is `pkg/asymptoteobserve/activesession` (`~/.beacon/endpoint/active-sessions.json`, 0600 under 0700, atomic and locked, at most 256 entries, 14-day prune, an unchanged entry rewritten at most once a minute), written by the hook logger after every endpoint event with a session id, working directory and harness; it holds identifiers and paths only, never content, and hooks write it silently and never touch the network for it. Hook tests point `BEACON_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_FILE` at a temp file in `TestMain`. Auto-share (`beacon share auto enable|disable|status`, `cli/beacon/cmd/share_auto.go`, settings in `pkg/asymptoteobserve/shareauto`) is server-side publishing: when it applies to a session's working directory, the hook logger writes ONE local `session.share_requested` event per session (`event.fidelity=inferred`, `share.visibility`; deduplicated under the active-session record's lock) and Beacon Cloud forwarding ships it; beacon.sh builds and refreshes the trace with the same `BuildShareBundle` projection and `ShareExternalID`. Hooks never upload. The user file `~/.beacon/endpoint/share.json` (0600, CLI-written) holds the user-wide switch, three-state (unset, on, or off as a kill switch over every project; `auto.state`, with `auto.enabled` kept in step so older files read) and per-project choices by path, which a user-wide enable or disable never rewrites; a project marker `<repo>/.beacon/share.json` may disable on its own (and an off marker wins over the user's entry for the same directory; the closest directory with an entry or marker decides) but enables only when the user's file trusts that project, with the user's visibility, so a cloned repository can never publish someone's sessions. `ForHook` costs one failed read when nothing is enabled. Hook tests point `BEACON_SHARE_SETTINGS_FILE` at a temp file. The share projection and `handoff.LogSessions` recency skip `session.share_requested`.
+- Session sharing via `beacon share` and `beacon share refresh` (`cli/beacon/cmd/share.go`; docs in `docs/cli/share.mdx`, with the workflow guides in `docs/sharing/` kept in sync). It publishes one session the person names (or the most recent in a directory) to beacon.sh as a shared trace that is a `beacon.trace.v1` trace, the projection the dashboard uses: `BuildShareBundle` (sanitize, scrub, then `TraceEventFromEvent`/`TraceBuilder`), the wire types (`ShareTraceV1` summary body, `ShareEventsBatchV1` of `TraceEventV1`s, `ShareTraceStateV1` with `last_event_id`), `ShareExternalID` (`<harness>:<session-id>`, or a sha256 form), `ShareRelation` and `ShareEventsAfter` live in `pkg/asymptoteobserve/share.go`, and the client in `cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go` (`PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST .../events/batch` capped at `ShareMaxEventsPerBatch`, `GET`). The chat view is derived on beacon.sh with `TraceMessages` (`pkg/asymptoteobserve/tracemessages.go`), which pairs a tool invocation and its completion by `tool_call_id` and writes a call reported twice once; messages are never uploaded. Sessions resolve through the handoff registry (store first, then the runtime log). Every event goes through `SanitizeEvent` and session-directory/home paths are rewritten in every projected field before projection, and the shared summary drops the working directory and repository path and names the project by `project.name`. `--print` shows the exact `{external_id, trace, events}` payload with no network, `public` needs confirmation (refused without a terminal unless `--yes`), a re-share upserts by stable event id, and a refresh sends only `ShareEventsAfter` the server's `last_event_id` (re-sending it and any tool call still open). After an upload it writes one `session.shared` event (`event.fidelity=inferred`, no collection method) carrying `shared_url`, `visibility`, `shared_at`/`last_refreshed_at` in raw, which the trace list reads as the sharing state; the projection skips that event. It never runs from hooks or in the background, except the opted-in pre-push sharing below. From a Metadata-only endpoint the share payload goes through `asymptoteobserve.StripToMetadata` (the same fields the Vector metadata transform removes, applied after event ids are derived) and drops the derived title. With no selector (or `--current`) it shares the session it runs inside: `BEACON_SESSION_ID`/`BEACON_HARNESS` (the Claude Code SessionStart hook appends both as `export` lines to `$CLAUDE_ENV_FILE`, plain identifiers only; a child runtime inherits them, so without `--harness` they are refused, naming both sessions, when the named session ran outside this directory and its parents or another runtime worked here more recently: `shareEnvContradiction`), then the active-session record (only when the entry was seen at least as recently as the directory's newest session, since OTLP-only and poll runtimes never write it), then the directory's most recent session. The record is `pkg/asymptoteobserve/activesession` (`~/.beacon/endpoint/active-sessions.json`, 0600 under 0700, atomic and locked, at most 256 entries, 14-day prune, an unchanged entry rewritten at most once a minute), written by the hook logger after every endpoint event with a session id, working directory and harness; it holds identifiers and paths only, never content, and hooks write it silently and never touch the network for it. Hook tests point `BEACON_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_FILE` at a temp file in `TestMain`. Auto-share (`beacon share auto enable|disable|status`, `cli/beacon/cmd/share_auto.go`, settings in `pkg/asymptoteobserve/shareauto`) is server-side publishing: when it applies to a session's working directory, the hook logger writes ONE local `session.share_requested` event per session (`event.fidelity=inferred`, `share.visibility`; deduplicated under the active-session record's lock) and Beacon Cloud forwarding ships it; beacon.sh builds and refreshes the trace with the same `BuildShareBundle` projection and `ShareExternalID`. Hooks never upload. The user file `~/.beacon/endpoint/share.json` (0600, CLI-written) holds the user-wide switch, three-state (unset, on, or off as a kill switch over every project; `auto.state`, with `auto.enabled` kept in step so older files read) and per-project choices by path, which a user-wide enable or disable never rewrites; a project marker `<repo>/.beacon/share.json` may disable on its own (and an off marker wins over the user's entry for the same directory; the closest directory with an entry or marker decides) but enables only when the user's file trusts that project, with the user's visibility, so a cloned repository can never publish someone's sessions. `ForHook` costs one failed read when nothing is enabled. Hook tests point `BEACON_SHARE_SETTINGS_FILE` at a temp file. The share projection and `handoff.LogSessions` recency skip `session.share_requested`.
- Commit-to-session links via `beacon git setup|status|remove|link|notes` (`cli/beacon/internal/gitlink`, `cli/beacon/cmd/git*.go`; docs in `docs/cli/git.mdx`). A link is a `beacon:<harness>/<session-id>` line in a git note under `refs/notes/beacon`; it carries identifiers only, never content, because notes can be pushed. Which sessions to link is inferred from the local runtime log: a session is linked when, between the parent commit and the commit (at least two hours, at most 24), it wrote a file the commit changes (for a merge, only files that differ from every parent, so a clean merge or pull links nothing). Evidence is file write events, write-type `file.operation`s, plainly readable shell targets, and `apply_patch` envelopes; reads never count. Note updates are a compare-and-swap on the notes ref through a private `refs/notes/beacon-tx/` working ref, and every existing note line, a teammate's or a person's, is kept verbatim. `setup` installs post-commit (links HEAD in the foreground with a 3 s budget, silent, never fails the commit, skips rebase/cherry-pick/revert) and post-rewrite (normalizes the note git concatenates on amend) as standalone `beacon-<hook>` scripts called from a marked block inserted after the shebang of the repository's own hook; only shell hooks are edited, `core.hooksPath` is refused without `--hooks-path`, and `notes.rewriteRef` carries links through amend and rebase. `BEACON_GIT_HOOKS=0` disables the hooks for one command. Every link a run adds is also written to the runtime log as one `session.commit_linked` event in the linked session's timeline (`event.fidelity=inferred`, no collection method), with commit id, branch and credential-stripped remote in the OTel-shaped `vcs` block and overlap counts in `vcs.attribution`; the event deliberately carries no file, command or tool fields so it can never become attribution evidence. Sharing is opt-in (`setup --share-notes`, off by default): a non-destructive fetch refspec `+refs/notes/beacon:refs/notes/beacon-remotes/<remote>` so git's own fetch brings teammates' links into a read-only tracking ref that `beacon git notes` unions with the local one (never force-fetch into `refs/notes/beacon`: it would destroy unpushed links), and a pre-push hook that fetches, merges with `cat_sort_uniq` through the same CAS, and pushes only the notes ref with `--no-verify`, within a 10 s budget and never failing the push. That pre-push hook is the only Beacon git hook that touches the network, and only during a push the person started; `beacon git notes push|fetch` do the same by hand. A note line may carry the session's share URL as its first trailing field (`beacon:<harness>/<id> <url>`; an identifier, not content): `gitlink.ValidShareURL` admits only https URLs on beacon.sh or the configured Beacon host (`AllowShareHost`, fed by `gitAllowShareHosts`), on write and on read, and `MergeNote`/`ParseNote` prefer the line with the URL over the bare one. Post-commit and `link` take URLs only from local `session.shared` events (`localShareURLs`). `setup --share-sessions [--share-visibility]` (implies `--share-notes`; stored as `beacon.shareSessions`/`beacon.shareVisibility` in local git config; public needs confirmation or `--yes`) makes the pre-push hook, which now receives git's stdin, share sessions linked to pushed commits that have no URL (at most 100 commits/10 sessions, silent without credentials, never failing the push; the budget is enforced by the clock: the share phase runs in a goroutine delivering URLs to a collector, the hook takes what it holds after the 6 s upload budget and abandons the rest, then writes notes and pushes the notes ref with what remains of the hook's 10 s, never less than 1 s and 3 s, so only the main path ever writes notes) through `shareUpload` (`cmd/share_upload.go`: `alignShareSource` + `ShareEventsAfter`), then write the URLs into the notes before pushing them. `beacon share --follow [--interval]` (`cmd/share_follow.go`) polls the session locally, uploads through `shareUpload` only when the fingerprint of the projected trace events changed (the events only: the trace body carries its build time), stops at `session.ended` or Ctrl+C (`shareFollowWait`/`shareFollowSignals` are the test seams), and records `session.shared` after each upload, later ones as refreshes that keep the share date; `docs/cli/share.mdx` carries the API-key CI walkthrough with GitHub Actions and GitLab CI examples. Local views show sharing read-only: the trace summary (`traceFold`, which wraps `asymptoteobserve.TraceBuilder` with the local-only `traceStaleness`, and the history through `traceAggregateState`, derivation version 12) and the dashboard's `SessionRecord.Sharing` mark a shared session `stale` when an event `asymptoteobserve.ShareProjects` accepts (the one definition of what a share publishes) and that is not the share's own (`shareActivity`) is newer than what its last `session.shared` record covered (`shared_through`), and carry `asymptoteobserve.ShareRefreshCommand` for the reader to copy; the session list/page, `beacon traces` TUI and plain list display them, and nothing in them shares.
- Beacon Cloud MCP registration via `beacon mcp connect|disconnect|status` (`cli/beacon/internal/mcpconnect`, `cli/beacon/cmd/mcp_connect.go`; docs in `docs/cli/mcp-connect.mdx`). It registers the Beacon Cloud MCP server as `beacon-managed`, a different name from the local stdio server `beacon`, in the user-level config of Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor, VS Code, Gemini CLI and OpenCode. It prints manual steps for runtimes without confirmed MCP OAuth support. OAuth is the default and writes only the URL; `--token-env` writes a reference to an environment variable in each harness's own syntax, never a value. `connect` never reads or copies the account token and never writes a token; minting one is the separate, explicit `beacon mcp token create`. It is explicit and interactive: never run by an unattended install; the onboarding wizard runs it only after the person chose Beacon Cloud and left "Beacon Cloud MCP" selected (that screen is the confirmation), and otherwise the install only suggests it. It is refused as root, and refused in CI or without a terminal unless `--yes` is given. Its one network request is the RFC 9728 resource-metadata check of the URL, which `--dry-run` skips. Configs are edited like the Kimi Code writer: never re-serialized, spliced as text, parsed back and compared before an atomic replace, backed up first. What was written is recorded in `~/.beacon/mcp/connections.json`, and `disconnect` removes only entries recorded there that still point at the recorded URL. `cmd/mcp_connect_e2e_test.go` runs the real harness CLIs when they are installed; re-run it when a harness changes its MCP config format.
- An optional, off-by-default policy seam in the hook path (`cli/beacon-hooks/internal/policy`) governed by the stable contract in `pkg/asymptoteobserve/policycontract`. When `BEACON_POLICY_PROVIDER` names an executable, the `pre-tool` and `permission-request` hooks send it a JSON request describing the imminent tool call and honor an allow/deny response, returning the runtime's native deny shape and `policy.enforcement=enforce` telemetry on a deny. The seam is inert when unset and fail-open on any error (timeout, non-zero exit, malformed output), so the open build ships no enforcement of its own; all audit/enforce decision logic lives in the external provider. `rules/agent-control/agent-permission-bypass-spawn.rule.yaml` is the open detect twin that flags the same pattern in `beacon scan`.