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Merge main and resolve detection coverage conflicts
Justin D'Souza2977ee93bee0
diff --cc cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/dashboard/testdata/lens-e2e/tests/builtin-security-review.spec.tsindex af0787d5,5ee9766f..4a4e71f2--- a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/dashboard/testdata/lens-e2e/tests/builtin-security-review.spec.ts+++ b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/dashboard/testdata/lens-e2e/tests/builtin-security-review.spec.ts@@@ -3,9 -3,10 +3,10 @@@ import { expect, test } from '@playwrigtest('security review: findings grouped by risk, the combination flagged, evidence resolved', async ({ page }) => {await page.goto('/session.html?id=risky&lens=security-review');const frame = page.frameLocator('iframe.lens-frame');- await expect(frame.locator('#root')).toBeVisible();+ // The host stays hidden until /api/status finishes local runtime discovery.+ await expect(frame.locator('#root')).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 });- await expect(frame.locator('#root > p').first()).toHaveText('5 findings across 86 rules evaluated.');- await expect(frame.locator('#root > p').first()).toHaveText('6 findings across 82 rules evaluated.');++ await expect(frame.locator('#root > p').first()).toHaveText('6 findings across 87 rules evaluated.');await expect(frame.locator('.alert')).toContainText('combines untrusted input, sensitive access and a consequential action');const rows = frame.locator('tbody tr');diff --cc docs/detections/index.mdxindex 5b96f977,233d5366..db0120df--- a/docs/detections/index.mdx+++ b/docs/detections/index.mdx@@@ -71,17 -71,23 +71,25 @@@ Beacon ships with a small built-in base| Category | Example behaviors || --- | --- || `credential-access` | Credential-file reads, browser session store reads, shell history scans, SSH agent enumeration, Kubernetes kubeconfig reads, GPG secret-key exports, password-manager vault reads, OS keychain secret reads, cloud CLI token export |- | `context-exfiltration` | Secret read then egress, credentials in curl data, upload to paste or transfer sites, SSH tunnel egress, archive-then-upload pipelines |+ | `context-exfiltration` | Secret read then egress, credential file sent in one command, credentials in curl data, upload to paste or transfer sites, SSH tunnel egress, archive-then-upload pipelines |-| `risky-command` | Curl piped to shell, recursive root delete, sudoers tampering, persistence installation, crontab modification, kernel-module load, package install from an untrusted source |+| `risky-command` | Curl piped to shell, recursive root delete, sudoers tampering, persistence installation, crontab modification, kernel-module load, package install from an untrusted source, database drop or flush, infrastructure teardown, cloud permission grants, telemetry or history tampering || `sensitive-edit` | CI pipeline edits, dependency manifest edits, shell login file edits, agent instruction and control surface edits across runtimes (including shell writes like `tee .mcp.json`), SSH authorized_keys edits, /etc/hosts edits, container / IaC file edits || `prompt-injection` | Role override jailbreaks, hidden payloads, markdown-image exfiltration, instruction override markers, injected instructions in files, web pages, or MCP results the agent reads || `external-access` | Cloud metadata endpoint access, link-local target fetches, external MCP tool calls || `approval-abuse` | Permission-bypass execution or high-risk approvals without reviewer context, denied-command re-invocation through renamed binaries |-| `source-control` | Git hook installation, remote tampering, Git config execution injection, history rewriting (filter-branch / filter-repo / rebase -i), force-push to protected branches |+| `source-control` | Git hook installation, remote tampering, Git config execution injection, history rewriting (filter-branch / filter-repo / rebase -i), force-push to protected branches, hard reset, forced clean, whole-tree restore, stash clear || `agent-control` | Agent CLIs spawned with permission-elevating env vars, sandbox-escape primitives, inter-agent credential handoff, MCP servers / plugins / extensions installed by command |+ - `context-exfiltration`: `secret-read-and-egress` detects a credential file sent+ directly as an upload, request body, remote-copy source or gist input, or piped+ or redirected to a network sender in one command. It complements the two-event+ `secret-read-then-egress` correlation. `credentials-in-curl-data` remains for+ inline credential fields; overlapping curl/wget file uploads can fire both.+ These are direct command patterns, not general dataflow analysis through+ variables or intermediate files.++Telemetry-tampering detections cover commands that remove Beacon logs or plugins, stop its services, uninstall or disconnect it, or clear or disable shell history. They can only fire if the command was captured before collection stopped.+Rules only evaluate events that exist in the runtime log. For example, an MCP detection needs MCP-like activity to be emitted by a supported harness, and a prompt-injection rule needs retained prompt or content fields to be present under the endpoint's local data-retention settings.## Detection flow