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fix(rules): anchor approval-bypass -rf/-fr flags to rm-like binary basename

AnandSundar29bdb56f1645
diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml
index 22585d6b..a101ee7a 100644
--- a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml
@@ -10,9 +10,13 @@ description: >
indicates the operator blocked the canonical path and the agent re-issued the
action through a wrapper or copy to evade the gate. The rule is a
correlation between an approval.denied event in the same session and a
- dangerous-class command that is not the literal denied path. Negative fixtures
- cover denials with no follow-up, follow-ups in a different session, and
- follow-ups that are unrelated benign commands.
+ dangerous-class command that is not the literal denied path. The `-rf`/`-fr`
+ flag patterns are anchored to a preceding rm-like binary basename
+ (e.g. `myrm`, `crm`, `rm`) so that legitimate tar-archive operations like
+ `tar -rf /tmp/myarchive.tar /var/data` do not correlate after a denied
+ `rm -rf`. Negative fixtures cover denials with no follow-up, follow-ups in a
+ different session, follow-ups that are unrelated benign commands, and the
+ legitimate-tar-archive shape.
severity: critical
status: experimental
posture: detect
@@ -32,7 +36,7 @@ correlation:
match: >
e.event.action == "command.executed" &&
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(/tmp/|/var/tmp/|\\$\\(mktemp\\))") &&
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\s+if\\s*=|\\s+of\\s*=/dev/sd|\\s+-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f\\b|\\s+-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b)")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\s+if\\s*=|\\s+of\\s*=/dev/sd|(?:^|[;&|]\\s*|/)[^;&|]*?[a-z]*rm\\b[^;&|]*\\s+-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f\\b|(?:^|[;&|]\\s*|/)[^;&|]*?[a-z]*rm\\b[^;&|]*\\s+-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b)")
emit:
reason: "Denied dangerous command re-invoked via a renamed or shimmed binary in the same session"
@@ -93,3 +97,39 @@ tests:
event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "cp /bin/rm /tmp/myrm && /tmp/myrm -rf /var/data" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: denied_rm_then_tar_with_rf_flag
+ verdict: no_match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:00:00Z"
+ event: { action: approval.denied }
+ command: { command: "rm -rf /var/data" }
+ approval: { decision: "denied", required: true }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:00:45Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "tar -rf /tmp/myarchive.tar /var/data" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: denied_rm_then_renamed_myrm
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:00:00Z"
+ event: { action: approval.denied }
+ command: { command: "rm -rf /var/data" }
+ approval: { decision: "denied", required: true }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:00:45Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "cp /bin/rm /tmp/myrm && /tmp/myrm -rf /var/data" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: denied_dd_then_renamed_dd_still_fires
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:00:00Z"
+ event: { action: approval.denied }
+ command: { command: "dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda" }
+ approval: { decision: "denied", required: true }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:00:45Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "cp /bin/dd /var/tmp/.x && /var/tmp/.x if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda" }
+ session: { id: s1 }