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Harden rule pack extraction and install against path traversal
Justin D'Souza2cdbef2b34dd
diff --git a/cli/beacon/cmd/rules.go b/cli/beacon/cmd/rules.goindex 37210d88..e2de48ec 100644--- a/cli/beacon/cmd/rules.go+++ b/cli/beacon/cmd/rules.go@@ -172,10 +172,7 @@ func extractRuleTarball(r io.Reader, dir string) error {return fmt.Errorf("gzip: %w", err)}defer gz.Close()- dirAbs, err := filepath.Abs(dir)- if err != nil {- return fmt.Errorf("resolve destination dir: %w", err)- }+ cleanDir := filepath.Clean(dir)tr := tar.NewReader(gz)count := 0for {@@ -189,16 +186,12 @@ func extractRuleTarball(r io.Reader, dir string) error {if hdr.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg || !strings.HasSuffix(hdr.Name, ".rule.yaml") {continue}- // Flatten to the base name (archive directory structure is ignored) and confirm- // the resolved destination stays inside dir before writing — defense in depth- // against archive path traversal ("Zip Slip").- name := filepath.Base(filepath.ToSlash(hdr.Name))- dest := filepath.Join(dir, name)- destAbs, err := filepath.Abs(dest)- if err != nil {- return fmt.Errorf("resolve destination path: %w", err)- }- if destAbs != dirAbs && !strings.HasPrefix(destAbs, dirAbs+string(os.PathSeparator)) {+ // Flatten archive directory structure to a base name, then confirm the joined+ // destination stays within cleanDir before any file operation. The same `dest`+ // value is both validated and written, guarding against archive path traversal+ // ("Zip Slip").+ dest := filepath.Join(cleanDir, filepath.Base(filepath.ToSlash(hdr.Name)))+ if dest != cleanDir && !strings.HasPrefix(dest, cleanDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {return fmt.Errorf("archive entry %q resolves outside the destination directory", hdr.Name)}if err := writeReaderToFile(io.LimitReader(tr, 1<<20), dest); err != nil {diff --git a/cli/beacon/cmd/scan.go b/cli/beacon/cmd/scan.goindex 4ea53bd2..a9e82cf2 100644--- a/cli/beacon/cmd/scan.go+++ b/cli/beacon/cmd/scan.go@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ func runScan(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {if err != nil {return fmt.Errorf("scan: %w", err)}+ // The --fail-on gate is a CI signal that must reflect every detection in the+ // scan, so count it before --min-severity (a display-only filter) drops+ // findings from the output slice.+ failCount := 0+ if failRank >= 0 {+ failCount = countAtOrAbove(findings, failRank)+ }if minRank > 0 {findings = filterBySeverity(findings, minRank)}@@ -136,12 +143,8 @@ func runScan(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {printFindings(cmd, findings, len(events), runtimeLog.EffectiveLogPath)}- if failRank >= 0 {- for _, f := range findings {- if severityRank[f.Severity] >= failRank {- return fmt.Errorf("scan found %d finding(s) at or above %q", countAtOrAbove(findings, failRank), scanOpts.failOn)- }- }+ if failRank >= 0 && failCount > 0 {+ return fmt.Errorf("scan found %d finding(s) at or above %q", failCount, scanOpts.failOn)}return nil}diff --git a/cli/beacon/cmd/scan_test.go b/cli/beacon/cmd/scan_test.goindex 605f2cb0..c35b2745 100644--- a/cli/beacon/cmd/scan_test.go+++ b/cli/beacon/cmd/scan_test.go@@ -122,6 +122,26 @@ func TestScanFailOn(t *testing.T) {}}+// TestScanFailOnIgnoresMinSeverityFilter guards the CI gate: --min-severity is a+// display-only filter, so a detection at or above --fail-on must still fail the+// scan even when --min-severity hides it from the printed output.+func TestScanFailOnIgnoresMinSeverityFilter(t *testing.T) {+ scanFixture(t, []string{evSecretRead})+ scanOpts.minSeverity = "critical" // high finding filtered out of output+ scanOpts.failOn = "high" // ...but still meets the fail gate+ cmd, buf := newCmd()+ err := runScan(cmd, nil)+ if err == nil {+ t.Fatalf("expected non-zero exit: a high finding meets --fail-on high even when --min-severity critical hides it; output:\n%s", buf.String())+ }+ if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "1 finding") {+ t.Fatalf("expected fail gate to count the filtered finding, got: %v", err)+ }+ if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "No findings") {+ t.Fatalf("expected the high finding hidden from output by --min-severity critical, got:\n%s", buf.String())+ }+}+func TestScanMinSeverityFilters(t *testing.T) {scanFixture(t, []string{evSecretRead})scanOpts.minSeverity = "critical" // finding is high -> filtered outdiff --git a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect.go b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect.goindex e522f653..95571d13 100644--- a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect.go+++ b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect.go@@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ func InstallFiles(userMode bool, src string, force bool) ([]Installed, error) {return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: fixture %s", p, res.String())}}+ // rule.ID passed CheckRule (id-grammar) above; re-assert it explicitly so the+ // store path join below can never be driven outside the store by rule content.+ if !threatrules.ValidID(rule.ID) {+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: invalid rule id %q", p, rule.ID)+ }if (existing[rule.ID] || staged[rule.ID]) && !force {return nil, fmt.Errorf("rule %q already installed (use --force to overwrite)", rule.ID)}@@ -215,8 +220,13 @@ func InstallFiles(userMode bool, src string, force bool) ([]Installed, error) {return installed, nil}-// Remove deletes a rule by id from the store. Returns the removed path.+// Remove deletes a rule by id from the store. Returns the removed path. The id+// is validated against the rule-id grammar before use so it can never contain+// path separators or ".." segments that would resolve outside the store.func Remove(userMode bool, id string) (string, error) {+ if !threatrules.ValidID(id) {+ return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid rule id %q", id)+ }path := filepath.Join(StoreDir(userMode), id+ruleFileSuffix)if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil {if os.IsNotExist(err) {diff --git a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect_test.go b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect_test.goindex d7329eda..353d42c8 100644--- a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect_test.go+++ b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/detect/detect_test.go@@ -150,6 +150,32 @@ func TestRemove(t *testing.T) {}}+func TestRemoveRejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {+ home := t.TempDir()+ t.Setenv("HOME", home)++ // A rule file outside the store that a traversal id could resolve to.+ victimDir := t.TempDir()+ victim := filepath.Join(victimDir, "victim.rule.yaml")+ if err := os.WriteFile(victim, []byte("id: victim\n"), 0o644); err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ // id crafted so id+suffix == "<victimDir>/victim.rule.yaml" after Join+Clean.+ rel, err := filepath.Rel(StoreDir(true), filepath.Join(victimDir, "victim"))+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ for _, id := range []string{rel, "../../etc/passwd", "a/b", "."} {+ if _, err := Remove(true, id); err == nil {+ t.Fatalf("expected Remove to reject unsafe id %q", id)+ }+ }+ if _, err := os.Stat(victim); err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("victim file must not be deleted: %v", err)+ }+}+func srcOf(l []LoadedRule) []Source {s := make([]Source, len(l))for i := range l {diff --git a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/rule.go b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/rule.goindex 684f2df3..2fe0cdfc 100644--- a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/rule.go+++ b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/rule.go@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ import (// idPattern constrains rule ids to a stable kebab slug.var idPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$`)+// ValidID reports whether id is a well-formed rule id. The pattern admits no+// path separators or "." segments, so a valid id is always a safe single+// filename component when joined with the store directory.+func ValidID(id string) bool { return idPattern.MatchString(id) }+// Status is a rule's maturity level; it drives the conformance gates (see lint.go).type Status string