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feat(rules): add 3 credential-access rules — k8s, gpg, password managers
AnandSundar3fd8581bfe7b
diff --git a/rules/credential-access/gpg-keyring-access.rule.yaml b/rules/credential-access/gpg-keyring-access.rule.yamlnew file mode 100644index 00000000..645bf18a--- /dev/null+++ b/rules/credential-access/gpg-keyring-access.rule.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@+id: gpg-keyring-access+version: 1+title: Agent read a GPG private key or exported a secret key+description: >+ The agent either read a file under the GnuPG private-key directory+ (private-keys-v1.d/, secring.gpg, .gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/ certificate+ revocation, .gnupg/trustdb.gpg trust database, .gnupg/gpg-control files) OR+ invoked gpg with --export-secret-keys, --export-secret-subkeys, or+ --gen-key. Private GPG keys sign commits and decrypt sensitive mail; an+ agent touching a private keyring is a high-value exfil signal. The rule+ is anchored on the path or on a gpg subcommand, and explicitly excludes+ the public keyring (pubring.gpg, *.asc public keys) since reading public+ keys is a routine signature-verification operation.+severity: high+status: experimental+posture: detect+taxonomy:+ owasp_llm: LLM02+ mitre_atlas: AML.T0024++match: >+ (e.event.action == "file.read" && (+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.gnupg/private-keys-v1\\.d/") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)secring\\.gpg$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.gnupg/(openpgp-revocs\\.d/|trustdb\\.gpg$)") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.gnupg/[^/]+\\.key$")+ )) || (+ e.event.action == "command.executed" && (+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*|\\bsudo\\s+)\\s*gpg\\b[^;&|]*--export-secret-(keys|subkeys)\\b") ||+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*|\\bsudo\\s+)\\s*gpg\\b[^;&|]*--gen-key\\b") ||+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*|\\bsudo\\s+)\\s*gpg\\b[^;&|]*--card-status\\b[^;&|]*--with-keygrip\\b")+ )+ )++emit:+ reason: "Agent accessed a GPG private key (file read or secret-export invocation)"++tests:+ - name: read_private_keys_dir+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/ABC123.key" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_secring_gpg+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.gnupg/secring.gpg" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_trustdb+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: gpg_export_secret_keys+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: command.executed }+ command: { command: "gpg --export-secret-keys --armor 0xDEADBEEF" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: gpg_export_secret_subkeys+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: command.executed }+ command: { command: "gpg --export-secret-subkeys 0xCAFEBABE > /tmp/keys.asc" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_public_keyring+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.gnupg/pubring.kbx" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: gpg_list_keys+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: command.executed }+ command: { command: "gpg --list-keys" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: gpg_verify_signature+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: command.executed }+ command: { command: "gpg --verify release.tar.gz.asc" }+ session: { id: s1 }diff --git a/rules/credential-access/kubernetes-secret-file-read.rule.yaml b/rules/credential-access/kubernetes-secret-file-read.rule.yamlnew file mode 100644index 00000000..f3f19748--- /dev/null+++ b/rules/credential-access/kubernetes-secret-file-read.rule.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@+id: kubernetes-secret-file-read+version: 1+title: Agent read a Kubernetes secret-bearing file+description: >+ The agent read a Kubernetes credential or cluster-admin artifact: a kubeconfig+ file under ~/.kube/, a service-account bearer token, or a path bearing the+ kubeconfig / token naming convention. Kubeconfig files hold long-lived+ cluster credentials and are the canonical high-value Kubernetes secret;+ service-account tokens are the canonical runtime bearer secret. An agent+ reading either is almost always a credential-exfiltration or lateral-movement+ signal. The rule is anchored on the path (anchored to a slash or end of+ string, or to specific file names) so unrelated files with "kube" in the+ name (e.g. "kube-prometheus-stack/") do not fire.+severity: high+status: experimental+posture: detect+taxonomy:+ owasp_llm: LLM02+ mitre_atlas: AML.T0024++match: >+ e.event.action == "file.read" && (+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.kube/config(-[^/]+)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)kubeconfig(\\.yaml|\\.yml)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.kube/[^/]*kubeconfig[^/]*$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)(token|sa[-_]?token|service[-_]?account[-_]?token)(\\.csv)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)/var/run/secrets/kubernetes\\.io/serviceaccount/(token|ca\\.crt|namespace)$")+ )++emit:+ reason: "Agent read a Kubernetes secret-bearing file (kubeconfig or service-account token)"++tests:+ - name: read_kubeconfig+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.kube/config" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_named_kubeconfig+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.kube/config-prod" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_service_account_token+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_generic_kubeconfig_yaml+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/opt/clusters/kubeconfig.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_ordinary_yaml+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/repo/deploy/k8s-manifest.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_kube_prometheus_chart+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/repo/charts/kube-prometheus-stack/values.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_kubeconfig_directory+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.kube/" }+ session: { id: s1 }diff --git a/rules/credential-access/password-manager-db-read.rule.yaml b/rules/credential-access/password-manager-db-read.rule.yamlnew file mode 100644index 00000000..37dab9ec--- /dev/null+++ b/rules/credential-access/password-manager-db-read.rule.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@+id: password-manager-db-read+version: 1+title: Agent read a password-manager vault or DB+description: >+ The agent read a password-manager vault: a KeePass .kdbx file, the GNU pass+ ~/.password-store/ tree, a 1Password database directory, a LastPass vault+ file, or a Bitwarden vault directory. These files contain the user's full+ set of credentials and an agent reading one is a near-certain+ credential-exfiltration signal. The rule is anchored on a path component+ specific to each manager (not on the .db extension generally) so unrelated+ application databases (sqlite, leveldb) do not fire. Reads to a key file+ for a vault are also covered.+severity: high+status: experimental+posture: detect+taxonomy:+ owasp_llm: LLM02+ mitre_atlas: AML.T0024++match: >+ e.event.action == "file.read" && (+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)[^/]+\\.kdbx$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.password-store/") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)(\\.1password|1Password)/") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.config/(1Password|Bitwarden|\\.1password)/") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)(\\.lastpass|LastPass)/") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.bitwarden/") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.config/Bitwarden[^/]*\\.sqlite(\\.[0-9]+)?$")+ )++emit:+ reason: "Agent read a password-manager vault or DB (KeePass / pass / 1Password / LastPass / Bitwarden)"++tests:+ - name: read_kdbx+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/Documents/vault.kdbx" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_pass_store+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.password-store/work/github.gpg" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_1password_dir+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.1password/agent.sock" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_bitwarden_config_sqlite+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.config/Bitwarden/data.json" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_lastpass_dir+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.lastpass/vault.pswd" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_unrelated_sqlite+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/repo/app/data/cache.sqlite" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_unrelated_db+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/opt/app/users.db" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_password_file_mention+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/repo/docs/passwords.md" }+ session: { id: s1 }