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feat(rules): add 3 sensitive-edit rules — SSH keys, /etc/hosts, container/IaC
AnandSundar42924b0aa7b2
diff --git a/rules/sensitive-edit/container-or-iac-file-modified.rule.yaml b/rules/sensitive-edit/container-or-iac-file-modified.rule.yamlnew file mode 100644index 00000000..9713ad5c--- /dev/null+++ b/rules/sensitive-edit/container-or-iac-file-modified.rule.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@+id: container-or-iac-file-modified+version: 1+title: Container or IaC file modified (Dockerfile / compose / Terraform / K8s / Helm)+description: >+ The agent modified a container, orchestration, or infrastructure-as-code+ file: a Dockerfile, a docker-compose YAML, a Terraform .tf / .tfstate,+ a Kubernetes manifest (kubernetes*.yaml / k8s*.yaml / kustomization.yaml),+ or a Helm values.yaml. A modified IaC file is a supply-chain /+ lateral-movement primitive — an attacker can add a privileged+ container, a host-path mount, an exec into a running pod, or a+ wide-permission IAM role that gets applied on the next apply. The rule+ matches the well-known file names (anchored on `Dockerfile` as a+ whole word, anchored on `.tf` / `.tfstate` suffixes, anchored on+ `values.yaml` as a leaf, and anchored on the k8s file-naming+ convention), so random .yaml files in a repo are not flagged.+severity: medium+status: experimental+posture: detect+taxonomy:+ owasp_llm: LLM03+ mitre_atlas: AML.T0011++match: >+ e.event.action == "file.modified" && (+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)dockerfile(\\.prod|\\.dev|\\.local|\\.test|\\.staging|\\.debug|\\.alpine|\\.nginx|\\.node|\\.python|\\.go|\\.rust|\\.java|\\.base|\\.builder|\\.runtime|\\.ci|\\.prod|\\.pr[a-z0-9]+)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)containerfile(\\.prod|\\.dev|\\.local|\\.test|\\.staging|\\.debug|\\.alpine|\\.nginx|\\.node|\\.python|\\.go|\\.rust|\\.java|\\.base|\\.builder|\\.runtime|\\.ci|\\.pr[a-z0-9]+)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)docker-compose(-[^/]+)?\\.(yml|yaml)$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)[^/]+\\.tf$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)[^/]+\\.tfstate(\\.[0-9]+)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)kubernetes(-[^/]+)?\\.(yml|yaml)$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)k8s(-[^/]+)?\\.(yml|yaml)$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)kustomization\\.(yml|yaml)$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)values\\.(yml|yaml)$")+ )++emit:+ reason: "Container or IaC file modified (Dockerfile / compose / Terraform / K8s manifest / Helm values)"++tests:+ - name: modify_dockerfile+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "app/Dockerfile" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_dockerfile_prod_variant+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "app/Dockerfile.prod" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_docker_compose+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "deploy/docker-compose.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_terraform_main+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "infra/prod/main.tf" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_terraform_state+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "infra/prod/terraform.tfstate" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_kubernetes_manifest+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "deploy/kubernetes-prod.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_helm_values+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "charts/api/values.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_kustomization+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "deploy/kustomization.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_ordinary_source+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "src/main.go" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_unrelated_yaml+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "config/api.yaml" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_dockerfile+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "app/Dockerfile" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_dockerfile_backup+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "app/Dockerfile.bak" }+ session: { id: s1 }diff --git a/rules/sensitive-edit/etc-hosts-modified.rule.yaml b/rules/sensitive-edit/etc-hosts-modified.rule.yamlnew file mode 100644index 00000000..38769ad6--- /dev/null+++ b/rules/sensitive-edit/etc-hosts-modified.rule.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@+id: etc-hosts-modified+version: 1+title: /etc/hosts or hosts.allow/deny modified+description: >+ The agent modified a system name resolution file: /etc/hosts (the+ primary local DNS override), /etc/hosts.allow, or /etc/hosts.deny+ (the TCP-wrappers access control list). Modifying /etc/hosts is a+ local DNS-hijack primitive — an attacker can redirect a known+ hostname (e.g. github.com, an internal package registry) to an+ attacker-controlled IP and exfiltrate credentials on the next+ connection. Modifying hosts.allow / hosts.deny changes the+ network-access ACL for the system. The rule matches the well-known+ paths and excludes generic "hosts" mentions (e.g. a file named+ "hosts" in a project tree).+severity: high+status: experimental+posture: detect+taxonomy:+ owasp_llm: LLM06+ mitre_atlas: AML.T0011++match: >+ e.event.action == "file.modified" && (+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)etc/hosts$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)etc/hosts\\.(allow|deny)$")+ )++emit:+ reason: "/etc/hosts or hosts.allow/deny modified (local DNS hijack or ACL change)"++tests:+ - name: modify_etc_hosts+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/etc/hosts" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_etc_hosts_allow+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/etc/hosts.allow" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_etc_hosts_deny+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/etc/hosts.deny" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_etc_hosts+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/etc/hosts" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_project_hosts_file+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/repo/ops/hosts" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_etc_hosts_backup+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/etc/hosts.bak" }+ session: { id: s1 }diff --git a/rules/sensitive-edit/ssh-authorized-keys-modified.rule.yaml b/rules/sensitive-edit/ssh-authorized-keys-modified.rule.yamlnew file mode 100644index 00000000..4b76b9bf--- /dev/null+++ b/rules/sensitive-edit/ssh-authorized-keys-modified.rule.yaml@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@+id: ssh-authorized-keys-modified+version: 1+title: SSH authorized_keys or sshd_config modified+description: >+ The agent modified an SSH trust file: a user authorized_keys+ (~/.ssh/authorized_keys or the legacy authorized_keys2), the+ system-wide sshd_config (/etc/ssh/sshd_config and any+ sshd_config.d/* drop-in), or a known_hosts file. Modifying+ authorized_keys adds a new persistent SSH login key for the+ account — a strong persistence signal — and modifying sshd_config+ can change the server's permitted auth methods (e.g. enabling+ PermitRootLogin, PasswordAuthentication, or AuthorizedKeysFile to+ a writable path). The rule matches the well-known paths only, so+ benign edits to other ~/.ssh/* files (config, environment) do not+ fire.+severity: high+status: experimental+posture: detect+taxonomy:+ owasp_llm: LLM06+ mitre_atlas: AML.T0011++match: >+ e.event.action == "file.modified" && (+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.ssh/authorized_keys(2)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)\\.ssh/known_hosts(2)?$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)etc/ssh/sshd_config$") ||+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)etc/ssh/sshd_config\\.d/[^/]+\\.conf$")+ )++emit:+ reason: "SSH authorized_keys, known_hosts, or sshd_config modified (persistence or auth bypass)"++tests:+ - name: modify_authorized_keys+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.ssh/authorized_keys" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_authorized_keys2+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.ssh/authorized_keys2" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_sshd_config+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_sshd_config_d_dropin+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-override.conf" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_known_hosts+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.ssh/known_hosts" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_ssh_config+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.ssh/config" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: read_authorized_keys+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.read }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.ssh/authorized_keys" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: modify_authorized_keys_dotbak+ verdict: no_match+ events:+ - event: { action: file.modified }+ file: { path: "/home/u/.ssh/authorized_keys.bak" }+ session: { id: s1 }