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Address Cursor Bugbot review on threat-rules pack

Souvik Banerjee8a7fca787766
diff --git a/rules/credential-access/browser-session-store-read.rule.yaml b/rules/credential-access/browser-session-store-read.rule.yaml
index a6d5a123..53235a7a 100644
--- a/rules/credential-access/browser-session-store-read.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/credential-access/browser-session-store-read.rule.yaml
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
id: browser-session-store-read
-version: 1
+version: 2
title: Agent read a browser session/cookie store
description: >
- The agent read a browser cookie jar or saved-login store (Cookies / cookies.sqlite
- / logins.json / "Login Data"). These carry live session material that can hijack a
- SaaS session past password + MFA. Ported from blastradius `is_browser_session_path`.
+ The agent read a browser cookie jar or saved-login store (cookies.sqlite /
+ logins.json by name, or the ambiguous basenames Cookies / "Login Data" only inside a
+ known browser profile directory — Chrome/Chromium/Brave/Edge/Firefox/Safari). These
+ carry live session material that can hijack a SaaS session past password + MFA. The
+ browser-dir requirement keeps a non-browser file named "cookies" from firing, and
+ matches the read step of the browser-session-read-then-egress correlation. Ported
+ from blastradius is_browser_session_path.
severity: high
status: stable
posture: detect
@@ -13,8 +17,10 @@ taxonomy:
mitre_atlas: AML.T0024
match: >
- e.event.action == "file.read" &&
- e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)(cookies\\.sqlite|logins\\.json|cookies|login data)$")
+ e.event.action == "file.read" && (
+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)(cookies\\.sqlite|logins\\.json)$") ||
+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)/(google-chrome|chromium|chrome|brave[ -]?browser|bravesoftware|microsoft-?edge|edge|firefox|mozilla|safari)/.*(cookies|login data)$")
+ )
emit:
reason: "Agent read a browser session/cookie store (session-hijack material)"
@@ -32,9 +38,27 @@ tests:
- event: { action: file.read }
file: { path: "/home/u/.config/google-chrome/Default/Login Data" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: read_chrome_bare_cookies
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: file.read }
+ file: { path: "/home/u/.config/google-chrome/Default/Cookies" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: read_brave_cookies
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: file.read }
+ file: { path: "/home/u/.config/BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser/Default/Cookies" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: source_file_named_cookies
verdict: no_match
events:
- event: { action: file.read }
file: { path: "src/cookies.test.ts" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: non_browser_cookies_file
+ verdict: no_match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: file.read }
+ file: { path: "recipes/cookies" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
diff --git a/rules/risky-command/privileged-container-run.rule.yaml b/rules/risky-command/privileged-container-run.rule.yaml
index eb4d941c..4f93a9a0 100644
--- a/rules/risky-command/privileged-container-run.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/risky-command/privileged-container-run.rule.yaml
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
id: privileged-container-run
-version: 3
+version: 4
title: Container started with host-escaping privileges
description: >
- A docker/podman run or exec grants container-escape primitives — --privileged,
+ A docker/podman run or exec — including Compose v2 (`docker compose run`) and the
+ legacy `docker-compose` binary — grants container-escape primitives: --privileged,
host namespace sharing (--pid/--net/--network/--ipc/--uts host), a root-filesystem
bind mount (-v /:...), a kernel capability add (--cap-add), or a mount of the docker
socket. The docker/podman token is anchored to command/segment start (allowing a
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ taxonomy:
match: >
e.event.action == "command.executed" &&
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|;|&&|\\|\\|)\\s*(sudo(\\s+-\\S+)*\\s+|env\\s+|([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=\\S*\\s+)+)*(docker|podman)\\s+(container\\s+)?(run|exec)\\b") &&
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|;|&&|\\|\\|)\\s*(sudo(\\s+-\\S+)*\\s+|env\\s+|([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=\\S*\\s+)+)*(docker|podman)(-compose)?\\s+(container\\s+|compose\\s+)?(run|exec)\\b") &&
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(--privileged|--(pid|net|network|ipc|uts)[= ]host|-v\\s+/:|--volume\\s+/:|--cap-add[= ]|/var/run/docker\\.sock\\b)")
emit:
@@ -36,6 +37,18 @@ tests:
- event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "docker container run --privileged ubuntu" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: docker_compose_run_privileged
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "docker compose run --privileged web" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: docker_compose_legacy_binary
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "docker-compose run --privileged web" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: podman_run_host_pid
verdict: match
events:
diff --git a/rules/risky-command/world-writable-chmod.rule.yaml b/rules/risky-command/world-writable-chmod.rule.yaml
index f1926028..051c0b6f 100644
--- a/rules/risky-command/world-writable-chmod.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/risky-command/world-writable-chmod.rule.yaml
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
id: world-writable-chmod
-version: 2
+version: 3
title: chmod grants world-writable or full permissions
description: >
- A command makes a file or tree world-writable / fully permissive (chmod 777 / 0777,
- or a symbolic mode that grants write to other/all). A common step for planting an
- executable others can tamper with or for loosening a sensitive file. Ported from
- blastradius DangerousCategory::WorldWritableChmod; chmod is anchored to the acting
- command position so it is not matched as an argument to another program.
+ A command makes a file or tree world-writable — chmod 777 / 0777, or a symbolic mode
+ (via + or =) that grants write to other or all (e.g. o+w, a+rwx, a=rwx, o=rwx,
+ ugo+rwx). Owner- or group-only grants (u+w, g=rw) are intentionally excluded because
+ they are not world-writable. chmod is anchored to the acting command position so it
+ is not matched as an argument to another program. Ported from blastradius
+ DangerousCategory::WorldWritableChmod, broadened to the = symbolic form.
severity: medium
status: stable
posture: detect
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ taxonomy:
match: >
e.event.action == "command.executed" &&
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*)chmod\\s+([^;&|]*\\s)?(0?777\\b|[ugoa]*\\+[rwx]*w[rwx]*\\b)")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*)chmod\\s+([^;&|]*\\s)?(0?777\\b|([ugoa]*[oa][ugoa]*)[+=][rwx]*w[rwx]*\\b)")
emit:
reason: "chmod grants world-writable or fully permissive access"
@@ -45,6 +46,18 @@ tests:
- event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "chmod o+w /etc/app/config" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: chmod_a_equals_rwx
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "chmod a=rwx /srv/app" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: chmod_o_equals_rwx
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "chmod o=rwx /srv/app/file" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: chmod_after_cd_separator
verdict: match
events:
@@ -63,6 +76,18 @@ tests:
- event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "chmod o+r /etc/hosts" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: chmod_owner_write_only
+ verdict: no_match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "chmod u+w src/main.go" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: chmod_group_write_only
+ verdict: no_match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "chmod g=rw shared.log" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: chmod_restrictive_mode
verdict: no_match
events:
diff --git a/rules/sensitive-edit/auth-security-code-modified.rule.yaml b/rules/sensitive-edit/auth-security-code-modified.rule.yaml
index 13842b53..3401fbfc 100644
--- a/rules/sensitive-edit/auth-security-code-modified.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/sensitive-edit/auth-security-code-modified.rule.yaml
@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
id: auth-security-code-modified
-version: 3
+version: 4
title: Authentication, payment, or security source modified
description: >
The agent modified a source file in the auth / payment / security surface (basename
containing auth, login, session, password, payment, billing, charge, stripe, checkout,
- security, crypto, token, oauth, jwt, rbac, acl, permission, credential). Changes here
- carry outsized risk and warrant review. Ported from blastradius
+ security, crypto, token, oauth, jwt, rbac, permission, credential). Changes here carry
+ outsized risk and warrant review. Ported from blastradius
is_auth_payment_security_path; documentation (.md/.txt), lockfiles, CI workflow
manifests, and credential stores (credentials.json/.toml — covered by
- credential-file-read) are excluded so they are not double-counted.
+ credential-file-read) are excluded so they are not double-counted. Keyword matching
+ is substring-based (faithful to the ported source), so a basename that embeds a
+ keyword (e.g. tokenizer) may match; the 3-char `acl` needle was dropped because it
+ false-matched unrelated words (oracle, miracle).
severity: medium
status: stable
posture: detect
@@ -17,7 +20,7 @@ taxonomy:
match: >
e.event.action == "file.modified" &&
- e.file.path.matches("(?i)[^/]*(auth|login|session|password|passwd|credential|payment|billing|charge|stripe|checkout|security|crypto|token|oauth|jwt|rbac|acl|permission)[^/]*\\.[a-z0-9]+$") &&
+ e.file.path.matches("(?i)[^/]*(auth|login|session|password|passwd|credential|payment|billing|charge|stripe|checkout|security|crypto|token|oauth|jwt|rbac|permission)[^/]*\\.[a-z0-9]+$") &&
!e.file.path.matches("(?i)\\.(md|txt|lock)$") &&
!e.file.path.matches("(?i)\\.github/workflows/[^/]*\\.ya?ml$") &&
!e.file.path.matches("(?i)(^|/)credentials\\.(json|toml)$")
@@ -74,6 +77,12 @@ tests:
- event: { action: file.modified }
file: { path: "src/auth/index.ts" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: oracle_not_acl_false_match
+ verdict: no_match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: file.modified }
+ file: { path: "src/db/oracle.go" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: ordinary_source_edit
verdict: no_match
events:
diff --git a/rules/source-control/git-remote-tampering.rule.yaml b/rules/source-control/git-remote-tampering.rule.yaml
index ba894fe3..8e5f889f 100644
--- a/rules/source-control/git-remote-tampering.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/source-control/git-remote-tampering.rule.yaml
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
id: git-remote-tampering
-version: 3
+version: 4
title: Git remote repointed or force-push to remote
description: >
A command repoints a git remote (remote set-url / remote add, or the config-key
form remote.<name>.url set to a value), force-pushes (--force / --force-with-lease /
-f / a leading + refspec), or installs an insteadOf URL rewrite — ways to redirect
- code to an attacker-controlled destination or overwrite remote history. git is
- anchored to a command boundary and each clause is kept within one command segment so
- a benign mention or a read-only `git config --get` does not fire. Ported from
- blastradius is_git_write_shape (source_control_mutation_path).
+ code to an attacker-controlled destination or overwrite remote history. Every clause
+ is git-anchored to a command boundary and kept within one command segment, so a
+ benign mention, a `grep insteadOf`, or a read-only `git config --get` does not fire.
+ Ported from blastradius is_git_write_shape (source_control_mutation_path).
severity: high
status: stable
posture: detect
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ match: >
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*)git\\b[^;&|]*\\bremote\\b\\s+(set-url|add)\\b") ||
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*)git\\b[^;&|]*\\bconfig\\b[^;&|]*\\bremote\\.[^ ]+\\.url\\b\\s+\\S") ||
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*)git\\b[^;&|]*\\bpush\\b[^;&|]*(\\s--force(-with-lease)?\\b|\\s-f\\b|\\s\\+)") ||
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)\\binsteadof\\b")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]\\s*)git\\b[^;&|]*\\binsteadof\\b")
)
emit:
@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@ tests:
- event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "git config remote.origin.url https://attacker.example/x.git" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: instead_of_rewrite
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "git config url.https://attacker.example/.insteadOf https://github.com/" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: ordinary_push
verdict: no_match
events:
@@ -81,3 +87,9 @@ tests:
- event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "echo git remote set-url is dangerous" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: grep_insteadof_docs
+ verdict: no_match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "man git-config | grep insteadOf" }
+ session: { id: s1 }