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Roll back the log a failed first install created, so a retry is still first

Claude9814e735d2ea
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 403ddf54..d556975b 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Do not recreate or depend on removed `asymptote` mirror trees. Keep new work foc
- Beacon is visibility-first endpoint telemetry for local AI agent runtimes, not a hosted policy service or general endpoint protection product.
- Preserve the local-only default. The public Beacon build must not require a hosted account, remote policy fetch, hosted dashboard, or external network dependency during normal hook execution, and hooks themselves never touch the network.
- `beacon login` is the account-identity channel for interactive users and is required by the interactive `beacon endpoint install` wizard. It uses browser PKCE against beacon.sh and stores the scoped CLI token only in `~/.beacon/auth/session.json` (0600 under a 0700 directory). Signing in alone never starts forwarding. User-mode `beacon endpoint connect` may send that token once to `POST /api/cli/enroll/account` to authorize minting a separate device ingest key, and `beacon mcp token create` may send it to `POST /api/cli/mcp/tokens` (scope `mcp:token:create`, listed on the sign-in page) to mint a personal MCP token that is printed once to stdout and never written to a file, and `beacon share` may send it (scope `traces:write`, also on the sign-in page) to `PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST /v1/traces/{external_id}/events/batch` and `GET /v1/traces/{external_id}` on the Beacon API host (`https://api.beacon.sh` for a beacon.sh sign-in, other hosts unchanged, `BEACON_API_URL` overrides) to upload a shared trace the person chose to publish, as a `beacon.trace.v1` summary and its events (`cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go`; a `bcn_api_` API key from `--key` or `BEACON_API_KEY` may stand in for it, precedence `--key`, then a current sign-in carrying the scope, then the environment). These are explicit, user-initiated requests with redirects refused. Hooks, plugins and background jobs never make them, with one exception: the git pre-push hook, only when the person opted in with `beacon git setup --share-sessions` (public needs confirmation), may make the three share requests during a push the person started, within the hook's budget and never failing the push. Never copy the account token into endpoint config, Vector, hook environments, logs, or command output. System/root/package/MDM/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run installs stay noninteractive and account-free.
-- System log access (`beacon endpoint install|repair --system --log-access shared|restricted`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#restricted-log-access`). Shared, the CLI default, is the system log as it always was: hooks append to `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` directly, so it is `0666`. Restricted is opt-in for the CLI and the default for a first package install on every platform (see below; on Linux `packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh` passes `--log-access restricted` only when neither the system `config.json` nor the runtime log exists, `/proc/1/comm` is systemd and `BEACON_SERVICE` is unset, `auto` or `systemd`; otherwise it passes nothing and the endpoint keeps its mode; `packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`, sourced by that script and by the postinstall (which takes only `BEACON_ENDPOINT_HARNESSES`, through `beacon_settings_harnesses` in a subshell, because its user-config step re-runs the CLI as each logged-in user with its environment and must not hand them a Splunk HEC token from the file), reads the `BEACON_*` install settings, never sourcing the file, from a root-owned, not group/other-writable `/etc/default/beacon` or `/etc/sysconfig/beacon` in shell syntax with trailing comments, skipping a malformed value with a warning naming only the key, the last assignment of a key winning within the file, the environment and `install-endpoint.sh`'s positional arguments winning over it; the postinstall prints the `usermod -aG beacon-log` hint for a restricted log; `packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh` checks all of it). Restricted makes the root collector the only writer: its `beacon_ingest` extension (`collector-builder/exporter/beaconjsonexporter/beaconingestextension`, appending through the exporter's own `internal/runtimelog`) serves `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, and the hook adapter and the CLI writer, as any account but root writing the system log, hand finished lines to it through `pkg/asymptoteobserve/localingest` (`Deliverer`). The protocol is one batch per connection (`BEACON-INGEST/1`, a header naming the log, one event per line, one JSON reply saying how far it got); the server refuses a batch for any log but its own, identifies the sender only by kernel peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`, `LOCAL_PEERCRED`), overwrites the event's `user` with that uid and its resolved name and always derives `event.id` itself (`StampLine` re-encodes, so a sender cannot split or forge lines or reuse another event's id), and bounds connections overall and per uid, batch size, each account's bytes per second, and its own time per connection (shorter than the client's, so it reports how far it got instead of being resent). The client sends only to a socket that root owns in a directory nobody else can write (group-writable ancestors only for gid 0/1, which macOS's `/private/var/run` needs). `Deliverer.Write` sends through the socket when it answers and otherwise appends directly as before; only a direct append refused for permission (a restricted log whose collector is down) spools the line, to the account's private spool for that log (`~/.beacon/endpoint/spool/<log digest>`, 0600 under 0700), and the next line that gets through either way drains it. Root writers and per-user logs always write directly. The mode is `config.json` `log_access`, carried through repair and package upgrades (`BEACON_LOG_ACCESS` in the install scripts). A first install from any package (`.deb`/`.rpm` on systemd hosts, the macOS `.pkg`, the MSI unless `BEACON_SERVICE` names the supervised collector; no system config and no kept log) defaults to restricted in its install script, and adds to `beacon-log` (`--log-readers`, `loggroup.AddMember`: gpasswd/addgroup, dseditgroup, net.exe; add-only, failures reported not fatal; `validAccount` also admits spaces, an apostrophe and non-ASCII letters on Windows, because OOBE names local accounts from what the person typed) exactly `BEACON_LOG_READERS` when set, even empty, else only a person who installed interactively (Linux `SUDO_USER` with a controlling terminal (`/dev/tty`, not stdin, which rpm scriptlets get as a pipe) and not `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive`, because Ansible `become` and Packer sudo set `SUDO_USER` too; macOS without `COMMAND_LINE_INSTALL` and with an `Installer` process of the console user whose lsof `txt` executable is Apple's `/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app`, never a bare process name; Windows MSI `UILevel` >= 4 via the custom action's `-UiLevel`), never an unattended fleet install. In both shell settings parsers an environment variable set to an empty string counts as unset (except `BEACON_LOG_READERS`, where empty means nobody), and the macOS Fleet wrapper (`packaging/macos/fleet/scripts/install.sh`) passes only arguments it was given, so neither hides the settings file or managed preferences. Fleet tooling sets the `BEACON_*` install settings where it writes settings: `/etc/default/beacon`/`/etc/sysconfig/beacon` (`packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`), managed or local preferences for `com.beacon.endpoint` (`packaging/macos/beacon-settings.sh`), `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Beacon\Endpoint` (`install-endpoint.ps1`); each read only when root/admin-controlled, environment wins; docs in `docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx#package-installs`. Install creates the `beacon-log` group (`internal/endpoint/loggroup`, getent/groupadd, dscl/dseditgroup) and `writer.RestrictSystemLog` makes the directory `root:beacon-log 02750`, the log and archives `0640` and the lock root-only `0600`, after writing the root-owned `.beacon-log-access` marker beside the log; a shared log is not narrowed in place but copied to fresh root-created files and renamed over, under its lock (bounded wait), because a descriptor opened while it was 0666 survives any chmod. A failed install restores the previous mode in its rollback, and a shared install removes a dead socket. The marker is what tells every root writer (`asymptoteobserve.RuntimeLogModes`) to keep the restricted modes. The OTLP receivers on loopback are not covered by the socket: any local process can still send OTLP. On Linux, macOS and Windows those events are attributed to the account that owns the sending socket (peer attribution, below), which names the sender but does not stop an account sending what it likes under its own name, so never claim more than that. Doctor's `runtime_log_access` covers the marker, the socket and pending spool. Unix sockets are local IPC, not a network channel, so the hooks-never-touch-the-network rule holds. On Windows the same mode runs over the named pipe `\\.\pipe\beacon-agent-ingest` (`localingest` `transport_windows.go`, go-winio): the collector creates it as the first instance, and when the name is taken (any account may create one) it reports a recoverable error and retries every few seconds rather than failing, so the rest of the collector stays up; it rejects remote clients and its DACL denies NETWORK and withholds `FILE_CREATE_PIPE_INSTANCE` from ordinary accounts, so it is not a network channel either; a client connects at identification level and sends only to a pipe owned by SYSTEM or Administrators; the server counts a connection against its account from the client process's token before reading and stamps the SID it reads by `ImpersonateNamedPipeClient` after the preamble (they must agree), with `Peer.UID` a string (decimal uid on Unix, SID on Windows) and the name from `LookupAccountSid`, bounded. Privileged writers there are SYSTEM and tokens with Administrators enabled (`CheckTokenMembership`; elevation for another group is not enough). The directory gets `sysacl.RestrictedLogDirDACL` (protected: SYSTEM and Administrators full, `beacon-log` local group read, nothing else; the lock SYSTEM and Administrators only) and everything below it is reset, because every account may bypass traverse checking; `writer.RestrictSystemLog` replaces every file directly in the directory (the log family under the lock; files outside it with another hard link are skipped) with a copy created with its final owner and DACL (`sysacl.CreateRestrictedFile`) and a POSIX-semantics rename, fails naming any file held open without sharing delete and then puts a log that was shared back to shared, and writes the marker last (on Windows it decides nothing for root writers, so a failed or killed run is not mistaken for a finished one). The marker counts there when SYSTEM or Administrators own it and no other account can write it. `loggroup` creates the local group with `net.exe` and looks it up qualified with the computer name. Doctor reads the restricted ACL (`writer.CheckRestrictedSystemLogACL`). `packaging/windows/smoke-restricted-log.ps1` runs in `windows-package-smoke` against the installed MSI with a real ordinary account. Hook and writer tests point `logging.EndpointIngest`/`writer.Ingest` at sockets of their own.
+- System log access (`beacon endpoint install|repair --system --log-access shared|restricted`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#restricted-log-access`). Shared, the CLI default, is the system log as it always was: hooks append to `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` directly, so it is `0666`. Restricted is opt-in for the CLI and the default for a first package install on every platform (see below; on Linux `packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh` passes `--log-access restricted` only when neither the system `config.json` nor the runtime log exists, `/proc/1/comm` is systemd and `BEACON_SERVICE` is unset, `auto` or `systemd`; otherwise it passes nothing and the endpoint keeps its mode; `packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`, sourced by that script and by the postinstall (which takes only `BEACON_ENDPOINT_HARNESSES`, through `beacon_settings_harnesses` in a subshell, because its user-config step re-runs the CLI as each logged-in user with its environment and must not hand them a Splunk HEC token from the file), reads the `BEACON_*` install settings, never sourcing the file, from a root-owned, not group/other-writable `/etc/default/beacon` or `/etc/sysconfig/beacon` in shell syntax with trailing comments, skipping a malformed value with a warning naming only the key, the last assignment of a key winning within the file, the environment and `install-endpoint.sh`'s positional arguments winning over it; the postinstall prints the `usermod -aG beacon-log` hint for a restricted log; `packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh` checks all of it). Restricted makes the root collector the only writer: its `beacon_ingest` extension (`collector-builder/exporter/beaconjsonexporter/beaconingestextension`, appending through the exporter's own `internal/runtimelog`) serves `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, and the hook adapter and the CLI writer, as any account but root writing the system log, hand finished lines to it through `pkg/asymptoteobserve/localingest` (`Deliverer`). The protocol is one batch per connection (`BEACON-INGEST/1`, a header naming the log, one event per line, one JSON reply saying how far it got); the server refuses a batch for any log but its own, identifies the sender only by kernel peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`, `LOCAL_PEERCRED`), overwrites the event's `user` with that uid and its resolved name and always derives `event.id` itself (`StampLine` re-encodes, so a sender cannot split or forge lines or reuse another event's id), and bounds connections overall and per uid, batch size, each account's bytes per second, and its own time per connection (shorter than the client's, so it reports how far it got instead of being resent). The client sends only to a socket that root owns in a directory nobody else can write (group-writable ancestors only for gid 0/1, which macOS's `/private/var/run` needs). `Deliverer.Write` sends through the socket when it answers and otherwise appends directly as before; only a direct append refused for permission (a restricted log whose collector is down) spools the line, to the account's private spool for that log (`~/.beacon/endpoint/spool/<log digest>`, 0600 under 0700), and the next line that gets through either way drains it. Root writers and per-user logs always write directly. The mode is `config.json` `log_access`, carried through repair and package upgrades (`BEACON_LOG_ACCESS` in the install scripts). A first install from any package (`.deb`/`.rpm` on systemd hosts, the macOS `.pkg`, the MSI unless `BEACON_SERVICE` names the supervised collector; no system config and no kept log) defaults to restricted in its install script, and adds to `beacon-log` (`--log-readers`, `loggroup.AddMember`: gpasswd/addgroup, dseditgroup, net.exe; add-only, failures reported not fatal; `validAccount` also admits spaces, an apostrophe and non-ASCII letters on Windows, because OOBE names local accounts from what the person typed) exactly `BEACON_LOG_READERS` when set, even empty, else only a person who installed interactively (Linux `SUDO_USER` with a controlling terminal (`/dev/tty`, not stdin, which rpm scriptlets get as a pipe) and not `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive`, because Ansible `become` and Packer sudo set `SUDO_USER` too; macOS without `COMMAND_LINE_INSTALL` and with an `Installer` process of the console user whose lsof `txt` executable is Apple's `/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app`, never a bare process name; Windows MSI `UILevel` >= 4 via the custom action's `-UiLevel`), never an unattended fleet install. In both shell settings parsers an environment variable set to an empty string counts as unset (except `BEACON_LOG_READERS`, where empty means nobody), and the macOS Fleet wrapper (`packaging/macos/fleet/scripts/install.sh`) passes only arguments it was given, so neither hides the settings file or managed preferences. Fleet tooling sets the `BEACON_*` install settings where it writes settings: `/etc/default/beacon`/`/etc/sysconfig/beacon` (`packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`), managed or local preferences for `com.beacon.endpoint` (`packaging/macos/beacon-settings.sh`), `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Beacon\Endpoint` (`install-endpoint.ps1`); each read only when root/admin-controlled, environment wins; docs in `docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx#package-installs`. Install creates the `beacon-log` group (`internal/endpoint/loggroup`, getent/groupadd, dscl/dseditgroup) and `writer.RestrictSystemLog` makes the directory `root:beacon-log 02750`, the log and archives `0640` and the lock root-only `0600`, after writing the root-owned `.beacon-log-access` marker beside the log; a shared log is not narrowed in place but copied to fresh root-created files and renamed over, under its lock (bounded wait), because a descriptor opened while it was 0666 survives any chmod. A failed install restores the previous mode in its rollback (`logAccessRestorer`), or, when there was no log before, removes the log, lock and marker it created, because every package script reads a log without a system config as one kept by `--keep-logs`, which would turn the retry of a failed first install into an upgrade; and a shared install removes a dead socket. The marker is what tells every root writer (`asymptoteobserve.RuntimeLogModes`) to keep the restricted modes. The OTLP receivers on loopback are not covered by the socket: any local process can still send OTLP. On Linux, macOS and Windows those events are attributed to the account that owns the sending socket (peer attribution, below), which names the sender but does not stop an account sending what it likes under its own name, so never claim more than that. Doctor's `runtime_log_access` covers the marker, the socket and pending spool. Unix sockets are local IPC, not a network channel, so the hooks-never-touch-the-network rule holds. On Windows the same mode runs over the named pipe `\\.\pipe\beacon-agent-ingest` (`localingest` `transport_windows.go`, go-winio): the collector creates it as the first instance, and when the name is taken (any account may create one) it reports a recoverable error and retries every few seconds rather than failing, so the rest of the collector stays up; it rejects remote clients and its DACL denies NETWORK and withholds `FILE_CREATE_PIPE_INSTANCE` from ordinary accounts, so it is not a network channel either; a client connects at identification level and sends only to a pipe owned by SYSTEM or Administrators; the server counts a connection against its account from the client process's token before reading and stamps the SID it reads by `ImpersonateNamedPipeClient` after the preamble (they must agree), with `Peer.UID` a string (decimal uid on Unix, SID on Windows) and the name from `LookupAccountSid`, bounded. Privileged writers there are SYSTEM and tokens with Administrators enabled (`CheckTokenMembership`; elevation for another group is not enough). The directory gets `sysacl.RestrictedLogDirDACL` (protected: SYSTEM and Administrators full, `beacon-log` local group read, nothing else; the lock SYSTEM and Administrators only) and everything below it is reset, because every account may bypass traverse checking; `writer.RestrictSystemLog` replaces every file directly in the directory (the log family under the lock; files outside it with another hard link are skipped) with a copy created with its final owner and DACL (`sysacl.CreateRestrictedFile`) and a POSIX-semantics rename, fails naming any file held open without sharing delete and then puts a log that was shared back to shared, and writes the marker last (on Windows it decides nothing for root writers, so a failed or killed run is not mistaken for a finished one). The marker counts there when SYSTEM or Administrators own it and no other account can write it. `loggroup` creates the local group with `net.exe` and looks it up qualified with the computer name. Doctor reads the restricted ACL (`writer.CheckRestrictedSystemLogACL`). `packaging/windows/smoke-restricted-log.ps1` runs in `windows-package-smoke` against the installed MSI with a real ordinary account. Hook and writer tests point `logging.EndpointIngest`/`writer.Ingest` at sockets of their own.
- Beacon Cloud forwarding (`cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/asymptote`, `beacon endpoint connect`, `beacon endpoint asymptote`) is Vector-shaped: Beacon writes local JSONL, Vector ships runtime lines only from the connection point forward and reads inventory from the beginning to establish the endpoint's current baseline, plus the one bounded exception of the session backfill (below), and the `bcn_device_*` key stays only in `<BaseDir>/asymptote/vector-secrets.json` via Vector's secret backend. The onboarding wizard preselects Beacon Cloud, and confirming it connects this endpoint in the same command once the local install has succeeded; an endpoint that is already enrolled is never re-enrolled, because enrollment rotates the device key. Standard mode ships locally sanitized retained content; metadata-only uses local Vector transforms to remove prompts, responses, reasoning, tool arguments/results, tool descriptions/definitions, retrieval queries/documents, evaluation explanations, agent descriptions, stop sequences, approval/policy reasons, command output, raw fields, diffs, inventory content, and MCP definitions before buffering/upload. Every text-shaped event field must be classified in `metadata_fields_test.go` (`metadataOnlyRemoved`, each with its own `del()` in `pack/metadata-transforms.toml`, or `metadataOnlyKept`); a new field fails that test until it is, and `BEACON_TEST_VECTOR_BIN` runs the transform on an event with every field set. `vector.toml` is not rendered only at connect: `asymptote.ReconcileForwarder` re-renders it in place for a connected endpoint from the current pack with the enrollment's ingest URL and recorded privacy mode, validates it with the forwarder's own Vector exactly as connect does, atomically replaces it, and, when run from install, repair, the package upgrade or the hidden reconcile the macOS postinstall runs (`ReconcileOptions.Restart`), restarts a running forwarder even when nothing changed (after `vector validate` of the current config with the forwarder's own Vector, and never after a warning, so a refused config or a missing Vector leaves the running forwarder alone), as the Sentinel reconcile does: switching to restricted log access replaces the runtime log with a copy, and Vector, which recognizes a file by its first line, keeps tailing the replaced one until it restarts; an upgrade may also have installed a new Vector. A stopped one is never started and reads the new config when it next starts. The `beacon_runtime` source reads `runtime.jsonl.1` too, as the Sentinel pack does, so lines written to a replaced log before a restart are found again at the next rotation instead of lost. It never enrolls, reads or rewrites the secrets file, makes a network request, or touches `vector-data/` (checkpoints stay, so pack changes must keep source ids and fingerprinting stable), and a rejected config is a warning that keeps the old one; it is a no-op when not connected, after an incomplete connect, without an installed unit, or where `ForwarderManager` is unsupported (supervised mode). `lifecycle.Install` runs it last when services are started (so install, repair and the Linux package upgrade), repair's teardown keeps the forwarder (`UninstallOptions.KeepManagedIngest`) instead of disconnecting it, and the macOS postinstall, which installs with `--no-start`, runs the hidden `beacon endpoint asymptote reconcile --system`. Keep the ingest URL `https://`, the wire contract aligned with `beacon-ingest` (`/v1/ingest/{runtime,inventory}` and `/v1/ingest/health`), and do not add another endpoint network channel. The cloud-sandbox shuttle is the bounded exception: only with `BEACON_ORIGIN=cloud`, it can upload new runtime lines to GCS, S3, or the same Beacon ingest contract because no Vector/service manager/browser/persistent disk exists there.
- Session backfill (`cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_backfill.go`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#session-backfill` and `docs/cli/endpoint-connect.mdx#session-backfill`): after every successful install (user or system mode), every session-store collector runs once with `CollectOptions.Since` (30 days; `sessionwindow.Recent` keeps those sessions, newest first, and never touches the cursors of the rest) and a shared `writer.Budget` (24 MiB, at most 12 MiB per runtime through `Budget.Sub`; a refused append returns `writer.ErrBudgetSpent`, the collector stops with cursors past only what was written, and a manual sync reads the rest). A new session-store collector takes both fields, reads its store only through `internal/sessionfs` (a test parses every collector package to enforce it), and joins `endpointBackfillRunners` and that test's list. Every connect, first or re-connect, user or system, runs the same sweep before enrollment (skipped when install just ran it) and, before the forwarder starts, `asymptote.StageBackfill` copies the window's `harness.collection_method=poll` lines into `cloud-backfill.jsonl` beside the runtime log, which the `beacon_backfill` Vector source (fingerprinted `device_and_inode`, so each atomically restaged copy is a new file) reads from the beginning into the runtime sink through the same privacy transform. Live hook/OTLP/plugin history before the connection point stays local. Re-connects restage, so a resend of already-shipped lines is expected and rests on the deterministic `event.id`; a privacy-mode change clears the checkpoints and the restage renames the new-mode copy over the old one (kept until then so the copy is always a new inode; deleted instead when nothing restages), and `disconnect` removes it. System mode runs the collectors under `withUserHome` for the active console user (`activeConsoleUser`), with cursors under the system base directory, and reports a skip when nobody is logged in; root is reading a home the console user controls, so the sweep runs under `sessionfs.Confine` (an `os.Root` on that home, files owned by the home's owner only, non-blocking opens that refuse FIFOs/devices, SQLite read from a private snapshot under `<SystemBaseDir>/state/backfill-snapshots`, retried until the database size/change counter and WAL header are unchanged across the copy, and refused past `sessionfs.MaxSnapshotBytes` (512 MiB with its WAL) with the runtime's sync command named in the report), and refused paths read as absent and are listed in the report. User-mode sync and backfill stay unconfined. The wizard's confirm screen names the upload (`WizardOptions.BackfillDays`). Dry-run, `--no-backfill` and `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` skip all of it; the cmd tests run with `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` set in `TestMain`.
- `beacon endpoint install` has a full-screen onboarding wizard on interactive user TTYs. It signs in, preselects Beacon Cloud, requires an explicit choice to opt out to Local, and asks Managed users to choose Standard or Metadata-only privacy. Signing in alone still moves no telemetry. Confirming Beacon Cloud does: the confirm screen states that it installs Beacon and starts forwarding, and names what the selected privacy mode sends, so that screen is the consent point. The managed destination is recorded only after enrollment succeeds, so a failed enrollment leaves a working local install, prints `beacon endpoint connect` as the retry, and re-offers the question on the next install. The onboarding record is written only after `lifecycle.Install` returns, because a profile written first left a failed install looking onboarded and silently skipped the wizard on the retry. Explicit `install --connect` is unchanged. The wizard is skipped for system/root/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run or `BEACON_ONBOARDING=0`; those unattended paths must never gain an account or browser dependency. Legacy `BEACON_ONBOARDING_EMAIL`/`USAGE` submissions remain only for fleet compatibility. After the destination, the wizard shows an agent tools screen; every row is preselected (opt-out, space toggles). Beacon Cloud MCP is offered only with Beacon Cloud and runs the `beacon mcp connect` flow (`connectCloudMCP` with `yes`, OAuth, detected harnesses) only after the endpoint is connected (or already was), via `finishCloudSetup`; a failed enrollment skips it and names the retry. The Beacon Agent Skills are offered for either destination and installed user-wide into `~/.agents/skills` and, when Claude Code is set up, `~/.claude/skills` (`cli/beacon/internal/agentskills`, `beacon skills install|uninstall`; a `.beacon-managed` marker decides what Beacon may replace or remove; install and repair refresh only copies Beacon already wrote). Both run after `lifecycle.Install` returns and warn rather than fail. The answers are recorded as `onboarding.cloud_mcp`/`agent_skills`. Implementation lives in `cli/beacon/internal/onboarding`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_onboarding.go`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_install.go` and `cli/beacon/cmd/agent_tools.go`; keep `docs/cli/endpoint-onboarding.mdx` and `docs/cli/skills.mdx` in sync.
diff --git a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess.go b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess.go
index b028d723..200cef15 100644
--- a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess.go
+++ b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess.go
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
package lifecycle
import (
+ "errors"
"fmt"
+ "io/fs"
+ "os"
"strings"
endpointconfig "github.com/asymptote-labs/agent-beacon/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/config"
@@ -75,9 +78,23 @@ func prepareSystemLog(cfg endpointconfig.Config) (groupCreated bool, err error)
// logAccessRestorer records the system log's access mode before an install changes it and returns
// what puts it back. Restoring is best effort, like the rest of a rollback.
+//
+// When there was no log before, the install created it (with its lock, and for a restricted log
+// the marker), and restoring removes exactly the files it created rather than choosing a mode for
+// them. The package install scripts treat a log found without a system config as one kept by
+// uninstall --keep-logs and keep its mode, so a log left behind by a failed first install would
+// make the retry an upgrade: an MSI retry would install shared, and every script would skip adding
+// the person who installed to the readers group.
func logAccessRestorer(cfg endpointconfig.Config) func() {
wasRestricted := logIsRestricted(cfg.LogPath)
+ created := logFilesAbsent(cfg.LogPath)
return func() {
+ if len(created) > 0 && created[0] == cfg.LogPath {
+ for _, path := range created {
+ _ = os.Remove(path)
+ }
+ return
+ }
if logIsRestricted(cfg.LogPath) == wasRestricted {
return
}
@@ -91,6 +108,19 @@ func logAccessRestorer(cfg endpointconfig.Config) func() {
}
}
+// logFilesAbsent lists which of the log, its lock and the access marker do not exist yet, the log
+// first. A path that cannot be checked for any reason but its absence is left out, so a rollback
+// never removes a file it could not see before.
+func logFilesAbsent(logPath string) []string {
+ var absent []string
+ for _, path := range []string{logPath, logPath + ".lock", asymptoteobserve.LogAccessMarkerPath(logPath)} {
+ if _, err := os.Lstat(path); errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+ absent = append(absent, path)
+ }
+ }
+ return absent
+}
+
// addLogReaders puts each named account in the readers group of a restricted system log. It never
// removes anyone, and an account that cannot be added (unknown, or a tool that failed) is reported
// rather than failing an install that has otherwise succeeded: a fleet install must not stop over
diff --git a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess_test.go b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess_test.go
index c4a56c00..b60bc3b8 100644
--- a/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess_test.go
+++ b/cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/lifecycle/logaccess_test.go
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package lifecycle
import (
"errors"
+ "io/fs"
+ "os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -157,7 +159,11 @@ func TestLogAccessRestorerPutsBackWhatAFailedInstallChanged(t *testing.T) {
logIsRestricted = func(string) bool { return restricted }
t.Cleanup(func() { logIsRestricted = prev })
calls := fakeLogAccess(t, 77, false, nil, nil)
- cfg := endpointconfig.Config{LogPath: "/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl"}
+ // An existing log: one with nothing beside it is removed instead (below).
+ cfg := endpointconfig.Config{LogPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "runtime.jsonl")}
+ if err := os.WriteFile(cfg.LogPath, []byte("{}\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
// Shared before; the failed install restricted it.
restore := logAccessRestorer(cfg)
@@ -184,6 +190,64 @@ func TestLogAccessRestorerPutsBackWhatAFailedInstallChanged(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+// A failed first install must leave no log behind. The package install scripts read a log without
+// a system config as one kept by uninstall --keep-logs and keep its mode, so a leftover log would
+// turn the retry of a first MSI install into a shared one, and stop every script adding the person
+// who installed to the readers group.
+func TestLogAccessRestorerRemovesTheFilesAFailedFirstInstallCreated(t *testing.T) {
+ dir := t.TempDir()
+ cfg := endpointconfig.Config{LogPath: filepath.Join(dir, "runtime.jsonl"), LogAccess: "restricted"}
+ marker := asymptoteobserve.LogAccessMarkerPath(cfg.LogPath)
+ calls := fakeLogAccess(t, 77, true, nil, nil)
+ restricted := false
+ prev := logIsRestricted
+ logIsRestricted = func(string) bool { return restricted }
+ t.Cleanup(func() { logIsRestricted = prev })
+
+ restore := logAccessRestorer(cfg)
+ // What restricting a missing log creates, plus a file the install did not create.
+ for _, path := range []string{cfg.LogPath, cfg.LogPath + ".lock", marker, filepath.Join(dir, "other")} {
+ if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("x"), 0o600); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ }
+ restricted = true
+ restore()
+ for _, path := range []string{cfg.LogPath, cfg.LogPath + ".lock", marker} {
+ if _, err := os.Lstat(path); !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+ t.Fatalf("%s survived the rollback of the install that created it (%v)", path, err)
+ }
+ }
+ if _, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, "other")); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("removed a file the install did not create: %v", err)
+ }
+ if calls.shared != 0 || len(calls.restricted) != 0 {
+ t.Fatalf("chose a mode for files it removed: %+v", calls)
+ }
+}
+
+// A lock or marker that was already there, without a log, belongs to someone else's state: only
+// the files that were absent are removed.
+func TestLogAccessRestorerKeepsFilesThatExistedBefore(t *testing.T) {
+ dir := t.TempDir()
+ cfg := endpointconfig.Config{LogPath: filepath.Join(dir, "runtime.jsonl")}
+ fakeLogAccess(t, 0, false, nil, nil)
+ if err := os.WriteFile(cfg.LogPath+".lock", nil, 0o600); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ restore := logAccessRestorer(cfg)
+ if err := os.WriteFile(cfg.LogPath, []byte("x"), 0o600); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ restore()
+ if _, err := os.Lstat(cfg.LogPath); !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+ t.Fatalf("the log the install created survived: %v", err)
+ }
+ if _, err := os.Lstat(cfg.LogPath + ".lock"); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("removed a lock that existed before the install: %v", err)
+ }
+}
+
func TestRollbackRestoresTheLogAccessMode(t *testing.T) {
called := false
tx := newInstallRollback(service.Manager{UserMode: true, Kind: service.KindSupervised})
diff --git a/docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx b/docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx
index 68955644..52e95b37 100644
--- a/docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx
+++ b/docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ The mode is recorded in `config.json` as `log_access` and in a root-owned `.beac
The `.deb` and `.rpm`, the macOS `.pkg` and the Windows MSI follow the same rules.
-**A first install is restricted.** A package is installed by an administrator for the whole machine, often by fleet tooling, so it sets up restricted access without a second step. An upgrade, a reinstall over a kept config, or a reinstall over a log kept by `uninstall --keep-logs` keeps whatever mode the endpoint already has, so existing endpoints never change. An install whose collector is not an OS service stays shared, because nothing there restarts the collector: on Linux a host without systemd as PID 1 (a container, WSL without systemd), and on Linux or Windows one installed with `BEACON_SERVICE=none`. `BEACON_LOG_ACCESS=shared` installs a new endpoint shared.
+**A first install is restricted.** A package is installed by an administrator for the whole machine, often by fleet tooling, so it sets up restricted access without a second step. An upgrade, a reinstall over a kept config, or a reinstall over a log kept by `uninstall --keep-logs` keeps whatever mode the endpoint already has, so existing endpoints never change. A first install that fails removes the log it created, so retrying it is still a first install. An install whose collector is not an OS service stays shared, because nothing there restarts the collector: on Linux a host without systemd as PID 1 (a container, WSL without systemd), and on Linux or Windows one installed with `BEACON_SERVICE=none`. `BEACON_LOG_ACCESS=shared` installs a new endpoint shared.
**Who is added to `beacon-log` depends on how the package was installed:**