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Keep token type prefixes so credential rules still match the log

Claudeb599004d5f5d
diff --git a/docs/security/retention-redaction.mdx b/docs/security/retention-redaction.mdx
index 17539038..0bac8b85 100644
--- a/docs/security/retention-redaction.mdx
+++ b/docs/security/retention-redaction.mdx
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Redaction runs on retained text (prompts, command output, diffs, tool arguments
| Authorization headers and flags | `Authorization: Bearer …`, `Authorization: Basic …`, `--password …`, `--token=…` |
| URL credentials | the password in `postgres://user:…@host`, `https://x-access-token:…@github.com` |
| Private keys | PEM and OpenSSH `PRIVATE KEY` blocks, including a block cut off before its end line |
-| Recognizable tokens | Anthropic and OpenAI `sk-…`, AWS `AKIA…`/`ASIA…`, GitHub `ghp_…`/`github_pat_…`, GitLab `glpat-…`, Slack `xox…-`, Stripe `sk_live_…`, Google `AIza…`, npm, Hugging Face, Beacon `bcn_…` keys, and JWTs |
+| Recognizable tokens (the public type prefix stays, as in `ghp_[REDACTED]`) | Anthropic and OpenAI `sk-…`, AWS `AKIA…`/`ASIA…`, GitHub `ghp_…`/`github_pat_…`, GitLab `glpat-…`, Slack `xox…-`, Stripe `sk_live_…`, Google `AIza…`, npm, Hugging Face, Beacon `bcn_…` keys, and JWTs |
Redaction is pattern-based. A credential with no label and no recognizable shape, such as a bare random password, is not detected, so treat retained content as sensitive. Metadata-only forwarding is the control for keeping content off Beacon Cloud entirely.
diff --git a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy.go b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy.go
index 9af5dde7..77840bd0 100644
--- a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy.go
+++ b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy.go
@@ -35,35 +35,72 @@ const secretValue = "[^\"'`,\\s}\\]\\\\\\[][^\"'`,\\s}\\]\\\\]*"
type secretRule struct {
pattern *regexp.Regexp
replacement string
+ // keep, when set, leaves a match alone if its value (${2}) passes.
+ keep func(value string) bool
+}
+
+// isAuthScheme reports whether a labeled value is an Authorization scheme rather than a
+// credential. `Authorization: Bearer x` is redacted to `Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]` by the
+// header rule, and the assignment rule must not then take `Bearer` for the value and erase what
+// kind of credential the line held.
+func isAuthScheme(value string) bool {
+ switch strings.ToLower(value) {
+ case "bearer", "basic", "token", "digest":
+ return true
+ }
+ return false
}
var secretRules = []secretRule{
// A private key block, or the rest of the text when the block was cut before its END line.
- {regexp.MustCompile(`-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY( BLOCK)?-----(?:[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY( BLOCK)?-----|[\s\S]*$)`), redactedValue},
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY( BLOCK)?-----(?:[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY( BLOCK)?-----|[\s\S]*$)`), redactedValue, nil},
// An Authorization header's credential after its scheme: Bearer, Basic, Token, Digest.
- {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(authorization["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?(?:bearer|basic|token|digest)\s+)([^"'\s,]+)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue},
- {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\bbearer\s+)([a-z0-9._~+/=-]+)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue},
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(authorization["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?(?:bearer|basic|token|digest)\s+)([^"'\s,]+)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil},
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\bbearer\s+)([a-z0-9._~+/=-]+)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil},
// A labeled assignment in prose, shell, env files, YAML, TOML or JSON: `token=x`,
// `export GITHUB_TOKEN="x"`, `{"api_key": "x"}`. The closing quote of a quoted label is allowed
// between the label and the separator.
- {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\b` + secretKeyName + secretAssignment + `)(` + secretValue + `)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue},
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\b` + secretKeyName + secretAssignment + `)(` + secretValue + `)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue, isAuthScheme},
// A command-line flag: `--password x`, `--token=x`, `--api-key x`.
- {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)((?:^|\s)--?[a-z0-9-]*(?:password|passwd|passphrase|token|secret|api-?key|access-?key)(?:=|\s+))([^\s"'-][^\s"']*)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue},
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)((?:^|\s)--?[a-z0-9-]*(?:password|passwd|passphrase|token|secret|api-?key|access-?key)(?:=|\s+))([^\s"'-][^\s"']*)()`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil},
// The password in a URL's userinfo: `postgres://user:pw@host`, `https://x-access-token:[email protected]`.
- {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://[^/\s:@"'<>]+:)([^@/\s"'<>]+)(@)`), "${1}" + redactedValue + "${3}"},
- // Credentials recognizable by their own shape, wherever they appear.
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`), redactedValue}, // Anthropic sk-ant-, OpenAI sk-proj- and sk-
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(?:AKIA|ASIA|ABIA|ACCA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b`), redactedValue}, // AWS access key id
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`), redactedValue}, // GitHub tokens
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}`), redactedValue}, // GitHub fine-grained tokens
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`), redactedValue}, // GitLab
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bxox[abposr]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}`), redactedValue}, // Slack
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\b[rs]k_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}`), redactedValue}, // Stripe
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}`), redactedValue}, // Google API key
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}`), redactedValue}, // npm
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`), redactedValue}, // Hugging Face
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\bbcn_(?:api|device|mcp)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}`), redactedValue}, // Beacon's own keys
- {regexp.MustCompile(`\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}`), redactedValue}, // JWT
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://[^/\s:@"'<>]+:)([^@/\s"'<>]+)(@)`), "${1}" + redactedValue + "${3}", nil},
+ // Credentials recognizable by their own shape, wherever they appear. The type prefix is public
+ // and stays (`ghp_[REDACTED]`, `AKIA[REDACTED]`), the way secret scanners report a finding: the
+ // line still says a GitHub token or an AWS key was there, which is what detection rules match on
+ // in the log, and none of the credential is left.
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(sk-)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // Anthropic sk-ant-, OpenAI sk-proj- and sk-
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(AKIA|ASIA|ABIA|ACCA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // AWS access key id
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(gh[pousr]_)[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // GitHub tokens
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(github_pat_)[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // GitHub fine-grained tokens
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(glpat-)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // GitLab
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(xox[abposr]-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // Slack
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b([rs]k_(?:live|test)_)[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // Stripe
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(AIza)[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // Google API key
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(npm_)[A-Za-z0-9]{36}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // npm
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(hf_)[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // Hugging Face
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(bcn_(?:api|device|mcp)_)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // Beacon's own keys
+ {regexp.MustCompile(`\b(eyJ)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}`), "${1}" + redactedValue, nil}, // JWT
+}
+
+func (rule secretRule) apply(value string) string {
+ if rule.keep == nil {
+ return rule.pattern.ReplaceAllString(value, rule.replacement)
+ }
+ var out []byte
+ last := 0
+ for _, match := range rule.pattern.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(value, -1) {
+ if match[4] >= 0 && rule.keep(value[match[4]:match[5]]) {
+ continue
+ }
+ out = append(out, value[last:match[0]]...)
+ out = rule.pattern.ExpandString(out, rule.replacement, value, match)
+ last = match[1]
+ }
+ if out == nil {
+ return value
+ }
+ return string(append(out, value[last:]...))
}
// assignedSecretPattern captures the value of a labeled assignment so a bare copy of it elsewhere in
@@ -92,7 +129,7 @@ func RedactString(value string) string {
}
}
for _, rule := range secretRules {
- value = rule.pattern.ReplaceAllString(value, rule.replacement)
+ value = rule.apply(value)
}
// Each copy is searched for and removed; none of it survives into the result.
for _, copied := range assigned {
diff --git a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy_test.go b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy_test.go
index d276ace1..87b07c90 100644
--- a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy_test.go
+++ b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/privacy_test.go
@@ -173,6 +173,18 @@ func TestRedactStringKeepsLabelsAndOrdinaryText(t *testing.T) {
if got := RedactString("git clone https://u:[email protected]/r"); got != "git clone https://u:[REDACTED]@example.com/r" {
t.Fatalf("URL credential = %q, want the scheme, user and host kept", got)
}
+ // Detection rules match what kind of credential a line held, so the public type prefix and the
+ // Authorization scheme stay.
+ for input, want := range map[string]string{
+ "deploy with ghp_AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUvWxYz0123456789": "deploy with ghp_[REDACTED]",
+ "upload with AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE": "upload with AKIA[REDACTED]",
+ "Authorization: Bearer abc.def.ghi": "Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]",
+ `{"authorization": "Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz"}`: `{"authorization": "Basic [REDACTED]"}`,
+ } {
+ if got := RedactString(input); got != want {
+ t.Fatalf("RedactString(%q) = %q, want %q", input, got, want)
+ }
+ }
}
// Events are sanitized again on every read path, so a second pass must not change the first one's
diff --git a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/conformance_test.go b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/conformance_test.go
index 7e50932a..989600e7 100644
--- a/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/conformance_test.go
+++ b/pkg/asymptoteobserve/threatrules/conformance_test.go
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
+
+ "github.com/asymptote-labs/agent-beacon/pkg/asymptoteobserve"
)
// repoRoot locates the repository root by walking up from this test file until it finds
@@ -66,6 +68,37 @@ func TestPackConformance(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+// TestPackMatchesWhatTheLogHolds runs every fixture again after the sanitizer every log writer
+// applies, and requires the same verdict. `beacon scan` and the dashboard only ever see the
+// sanitized line, so a rule that matches a raw value redaction removes (a token, a key) is dead on
+// real logs even though its plain fixtures pass.
+func TestPackMatchesWhatTheLogHolds(t *testing.T) {
+ rules, err := LoadDir(rulesDir(t))
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("load rule pack: %v", err)
+ }
+ for _, rule := range rules {
+ compiled, err := Compile(rule)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("rule %q: compile: %v", rule.ID, err)
+ }
+ for _, fixture := range rule.Tests {
+ events := fixture.EventList()
+ for i := range events {
+ events[i] = asymptoteobserve.SanitizeEvent(events[i], 64*1024)
+ }
+ got, err := compiled.Evaluate(events)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("%s/%s: evaluate sanitized events: %v", rule.ID, fixture.Name, err)
+ continue
+ }
+ if got != fixture.Verdict {
+ t.Errorf("%s/%s: verdict %q on the sanitized events the log holds, want %q", rule.ID, fixture.Name, got, fixture.Verdict)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
// TestPackSharedCredentialRead pins correlation read steps that are meant to reuse
// credential-file-read's definition of a secret. The format has no include mechanism, so
// the expression is copied; this fails when one copy changes without the other.
diff --git a/rules/agent-control/handoff-to-second-agent-with-credentials.rule.yaml b/rules/agent-control/handoff-to-second-agent-with-credentials.rule.yaml
index efae34d6..2ed35efc 100644
--- a/rules/agent-control/handoff-to-second-agent-with-credentials.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/agent-control/handoff-to-second-agent-with-credentials.rule.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
id: handoff-to-second-agent-with-credentials
-version: 1
+version: 2
title: Agent handed off to a second agent with credential-shaped payload
description: >
A command.executed event spawns or invokes a second AI agent runtime
@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@ description: >
the command line. The second agent thus inherits the secret in its
initial context, a classic LLM06/AML.T0024 exfiltration shape. The
rule requires both the second-agent invocation AND the credential
- reference to fire.
+ reference to fire. Beacon redacts literal tokens before it writes the
+ log and keeps their type prefix (`ghp_[REDACTED]`, `AKIA[REDACTED]`,
+ `Bearer [REDACTED]`), so the literal arm matches that form as well as
+ the raw one.
severity: critical
status: experimental
posture: detect
@@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ match: >
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(^|[;&|]|&&|\\|\\||\\bsudo\\s+|\\benv\\s+|\\bnpx\\s+)\\s*(claude|codex|cursor-agent|aider|goose|opencode|gemini|mcp[ -]?server)\\b") &&
(
e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\.env($|[^a-z])|\\.aws/credentials|\\.aws/config|\\.ssh/id_(rsa|ed25519|ecdsa|dsa)([^a-z]|$)|\\.gnupg/private-keys-v1\\.d|secring\\.gpg|/\\.kube/config|\\.kdbx($|[^a-z])|\\.netrc($|[^a-z])|\\.pgpass($|[^a-z])|secrets\\.yaml)") ||
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(Bearer\\s+eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|xox[bpars]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,})")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(Bearer\\s+(eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}|\\[REDACTED\\])|sk-([A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|\\[REDACTED\\])|ghp_([A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|\\[REDACTED\\])|AKIA([0-9A-Z]{16}|\\[REDACTED\\])|xox[bpars]-([A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|\\[REDACTED\\]))")
)
emit:
@@ -62,6 +65,34 @@ tests:
event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "claude -p 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.payload.sig - hit /api'" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: claude_with_github_token_literal
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:03:10Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "claude -p \"deploy with ghp_AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUvWxYz0123456789\"" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: codex_with_aws_key_literal
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:03:20Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "codex exec 'upload with AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: gemini_with_slack_and_openai_literals
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:03:30Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "gemini -p 'post with xoxb-1234567890-abcdefghijkl and sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123'" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: claude_with_redacted_github_token_in_log
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-23T10:03:40Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "claude -p \"deploy with ghp_[REDACTED]\"" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: codex_with_kubeconfig
verdict: match
events: