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docs: restricted log access
Claudebcce2d466c03
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.mdindex 772b410c..8c8d8561 100644--- a/CLAUDE.md+++ b/CLAUDE.md@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Beacon Endpoint Agent is a local-only endpoint telemetry agent for AI runtimes.- `collector-builder`: OpenTelemetry Collector distribution and Beacon JSONL exporter.- `packages/asymptote-sdk-js`: TypeScript SDK for cloud agent telemetry that exports Beacon-compatible OpenTelemetry spans.- `browser-extension`: optional MV3 collector (Chrome, plus a beta Firefox build target) that relays Claude.ai and ChatGPT chat telemetry into the local pipeline as OTLP.-- `pkg/asymptoteobserve`: shared Go library — event schema, harness-name normalization, provenance markers, token usage, and the threat-rules engine. Imported by the CLI, the hook adapter, and the collector exporter, so a change here reaches all three.+- `pkg/asymptoteobserve`: shared Go library — event schema, harness-name normalization, provenance markers, token usage, runtime log modes and the local ingest channel (`localingest`), and the threat-rules engine. Imported by the CLI, the hook adapter, and the collector exporter, so a change here reaches all three.- `plugins`: TypeScript sources for the managed runtime plugins/extensions (`opencode-beacon`, `cline-beacon`, `pi-beacon`, `omp-beacon`, `openclaw-beacon`, `prime-beacon`, `omo-beacon`), each mirrored into an embedded copy under `cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/hooks/assets/`.- `agent-skills`: publishable Agent Skills plugin for the traces-to-memory workflow (`beacon-memory-recall`, `beacon-memory-distill`, `beacon-memory-promote`), for authoring dashboard lenses (`beacon-lens-create`), for sharing the current session to beacon.sh (`beacon-trace-share`, which runs `beacon share --current --harness <runtime> --json`, keeps the default direct visibility and asks before public), and for continuing local sessions in another runtime (`beacon-session-handoff`, which uses detached CLI launch) with manifests for Claude Code, Agent Plugins (Codex, Copilot, VS Code, Kiro, Devin), Cursor, Kimi Code, and Gemini CLI. At the repo root, `.claude-plugin/marketplace.json` is read by most harnesses, `.cursor-plugin/marketplace.json` by Cursor, and `package.json` (`pi.skills` only) makes the repo a Pi/Prime Agent package; keep that root `package.json` free of dependencies and scripts. `cli/beacon/cmd/agent_skills_test.go` checks every `beacon` command and flag the skills name against the real command tree, so rename a command and update the skills together. The binary carries a copy of `agent-skills/skills` in `cli/beacon/internal/agentskills/skills` for onboarding and `beacon skills install`; a test keeps it identical, so copy it across whenever a skill changes.- `rules` and `spec/threat-rules`: the open rule corpus and the Threat Rules format it conforms to. Every rule's `taxonomy.beacon_category` is its directory name, and the six embedded baseline rules in `pkg/asymptoteobserve/rulestore/baseline` are byte-identical copies of their corpus rules; conformance tests enforce both.@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Do not recreate or depend on removed `asymptote` mirror trees. Keep new work foc- Beacon is visibility-first endpoint telemetry for local AI agent runtimes, not a hosted policy service or general endpoint protection product.- Preserve the local-only default. The public Beacon build must not require a hosted account, remote policy fetch, hosted dashboard, or external network dependency during normal hook execution, and hooks themselves never touch the network.- `beacon login` is the account-identity channel for interactive users and is required by the interactive `beacon endpoint install` wizard. It uses browser PKCE against beacon.sh and stores the scoped CLI token only in `~/.beacon/auth/session.json` (0600 under a 0700 directory). Signing in alone never starts forwarding. User-mode `beacon endpoint connect` may send that token once to `POST /api/cli/enroll/account` to authorize minting a separate device ingest key, and `beacon mcp token create` may send it to `POST /api/cli/mcp/tokens` (scope `mcp:token:create`, listed on the sign-in page) to mint a personal MCP token that is printed once to stdout and never written to a file, and `beacon share` may send it (scope `traces:write`, also on the sign-in page) to `PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST /v1/traces/{external_id}/events/batch` and `GET /v1/traces/{external_id}` on the Beacon API host (`https://api.beacon.sh` for a beacon.sh sign-in, other hosts unchanged, `BEACON_API_URL` overrides) to upload a shared trace the person chose to publish, as a `beacon.trace.v1` summary and its events (`cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go`; a `bcn_api_` API key from `--key` or `BEACON_API_KEY` may stand in for it, precedence `--key`, then a current sign-in carrying the scope, then the environment). These are explicit, user-initiated requests with redirects refused. Hooks, plugins and background jobs never make them, with one exception: the git pre-push hook, only when the person opted in with `beacon git setup --share-sessions` (public needs confirmation), may make the three share requests during a push the person started, within the hook's budget and never failing the push. Never copy the account token into endpoint config, Vector, hook environments, logs, or command output. System/root/package/MDM/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run installs stay noninteractive and account-free.+- System log access (`beacon endpoint install|repair --system --log-access shared|restricted`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#restricted-log-access`). Shared, the default, is the system log as it always was: hooks append to `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` directly, so it is `0666`. Restricted is opt-in and makes the root collector the only writer: its `beacon_ingest` extension (`collector-builder/exporter/beaconjsonexporter/beaconingestextension`, appending through the exporter's own `internal/runtimelog`) serves `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, and the hook adapter and the CLI writer, as any account but root writing the system log, hand finished lines to it through `pkg/asymptoteobserve/localingest` (`Deliverer`). The protocol is one batch per connection (`BEACON-INGEST/1`, a header naming the log, one event per line, one JSON reply saying how far it got); the server refuses a batch for any log but its own, identifies the sender only by kernel peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`, `LOCAL_PEERCRED`), overwrites the event's `user` with that uid and its resolved name and always derives `event.id` itself (`StampLine` re-encodes, so a sender cannot split or forge lines or reuse another event's id), and bounds connections overall and per uid, batch size, each account's bytes per second, and its own time per connection (shorter than the client's, so it reports how far it got instead of being resent). The client sends only to a socket that root owns in a directory nobody else can write (group-writable ancestors only for gid 0/1, which macOS's `/private/var/run` needs). `Deliverer.Write` sends through the socket when it answers and otherwise appends directly as before; only a direct append refused for permission (a restricted log whose collector is down) spools the line, to the account's private spool for that log (`~/.beacon/endpoint/spool/<log digest>`, 0600 under 0700), and the next line that gets through either way drains it. Root writers and per-user logs always write directly. The mode is `config.json` `log_access`, carried through repair and package upgrades (`BEACON_LOG_ACCESS` in the install scripts); install creates the `beacon-log` group (`internal/endpoint/loggroup`, getent/groupadd, dscl/dseditgroup) and `writer.RestrictSystemLog` makes the directory `root:beacon-log 02750`, the log and archives `0640` and the lock root-only `0600`, after writing the root-owned `.beacon-log-access` marker beside the log; a shared log is not narrowed in place but copied to fresh root-created files and renamed over, under its lock (bounded wait), because a descriptor opened while it was 0666 survives any chmod. A failed install restores the previous mode in its rollback, and a shared install removes a dead socket. The marker is what tells every root writer (`asymptoteobserve.RuntimeLogModes`) to keep the restricted modes. The OTLP receivers on loopback are not covered: any local process can still send OTLP, unattributed, so never claim more than the hook channel guarantees. Doctor's `runtime_log_access` covers the marker, the socket and pending spool. Unix sockets are local IPC, not a network channel, so the hooks-never-touch-the-network rule holds. Windows is shared only. Hook and writer tests point `logging.EndpointIngest`/`writer.Ingest` at sockets of their own.- Beacon Cloud forwarding (`cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/asymptote`, `beacon endpoint connect`, `beacon endpoint asymptote`) is Vector-shaped: Beacon writes local JSONL, Vector ships runtime lines only from the connection point forward and reads inventory from the beginning to establish the endpoint's current baseline, plus the one bounded exception of the session backfill (below), and the `bcn_device_*` key stays only in `<BaseDir>/asymptote/vector-secrets.json` via Vector's secret backend. The onboarding wizard preselects Beacon Cloud, and confirming it connects this endpoint in the same command once the local install has succeeded; an endpoint that is already enrolled is never re-enrolled, because enrollment rotates the device key. Standard mode ships locally sanitized retained content; metadata-only uses local Vector transforms to remove prompts, responses, reasoning, tool arguments/results, tool descriptions/definitions, retrieval queries/documents, evaluation explanations, agent descriptions, stop sequences, approval/policy reasons, command output, raw fields, diffs, inventory content, and MCP definitions before buffering/upload. Every text-shaped event field must be classified in `metadata_fields_test.go` (`metadataOnlyRemoved`, each with its own `del()` in `pack/metadata-transforms.toml`, or `metadataOnlyKept`); a new field fails that test until it is, and `BEACON_TEST_VECTOR_BIN` runs the transform on an event with every field set. `vector.toml` is not rendered only at connect: `asymptote.ReconcileForwarder` re-renders it in place for a connected endpoint from the current pack with the enrollment's ingest URL and recorded privacy mode, validates it with the forwarder's own Vector exactly as connect does, atomically replaces it, and restarts the forwarder only when the content changed and the forwarder is running (a stopped one reads the new config when it next starts). It never enrolls, reads or rewrites the secrets file, makes a network request, or touches `vector-data/` (checkpoints stay, so pack changes must keep source ids and fingerprinting stable), and a rejected config is a warning that keeps the old one; it is a no-op when not connected, after an incomplete connect, without an installed unit, or where `ForwarderManager` is unsupported (supervised mode). `lifecycle.Install` runs it last when services are started (so install, repair and the Linux package upgrade), repair's teardown keeps the forwarder (`UninstallOptions.KeepManagedIngest`) instead of disconnecting it, and the macOS postinstall, which installs with `--no-start`, runs the hidden `beacon endpoint asymptote reconcile --system`. Keep the ingest URL `https://`, the wire contract aligned with `beacon-ingest` (`/v1/ingest/{runtime,inventory}` and `/v1/ingest/health`), and do not add another endpoint network channel. The cloud-sandbox shuttle is the bounded exception: only with `BEACON_ORIGIN=cloud`, it can upload new runtime lines to GCS, S3, or the same Beacon ingest contract because no Vector/service manager/browser/persistent disk exists there.- Session backfill (`cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_backfill.go`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#session-backfill` and `docs/cli/endpoint-connect.mdx#session-backfill`): after every successful install (user or system mode), every session-store collector runs once with `CollectOptions.Since` (30 days; `sessionwindow.Recent` keeps those sessions, newest first, and never touches the cursors of the rest) and a shared `writer.Budget` (24 MiB, at most 12 MiB per runtime through `Budget.Sub`; a refused append returns `writer.ErrBudgetSpent`, the collector stops with cursors past only what was written, and a manual sync reads the rest). A new session-store collector takes both fields, reads its store only through `internal/sessionfs` (a test parses every collector package to enforce it), and joins `endpointBackfillRunners` and that test's list. Every connect, first or re-connect, user or system, runs the same sweep before enrollment (skipped when install just ran it) and, before the forwarder starts, `asymptote.StageBackfill` copies the window's `harness.collection_method=poll` lines into `cloud-backfill.jsonl` beside the runtime log, which the `beacon_backfill` Vector source (fingerprinted `device_and_inode`, so each atomically restaged copy is a new file) reads from the beginning into the runtime sink through the same privacy transform. Live hook/OTLP/plugin history before the connection point stays local. Re-connects restage, so a resend of already-shipped lines is expected and rests on the deterministic `event.id`; a privacy-mode change clears the checkpoints and the restage renames the new-mode copy over the old one (kept until then so the copy is always a new inode; deleted instead when nothing restages), and `disconnect` removes it. System mode runs the collectors under `withUserHome` for the active console user (`activeConsoleUser`), with cursors under the system base directory, and reports a skip when nobody is logged in; root is reading a home the console user controls, so the sweep runs under `sessionfs.Confine` (an `os.Root` on that home, files owned by the home's owner only, non-blocking opens that refuse FIFOs/devices, SQLite read from a private snapshot under `<SystemBaseDir>/state/backfill-snapshots`, retried until the database size/change counter and WAL header are unchanged across the copy, and refused past `sessionfs.MaxSnapshotBytes` (512 MiB with its WAL) with the runtime's sync command named in the report), and refused paths read as absent and are listed in the report. User-mode sync and backfill stay unconfined. The wizard's confirm screen names the upload (`WizardOptions.BackfillDays`). Dry-run, `--no-backfill` and `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` skip all of it; the cmd tests run with `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` set in `TestMain`.- `beacon endpoint install` has a full-screen onboarding wizard on interactive user TTYs. It signs in, preselects Beacon Cloud, requires an explicit choice to opt out to Local, and asks Managed users to choose Standard or Metadata-only privacy. Signing in alone still moves no telemetry. Confirming Beacon Cloud does: the confirm screen states that it installs Beacon and starts forwarding, and names what the selected privacy mode sends, so that screen is the consent point. The managed destination is recorded only after enrollment succeeds, so a failed enrollment leaves a working local install, prints `beacon endpoint connect` as the retry, and re-offers the question on the next install. The onboarding record is written only after `lifecycle.Install` returns, because a profile written first left a failed install looking onboarded and silently skipped the wizard on the retry. Explicit `install --connect` is unchanged. The wizard is skipped for system/root/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run or `BEACON_ONBOARDING=0`; those unattended paths must never gain an account or browser dependency. Legacy `BEACON_ONBOARDING_EMAIL`/`USAGE` submissions remain only for fleet compatibility. After the destination, the wizard shows an agent tools screen; every row is preselected (opt-out, space toggles). Beacon Cloud MCP is offered only with Beacon Cloud and runs the `beacon mcp connect` flow (`connectCloudMCP` with `yes`, OAuth, detected harnesses) only after the endpoint is connected (or already was), via `finishCloudSetup`; a failed enrollment skips it and names the retry. The Beacon Agent Skills are offered for either destination and installed user-wide into `~/.agents/skills` and, when Claude Code is set up, `~/.claude/skills` (`cli/beacon/internal/agentskills`, `beacon skills install|uninstall`; a `.beacon-managed` marker decides what Beacon may replace or remove; install and repair refresh only copies Beacon already wrote). Both run after `lifecycle.Install` returns and warn rather than fail. The answers are recorded as `onboarding.cloud_mcp`/`agent_skills`. Implementation lives in `cli/beacon/internal/onboarding`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_onboarding.go`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_install.go` and `cli/beacon/cmd/agent_tools.go`; keep `docs/cli/endpoint-onboarding.mdx` and `docs/cli/skills.mdx` in sync.diff --git a/docs/changelog/cli.mdx b/docs/changelog/cli.mdxindex d3e3f2c9..5f5da637 100644--- a/docs/changelog/cli.mdx+++ b/docs/changelog/cli.mdx@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Stay up to date with the latest changes to the Agent Beacon CLI.## Unreleased+- **Restricted log access for system installs** · `beacon endpoint install --system --log-access restricted` makes the collector the only writer of `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl`. Hooks send their events to it over a local Unix socket, each event is recorded under the account the operating system says sent it, and the log becomes `0640 root:beacon-log`, so local accounts can no longer rewrite the log or read other users' sessions. Events are spooled privately and delivered later while the collector restarts. Opt in per endpoint, or with `BEACON_LOG_ACCESS=restricted` for package installs; repair and upgrades keep the mode, and `beacon endpoint doctor` reports a collector that is not serving the socket. Log shippers that do not run as root need to join the `beacon-log` group. The default stays shared, and Windows is not supported yet. See [Restricted log access](/cli/endpoint-install#restricted-log-access).- **Threat rules can match parsed shell commands** · Rules on spec `threat-rules/v1.2` can read `e.command.parsed_commands`: each command's name, arguments, environment prefixes, pipeline stage and the files it writes or deletes. `curl-pipe-to-shell`, `recursive-root-delete` and `base64-decode-piped-to-shell` use it, so they now catch `curl … | sudo -u root bash`, `| /usr/bin/env bash`, `{ curl …; } | sh`, `rm -rf "$HOME"` and `bash -lc '…'` scripts, and no longer fire on the same text inside a quoted string, a commit message or a here-document, or on `rm -rf ~/project/build`. An older Beacon skips v1.2 rules with a warning.- **Shared sessions stay current after more kinds of `beacon share` call** · The dashboard now recognises `beacon share` run under `sudo`, `nohup`, environment assignments or backticks, or cut off when a long command was captured, so a session that shared itself is no longer marked stale.- **Hook events keep a command's closing quote** · A command ending in a quoted word, such as `git commit -m "fix: thing"`, was recorded without its final `"`.diff --git a/docs/cli/endpoint-doctor.mdx b/docs/cli/endpoint-doctor.mdxindex 9f7d2264..8bc2b260 100644--- a/docs/cli/endpoint-doctor.mdx+++ b/docs/cli/endpoint-doctor.mdx@@ -30,9 +30,26 @@ Doctor verifies:- Whether DeepSeek Harness hooks are actually recording live events (`dsh_hook_capture`)- Whether Beacon's git hooks ran out of time recently (`git_hook_budget`)- Whether a real user's agent runtime points at the collector (system mode only)+- The system log's access mode, and in the restricted mode whether the collector is serving the ingest socket (`runtime_log_access`)The runtime log itself can be missing before the first event is written. In that case, doctor reports a warning instead of a hard failure.+### `runtime_log_access`++System mode only. Reports whether the system log is shared or [restricted](/cli/endpoint-install#restricted-log-access), and in the restricted mode whether everything it depends on is in place.++| Evidence | Status | Meaning |+|---|---|---|+| `log_access_shared` | ok | Hooks append to the log directly; any local account can modify or read it |+| `log_access_restricted` | ok | Only the collector writes the log; root and the `beacon-log` group read it |+| `ingest_socket_missing` | fail | The collector is not serving `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, so hooks are spooling their events instead of recording them. Start or repair the collector |+| `ingest_socket_untrusted` | fail | Something is at the socket path that root does not own, so hooks will not send to it |+| `log_access_marker_missing` | fail | `config.json` says restricted but the log is not marked, so the collector would widen it again. Run `sudo beacon endpoint repair --system` |+| `log_access_mismatch` | warn | The log is marked restricted but `config.json` says shared, so hooks cannot append |+| `ingest_spool_pending` | warn | Events from the account running doctor are waiting in its spool; they go to the collector with its next event |++In the restricted mode, `runtime_log_permissions` checks that the log and its directory are closed to other accounts instead of checking that hooks can append. Run without `sudo`, doctor cannot open a restricted log, and says so rather than reporting a failure.+### `console_user_configured`System-mode only, and worth understanding because it is the one failure that a completely healthy endpoint can still report.diff --git a/docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx b/docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdxindex 044277e9..2ff90ea1 100644--- a/docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx+++ b/docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ The `claude` harness writes both Claude Code's OpenTelemetry settings and its us| `--falcon-sourcetype <type>` | Optional Falcon LogScale parser or sourcetype || `--falcon-insecure-skip-verify` | Skip Falcon LogScale HEC TLS certificate verification || `--falcon-ca-file <path>` | Optional CA certificate path for Falcon LogScale HEC TLS verification |+| `--log-access <mode>` | System log access: `shared` (the default) or `restricted`. See [Restricted log access](#restricted-log-access). Omitted, an install keeps the mode the endpoint already has. System installs on macOS and Linux only || `--no-backfill` | Skip the [session backfill](#session-backfill). `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` does the same || `--connect` | After a successful install, attempt to connect this endpoint to Beacon Cloud ingest. User mode uses the signed-in CLI account; system mode opens browser approval. A connection failure does not roll back or fail the completed local install; verify with `beacon endpoint status --json` and retry with [`beacon endpoint connect`](/cli/endpoint-connect) |@@ -243,6 +244,42 @@ beacon endpoint hooks install --harness grok --level projectSystem-mode install (`--system`) is supported on macOS and on Linux distributions that use systemd. Omit `--system` for the default non-root local install. GitHub Copilot CLI and Factory Droid OTLP use launch-environment settings rather tha Beacon-managed shell-profile edits.</Note>+## Restricted log access++A system-mode endpoint keeps one runtime log, `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl`, for every user on the machine. By default the log is shared: hooks run as each logged-in user and append to it directly, so the file is `0666`. That also means any local account can truncate or rewrite the log, and read every other user's prompts, command output and diffs.++`--log-access restricted` makes the collector the only writer:++```bash title="Install with restricted log access"+sudo beacon endpoint install --system --log-access restricted+```++- Hooks send their events to the collector over a local Unix socket, `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, instead of writing the file. Nothing leaves the machine.+- The collector records each event under the account the operating system says sent it, not the account the event claims.+- The log directory becomes `root:beacon-log` mode `2750`, the log and its archives `0640`, and its lock `0600`. Only the collector writes the log; only root and members of the `beacon-log` group read it. Switching an existing log to restricted replaces its files with fresh copies, so a handle another account opened while the log was shared stops reaching it.+- If the collector is stopped or restarting, hooks keep their events in a private spool in each user's home (`~/.beacon/endpoint/spool`, `0600`) and send them with the next event once the collector is back. The agent is never held up.++Install creates the `beacon-log` group when it is missing and adds nobody to it. Add each account that should read the log, such as a log shipper's service account, then restart that shipper:++```bash title="Let a log shipper read a restricted log"+# Linux+sudo usermod -aG beacon-log <account>+# macOS+sudo dseditgroup -o edit -a <account> -t user beacon-log+```++The log format and every event field stay the same, so a SIEM or forwarder that parses the log needs no change. Shippers that run as root, and the Beacon Cloud forwarder, keep working without one.++The mode is recorded in `config.json` as `log_access`, and `beacon endpoint repair` and package upgrades keep it. To go back, run `sudo beacon endpoint repair --system --log-access shared`; the log is writable by every account again at once. For package installs, set `BEACON_LOG_ACCESS=restricted` in the environment of the package's install script.++What this does and does not change:++- Local accounts can no longer alter or delete events already in the log, or read other users' sessions.+- Every event that arrives over the socket records the account that sent it, as the operating system reports it. A user still controls their own agent, so they can still send events of their own choosing, including ones that name another session's id, but always under their own account.+- The collector's OTLP ports on `127.0.0.1` still accept telemetry from any local process, as they do in the shared mode. Agents that export over OTLP, such as Claude Code and Codex, use them. Events that arrive that way are not attributed by the operating system.++While the endpoint is restricted, commands that read the system log as the person running them (`beacon endpoint dashboard`, `beacon scan`, `beacon traces`, and the session lookups in `beacon share`, `beacon handoff` and `beacon git` commit linking) see it only when run as root or by a `beacon-log` member. [`beacon endpoint doctor`](/cli/endpoint-doctor#runtime_log_access) reports a collector that is not serving the socket, and any events waiting in the caller's spool. Restricted log access is not available on Windows yet.+## Running user and system mode togetherA user-mode collector can run beside a system-mode one on the same machine when the two use different ports. Give the user install its own OTLP ports; its health-check port moves with them:diff --git a/docs/cli/endpoint-repair.mdx b/docs/cli/endpoint-repair.mdxindex 83e03b75..ad35a2cf 100644--- a/docs/cli/endpoint-repair.mdx+++ b/docs/cli/endpoint-repair.mdx@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ On an endpoint connected to Beacon Cloud, repair leaves the forwarder service, t| `--health-port <port>` | Local collector health-check port. Defaults to `13133`, moved by the same amount as `--otlp-http-port` when that is changed (HTTP port `4328` gives `13143`), so a second collector on alternate OTLP ports does not collide with the first || `--collector <path>` | Path to a `beacon-otelcol` binary || `--no-start` | Write files without starting the collector service |+| `--log-access <mode>` | Change the system log's access mode to `shared` or `restricted`. Omitted, repair keeps the current mode. See [Restricted log access](/cli/endpoint-install#restricted-log-access) || `--service <kind>` | Service manager to use: `auto` (default), `launchd`, `systemd`, or `none` for a supervised collector process || `--dry-run` | Print planned actions without changing endpoint files or services || `--include-runtime-metrics` | Include generic process, runtime, and harness operational OTLP metrics in Beacon JSONL. By default, low-signal metrics such as process CPU, memory, Node.js event loop, V8 heap, GitHub Copilot CLI, and OpenClaw operational metrics are filtered out |diff --git a/docs/platforms/linux-deployment-profile.mdx b/docs/platforms/linux-deployment-profile.mdxindex 906114a6..59fb12f4 100644--- a/docs/platforms/linux-deployment-profile.mdx+++ b/docs/platforms/linux-deployment-profile.mdx@@ -109,7 +109,10 @@ ss -ltnp | grep beacon-otelcol## Privileges and data- In system mode the collector runs as root. Hooks run as the logged-in user and append to the same- log, which is why `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` is mode `0666`.+ log, which is why `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` is mode `0666`. With+ [`--log-access restricted`](/cli/endpoint-install#restricted-log-access) the collector is the only+ writer instead: hooks send events to it over `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, the log is+ `0640 root:beacon-log`, and log shippers that do not run as root join the `beacon-log` group.- In user mode everything runs as you under `~/.beacon`, with no privileges required.- The log contains prompt text, command lines, file paths, and tool inputs, after redaction and a64 KiB per-event limit. Treat it as sensitive data.diff --git a/docs/platforms/linux.mdx b/docs/platforms/linux.mdxindex 264e7caf..24a5b95a 100644--- a/docs/platforms/linux.mdx+++ b/docs/platforms/linux.mdx@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ That last row is worth knowing about. A system-mode endpoint runs as root, so thsudo beacon endpoint user-config repair-installed --system```-Other users on the same machine run the same command for themselves. They all export to the same collector and the same log. That is why `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` is group- and world-writable: hooks run as the logged-in user and append to it directly.+Other users on the same machine run the same command for themselves. They all export to the same collector and the same log. That is why `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` is group- and world-writable: hooks run as the logged-in user and append to it directly. To stop other accounts from modifying or reading it, install with [`--log-access restricted`](/cli/endpoint-install#restricted-log-access): the collector becomes the only writer and hooks send their events to it over a local socket.## Managing the service