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fix(rules): treat rm -fr as high-risk in high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason (#1036)
Rudy Mizrahi Celeklic2f579d3ba65
diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yamlindex 8386bdfb..25952f00 100644--- a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@id: approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary-version: 1+version: 2title: Denied dangerous command re-invoked via a renamed copy of the binarydescription: >An approval for a destructive or high-impact shell command was explicitly denied@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ correlation:- id: deniedmatch: >e.event.action == "approval.denied" &&- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")- id: renamed_dangerousmatch: >e.event.action == "command.executed" &&diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yamlindex 05bb8cb9..97853f5e 100644--- a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@id: approval-denied-command-executed-anyway-version: 1+version: 2title: Denied dangerous command executed anyway within the sessiondescription: >An approval for a destructive or high-impact shell command was explicitly denied@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ correlation:- id: deniedmatch: >e.event.action == "approval.denied" &&- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")- id: executedmatch: >e.event.action == "command.executed" &&- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")emit:reason: "Dangerous command executed in a session after an explicit approval denial"@@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ tests:event: { action: command.executed }command: { command: "rm -rf /var/data" }session: { id: s1 }+ - name: denied_rm_rfv_then_executed+ verdict: match+ events:+ - timestamp: "2026-06-13T10:00:00Z"+ event: { action: approval.denied }+ command: { command: "rm -rfv /var/data" }+ approval: { decision: "denied", required: true }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - timestamp: "2026-06-13T10:00:45Z"+ event: { action: command.executed }+ command: { command: "rm -frv /var/data" }+ session: { id: s1 }- name: denied_then_curl_pipe_shellverdict: matchevents:diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yamlindex 2a5d023c..645a5b37 100644--- a/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@id: high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason-version: 1+version: 2title: High-risk action approved with an empty approval reasondescription: >An approval was granted (event.action approval.allowed) for a high-risk operation —@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ match: >e.approval.required &&e.approval.reason == "" &&(- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|\\bsudo\\b|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)") ||+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|\\bsudo\\b|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)") ||e.file.path.matches("(?i)(\\.env$|\\.env\\.|/credentials$|id_rsa$|\\.aws/|\\.github/workflows/|\\.gitlab-ci\\.yml$|/auth\\.|/security\\.)"))@@ -38,6 +38,20 @@ tests:command: { command: "sudo rm -rf /etc" }approval: { decision: "allow", required: true, reason: "" }session: { id: s1 }+ - name: rm_fr_flag_order_allowed_empty_reason+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: approval.allowed }+ command: { command: "rm -fr /var/lib/app" }+ approval: { decision: "allow", required: true, reason: "" }+ session: { id: s1 }+ - name: rm_rfv_verbose_cluster_allowed_empty_reason+ verdict: match+ events:+ - event: { action: approval.allowed }+ command: { command: "rm -rfv build/" }+ approval: { decision: "allow", required: true, reason: "" }+ session: { id: s1 }- name: workflow_edit_allowed_empty_reasonverdict: matchevents: