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fix(rules): treat rm -fr as high-risk in high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason (#1036)

Rudy Mizrahi Celeklic2f579d3ba65
diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml
index 8386bdfb..25952f00 100644
--- a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary.rule.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
id: approval-bypass-via-renamed-binary
-version: 1
+version: 2
title: Denied dangerous command re-invoked via a renamed copy of the binary
description: >
An approval for a destructive or high-impact shell command was explicitly denied
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ correlation:
- id: denied
match: >
e.event.action == "approval.denied" &&
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")
- id: renamed_dangerous
match: >
e.event.action == "command.executed" &&
diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml
index 05bb8cb9..97853f5e 100644
--- a/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/approval-denied-command-executed-anyway.rule.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
id: approval-denied-command-executed-anyway
-version: 1
+version: 2
title: Denied dangerous command executed anyway within the session
description: >
An approval for a destructive or high-impact shell command was explicitly denied
@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ correlation:
- id: denied
match: >
e.event.action == "approval.denied" &&
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")
- id: executed
match: >
e.event.action == "command.executed" &&
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|:\\(\\)\\s*\\{\\s*:\\|:|>\\s*/dev/sd|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bsudo\\s+-s\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)")
emit:
reason: "Dangerous command executed in a session after an explicit approval denial"
@@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ tests:
event: { action: command.executed }
command: { command: "rm -rf /var/data" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: denied_rm_rfv_then_executed
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-13T10:00:00Z"
+ event: { action: approval.denied }
+ command: { command: "rm -rfv /var/data" }
+ approval: { decision: "denied", required: true }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - timestamp: "2026-06-13T10:00:45Z"
+ event: { action: command.executed }
+ command: { command: "rm -frv /var/data" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: denied_then_curl_pipe_shell
verdict: match
events:
diff --git a/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml b/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml
index 2a5d023c..645a5b37 100644
--- a/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml
+++ b/rules/approval-abuse/high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason.rule.yaml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
id: high-risk-approval-allowed-without-reason
-version: 1
+version: 2
title: High-risk action approved with an empty approval reason
description: >
An approval was granted (event.action approval.allowed) for a high-risk operation —
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ match: >
e.approval.required &&
e.approval.reason == "" &&
(
- e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|\\bsudo\\b|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)") ||
+ e.command.command.matches("(?i)(\\brm\\s+-[a-z]*(r[a-z]*f|f[a-z]*r)[a-z]*\\b|\\bmkfs\\b|\\bdd\\s+if=|\\bsudo\\b|\\b(curl|wget)\\b.*\\|\\s*(ba)?sh\\b|\\bchmod\\s+-R\\s+777\\b)") ||
e.file.path.matches("(?i)(\\.env$|\\.env\\.|/credentials$|id_rsa$|\\.aws/|\\.github/workflows/|\\.gitlab-ci\\.yml$|/auth\\.|/security\\.)")
)
@@ -38,6 +38,20 @@ tests:
command: { command: "sudo rm -rf /etc" }
approval: { decision: "allow", required: true, reason: "" }
session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: rm_fr_flag_order_allowed_empty_reason
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: approval.allowed }
+ command: { command: "rm -fr /var/lib/app" }
+ approval: { decision: "allow", required: true, reason: "" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
+ - name: rm_rfv_verbose_cluster_allowed_empty_reason
+ verdict: match
+ events:
+ - event: { action: approval.allowed }
+ command: { command: "rm -rfv build/" }
+ approval: { decision: "allow", required: true, reason: "" }
+ session: { id: s1 }
- name: workflow_edit_allowed_empty_reason
verdict: match
events: