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apt repository: trust only packages built from this release's history
Clauded99f79407c3b
diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.ymlindex f0853e68..101fa01d 100644--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml@@ -505,8 +505,12 @@ jobs:echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"echo "publish=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"+ # Full history and tags: every package is trusted only when its tag's commit is an ancestor+ # of this run's commit (see "Fetch the released .deb files").- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1if: steps.gate.outputs.publish == 'true'+ with:+ fetch-depth: 0- name: Install apt repository toolsif: steps.gate.outputs.publish == 'true'@@ -626,9 +630,26 @@ jobs:# about itself. This tag's packages (MODE required) must pass; a backfilled release whose# package has no such attestation (one from before attestations, or a replaced asset) is# left out with a warning. A package that is attested but misnamed fails the job.+ #+ # The workflow path and ref alone are not enough: anyone who can push a v* tag can run+ # their own release.yml at that tag (finalize is outside the release environment) and so+ # mint a matching attestation. So TAG's commit must be an ancestor of this run's commit,+ # the history this release was built from, and the attestation must name that commit as+ # both its source and its signer workflow's commit. A tag on a side commit, or one moved+ # since its package was attested, is not trusted. This run's own commit is the trust+ # root, as it already is for everything else this job signs.fetch() {tag="$1" mode="$2" version="${1#v}" dir="dist/apt-debs/$1"shift 2+ if ! commit="$(git rev-parse --verify --quiet "refs/tags/$tag^{commit}")" \+ || ! git merge-base --is-ancestor "$commit" "$GITHUB_SHA"; then+ if [ "$mode" = required ]; then+ echo "$tag does not resolve to a commit in the history of $GITHUB_SHA" >&2+ exit 1+ fi+ echo "::warning title=apt repository::$tag is not in the history of this release ($GITHUB_SHA); its packages are not published"+ return 0+ fimkdir -p "$dir"for arch in "$@"; doname="beacon_${version}_linux_${arch}.deb"@@ -636,13 +657,14 @@ jobs:gh release download "$tag" --repo "$REPO" --dir "$dir" --pattern "$name"if ! gh attestation verify "$deb" --repo "$REPO" \--signer-workflow "$REPO/.github/workflows/release.yml" --source-ref "refs/tags/$tag" \+ --source-digest "$commit" --signer-digest "$commit" \--deny-self-hosted-runners > "$RUNNER_TEMP/attestation.log" 2>&1; thencat "$RUNNER_TEMP/attestation.log" >&2if [ "$mode" = required ]; then- echo "$name has no build-provenance attestation from $REPO's release workflow at $tag" >&2+ echo "$name has no build-provenance attestation from $REPO's release workflow at $tag ($commit)" >&2exit 1fi- echo "::warning title=apt repository::$name has no build-provenance attestation from the release workflow at $tag; it is not published"+ echo "::warning title=apt repository::$name has no build-provenance attestation from the release workflow at $tag ($commit); it is not published"rm -f "$deb"continuefidiff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.mdindex a1766c98..c963bcb3 100644--- a/CLAUDE.md+++ b/CLAUDE.md@@ -303,9 +303,13 @@ A pushed `v*` tag runs the full release end-to-end viaan edited index is never re-signed), refuses to replace a published version, and fails unlessevery key in the secret is a committed one and signed. Every `.deb` (this tag's and eachbackfilled one) must pass `gh attestation verify` against finalize's attestation from- `release.yml` at `refs/tags/<tag>`, never the release's replaceable `checksums.txt`, and its- control fields must name `beacon`, the tag's version and the architecture; this tag's must- pass, and a backfilled one without an attestation is left out with a warning. Rotating the+ `release.yml` at `refs/tags/<tag>`, never the release's replaceable `checksums.txt`, pinned+ (`--source-digest`/`--signer-digest`) to the tag's commit, which must be an ancestor of this+ run's commit: anyone who can push a `v*` tag can run their own `release.yml` and mint an+ attestation for that path and ref, so only packages built from this release's history are+ trusted (the checkout uses `fetch-depth: 0` for the check). Its control fields must name+ `beacon`, the tag's version and the architecture; this tag's must pass, and a backfilled one+ that fails (no attestation, or a tag outside the history) is left out with a warning. Rotating thekey is a reviewed commit in two steps: commit the new public key beside the old and put bothsecret keys in `APT_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY`, so every release is signed by both and hosts that trustonly the old key keep updating while they fetch the new keyring; then remove the old key from