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Linux installs: detect a person by the controlling terminal, not stdin

Claudedd9e37bbda23
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index b66659b5..0775dfb4 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Do not recreate or depend on removed `asymptote` mirror trees. Keep new work foc
- Beacon is visibility-first endpoint telemetry for local AI agent runtimes, not a hosted policy service or general endpoint protection product.
- Preserve the local-only default. The public Beacon build must not require a hosted account, remote policy fetch, hosted dashboard, or external network dependency during normal hook execution, and hooks themselves never touch the network.
- `beacon login` is the account-identity channel for interactive users and is required by the interactive `beacon endpoint install` wizard. It uses browser PKCE against beacon.sh and stores the scoped CLI token only in `~/.beacon/auth/session.json` (0600 under a 0700 directory). Signing in alone never starts forwarding. User-mode `beacon endpoint connect` may send that token once to `POST /api/cli/enroll/account` to authorize minting a separate device ingest key, and `beacon mcp token create` may send it to `POST /api/cli/mcp/tokens` (scope `mcp:token:create`, listed on the sign-in page) to mint a personal MCP token that is printed once to stdout and never written to a file, and `beacon share` may send it (scope `traces:write`, also on the sign-in page) to `PUT /v1/traces/{external_id}`, `POST /v1/traces/{external_id}/events/batch` and `GET /v1/traces/{external_id}` on the Beacon API host (`https://api.beacon.sh` for a beacon.sh sign-in, other hosts unchanged, `BEACON_API_URL` overrides) to upload a shared trace the person chose to publish, as a `beacon.trace.v1` summary and its events (`cli/beacon/internal/account/share.go`; a `bcn_api_` API key from `--key` or `BEACON_API_KEY` may stand in for it, precedence `--key`, then a current sign-in carrying the scope, then the environment). These are explicit, user-initiated requests with redirects refused. Hooks, plugins and background jobs never make them, with one exception: the git pre-push hook, only when the person opted in with `beacon git setup --share-sessions` (public needs confirmation), may make the three share requests during a push the person started, within the hook's budget and never failing the push. Never copy the account token into endpoint config, Vector, hook environments, logs, or command output. System/root/package/MDM/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run installs stay noninteractive and account-free.
-- System log access (`beacon endpoint install|repair --system --log-access shared|restricted`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#restricted-log-access`). Shared, the CLI default, is the system log as it always was: hooks append to `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` directly, so it is `0666`. Restricted is opt-in for the CLI and the default for a first package install on every platform (see below; on Linux `packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh` passes `--log-access restricted` only when neither the system `config.json` nor the runtime log exists, `/proc/1/comm` is systemd and `BEACON_SERVICE` is unset, `auto` or `systemd`; otherwise it passes nothing and the endpoint keeps its mode; `packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`, sourced by that script and by the postinstall (which takes only `BEACON_ENDPOINT_HARNESSES`, through `beacon_settings_harnesses` in a subshell, because its user-config step re-runs the CLI as each logged-in user with its environment and must not hand them a Splunk HEC token from the file), reads the `BEACON_*` install settings, never sourcing the file, from a root-owned, not group/other-writable `/etc/default/beacon` or `/etc/sysconfig/beacon` in shell syntax with trailing comments, skipping a malformed value with a warning naming only the key, the last assignment of a key winning within the file, the environment and `install-endpoint.sh`'s positional arguments winning over it; the postinstall prints the `usermod -aG beacon-log` hint for a restricted log; `packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh` checks all of it). Restricted makes the root collector the only writer: its `beacon_ingest` extension (`collector-builder/exporter/beaconjsonexporter/beaconingestextension`, appending through the exporter's own `internal/runtimelog`) serves `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, and the hook adapter and the CLI writer, as any account but root writing the system log, hand finished lines to it through `pkg/asymptoteobserve/localingest` (`Deliverer`). The protocol is one batch per connection (`BEACON-INGEST/1`, a header naming the log, one event per line, one JSON reply saying how far it got); the server refuses a batch for any log but its own, identifies the sender only by kernel peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`, `LOCAL_PEERCRED`), overwrites the event's `user` with that uid and its resolved name and always derives `event.id` itself (`StampLine` re-encodes, so a sender cannot split or forge lines or reuse another event's id), and bounds connections overall and per uid, batch size, each account's bytes per second, and its own time per connection (shorter than the client's, so it reports how far it got instead of being resent). The client sends only to a socket that root owns in a directory nobody else can write (group-writable ancestors only for gid 0/1, which macOS's `/private/var/run` needs). `Deliverer.Write` sends through the socket when it answers and otherwise appends directly as before; only a direct append refused for permission (a restricted log whose collector is down) spools the line, to the account's private spool for that log (`~/.beacon/endpoint/spool/<log digest>`, 0600 under 0700), and the next line that gets through either way drains it. Root writers and per-user logs always write directly. The mode is `config.json` `log_access`, carried through repair and package upgrades (`BEACON_LOG_ACCESS` in the install scripts). A first install from any package (`.deb`/`.rpm` on systemd hosts, the macOS `.pkg`, the MSI unless `BEACON_SERVICE` names the supervised collector; no system config and no kept log) defaults to restricted in its install script, and adds to `beacon-log` (`--log-readers`, `loggroup.AddMember`: gpasswd/addgroup, dseditgroup, net.exe; add-only, failures reported not fatal; `validAccount` also admits spaces, an apostrophe and non-ASCII letters on Windows, because OOBE names local accounts from what the person typed) exactly `BEACON_LOG_READERS` when set, even empty, else only a person who installed interactively (Linux `SUDO_USER` with a terminal on stdin and not `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive`, because Ansible `become` and Packer sudo set `SUDO_USER` too; macOS without `COMMAND_LINE_INSTALL` and with an `Installer` process of the console user whose lsof `txt` executable is Apple's `/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app`, never a bare process name; Windows MSI `UILevel` >= 4 via the custom action's `-UiLevel`), never an unattended fleet install. In both shell settings parsers an environment variable set to an empty string counts as unset (except `BEACON_LOG_READERS`, where empty means nobody), and the macOS Fleet wrapper (`packaging/macos/fleet/scripts/install.sh`) passes only arguments it was given, so neither hides the settings file or managed preferences. Fleet tooling sets the `BEACON_*` install settings where it writes settings: `/etc/default/beacon`/`/etc/sysconfig/beacon` (`packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`), managed or local preferences for `com.beacon.endpoint` (`packaging/macos/beacon-settings.sh`), `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Beacon\Endpoint` (`install-endpoint.ps1`); each read only when root/admin-controlled, environment wins; docs in `docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx#package-installs`. Install creates the `beacon-log` group (`internal/endpoint/loggroup`, getent/groupadd, dscl/dseditgroup) and `writer.RestrictSystemLog` makes the directory `root:beacon-log 02750`, the log and archives `0640` and the lock root-only `0600`, after writing the root-owned `.beacon-log-access` marker beside the log; a shared log is not narrowed in place but copied to fresh root-created files and renamed over, under its lock (bounded wait), because a descriptor opened while it was 0666 survives any chmod. A failed install restores the previous mode in its rollback, and a shared install removes a dead socket. The marker is what tells every root writer (`asymptoteobserve.RuntimeLogModes`) to keep the restricted modes. The OTLP receivers on loopback are not covered by the socket: any local process can still send OTLP. On Linux those events are attributed to the account that owns the sending socket (peer attribution, below), which names the sender but does not stop an account sending what it likes under its own name; elsewhere they are unattributed, so never claim more than that. Doctor's `runtime_log_access` covers the marker, the socket and pending spool. Unix sockets are local IPC, not a network channel, so the hooks-never-touch-the-network rule holds. On Windows the same mode runs over the named pipe `\\.\pipe\beacon-agent-ingest` (`localingest` `transport_windows.go`, go-winio): the collector creates it as the first instance, and when the name is taken (any account may create one) it reports a recoverable error and retries every few seconds rather than failing, so the rest of the collector stays up; it rejects remote clients and its DACL denies NETWORK and withholds `FILE_CREATE_PIPE_INSTANCE` from ordinary accounts, so it is not a network channel either; a client connects at identification level and sends only to a pipe owned by SYSTEM or Administrators; the server counts a connection against its account from the client process's token before reading and stamps the SID it reads by `ImpersonateNamedPipeClient` after the preamble (they must agree), with `Peer.UID` a string (decimal uid on Unix, SID on Windows) and the name from `LookupAccountSid`, bounded. Privileged writers there are SYSTEM and tokens with Administrators enabled (`CheckTokenMembership`; elevation for another group is not enough). The directory gets `sysacl.RestrictedLogDirDACL` (protected: SYSTEM and Administrators full, `beacon-log` local group read, nothing else; the lock SYSTEM and Administrators only) and everything below it is reset, because every account may bypass traverse checking; `writer.RestrictSystemLog` replaces every file directly in the directory (the log family under the lock; files outside it with another hard link are skipped) with a copy created with its final owner and DACL (`sysacl.CreateRestrictedFile`) and a POSIX-semantics rename, fails naming any file held open without sharing delete and then puts a log that was shared back to shared, and writes the marker last (on Windows it decides nothing for root writers, so a failed or killed run is not mistaken for a finished one). The marker counts there when SYSTEM or Administrators own it and no other account can write it. `loggroup` creates the local group with `net.exe` and looks it up qualified with the computer name. Doctor reads the restricted ACL (`writer.CheckRestrictedSystemLogACL`). `packaging/windows/smoke-restricted-log.ps1` runs in `windows-package-smoke` against the installed MSI with a real ordinary account. Hook and writer tests point `logging.EndpointIngest`/`writer.Ingest` at sockets of their own.
+- System log access (`beacon endpoint install|repair --system --log-access shared|restricted`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#restricted-log-access`). Shared, the CLI default, is the system log as it always was: hooks append to `/var/log/beacon-agent/runtime.jsonl` directly, so it is `0666`. Restricted is opt-in for the CLI and the default for a first package install on every platform (see below; on Linux `packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh` passes `--log-access restricted` only when neither the system `config.json` nor the runtime log exists, `/proc/1/comm` is systemd and `BEACON_SERVICE` is unset, `auto` or `systemd`; otherwise it passes nothing and the endpoint keeps its mode; `packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`, sourced by that script and by the postinstall (which takes only `BEACON_ENDPOINT_HARNESSES`, through `beacon_settings_harnesses` in a subshell, because its user-config step re-runs the CLI as each logged-in user with its environment and must not hand them a Splunk HEC token from the file), reads the `BEACON_*` install settings, never sourcing the file, from a root-owned, not group/other-writable `/etc/default/beacon` or `/etc/sysconfig/beacon` in shell syntax with trailing comments, skipping a malformed value with a warning naming only the key, the last assignment of a key winning within the file, the environment and `install-endpoint.sh`'s positional arguments winning over it; the postinstall prints the `usermod -aG beacon-log` hint for a restricted log; `packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh` checks all of it). Restricted makes the root collector the only writer: its `beacon_ingest` extension (`collector-builder/exporter/beaconjsonexporter/beaconingestextension`, appending through the exporter's own `internal/runtimelog`) serves `/var/run/beacon-agent/ingest.sock`, and the hook adapter and the CLI writer, as any account but root writing the system log, hand finished lines to it through `pkg/asymptoteobserve/localingest` (`Deliverer`). The protocol is one batch per connection (`BEACON-INGEST/1`, a header naming the log, one event per line, one JSON reply saying how far it got); the server refuses a batch for any log but its own, identifies the sender only by kernel peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`, `LOCAL_PEERCRED`), overwrites the event's `user` with that uid and its resolved name and always derives `event.id` itself (`StampLine` re-encodes, so a sender cannot split or forge lines or reuse another event's id), and bounds connections overall and per uid, batch size, each account's bytes per second, and its own time per connection (shorter than the client's, so it reports how far it got instead of being resent). The client sends only to a socket that root owns in a directory nobody else can write (group-writable ancestors only for gid 0/1, which macOS's `/private/var/run` needs). `Deliverer.Write` sends through the socket when it answers and otherwise appends directly as before; only a direct append refused for permission (a restricted log whose collector is down) spools the line, to the account's private spool for that log (`~/.beacon/endpoint/spool/<log digest>`, 0600 under 0700), and the next line that gets through either way drains it. Root writers and per-user logs always write directly. The mode is `config.json` `log_access`, carried through repair and package upgrades (`BEACON_LOG_ACCESS` in the install scripts). A first install from any package (`.deb`/`.rpm` on systemd hosts, the macOS `.pkg`, the MSI unless `BEACON_SERVICE` names the supervised collector; no system config and no kept log) defaults to restricted in its install script, and adds to `beacon-log` (`--log-readers`, `loggroup.AddMember`: gpasswd/addgroup, dseditgroup, net.exe; add-only, failures reported not fatal; `validAccount` also admits spaces, an apostrophe and non-ASCII letters on Windows, because OOBE names local accounts from what the person typed) exactly `BEACON_LOG_READERS` when set, even empty, else only a person who installed interactively (Linux `SUDO_USER` with a controlling terminal (`/dev/tty`, not stdin, which rpm scriptlets get as a pipe) and not `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive`, because Ansible `become` and Packer sudo set `SUDO_USER` too; macOS without `COMMAND_LINE_INSTALL` and with an `Installer` process of the console user whose lsof `txt` executable is Apple's `/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app`, never a bare process name; Windows MSI `UILevel` >= 4 via the custom action's `-UiLevel`), never an unattended fleet install. In both shell settings parsers an environment variable set to an empty string counts as unset (except `BEACON_LOG_READERS`, where empty means nobody), and the macOS Fleet wrapper (`packaging/macos/fleet/scripts/install.sh`) passes only arguments it was given, so neither hides the settings file or managed preferences. Fleet tooling sets the `BEACON_*` install settings where it writes settings: `/etc/default/beacon`/`/etc/sysconfig/beacon` (`packaging/linux/beacon-settings.sh`), managed or local preferences for `com.beacon.endpoint` (`packaging/macos/beacon-settings.sh`), `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Beacon\Endpoint` (`install-endpoint.ps1`); each read only when root/admin-controlled, environment wins; docs in `docs/security/restricted-log-access.mdx#package-installs`. Install creates the `beacon-log` group (`internal/endpoint/loggroup`, getent/groupadd, dscl/dseditgroup) and `writer.RestrictSystemLog` makes the directory `root:beacon-log 02750`, the log and archives `0640` and the lock root-only `0600`, after writing the root-owned `.beacon-log-access` marker beside the log; a shared log is not narrowed in place but copied to fresh root-created files and renamed over, under its lock (bounded wait), because a descriptor opened while it was 0666 survives any chmod. A failed install restores the previous mode in its rollback, and a shared install removes a dead socket. The marker is what tells every root writer (`asymptoteobserve.RuntimeLogModes`) to keep the restricted modes. The OTLP receivers on loopback are not covered by the socket: any local process can still send OTLP. On Linux those events are attributed to the account that owns the sending socket (peer attribution, below), which names the sender but does not stop an account sending what it likes under its own name; elsewhere they are unattributed, so never claim more than that. Doctor's `runtime_log_access` covers the marker, the socket and pending spool. Unix sockets are local IPC, not a network channel, so the hooks-never-touch-the-network rule holds. On Windows the same mode runs over the named pipe `\\.\pipe\beacon-agent-ingest` (`localingest` `transport_windows.go`, go-winio): the collector creates it as the first instance, and when the name is taken (any account may create one) it reports a recoverable error and retries every few seconds rather than failing, so the rest of the collector stays up; it rejects remote clients and its DACL denies NETWORK and withholds `FILE_CREATE_PIPE_INSTANCE` from ordinary accounts, so it is not a network channel either; a client connects at identification level and sends only to a pipe owned by SYSTEM or Administrators; the server counts a connection against its account from the client process's token before reading and stamps the SID it reads by `ImpersonateNamedPipeClient` after the preamble (they must agree), with `Peer.UID` a string (decimal uid on Unix, SID on Windows) and the name from `LookupAccountSid`, bounded. Privileged writers there are SYSTEM and tokens with Administrators enabled (`CheckTokenMembership`; elevation for another group is not enough). The directory gets `sysacl.RestrictedLogDirDACL` (protected: SYSTEM and Administrators full, `beacon-log` local group read, nothing else; the lock SYSTEM and Administrators only) and everything below it is reset, because every account may bypass traverse checking; `writer.RestrictSystemLog` replaces every file directly in the directory (the log family under the lock; files outside it with another hard link are skipped) with a copy created with its final owner and DACL (`sysacl.CreateRestrictedFile`) and a POSIX-semantics rename, fails naming any file held open without sharing delete and then puts a log that was shared back to shared, and writes the marker last (on Windows it decides nothing for root writers, so a failed or killed run is not mistaken for a finished one). The marker counts there when SYSTEM or Administrators own it and no other account can write it. `loggroup` creates the local group with `net.exe` and looks it up qualified with the computer name. Doctor reads the restricted ACL (`writer.CheckRestrictedSystemLogACL`). `packaging/windows/smoke-restricted-log.ps1` runs in `windows-package-smoke` against the installed MSI with a real ordinary account. Hook and writer tests point `logging.EndpointIngest`/`writer.Ingest` at sockets of their own.
- Beacon Cloud forwarding (`cli/beacon/internal/endpoint/asymptote`, `beacon endpoint connect`, `beacon endpoint asymptote`) is Vector-shaped: Beacon writes local JSONL, Vector ships runtime lines only from the connection point forward and reads inventory from the beginning to establish the endpoint's current baseline, plus the one bounded exception of the session backfill (below), and the `bcn_device_*` key stays only in `<BaseDir>/asymptote/vector-secrets.json` via Vector's secret backend. The onboarding wizard preselects Beacon Cloud, and confirming it connects this endpoint in the same command once the local install has succeeded; an endpoint that is already enrolled is never re-enrolled, because enrollment rotates the device key. Standard mode ships locally sanitized retained content; metadata-only uses local Vector transforms to remove prompts, responses, reasoning, tool arguments/results, tool descriptions/definitions, retrieval queries/documents, evaluation explanations, agent descriptions, stop sequences, approval/policy reasons, command output, raw fields, diffs, inventory content, and MCP definitions before buffering/upload. Every text-shaped event field must be classified in `metadata_fields_test.go` (`metadataOnlyRemoved`, each with its own `del()` in `pack/metadata-transforms.toml`, or `metadataOnlyKept`); a new field fails that test until it is, and `BEACON_TEST_VECTOR_BIN` runs the transform on an event with every field set. `vector.toml` is not rendered only at connect: `asymptote.ReconcileForwarder` re-renders it in place for a connected endpoint from the current pack with the enrollment's ingest URL and recorded privacy mode, validates it with the forwarder's own Vector exactly as connect does, atomically replaces it, and, when run from install, repair, the package upgrade or the hidden reconcile the macOS postinstall runs (`ReconcileOptions.Restart`), restarts a running forwarder even when nothing changed (after `vector validate` of the current config with the forwarder's own Vector, and never after a warning, so a refused config or a missing Vector leaves the running forwarder alone), as the Sentinel reconcile does: switching to restricted log access replaces the runtime log with a copy, and Vector, which recognizes a file by its first line, keeps tailing the replaced one until it restarts; an upgrade may also have installed a new Vector. A stopped one is never started and reads the new config when it next starts. The `beacon_runtime` source reads `runtime.jsonl.1` too, as the Sentinel pack does, so lines written to a replaced log before a restart are found again at the next rotation instead of lost. It never enrolls, reads or rewrites the secrets file, makes a network request, or touches `vector-data/` (checkpoints stay, so pack changes must keep source ids and fingerprinting stable), and a rejected config is a warning that keeps the old one; it is a no-op when not connected, after an incomplete connect, without an installed unit, or where `ForwarderManager` is unsupported (supervised mode). `lifecycle.Install` runs it last when services are started (so install, repair and the Linux package upgrade), repair's teardown keeps the forwarder (`UninstallOptions.KeepManagedIngest`) instead of disconnecting it, and the macOS postinstall, which installs with `--no-start`, runs the hidden `beacon endpoint asymptote reconcile --system`. Keep the ingest URL `https://`, the wire contract aligned with `beacon-ingest` (`/v1/ingest/{runtime,inventory}` and `/v1/ingest/health`), and do not add another endpoint network channel. The cloud-sandbox shuttle is the bounded exception: only with `BEACON_ORIGIN=cloud`, it can upload new runtime lines to GCS, S3, or the same Beacon ingest contract because no Vector/service manager/browser/persistent disk exists there.
- Session backfill (`cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_backfill.go`; docs in `docs/cli/endpoint-install.mdx#session-backfill` and `docs/cli/endpoint-connect.mdx#session-backfill`): after every successful install (user or system mode), every session-store collector runs once with `CollectOptions.Since` (30 days; `sessionwindow.Recent` keeps those sessions, newest first, and never touches the cursors of the rest) and a shared `writer.Budget` (24 MiB, at most 12 MiB per runtime through `Budget.Sub`; a refused append returns `writer.ErrBudgetSpent`, the collector stops with cursors past only what was written, and a manual sync reads the rest). A new session-store collector takes both fields, reads its store only through `internal/sessionfs` (a test parses every collector package to enforce it), and joins `endpointBackfillRunners` and that test's list. Every connect, first or re-connect, user or system, runs the same sweep before enrollment (skipped when install just ran it) and, before the forwarder starts, `asymptote.StageBackfill` copies the window's `harness.collection_method=poll` lines into `cloud-backfill.jsonl` beside the runtime log, which the `beacon_backfill` Vector source (fingerprinted `device_and_inode`, so each atomically restaged copy is a new file) reads from the beginning into the runtime sink through the same privacy transform. Live hook/OTLP/plugin history before the connection point stays local. Re-connects restage, so a resend of already-shipped lines is expected and rests on the deterministic `event.id`; a privacy-mode change clears the checkpoints and the restage renames the new-mode copy over the old one (kept until then so the copy is always a new inode; deleted instead when nothing restages), and `disconnect` removes it. System mode runs the collectors under `withUserHome` for the active console user (`activeConsoleUser`), with cursors under the system base directory, and reports a skip when nobody is logged in; root is reading a home the console user controls, so the sweep runs under `sessionfs.Confine` (an `os.Root` on that home, files owned by the home's owner only, non-blocking opens that refuse FIFOs/devices, SQLite read from a private snapshot under `<SystemBaseDir>/state/backfill-snapshots`, retried until the database size/change counter and WAL header are unchanged across the copy, and refused past `sessionfs.MaxSnapshotBytes` (512 MiB with its WAL) with the runtime's sync command named in the report), and refused paths read as absent and are listed in the report. User-mode sync and backfill stay unconfined. The wizard's confirm screen names the upload (`WizardOptions.BackfillDays`). Dry-run, `--no-backfill` and `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` skip all of it; the cmd tests run with `BEACON_BACKFILL=0` set in `TestMain`.
- `beacon endpoint install` has a full-screen onboarding wizard on interactive user TTYs. It signs in, preselects Beacon Cloud, requires an explicit choice to opt out to Local, and asks Managed users to choose Standard or Metadata-only privacy. Signing in alone still moves no telemetry. Confirming Beacon Cloud does: the confirm screen states that it installs Beacon and starts forwarding, and names what the selected privacy mode sends, so that screen is the consent point. The managed destination is recorded only after enrollment succeeds, so a failed enrollment leaves a working local install, prints `beacon endpoint connect` as the retry, and re-offers the question on the next install. The onboarding record is written only after `lifecycle.Install` returns, because a profile written first left a failed install looking onboarded and silently skipped the wizard on the retry. Explicit `install --connect` is unchanged. The wizard is skipped for system/root/CI/piped-stdin/dry-run or `BEACON_ONBOARDING=0`; those unattended paths must never gain an account or browser dependency. Legacy `BEACON_ONBOARDING_EMAIL`/`USAGE` submissions remain only for fleet compatibility. After the destination, the wizard shows an agent tools screen; every row is preselected (opt-out, space toggles). Beacon Cloud MCP is offered only with Beacon Cloud and runs the `beacon mcp connect` flow (`connectCloudMCP` with `yes`, OAuth, detected harnesses) only after the endpoint is connected (or already was), via `finishCloudSetup`; a failed enrollment skips it and names the retry. The Beacon Agent Skills are offered for either destination and installed user-wide into `~/.agents/skills` and, when Claude Code is set up, `~/.claude/skills` (`cli/beacon/internal/agentskills`, `beacon skills install|uninstall`; a `.beacon-managed` marker decides what Beacon may replace or remove; install and repair refresh only copies Beacon already wrote). Both run after `lifecycle.Install` returns and warn rather than fail. The answers are recorded as `onboarding.cloud_mcp`/`agent_skills`. Implementation lives in `cli/beacon/internal/onboarding`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_onboarding.go`, `cli/beacon/cmd/endpoint_install.go` and `cli/beacon/cmd/agent_tools.go`; keep `docs/cli/endpoint-onboarding.mdx` and `docs/cli/skills.mdx` in sync.
diff --git a/packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh b/packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh
index bcdcc1ed..88758977 100755
--- a/packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh
+++ b/packaging/linux/install-endpoint.sh
@@ -85,19 +85,25 @@ fi
# machine can use the dashboard, `beacon traces` and `beacon share` without a second step. A
# configuration manager running as root has no SUDO_USER, and one that reaches root through sudo
# (Ansible `become`, a Packer sudo provisioner) sets SUDO_USER to its automation login, so SUDO_USER
-# alone is not a person: the install must also have a terminal on standard input and not run under
+# alone is not a person: the install must also have a controlling terminal and not run under
# DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive, which Ansible's apt module sets. Otherwise nobody is added, and the
-# postinstall prints how to add someone. Members are only ever added, never removed.
+# postinstall prints how to add someone. Automation that allocates a terminal (ssh -tt) passes this
+# check, so a fleet sets BEACON_LOG_READERS= to add nobody whatever runs the install. Members are
+# only ever added, never removed.
#
-# beacon_person_at_terminal succeeds when a person is running this install interactively.
-# BEACON_INSTALL_TTY=1|0 lets the packaging tests, which run without a terminal, say either way.
+# beacon_person_at_terminal succeeds when a person is running this install interactively. It asks
+# for a controlling terminal (/dev/tty) rather than a terminal on standard input, because rpm runs
+# scriptlets with standard input on a pipe of its own even under `sudo dnf install` at a terminal;
+# the controlling terminal is the session's and survives that. BEACON_INSTALL_TTY=1|0 lets the
+# packaging tests, which run without a terminal, say either way.
beacon_person_at_terminal() {
[ "${DEBIAN_FRONTEND:-}" != noninteractive ] || return 1
case "${BEACON_INSTALL_TTY:-}" in
1) return 0 ;;
0) return 1 ;;
esac
- [ -t 0 ]
+ # A subshell: a failed redirection on a builtin would end this non-interactive shell.
+ ( : <"${BEACON_CONTROLLING_TTY:-/dev/tty}" ) 2>/dev/null
}
if [ -z "${BEACON_LOG_READERS+set}" ]; then
BEACON_LOG_READERS=
diff --git a/packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh b/packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh
index 29caa13c..a6988965 100644
--- a/packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh
+++ b/packaging/linux/test-endpoint-scripts.sh
@@ -270,8 +270,13 @@ expect_readers alice "first install by sudo"
# terminal: its login account must not be added.
run_install SUDO_USER=deploy BEACON_INSTALL_TTY=0
has_flag --log-readers && fail "sudo install without a terminal added $(flag_value --log-readers)"
-run_install SUDO_USER=deploy
-has_flag --log-readers && fail "sudo install with no terminal on stdin added $(flag_value --log-readers)"
+# Without the override it asks for a controlling terminal, not a terminal on stdin: rpm gives
+# scriptlets a pipe on stdin even under `sudo dnf install` at a terminal.
+run_install SUDO_USER=deploy BEACON_CONTROLLING_TTY="$TMP_DIR/no-such-tty"
+has_flag --log-readers && fail "sudo install with no controlling terminal added $(flag_value --log-readers)"
+: >"$TMP_DIR/fake-tty"
+run_install SUDO_USER=alice BEACON_CONTROLLING_TTY="$TMP_DIR/fake-tty" </dev/null
+expect_readers alice "sudo install with a controlling terminal and stdin on a pipe (rpm)"
run_install SUDO_USER=deploy BEACON_INSTALL_TTY=1 DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
has_flag --log-readers && fail "DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive install added $(flag_value --log-readers)"
run_install SUDO_USER=deploy BEACON_INSTALL_TTY=0 BEACON_LOG_READERS=svc_splunk