Agent Zero AI framework
fix(api): resolve image_get containment bypass (#1609)
Alessandro1f2d51222652
diff --git a/api/image_get.py b/api/image_get.pyindex 8c0071201..26d027e35 100644--- a/api/image_get.py+++ b/api/image_get.py@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@import base64import os+from pathlib import Pathfrom urllib.parse import quotefrom helpers.api import ApiHandler, Request, Response, send_filefrom helpers import files, runtime@@ -7,6 +8,24 @@ import iofrom mimetypes import guess_type+IMAGE_EXTENSIONS = (+ ".jpg",+ ".jpeg",+ ".png",+ ".gif",+ ".bmp",+ ".webp",+ ".svg",+ ".ico",+ ".svgz",+)+SVG_EXTENSIONS = (".svg", ".svgz")+SVG_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY = (+ "sandbox; default-src 'none'; script-src 'none'; "+ "img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'"+)++class ImageGet(ApiHandler):@classmethod@@ -16,48 +35,35 @@ class ImageGet(ApiHandler):async def process(self, input: dict, request: Request) -> dict | Response:# input datapath = input.get("path", request.args.get("path", ""))- metadata = (- input.get("metadata", request.args.get("metadata", "false")).lower()- == "true"- )if not path:raise ValueError("No path provided")- # no real need to check, we have the extension filter in place- # check if path is within base directory- # if runtime.is_development():- # in_base = files.is_in_base_dir(files.fix_dev_path(path))- # else:- # in_base = files.is_in_base_dir(path)- # if not in_base and not files.is_in_dir(path, "/root"):- # raise ValueError("Path is outside of allowed directory")-# get file extension and infofile_ext = os.path.splitext(path)[1].lower()filename = os.path.basename(path)- # list of allowed image extensions- image_extensions = [".jpg", ".jpeg", ".png", ".gif", ".bmp", ".webp", ".svg", ".ico", ".svgz"]-- # # If metadata is requested, return file information- # if metadata:- # return _get_file_metadata(path, filename, file_ext, image_extensions)-- if file_ext in image_extensions:+ if file_ext in IMAGE_EXTENSIONS:+ try:+ local_path = _resolve_allowed_image_path(path)+ except ValueError as exc:+ return Response(str(exc), status=403, mimetype="text/plain")# in development environment, try to serve the image from local file system if exists, otherwise from dockerif runtime.is_development():- # Convert /a0/... Docker paths to local absolute paths- local_path = files.fix_dev_path(path)if files.exists(local_path):response = send_file(local_path)else:# Try fetching from Docker via RFC as fallbacktry:- if await runtime.call_development_function(files.exists, path):+ remote_path = await runtime.call_development_function(+ _resolve_allowed_image_path, path+ )+ if await runtime.call_development_function(+ files.exists, remote_path+ ):b64_content = await runtime.call_development_function(- files.read_file_base64, path+ files.read_file_base64, remote_path)file_content = base64.b64decode(b64_content)mime_type, _ = guess_type(filename)@@ -74,21 +80,50 @@ class ImageGet(ApiHandler):except Exception:response = _send_fallback_icon("image")else:- if files.exists(path):- response = send_file(path)+ if files.exists(local_path):+ response = send_file(local_path)else:response = _send_fallback_icon("image")- # Add cache headers for better device sync performance- response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "public, max-age=3600"- response.headers["X-File-Type"] = "image"- response.headers["X-File-Name"] = quote(filename)+ _set_image_headers(response, filename, file_ext)return responseelse:# Handle non-image files with fallback iconsreturn _send_file_type_icon(file_ext, filename)+def _resolve_allowed_image_path(path: str) -> str:+ """Resolve a requested image path and keep it inside Agent Zero's base dir."""++ if runtime.is_development():+ candidate = Path(files.fix_dev_path(path))+ else:+ candidate = Path(files.get_abs_path(path))++ if not candidate.is_absolute():+ candidate = Path(files.get_base_dir()) / candidate++ base_dir = Path(files.get_base_dir()).resolve()+ resolved = candidate.resolve(strict=False)++ try:+ resolved.relative_to(base_dir)+ except ValueError as exc:+ raise ValueError("Path is outside of allowed directory") from exc++ return str(resolved)+++def _set_image_headers(response: Response, filename: str, file_ext: str) -> None:+ # Add cache headers for better device sync performance.+ response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "public, max-age=3600"+ response.headers["X-File-Type"] = "image"+ response.headers["X-File-Name"] = quote(filename)+ response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"+ if file_ext in SVG_EXTENSIONS:+ response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = SVG_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY++def _send_file_type_icon(file_ext, filename=None):"""Return appropriate icon for file type"""diff --git a/helpers/api.py b/helpers/api.pyindex 8d4f64b08..9616528b7 100644--- a/helpers/api.py+++ b/helpers/api.py@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ from flask import (url_for,)from werkzeug.wrappers.response import Response as BaseResponse-from agent import AgentContextfrom helpers.print_style import PrintStylefrom helpers.errors import format_errorfrom helpers import files, cachediff --git a/helpers/runtime.py b/helpers/runtime.pyindex d56ca44fa..1d4b084e1 100644--- a/helpers/runtime.py+++ b/helpers/runtime.py@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import inspectimport secretsfrom pathlib import Pathfrom typing import TypeVar, Callable, Awaitable, Union, overload, cast-from helpers import dotenv, rfc, settings, files+from helpers import dotenv, rfc, filesimport asyncioimport threadingimport queue@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ def _get_rfc_password() -> str:def _get_rfc_url() -> str:+ # Delay import to avoid a circular import with helpers.settings.+ from helpers import settingsset = settings.get_settings()url = set["rfc_url"]if not "://" in url:diff --git a/tests/test_image_get_security.py b/tests/test_image_get_security.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..88ca2d0be--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_image_get_security.py@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@+import asyncio+import base64+import sys+import threading+from pathlib import Path++from flask import Flask, request++PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]+if str(PROJECT_ROOT) not in sys.path:+ sys.path.insert(0, str(PROJECT_ROOT))++from api import image_get+++def _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir: Path, *, development: bool = False) -> None:+ base_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)++ def fake_get_abs_path(*parts: str) -> str:+ if len(parts) == 1 and Path(str(parts[0])).is_absolute():+ return str(Path(str(parts[0])))+ return str(base_dir.joinpath(*(str(part) for part in parts)))++ monkeypatch.setattr(image_get.files, "get_base_dir", lambda: str(base_dir))+ monkeypatch.setattr(image_get.files, "get_abs_path", fake_get_abs_path)+ monkeypatch.setattr(image_get.runtime, "is_development", lambda: development)+++async def _request_image(path: str):+ app = Flask("test_image_get_security")+ handler = image_get.ImageGet(app, threading.Lock())+ with app.test_request_context("/api/image_get"):+ return await handler.process({"path": path}, request)+++def test_image_get_serves_images_inside_base_dir(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ base_dir = tmp_path / "a0"+ _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir)+ image_path = base_dir / "usr" / "uploads" / "safe.png"+ image_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)+ image_path.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n")++ response = asyncio.run(_request_image(str(image_path)))++ assert response.status_code == 200+ assert response.headers["X-File-Type"] == "image"+ assert response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] == "nosniff"+++def test_image_get_blocks_image_paths_outside_base_dir(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ base_dir = tmp_path / "a0"+ _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir)+ outside_image = tmp_path / "outside.png"+ outside_image.write_bytes(b"outside")++ response = asyncio.run(_request_image(str(outside_image)))++ assert response.status_code == 403+ assert response.get_data(as_text=True) == "Path is outside of allowed directory"+++def test_image_get_blocks_symlink_escape_from_base_dir(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ base_dir = tmp_path / "a0"+ _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir)+ outside_image = tmp_path / "secret.png"+ outside_image.write_bytes(b"secret")+ link_path = base_dir / "usr" / "uploads" / "linked.png"+ link_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)+ link_path.symlink_to(outside_image)++ response = asyncio.run(_request_image(str(link_path)))++ assert response.status_code == 403+++def test_image_get_hardens_svg_responses(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ base_dir = tmp_path / "a0"+ _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir)+ svg_path = base_dir / "usr" / "uploads" / "payload.svg"+ svg_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)+ svg_path.write_text(+ '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert(1)</script></svg>',+ encoding="utf-8",+ )++ response = asyncio.run(_request_image(str(svg_path)))++ assert response.status_code == 200+ assert response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"].startswith("sandbox;")+ assert "script-src 'none'" in response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"]+ assert response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] == "nosniff"+++def test_image_get_development_fallback_validates_remote_path(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ base_dir = tmp_path / "a0"+ _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir, development=True)+ calls = []++ async def fake_call_development_function(func, *args, **kwargs):+ calls.append(func.__name__)+ if func is image_get._resolve_allowed_image_path:+ return "/a0/usr/uploads/remote.png"+ if func is image_get.files.exists:+ return True+ if func is image_get.files.read_file_base64:+ return base64.b64encode(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n").decode("ascii")+ raise AssertionError(f"Unexpected remote call: {func.__name__}")++ monkeypatch.setattr(+ image_get.runtime,+ "call_development_function",+ fake_call_development_function,+ )++ response = asyncio.run(_request_image("/a0/usr/uploads/remote.png"))++ assert response.status_code == 200+ assert response.headers["X-File-Type"] == "image"+ assert calls == ["_resolve_allowed_image_path", "exists", "read_file_base64"]+++def test_image_get_development_fallback_does_not_read_rejected_remote_path(+ tmp_path,+ monkeypatch,+):+ base_dir = tmp_path / "a0"+ _patch_base_dir(monkeypatch, base_dir, development=True)+ calls = []++ async def fake_call_development_function(func, *args, **kwargs):+ calls.append(func.__name__)+ if func is image_get._resolve_allowed_image_path:+ raise ValueError("Path is outside of allowed directory")+ raise AssertionError(f"Unexpected remote call after validation: {func.__name__}")++ monkeypatch.setattr(+ image_get.runtime,+ "call_development_function",+ fake_call_development_function,+ )+ monkeypatch.setattr(+ image_get,+ "_send_fallback_icon",+ lambda _icon_name: image_get.Response("fallback", status=200),+ )++ response = asyncio.run(_request_image("/a0/usr/uploads/rejected.png"))++ assert response.status_code == 200+ assert response.get_data(as_text=True) == "fallback"+ assert calls == ["_resolve_allowed_image_path"]