#1 Persistent memory for AI coding agents based on real-world benchmarks
TypeScript agentmemoryagentsaiclaudeclaudecodecodexcopilotcursorgenaiharnesshermesmemoryompopenclawopencodepi
docs: address CodeRabbit review on security advisory drafts
Rohit Ghumarea4a1d23d12a5
diff --git a/.github/security-advisories/04-mesh-unauth.md b/.github/security-advisories/04-mesh-unauth.mdindex c636d160..d7ffe2eb 100644--- a/.github/security-advisories/04-mesh-unauth.md+++ b/.github/security-advisories/04-mesh-unauth.md@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Mesh is opt-in (requires an explicit peer registration), so this affected only uFixed in **0.8.2**:-- All 4 mesh REST endpoints (`mesh-register`, `mesh-list`, `mesh-sync`, `mesh-receive`, `mesh-export`) now return 503 with `"mesh requires AGENTMEMORY_SECRET"` if the secret is not configured+- All 5 mesh REST endpoints (`mesh-register`, `mesh-list`, `mesh-sync`, `mesh-receive`, `mesh-export`) now return 503 with `"mesh requires AGENTMEMORY_SECRET"` if the secret is not configured- The `mem::mesh-sync` function now accepts a `meshAuthToken` parameter and **refuses to sync at all** if the token is missing- Outgoing push/pull requests include `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` headers- Server-side, all mesh endpoints check bearer auth via the existing `checkAuth` helperdiff --git a/.github/security-advisories/05-obsidian-export-traversal.md b/.github/security-advisories/05-obsidian-export-traversal.mdindex 5d0f167f..13c4b8e9 100644--- a/.github/security-advisories/05-obsidian-export-traversal.md+++ b/.github/security-advisories/05-obsidian-export-traversal.md@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ Fixed in **0.8.2**:- Default export is confined to `~/.agentmemory/vault`- Tests added in `test/obsidian-export.test.ts` for both the custom-but-valid case and the rejection case+## Known limitations++`resolveVaultDir()` performs lexical containment only — it does not call `fs.realpathSync` / `fs.lstatSync`. A pre-existing symlink under `AGENTMEMORY_EXPORT_ROOT` that points outside the root can still be written through. Users who allow untrusted processes to create files inside `AGENTMEMORY_EXPORT_ROOT` should additionally run agentmemory inside a sandbox that forbids symlink creation, or file a follow-up issue requesting symlink-aware containment.+## WorkaroundsUsers on affected versions should: