Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
# OpenShell provider profile for an Agent Mesh node reachable from the gateway
# host. The credential is not stored anywhere: for each sandbox the supervisor
# trades the sandbox's JWT-SVID at the node's token endpoint (RFC 7523 client
# assertion) for a Biscuit bound to that identity, caches it, and injects it as
# X-Mesh-Authentication on every request the sandbox makes to the node.
id: agentmesh
display_name: Agent Mesh
description: Mesh services and models through a local agentmesh-node, under the sandbox's own identity
category: other
credentials:
- name: mesh_token
description: Biscuit the mesh issues for this sandbox's SPIFFE identity
required: false
# Injected as "X-Mesh-Authentication: Bearer <biscuit>".
auth_style: bearer
header_name: X-Mesh-Authentication
token_grant:
grant_type: client_credentials
token_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8090/oauth/token
# The aud claim of the JWT-SVID; the control plane accepts it with
# --allowed-audiences.
jwt_svid_audience: agentmesh
client_assertion_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-spiffe
# How long the supervisor keeps a Biscuit before trading a fresh SVID for
# a new one; a policy change reaches a sandbox within this time.
cache_ttl_seconds: 60
endpoints:
# The node's MCP server: discover and call tools across the mesh.
- host: host.openshell.internal
port: 8090
path: /mcp
protocol: mcp
enforcement: enforce
allowed_ips: [127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16]
mcp:
allow_all_known_mcp_methods: true
rules:
- allow: {}
# The node's OpenAI-compatible endpoint for models published on the mesh.
- host: host.openshell.internal
port: 8090
path: /v1/**
protocol: rest
access: read-write
enforcement: enforce
allowed_ips: [127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16]
binaries:
- /**