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Agent Mesh

fix(security): bump grpc to v1.83.1 (GO-2026-6348) and address review feedback

Antonio Ojea0ebb2d173ed5
diff --git a/internal/node/egress.go b/internal/node/egress.go
index 030204b4..3257d4d4 100644
--- a/internal/node/egress.go
+++ b/internal/node/egress.go
@@ -207,6 +207,12 @@ func (s *EgressService) Init(ctx context.Context) error {
return dialSafeEgressTCP(ctx, addr, allowLocal)
}
proxyTransport = cloned
+ } else {
+ proxyTransport = &http.Transport{
+ DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, _, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+ return dialSafeEgressTCP(ctx, addr, allowLocal)
+ },
+ }
}
proxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
@@ -221,12 +227,10 @@ func (s *EgressService) Init(ctx context.Context) error {
// What the caller sent authenticated it to the node, and what the
// node knows about the caller is for policy; none of it is for the
// destination, which sees the node's own credential only.
- pr.Out.Header.Del("Authorization")
- pr.Out.Header.Del("Cookie")
for name := range pr.Out.Header {
lower := strings.ToLower(name)
- if strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-sam-") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-forwarded-") || strings.EqualFold(name, api.HeaderPeerID) {
- pr.Out.Header.Del(name)
+ if lower == "authorization" || lower == "cookie" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-sam-") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-forwarded-") || strings.EqualFold(name, api.HeaderPeerID) {
+ delete(pr.Out.Header, name)
}
}
if auth, ok := pr.In.Context().Value(egressAuthKey{}).(string); ok && auth != "" {
diff --git a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go
index 2cbf474d..941cb5e4 100644
--- a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go
+++ b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
}
reqBody = decompressed
r.Header.Del("Content-Encoding")
+ r.Header.Del("Content-Length")
} else {
refuse(w, http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported Content-Encoding %q with Model Armor inspection", ce), proxyStatusDenied)
return
@@ -211,12 +212,10 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
}
// Strip caller auth and X-Sam-* headers on a working copy before any inspector sees them.
- r.Header.Del("Authorization")
- r.Header.Del("Cookie")
for name := range r.Header {
lower := strings.ToLower(name)
- if strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-sam-") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-forwarded-") || strings.EqualFold(name, api.HeaderPeerID) {
- r.Header.Del(name)
+ if lower == "authorization" || lower == "cookie" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-sam-") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-forwarded-") || strings.EqualFold(name, api.HeaderPeerID) {
+ delete(r.Header, name)
}
}
@@ -412,6 +411,7 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
}
respBody = decompressed
respHeader.Del("Content-Encoding")
+ respHeader.Del("Content-Length")
}
} else if !ma.GetFailOpen() {
refuse(w, http.StatusBadGateway, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported upstream Content-Encoding %q for Model Armor response inspection", ce), proxyStatusDenied)
diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go
index 246a0822..ea4fb9e1 100644
--- a/internal/node/node.go
+++ b/internal/node/node.go
@@ -2311,11 +2311,11 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error {
// Strip the biscuit header and any caller-supplied X-Sam-* headers so
// only transport-verified identity attributes reach the backend service.
for name := range r.Header {
- if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(name), "x-sam-") {
- r.Header.Del(name)
+ lower := strings.ToLower(name)
+ if lower == "cookie" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "x-sam-") {
+ delete(r.Header, name)
}
}
- r.Header.Del("Cookie")
r.Header.Set(api.HeaderPeerID, remotePeer.String())
if claims, cErr := n.VerifyLocalBiscuit(biscuitBytes); cErr == nil && claims != nil {
if p := claims.Principal(); p != "" {
diff --git a/internal/tlsinspect/tlsinspect_test.go b/internal/tlsinspect/tlsinspect_test.go
index 54f8a025..ea925d6b 100644
--- a/internal/tlsinspect/tlsinspect_test.go
+++ b/internal/tlsinspect/tlsinspect_test.go
@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ func buildTestClientHelloRecord(serverName string, includeECH bool) []byte {
}
var body []byte
- body = append(body, 0x03, 0x03) // legacy_version TLS 1.2
- body = append(body, make([]byte, 32)...) // random
- body = append(body, 0x00) // session_id length = 0
+ body = append(body, 0x03, 0x03) // legacy_version TLS 1.2
+ body = append(body, make([]byte, 32)...) // random
+ body = append(body, 0x00) // session_id length = 0
body = append(body, 0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01) // cipher_suites (TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
- body = append(body, 0x01, 0x00) // compression_methods (null)
+ body = append(body, 0x01, 0x00) // compression_methods (null)
if len(exts) > 0 {
extBlock := make([]byte, 2+len(exts))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(extBlock[0:2], uint16(len(exts)))