Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
use canonical peer ID string in revocation cache
Ibrahim1974442943d7
diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.goindex c67c296f..cf934824 100644--- a/internal/node/node.go+++ b/internal/node/node.go@@ -303,11 +303,12 @@ func NewSamNode(cfg Options) (*SamNode, error) {// bans from the first connection, instead of waiting for an event that// was already published while this node was down.for _, id := range cfg.BannedPeerIDs {- if _, err := peer.Decode(id); err != nil {+ p, err := peer.Decode(id)+ if err != nil {logger.Warnf("Ignoring undecodable banned peer ID %q from the control plane: %v", id, err)continue}- node.revokedPeers.Add(id, time.Now().Unix())+ node.revokedPeers.Add(p.String(), time.Now().UnixMilli())}node.peerLabelGate, err = lru.New[string, time.Time](labelGateCacheSize)if err != nil {@@ -1277,33 +1278,37 @@ func (n *SamNode) listenForControlPlaneEvents(ctx context.Context) {}func (n *SamNode) handleBannedEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) {+ p, err := peer.Decode(event.PeerId)+ if err != nil {+ logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Ignoring BANNED event with undecodable peer ID %q: %v", event.PeerId, err)+ return+ }+ canonicalID := p.String()+n.mu.Lock()if n.peerLastEventTime == nil {n.peerLastEventTime = make(map[string]int64)}- if event.Timestamp < n.peerLastEventTime[event.PeerId] {- logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Dropping out-of-order BANNED event for peer %s (event timestamp: %d, last processed: %d)", event.PeerId, event.Timestamp, n.peerLastEventTime[event.PeerId])+ if event.Timestamp < n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID] {+ logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Dropping out-of-order BANNED event for peer %s (event timestamp: %d, last processed: %d)", canonicalID, event.Timestamp, n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID])n.mu.Unlock()return}- n.peerLastEventTime[event.PeerId] = event.Timestamp-+ n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID] = event.Timestampn.mu.Unlock()- logger.Infow("[Mesh Event] peer banned", "event", meshEventBanned, "peer", event.PeerId)+ logger.Infow("[Mesh Event] peer banned", "event", meshEventBanned, "peer", canonicalID)if n.revokedPeers != nil {- n.revokedPeers.Add(event.PeerId, event.Timestamp)+ n.revokedPeers.Add(canonicalID, event.Timestamp)}// Drop any prior admission, otherwise the relay ACL keeps honouring it.// The cache entry above is not written to disk: a restarted node picks the// ban back up from the control plane's ban set in /info (see// SyncMeshConfig), which is also how an unban reaches it.- if p, err := peer.Decode(event.PeerId); err == nil {- n.authPeers.Delete(p)- if n.Host != nil {- _ = n.Host.Network().ClosePeer(p)- }+ n.authPeers.Delete(p)+ if n.Host != nil {+ _ = n.Host.Network().ClosePeer(p)}}diff --git a/internal/node/node_test.go b/internal/node/node_test.goindex 6f2ad09c..7f980b4a 100644--- a/internal/node/node_test.go+++ b/internal/node/node_test.go@@ -124,6 +124,43 @@ func TestHandleBannedEvent(t *testing.T) {}}+func TestBannedPeerCanonicalisation(t *testing.T) {+ priv, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(nil)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)+ }+ p, err := peer.IDFromPrivateKey(priv)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to derive peer ID: %v", err)+ }+ canonicalID := p.String()+ cidv1ID := peer.ToCid(p).String()++ revokedCache, err := lru.New[string, int64](10)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to create revocation cache: %v", err)+ }+ node := &SamNode{+ revokedPeers: revokedCache,+ peerLastEventTime: make(map[string]int64),+ BiscuitTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond,+ }++ ts := time.Now().UnixMilli()+ node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{+ Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,+ PeerId: cidv1ID,+ Timestamp: ts,+ })++ if !node.revokedPeers.Contains(canonicalID) {+ t.Errorf("revokedPeers missing canonical ID %q (event used %q)", canonicalID, cidv1ID)+ }+ if got := node.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID]; got != ts {+ t.Errorf("peerLastEventTime[%q] = %d, want %d", canonicalID, got, ts)+ }+}+func TestHandleKeyRotationEvent(t *testing.T) {node := &SamNode{BiscuitTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond}@@ -448,6 +485,41 @@ func TestNewSamNode_BiscuitTimeout(t *testing.T) {})}+func TestNewSamNode_BannedPeerCanonicalisation(t *testing.T) {+ bannedPriv, _, err := crypto.GenerateEd25519Key(nil)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)+ }+ p, err := peer.IDFromPrivateKey(bannedPriv)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to derive peer ID: %v", err)+ }+ canonicalID := p.String()+ cidv1ID := peer.ToCid(p).String()++ priv, _, err := crypto.GenerateKeyPair(crypto.Ed25519, -1)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to generate node key: %v", err)+ }+ store, err := NewStore(t.TempDir())+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ defer func() { _ = store.Close() }()++ node, err := NewSamNode(Options{+ PrivKey: priv,+ Store: store,+ BannedPeerIDs: []string{cidv1ID},+ })+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("NewSamNode: %v", err)+ }+ if !node.revokedPeers.Contains(canonicalID) {+ t.Errorf("revokedPeers missing canonical ID %q (seeded with %q)", canonicalID, cidv1ID)+ }+}+func TestNewSamNode_DHTOptions(t *testing.T) {priv, _, _ := crypto.GenerateKeyPair(crypto.Ed25519, -1)store, _ := NewStore(t.TempDir())