Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
fix(node): fail closed in evaluateExtAuthz when target service is unresolved
Antonio Ojea1cbeeb89e9cb
diff --git a/internal/node/ext_authz.go b/internal/node/ext_authz.goindex e51f084f..4128e110 100644--- a/internal/node/ext_authz.go+++ b/internal/node/ext_authz.go@@ -150,66 +150,72 @@ func evaluateExtAuthz(ctx context.Context, node *SamNode, in extAuthzCheckInput)}target, reqPath := resolveExtAuthzTarget(node, in)- if target != "" {- var callerPeer peer.ID- var isLocal bool- if peerHdr := in.Headers[strings.ToLower(api.HeaderPeerID)]; peerHdr != "" {- if pid, pErr := peer.Decode(peerHdr); pErr == nil {- callerPeer = pid- }+ if target == "" {+ return extAuthzCheckResult{+ Allowed: false,+ HTTPStatus: http.StatusForbidden,+ Message: "Forbidden: unable to resolve target service",}- if callerPeer == "" && claims.ActorNodePeerID != "" {- if pid, pErr := peer.Decode(claims.ActorNodePeerID); pErr == nil {- callerPeer = pid- }+ }++ var callerPeer peer.ID+ var isLocal bool+ if peerHdr := in.Headers[strings.ToLower(api.HeaderPeerID)]; peerHdr != "" {+ if pid, pErr := peer.Decode(peerHdr); pErr == nil {+ callerPeer = pid}- if callerPeer == "" && claims.NodePeerID != "" {- if pid, pErr := peer.Decode(claims.NodePeerID); pErr == nil {- callerPeer = pid- }+ }+ if callerPeer == "" && claims.ActorNodePeerID != "" {+ if pid, pErr := peer.Decode(claims.ActorNodePeerID); pErr == nil {+ callerPeer = pid}- if callerPeer == "" {- if pid, pErr := node.localPeerID(); pErr == nil {- callerPeer = pid- }- isLocal = true- }- if localPID, pErr := node.localPeerID(); pErr == nil && callerPeer == localPID {- isLocal = true- }-- method := in.Method- if method == "" {- method = http.MethodGet- }- if reqPath == "" {- reqPath = "/"- }- reqCtx := RequestContext{- PeerID: callerPeer,- Protocol: "ext_authz",- Target: target,- MCPTool: in.Headers[strings.ToLower(HeaderSamMCPTool)],- AllowMCPStreamInit: in.AllowMCPStreamInit,- HTTP: &HTTPRequestFacts{Method: method, Path: reqPath},- Local: isLocal,- }- if after, ok := strings.CutPrefix(target, api.EgressServicePrefix); ok {- reqCtx.Egress = &EgressFacts{Host: after, Port: 443}- if node.services != nil {- if svc, ok := node.services.GetTyped(api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS, after); ok {- if ef := egressFactsFor(svc); ef != nil {- reqCtx.Egress = ef- }+ }+ if callerPeer == "" && claims.NodePeerID != "" {+ if pid, pErr := peer.Decode(claims.NodePeerID); pErr == nil {+ callerPeer = pid+ }+ }+ if callerPeer == "" {+ if pid, pErr := node.localPeerID(); pErr == nil {+ callerPeer = pid+ }+ isLocal = true+ }+ if localPID, pErr := node.localPeerID(); pErr == nil && callerPeer == localPID {+ isLocal = true+ }++ method := in.Method+ if method == "" {+ method = http.MethodGet+ }+ if reqPath == "" {+ reqPath = "/"+ }+ reqCtx := RequestContext{+ PeerID: callerPeer,+ Protocol: "ext_authz",+ Target: target,+ MCPTool: in.Headers[strings.ToLower(HeaderSamMCPTool)],+ AllowMCPStreamInit: in.AllowMCPStreamInit,+ HTTP: &HTTPRequestFacts{Method: method, Path: reqPath},+ Local: isLocal,+ }+ if after, ok := strings.CutPrefix(target, api.EgressServicePrefix); ok {+ reqCtx.Egress = &EgressFacts{Host: after, Port: 443}+ if node.services != nil {+ if svc, ok := node.services.GetTyped(api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_EGRESS, after); ok {+ if ef := egressFactsFor(svc); ef != nil {+ reqCtx.Egress = ef}}}- if err := node.VerifyBiscuitToken(rawBiscuit, reqCtx); err != nil {- return extAuthzCheckResult{- Allowed: false,- HTTPStatus: http.StatusForbidden,- Message: fmt.Sprintf("Forbidden: %v", err),- }+ }+ if err := node.VerifyBiscuitToken(rawBiscuit, reqCtx); err != nil {+ return extAuthzCheckResult{+ Allowed: false,+ HTTPStatus: http.StatusForbidden,+ Message: fmt.Sprintf("Forbidden: %v", err),}}@@ -305,7 +311,17 @@ func resolveExtAuthzTarget(node *SamNode, in extAuthzCheckInput) (target, reqPatpath = path[:idx]}if explicit := strings.TrimSpace(in.Headers[strings.ToLower(api.HeaderSamTargetService)]); explicit != "" {- return explicit, path+ scheme, name := api.ParseServiceTarget(explicit)+ scheme = strings.ToLower(scheme)+ if isExtAuthzServiceScheme(scheme) && name != "" {+ if scheme == api.ServiceTypeStringEgress {+ name = api.NormalizeMeshHost(name)+ }+ if name != "" {+ return scheme + "://" + name, path+ }+ }+ return "", path}trimmed := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/sam/")trimmed = strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, "/")diff --git a/internal/node/sts_test.go b/internal/node/sts_test.goindex 4312d564..493a5a41 100644--- a/internal/node/sts_test.go+++ b/internal/node/sts_test.go@@ -467,6 +467,25 @@ func TestExtAuthzHTTPAndGRPC(t *testing.T) {t.Fatalf("expected HTTP ext_authz 403 Forbidden for merge_pr, got %d", recDeny.Code)}+ // 2b. HTTP ext_authz deny when target service cannot be resolved (must not skip VerifyBiscuitToken).+ reqNoTarget := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/ext_authz/unknown/route", nil)+ reqNoTarget.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+narrowedB64)+ recNoTarget := httptest.NewRecorder()+ handleExtAuthzHTTP(h.node, recNoTarget, reqNoTarget)+ if recNoTarget.Code != http.StatusForbidden {+ t.Fatalf("expected HTTP ext_authz 403 Forbidden when target cannot be resolved, got %d: %s", recNoTarget.Code, recNoTarget.Body.String())+ }++ // 2c. HTTP ext_authz deny when X-Sam-Target-Service is malformed.+ reqBadTarget := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/ext_authz", nil)+ reqBadTarget.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+narrowedB64)+ reqBadTarget.Header.Set(api.HeaderSamTargetService, "not-a-valid-scheme")+ recBadTarget := httptest.NewRecorder()+ handleExtAuthzHTTP(h.node, recBadTarget, reqBadTarget)+ if recBadTarget.Code != http.StatusForbidden {+ t.Fatalf("expected HTTP ext_authz 403 Forbidden for malformed X-Sam-Target-Service, got %d: %s", recBadTarget.Code, recBadTarget.Body.String())+ }+// 3. gRPC ext_authz Check (/envoy.service.auth.v3.Authorization/Check)grpcReqPayload := buildEnvoyCheckRequestPayload("POST", "/mcp/github", map[string]string{"authorization": "Bearer " + narrowedB64,