Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
fix(sec): prevent OIDC role impersonation and use deterministic proto marshaling for mesh signatures
Antonio Ojea20d6c3945f87
diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.goindex ddb05088..c12303b7 100644--- a/api/datalog.go+++ b/api/datalog.go@@ -368,6 +368,9 @@ func BuildServiceDatalogFact(serviceStr string) biscuit.Fact {// BuildTargetDatalogFact translates a target pattern string into a Datalog Fact.func BuildTargetDatalogFact(targetStr string) biscuit.Fact {tFact, tVal := ParseServiceTarget(targetStr)+ if tFact == "" {+ tFact = "node"+ }if tFact == "*" && tVal == "*" {return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedTargetAllFacts,diff --git a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yamlindex 8b92be99..5c784cb1 100644--- a/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml+++ b/charts/sam-mesh/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ spec:CP_URL="http://{{ include "sam-mesh.fullname" . }}-control-plane:8080"echo "Waiting for Control Plane to be ready..."- until curl -s "${CP_URL}/info" > /dev/null; do+ until curl -sf "${CP_URL}/info" > /dev/null; doecho "Control plane not ready yet, sleeping..."sleep 2donediff --git a/internal/controlplane/mesh.go b/internal/controlplane/mesh.goindex 8714c25b..0f708bde 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/mesh.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/mesh.go@@ -145,14 +145,14 @@ func (p *P2PMeshAdapter) PublishEvent(ctx context.Context, eventType api.MeshEve}if privKey != nil {- eventData, err := proto.Marshal(event)+ eventData, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)if err != nil {return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal event for signing: %w", err)}event.Signature = ed25519.Sign(privKey, eventData)}- data, err := proto.Marshal(event)+ data, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)if err != nil {return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal signed mesh event: %w", err)}diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.goindex 02c3a2fc..9cbcf205 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/server.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go@@ -1791,9 +1791,6 @@ func resolveRoles(peerID string, claims jwt.MapClaims, bindings []*api.PolicyBin}}}- for _, r := range oidcRoles {- resolvedRoles[r] = true- }var res []stringfor r := range resolvedRoles {diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go b/internal/controlplane/server_test.goindex 54938d6b..473fb998 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go@@ -1122,3 +1122,79 @@ func TestUserStatusAndTenancy(t *testing.T) {t.Error("expected node A to be banned/revoked in DB")}}++func TestResolveRolesAndRoleImpersonationProtection(t *testing.T) {+ bindings := []*api.PolicyBinding{+ {+ Role: api.RoleRouter,+ Members: []string{"group:routers", "role:oidc-router-role"},+ },+ {+ Role: api.RoleSamBox,+ Members: []string{"user:sambox-admin-sub"},+ },+ }++ t.Run("OIDC claims role is not blindly trusted without explicit binding", func(t *testing.T) {+ claims := jwt.MapClaims{+ "sub": "attacker-sub",+ "roles": []string{api.RoleRouter, api.RoleSamBox, "unbound-role"},+ }+ roles := resolveRoles("peer-123", claims, bindings)+ for _, r := range roles {+ if r == api.RoleRouter || r == api.RoleSamBox {+ t.Errorf("Security flaw: resolveRoles granted capability role %q from raw OIDC claims without explicit binding", r)+ }+ }+ })++ t.Run("Explicit role mapping in binding grants capability role", func(t *testing.T) {+ claims := jwt.MapClaims{+ "sub": "router-sub",+ "roles": []string{"oidc-router-role"},+ }+ roles := resolveRoles("peer-123", claims, bindings)+ hasRouter := false+ for _, r := range roles {+ if r == api.RoleRouter {+ hasRouter = true+ }+ }+ if !hasRouter {+ t.Errorf("Expected role %q to be granted via explicit role binding mapping", api.RoleRouter)+ }+ })++ t.Run("Group membership grants bound capability role", func(t *testing.T) {+ claims := jwt.MapClaims{+ "sub": "router-user",+ "groups": []string{"routers"},+ }+ roles := resolveRoles("peer-456", claims, bindings)+ hasRouter := false+ for _, r := range roles {+ if r == api.RoleRouter {+ hasRouter = true+ }+ }+ if !hasRouter {+ t.Errorf("Expected role %q to be granted via group binding", api.RoleRouter)+ }+ })++ t.Run("User sub grants bound capability role", func(t *testing.T) {+ claims := jwt.MapClaims{+ "sub": "sambox-admin-sub",+ }+ roles := resolveRoles("peer-789", claims, bindings)+ hasSamBox := false+ for _, r := range roles {+ if r == api.RoleSamBox {+ hasSamBox = true+ }+ }+ if !hasSamBox {+ t.Errorf("Expected role %q to be granted via user sub binding", api.RoleSamBox)+ }+ })+}diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.goindex 0c2f0a3f..ca62c90b 100644--- a/internal/node/node.go+++ b/internal/node/node.go@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) startKeyPruning(ctx context.Context, gracePeriod time.Durationfunc (n *SamNode) verifyEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) bool {sig := event.Signatureevent.Signature = nil- data, err := proto.Marshal(event)+ data, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)event.Signature = sig // Restoreif err != nil {logger.Errorf("[Mesh Event] Failed to marshal event for verification: %v", err)diff --git a/internal/node/policy.go b/internal/node/policy.goindex 74d42f33..6c667e4c 100644--- a/internal/node/policy.go+++ b/internal/node/policy.go@@ -50,61 +50,13 @@ func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*api.PolicyRole, bindings []*api.PolicyBinding) []roleName := role.Namefor _, svc := range role.AllowedServices {- svcType, svcName := api.ParseServiceTarget(svc)-- if svcType == "*" && svcName == "*" {- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- } else if svcName == "*" {- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedServiceAll,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(svcType)},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- } else if strings.HasPrefix(svcName, "*.") {- suffix := svcName[1:]- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedServiceSuffix,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(svcType), biscuit.String(suffix)},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- } else if strings.HasSuffix(svcName, ".*") {- prefix := svcName[:len(svcName)-1]- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedServicePrefix,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(svcType), biscuit.String(prefix)},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- } else {- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedServiceExact,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(svcType), biscuit.String(svcName)},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- }+ fact := api.BuildServiceDatalogFact(svc)+ rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{+ Head: fact.Predicate,+ Body: []biscuit.Predicate{+ {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},+ },+ })}hasUnrestricted := false@@ -145,36 +97,13 @@ func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*api.PolicyRole, bindings []*api.PolicyBinding) []if t == "*" {continue}-- // Try to parse as fact:value- parts := strings.SplitN(t, ":", 2)- if len(parts) == 2 {- factName := parts[0]- factVal := parts[1]- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedTargetExact,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(factName), biscuit.String(factVal)},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- } else {- // Fallback, if it doesn't have a colon, we'll just treat it as an unrestricted node check?- // Wait, earlier tests might use "node:foo", or maybe just a peerID?- // For compatibility, if no colon, assume it's a domain/prefix check?- // Actually, Phase 2 tests mostly use FactGrantedTargetExact.- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{- Head: biscuit.Predicate{- Name: api.FactGrantedTargetExact,- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String("node"), biscuit.String(t)},- },- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},- },- })- }+ fact := api.BuildTargetDatalogFact(t)+ rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{+ Head: fact.Predicate,+ Body: []biscuit.Predicate{+ {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},+ },+ })}for _, dl := range role.CustomDatalog {diff --git a/internal/router/router.go b/internal/router/router.goindex a6696706..10b42620 100644--- a/internal/router/router.go+++ b/internal/router/router.go@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ func (r *Router) getTrustedPublicKeys() []ed25519.PublicKey {func (r *Router) verifyEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) bool {sig := event.Signatureevent.Signature = nil- data, err := proto.Marshal(event)+ data, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)event.Signature = sigif err != nil {logger.Errorf("[Router Event] Failed to marshal event for verification: %v", err)