Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
Refactor policy bindings to use strongly-typed 'members' array
Antonio Ojea3be2f2944070
diff --git a/.github/k8s/sam-hub-template.yaml b/.github/k8s/sam-hub-template.yamlindex a72da18a..1178884d 100644--- a/.github/k8s/sam-hub-template.yaml+++ b/.github/k8s/sam-hub-template.yaml@@ -111,14 +111,21 @@ data:policies.yaml: |version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - user: "system:serviceaccount:sam-canary-${ENV_NAME}:sam-node-sa"+ - members: ["user:system:serviceaccount:sam-canary-${ENV_NAME}:sam-node-sa"]role: "sam-canary"+ - members: ["system:authenticated"]+ role: "public-mesh"roles:sam-canary:allowed_services:- "*"allowed_targets:- "*"+ public-mesh:+ allowed_services:+ - "system://sam.catalog"+ allowed_targets:+ - "*"---apiVersion: monitoring.googleapis.com/v1kind: PodMonitoringdiff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.goindex aebf4fb6..d13a92ee 100644--- a/api/datalog.go+++ b/api/datalog.go@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ import (// If target_unrestricted is present, target checking succeeds immediately.// Otherwise, it requires a matching allow_network_target rule to succeed.//-// For a high-level overview of policy translation and schemas, see the-// documentation in site/content/docs/development/policy.md.-//// ============================================================================// Biscuit fact names represent the Datalog predicates used in auth tokens and policy evaluation.@@ -214,12 +211,25 @@ var (func init() {// 1. Service Allow PoliciespolicyStrs := []string{+ // Exact Match: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_exact fact+ // that perfectly matches both the protocol type (e.g. "mcp") and the service name (e.g. "calculator").fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s($type, $name)`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceExact),++ // Prefix Match: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_prefix fact+ // for the given protocol type, and the requested service name starts with that prefix.fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s($type, $prefix), $name.starts_with($prefix)`, FactService, FactGrantedServicePrefix),++ // Suffix Match: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_suffix fact+ // for the given protocol type, and the requested service name ends with that suffix.fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s($type, $suffix), $name.ends_with($suffix)`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceSuffix),++ // Type Wildcard: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_all fact+ // for the given protocol type, granting access to ANY service name within that namespace.fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s($type)`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceAll),++ // Global Wildcard: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_all_types fact,+ // granting access to literally any service in any namespace (equivalent to '*').fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s()`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceAllTypes),- fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s(%q, "%s")`, FactService, SystemNamespace, CatalogTarget),}for i, pStr := range policyStrs {@@ -233,10 +243,19 @@ func init() {// 2. Target Evaluation Rules// These rules satisfy the check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) injected by the Hub.ruleStrs := []string{+ // Exact Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_exact fact matching a target_fact exactly.fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s($fact, $val)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetExact),++ // Prefix Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_prefix fact and the target_fact value starts with that prefix.fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s($fact, $prefix), $val.starts_with($prefix)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetPrefix),++ // Suffix Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_suffix fact and the target_fact value ends with that suffix.fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s($fact, $suffix), $val.ends_with($suffix)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetSuffix),++ // Wildcard Fact Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_all fact for a specific fact name (e.g. all values for "group").fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s($fact)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetAll),++ // Global Wildcard Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_all_facts fact, unconditionally allowing any target_fact.fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s()`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetAllFacts),}@@ -249,16 +268,23 @@ func init() {}var err error++ // BaselineReplayCheck prevents token theft/replay by ensuring the client_peer_id fact (embedded by the Hub during issuance)+ // perfectly matches the connection_peer_id fact (provided by the local node verifying the incoming libp2p connection).BaselineReplayCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($id), %s($id)`, FactClientPeerID, FactConnectionPeerID))if err != nil {panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse replay check: %v", err))}+ // BaselineTargetCheck enforces network target restrictions. The token must either have an unrestricted target,+ // or one of the Target Evaluation Rules must have successfully derived an allow_network_target fact.BaselineTargetCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($fact, $val) or %s()`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetUnrestricted))if err != nil {panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse target check: %v", err))}+ // OIDC Claims to Target Facts: Maps dynamically generated OIDC facts (like `user("alice")`)+ // into standard `target_fact("user", "alice")` facts for unified evaluation against network target policies.for _, val := range OIDCClaimToFact() {ruleStr := fmt.Sprintf(`%s(%q, $val) <- %s($val)`, FactTargetFact, val, val)r, err := parser.FromStringRule(ruleStr)@@ -268,17 +294,23 @@ func init() {TargetFactRules = append(TargetFactRules, r)}+ // Node PeerID Target Fact: Ensures the target node's PeerID is also evaluated as a standard target_fact.r, err := parser.FromStringRule(fmt.Sprintf(`%s(%q, $val) <- %s($val)`, FactTargetFact, FactNode, FactNode))if err != nil {panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse node fact rule: %v", err))}TargetFactRules = append(TargetFactRules, r)+ // HubStaticTimeCheck ensures the token is not expired at the time of evaluation.HubStaticTimeCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($time), %s($exp), $time <= $exp`, FactTime, FactExpiration))if err != nil {panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse static time check: %v", err))}+ // AllowIfTruePolicy is a permissive fallback policy used when explicit local node policies are omitted.+ // Note that this does NOT mean all requests are automatically allowed. Biscuit requires at least one policy+ // to evaluate to true AND all checks to pass. This simply satisfies the policy requirement, effectively+ // deferring entirely to the Hub's checks and granted facts without imposing extra local restrictions.AllowIfTruePolicy, err = parser.FromStringPolicy("allow if true")if err != nil {panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse static allow policy: %v", err))diff --git a/api/datalog_test.go b/api/datalog_test.goindex 4171bd1f..7d3bb3bd 100644--- a/api/datalog_test.go+++ b/api/datalog_test.go@@ -114,12 +114,6 @@ func TestBaselinePolicies(t *testing.T) {requestTarget: "mcp://calculator",expectAllow: true,},- {- name: "System catalog is always allowed",- tokenFacts: []biscuit.Fact{},- requestTarget: "system://sam.catalog",- expectAllow: true,- },}for _, tt := range tests {diff --git a/api/policy.go b/api/policy.goindex 1f059ef8..1fb94c73 100644--- a/api/policy.go+++ b/api/policy.go@@ -14,6 +14,21 @@package api+const (+ // SystemAuthenticated is a special member string representing any authenticated user.+ SystemAuthenticated = "system:authenticated"+)++var (+ // ValidMemberPrefixes defines the allowed identity prefixes in policy configuration.+ ValidMemberPrefixes = map[string]struct{}{+ FactUser: {},+ FactGroup: {},+ FactEmail: {},+ FactNode: {},+ }+)+// PolicyConfig is the root authorization configuration for the SAM Hub.type PolicyConfig struct {Version string `yaml:"version"`@@ -22,10 +37,8 @@ type PolicyConfig struct {}type Binding struct {- Group string `yaml:"group,omitempty"`- User string `yaml:"user,omitempty"`- Email string `yaml:"email,omitempty"`- Role string `yaml:"role"`+ Role string `yaml:"role"`+ Members []string `yaml:"members"` // format: "type:value" e.g. "user:alice", "group:eng"}// RolePolicy defines the capabilities granted to a specific authorization role.diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit.go b/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit.goindex 1b98713a..49b368bd 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit.go@@ -46,23 +46,40 @@ func (h *Hub) mintBiscuitToken(claims jwt.MapClaims, token *oidc.IDToken, remote// Resolve roles based on configured bindings and explicit OIDC rolesresolvedRoles := make(map[string]bool)if h.Policy != nil {- // 1. Map OIDC groups, users, and emails to roles via configured bindings (RBAC mapping)+ // 1. Evaluate explicit Policy Bindingsfor _, b := range h.Policy.Bindings {- if b.Group != "" {- for _, cg := range oidcGroups {- if b.Group == cg {- resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true- }- }- }- if b.User != "" && oidcSub != "" {- if b.User == oidcSub {+ for _, member := range b.Members {+ if member == api.SystemAuthenticated {resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true+ break}- }- if b.Email != "" && oidcEmail != "" {- if b.Email == oidcEmail {- resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true++ parts := strings.SplitN(member, ":", 2)+ if len(parts) != 2 {+ continue // validated at startup, but ignore if broken+ }+ prefix := parts[0]+ value := parts[1]++ switch prefix {+ case "group":+ for _, cg := range oidcGroups {+ if value == cg {+ resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true+ }+ }+ case "user":+ if oidcSub != "" && value == oidcSub {+ resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true+ }+ case "email":+ if oidcEmail != "" && value == oidcEmail {+ resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true+ }+ case "node":+ if value == remotePeer.String() {+ resolvedRoles[b.Role] = true+ }}}}diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_benchmark_test.go b/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_benchmark_test.goindex a582b2f9..22ad11f7 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_benchmark_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_benchmark_test.go@@ -40,10 +40,7 @@ func BenchmarkMintBiscuitToken(b *testing.B) {KeyRing: kr,Policy: &api.PolicyConfig{Bindings: []api.Binding{- {- Group: "engineering",- Role: "developer-role",- },+ {Role: "developer-role", Members: []string{"group:engineering"}},},Roles: map[string]api.RolePolicy{"developer-role": {diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_test.go b/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_test.goindex 61dc473b..d34e9a4b 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/biscuit_test.go@@ -44,14 +44,8 @@ func TestMintBiscuitToken(t *testing.T) {KeyRing: kr,Policy: &api.PolicyConfig{Bindings: []api.Binding{- {- Group: "system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary",- Role: "canary-role",- },- {- User: "system:serviceaccount:sam-canary:sam-node-sa",- Role: "canary-role",- },+ {Role: "canary-role", Members: []string{"group:system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary"}},+ {Role: "canary-role", Members: []string{"user:system:serviceaccount:sam-canary:sam-node-sa"}},},Roles: map[string]api.RolePolicy{"admin": {@@ -292,10 +286,7 @@ func TestMintBiscuitToken_ClaimsTranslation(t *testing.T) {KeyRing: kr,Policy: &api.PolicyConfig{Bindings: []api.Binding{- {- Group: "engineering",- Role: "developer-role",- },+ {Role: "developer-role", Members: []string{"group:engineering"}},},Roles: map[string]api.RolePolicy{"developer-role": {@@ -473,10 +464,7 @@ func TestMintBiscuitToken_VariousClaimsTypes(t *testing.T) {KeyRing: kr,Policy: &api.PolicyConfig{Bindings: []api.Binding{- {- Group: "eng-group",- Role: "eng-role",- },+ {Role: "eng-role", Members: []string{"group:eng-group"}},},Roles: map[string]api.RolePolicy{"admin": {},diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config.goindex 1885a0ad..6f08b8ef 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config.go@@ -51,23 +51,24 @@ func LoadPolicyConfig(path string) (*api.PolicyConfig, error) {// ValidatePolicyConfig ensures that no wildcards are used in policies, and that all referenced roles in bindings exist.func ValidatePolicyConfig(config *api.PolicyConfig) error {for _, b := range config.Bindings {- if b.Group == "" && b.User == "" && b.Email == "" {- return fmt.Errorf("binding must specify either 'group', 'user', or 'email'")+ if len(b.Members) == 0 {+ return fmt.Errorf("binding must specify at least one member")}- // A binding should only specify one of them- count := 0- if b.Group != "" {- count++- }- if b.User != "" {- count++- }- if b.Email != "" {- count++- }- if count > 1 {- return fmt.Errorf("binding cannot specify multiple identities (group/user/email) concurrently")++ for _, member := range b.Members {+ if member == api.SystemAuthenticated {+ continue+ }+ parts := strings.SplitN(member, ":", 2)+ if len(parts) != 2 {+ return fmt.Errorf("member %q is invalid, must be in format 'type:value' or '%s'", member, api.SystemAuthenticated)+ }+ prefix := parts[0]+ if _, validPrefix := api.ValidMemberPrefixes[prefix]; !validPrefix {+ return fmt.Errorf("member prefix %q is invalid, expected one of the standard identity facts (e.g., user, group, email, node)", prefix)+ }}+if b.Role == "" {return fmt.Errorf("binding role cannot be empty")}diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.goindex 2875ced9..0b4d6135 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ roles:yamlContent: `version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - group: "system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary-bananas"+ - members: ["group:system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary-bananas"]role: "mesh-member"roles:mesh-member:@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ roles:if len(config.Bindings) != 1 {t.Errorf("expected 1 binding, got %d", len(config.Bindings))}- if config.Bindings[0].Group != "system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary-bananas" || config.Bindings[0].Role != "mesh-member" {+ if len(config.Bindings[0].Members) == 0 || config.Bindings[0].Members[0] != "group:system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary-bananas" || config.Bindings[0].Role != "mesh-member" {t.Errorf("unexpected binding values: %+v", config.Bindings[0])}},@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ roles:yamlContent: `version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - group: "system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary-bananas"+ - members: ["group:system:serviceaccounts:sam-canary-bananas"]role: "non-existent-role"roles:mesh-member:@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ roles:yamlContent: `version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - user: "system:serviceaccount:sam-canary:sam-node-sa"+ - members: ["user:system:serviceaccount:sam-canary:sam-node-sa"]role: "mesh-member"roles:mesh-member:@@ -145,13 +145,13 @@ roles:if len(config.Bindings) != 1 {t.Errorf("expected 1 binding, got %d", len(config.Bindings))}- if config.Bindings[0].User != "system:serviceaccount:sam-canary:sam-node-sa" || config.Bindings[0].Role != "mesh-member" {+ if len(config.Bindings[0].Members) == 0 || config.Bindings[0].Members[0] != "user:system:serviceaccount:sam-canary:sam-node-sa" || config.Bindings[0].Role != "mesh-member" {t.Errorf("unexpected binding values: %+v", config.Bindings[0])}},},{- name: "Invalid binding with both group and user missing",+ name: "Invalid binding with no members",yamlContent: `version: "v1alpha1"bindings:@@ -163,12 +163,45 @@ roles:wantErr: true,},{- name: "Invalid binding with both group and user populated",+ name: "Invalid binding with invalid prefix",yamlContent: `version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - group: "some-group"- user: "some-user"+ - members: ["invalid-prefix:some-user"]+ role: "mesh-member"+roles:+ mesh-member:+ allowed_services: ["mcp://1.0.0"]+`,+ wantErr: true,+ },+ {+ name: "Valid binding with all valid member prefixes",+ yamlContent: `+version: "v1alpha1"+bindings:+ - members: ["user:bob", "group:eng", "email:[email protected]", "node:12D3KooW", "system:authenticated"]+ role: "mesh-member"+roles:+ mesh-member:+ allowed_services: ["mcp://1.0.0"]+`,+ wantErr: false,+ verify: func(t *testing.T, config *api.PolicyConfig) {+ if len(config.Bindings) != 1 {+ t.Errorf("expected 1 binding, got %d", len(config.Bindings))+ }+ if len(config.Bindings[0].Members) != 5 {+ t.Errorf("expected 5 members, got %d", len(config.Bindings[0].Members))+ }+ },+ },+ {+ name: "Invalid binding missing colon in member string",+ yamlContent: `+version: "v1alpha1"+bindings:+ - members: ["userbob"]role: "mesh-member"roles:mesh-member:diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/mcp_handlers_test.go b/cmd/sam-node/mcp_handlers_test.goindex 7d9c3e4a..fbedeeaf 100644--- a/cmd/sam-node/mcp_handlers_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-node/mcp_handlers_test.go@@ -362,11 +362,9 @@ func buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, allowreturn err}for _, svc := range allowedServices {- parts := strings.SplitN(svc, ":", 2)- opType := parts[0]- opName := "*"- if len(parts) > 1 {- opName = parts[1]+ opType, opName := api.ParseServiceTarget(svc)+ if opName == "" {+ opName = "*"}if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "granted_service_exact",@@ -405,9 +403,8 @@ func TestFetchRemoteToolCatalogue_AuthRejected(t *testing.T) {t.Fatal(err)}- // Create a biscuit that DOES NOT allow "summarizer", only "some_other_service".- // By baseline rules, it will STILL allow the catalog fetch.- if err := buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(nodeA, rootPrivEd, []string{"some_other_service"}); err != nil {+ // Create a biscuit that DOES NOT allow "summarizer", only "some_other_service" and "system://sam.catalog".+ if err := buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(nodeA, rootPrivEd, []string{"mcp://some_other_service", "system://sam.catalog"}); err != nil {t.Fatalf("buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit: %v", err)}diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go b/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.goindex 142fcd6b..e3f01c3a 100644--- a/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go@@ -198,15 +198,7 @@ func TestBaselineRules(t *testing.T) {target: "mcp://anything",expectSuccess: true,},- {- name: "Baseline Rule 3: Catalog Target",- mintToken: func(t *testing.T, builder biscuit.Builder) {- // No specific allowed_service facts needed- },- protocol: api.CatalogTarget, // "catalog"- target: "system://" + api.CatalogTarget,- expectSuccess: true,- },+{name: "Baseline Rule 4: Type Wildcard",mintToken: func(t *testing.T, builder biscuit.Builder) {diff --git a/site/content/docs/development/policy.md b/site/content/docs/development/policy.mdindex 442d6d1e..ee6c6201 100644--- a/site/content/docs/development/policy.md+++ b/site/content/docs/development/policy.md@@ -223,21 +223,21 @@ version: "v1alpha1"# so they must be bound explicitly using their 'user' claim format.bindings:# 1. Global Admins (Infrastructure SAs, Lead Architects)- - user: "system:serviceaccount:sam-mesh:admin-sa"+ - members: ["user:system:serviceaccount:sam-mesh:admin-sa"]role: "admin"- - group: "infrastructure-leads"+ - members: ["group:infrastructure-leads"]role: "admin"# 2. Software Developers- - group: "software-engineering-team"+ - members: ["group:software-engineering-team"]role: "developer"# 3. Data Scientists & AI Engineers- - group: "data-science-team"+ - members: ["group:data-science-team"]role: "data-scientist"# 4. Contractors / Read-Only Audits- - email: "[email protected]"+ - members: ["email:[email protected]"]role: "auditor"# Roles define the allowed destinations (allowed_targets) and tools (allowed_services)diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/hub-configuration.md b/site/content/docs/user/hub-configuration.mdindex 10fa348b..1ba1742e 100644--- a/site/content/docs/user/hub-configuration.md+++ b/site/content/docs/user/hub-configuration.md@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ roles:# Bind OIDC user subs, emails, or group claims to rolesbindings:- - email: "[email protected]"+ - members: ["email:[email protected]"]role: "admin-role"- - user: "auth0|123456"+ - members: ["user:auth0|123456"]role: "admin-role"- - group: "eng-team"+ - members: ["group:eng-team"]role: "developer-role"```diff --git a/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md b/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.mdindex 592e9ef7..e8b11a6a 100644--- a/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md+++ b/site/content/docs/user/kubernetes-deployment.md@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ data:policies.yaml: |version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - user: "system:serviceaccount:sam-nodes:sam-node-sa"+ - members: ["user:system:serviceaccount:sam-nodes:sam-node-sa"]role: "node-role"roles:node-role:diff --git a/tests/e2e/fixtures/default-policy.yaml b/tests/e2e/fixtures/default-policy.yamlindex 9d1c5c3c..8cd17c22 100644--- a/tests/e2e/fixtures/default-policy.yaml+++ b/tests/e2e/fixtures/default-policy.yaml@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@version: v1alpha1bindings:- - group: "*"+ - members: ["group:*"]role: adminroles:admin:diff --git a/tests/e2e/fixtures/sam-hub.yaml b/tests/e2e/fixtures/sam-hub.yamlindex 2a99bcbf..1d49a689 100644--- a/tests/e2e/fixtures/sam-hub.yaml+++ b/tests/e2e/fixtures/sam-hub.yaml@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ data:policy.yaml: |version: v1alpha1bindings:- - user: "system:serviceaccount:default:sam-node-sa"+ - members: ["user:system:serviceaccount:default:sam-node-sa"]role: admin- - group: "data-scientist"+ - members: ["group:data-scientist"]role: mesh-member- - group: "admin"+ - members: ["group:admin"]role: admin- - user: "admin-user"+ - members: ["user:admin-user"]role: adminroles:admin:@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ data:- "mcp://db-agent"- "mcp://http-tool"- "mcp://stdio-tool"+ - "system://sam.catalog"allowed_targets:- "*"---diff --git a/tests/integration/federation_test.go b/tests/integration/federation_test.goindex 6a1add8e..f8a47ca7 100644--- a/tests/integration/federation_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/federation_test.go@@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ func TestHubFederationAndRelay(t *testing.T) {policyFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "policies.yaml")policyContent := `version: "v1alpha1"bindings:- - user: mock-user+ - members: ["user:mock-user"]role: adminroles:admin:allowed_services:- "mcp://*"+ - "system://sam.catalog"`if err := os.WriteFile(policyFile, []byte(policyContent), 0644); err != nil {t.Fatal(err)diff --git a/tests/integration/local_policy_test.go b/tests/integration/local_policy_test.goindex 01bd4588..1694fddc 100644--- a/tests/integration/local_policy_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/local_policy_test.go@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ roles:allowed_targets: []bindings:- role: none- user: "unprivileged-user"+ members: ["user:unprivileged-user"]- role: none- user: "nodeB-user"+ members: ["user:nodeB-user"]`if err := os.WriteFile(hubPolicyFile, []byte(hubPolicyYAML), 0644); err != nil {t.Fatal(err)@@ -185,9 +185,9 @@ roles:allowed_targets: ["group:admin-only"]bindings:- role: restricted-role- user: "client-user"+ members: ["user:client-user"]- role: restricted-role- user: "nodeB-user"+ members: ["user:nodeB-user"]`if err := os.WriteFile(hubPolicyFile, []byte(hubPolicyYAML), 0644); err != nil {t.Fatal(err)diff --git a/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go b/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.goindex 610fe544..29a98bbc 100644--- a/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/policy_permutations_test.go@@ -100,17 +100,17 @@ roles:bindings:- role: role-user- user: "bob-subject"+ members: ["user:bob-subject"]- role: role-email- email: "[email protected]"+ members: ["email:[email protected]"]- role: role-group- group: "eng-team"+ members: ["group:eng-team"]- role: role-node- user: "node-user"+ members: ["user:node-user"]- role: admin- user: "admin-user"+ members: ["user:admin-user"]- role: admin- user: "nodeB"+ members: ["user:nodeB"]`if err := os.WriteFile(hubPolicyFile, []byte(hubPolicyYAML), 0644); err != nil {t.Fatal(err)