Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
api, docs: actor_node is half of the request binding
Ignacio Janeiro615aa3827d91
diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.goindex 32989f5b..d2728df6 100644--- a/api/datalog.go+++ b/api/datalog.go@@ -84,8 +84,10 @@ const (// a Biscuit the control plane mints at /oauth/*, it is the node whose// credential came with the request, or else the actor_peer_id the client// named (checked only for admission) or the control plane's own peer ID. It- // is for audit logs and for ext_proc attributes["mesh"].actor_node. It grants- // nothing: no baseline rule and no policy binding reads it.+ // is for audit logs, for ext_proc attributes["mesh"].actor_node, and,+ // together with client_peer_id, for the authority-block request binding+ // (identity.RequireAuthorityRequestBinding). No baseline rule and no policy+ // binding reads it, so it grants nothing.FactActorNode = "actor_node"// FactGroup defines the group claim extracted from the OIDC token.diff --git a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.mdindex 8e1bad3f..1b5fe9d5 100644--- a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md+++ b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md@@ -307,11 +307,13 @@ minted statelessly on the control plane with zero database writes:node's libp2p connection (`check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`),so an exfiltrated token cannot be replayed from another peer.- `actor_node("<origin_node_peer_id>")` records the acting node for audit logs- and `ext_proc` attributes: the node that called `POST /token/exchange`. For- `POST /oauth/token` it is the node whose credential came with the request, or- else a claimed peer: the `actor_peer_id` the client named (checked only for- admission) or the control plane's own peer ID. No policy rule grants- permissions on `actor_node`.+ and `ext_proc` attributes and, together with `client_peer_id`, binds a token+ without `node()` to the presenting peer (`identity.RequireAuthorityRequestBinding`).+ It is the node that called `POST /token/exchange`. For `POST /oauth/token` it+ is the node whose credential came with the request, or else a claimed peer:+ the `actor_peer_id` the client named (checked only for admission) or the+ control plane's own peer ID. No policy rule grants permissions on+ `actor_node`.- `user(...)`, `email(...)`, `group(...)`, `idp_role(...)`, and `role(...)` areresolved strictly from the caller's `subject_token`.- No `node()` fact is minted, which prevents `node:<peer_id>` policy bindings on