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Agent Mesh

api, docs: actor_node is half of the request binding

Ignacio Janeiro615aa3827d91
diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.go
index 32989f5b..d2728df6 100644
--- a/api/datalog.go
+++ b/api/datalog.go
@@ -84,8 +84,10 @@ const (
// a Biscuit the control plane mints at /oauth/*, it is the node whose
// credential came with the request, or else the actor_peer_id the client
// named (checked only for admission) or the control plane's own peer ID. It
- // is for audit logs and for ext_proc attributes["mesh"].actor_node. It grants
- // nothing: no baseline rule and no policy binding reads it.
+ // is for audit logs, for ext_proc attributes["mesh"].actor_node, and,
+ // together with client_peer_id, for the authority-block request binding
+ // (identity.RequireAuthorityRequestBinding). No baseline rule and no policy
+ // binding reads it, so it grants nothing.
FactActorNode = "actor_node"
// FactGroup defines the group claim extracted from the OIDC token.
diff --git a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md
index 8e1bad3f..1b5fe9d5 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md
@@ -307,11 +307,13 @@ minted statelessly on the control plane with zero database writes:
node's libp2p connection (`check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`),
so an exfiltrated token cannot be replayed from another peer.
- `actor_node("<origin_node_peer_id>")` records the acting node for audit logs
- and `ext_proc` attributes: the node that called `POST /token/exchange`. For
- `POST /oauth/token` it is the node whose credential came with the request, or
- else a claimed peer: the `actor_peer_id` the client named (checked only for
- admission) or the control plane's own peer ID. No policy rule grants
- permissions on `actor_node`.
+ and `ext_proc` attributes and, together with `client_peer_id`, binds a token
+ without `node()` to the presenting peer (`identity.RequireAuthorityRequestBinding`).
+ It is the node that called `POST /token/exchange`. For `POST /oauth/token` it
+ is the node whose credential came with the request, or else a claimed peer:
+ the `actor_peer_id` the client named (checked only for admission) or the
+ control plane's own peer ID. No policy rule grants permissions on
+ `actor_node`.
- `user(...)`, `email(...)`, `group(...)`, `idp_role(...)`, and `role(...)` are
resolved strictly from the caller's `subject_token`.
- No `node()` fact is minted, which prevents `node:<peer_id>` policy bindings on