Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
test: cover the logout deletion cookie and forged-token claims
Antonio Ojea6859ce081d97
diff --git a/internal/console/server_test.go b/internal/console/server_test.goindex 0c42211f..f41f324c 100644--- a/internal/console/server_test.go+++ b/internal/console/server_test.go@@ -528,6 +528,51 @@ func TestHandleTokenLogin(t *testing.T) {})}+// A deletion cookie must carry the same attributes as the cookie it clears,+// or browsers may keep the original session cookie alive after logout.+func TestHandleLogoutCookieAttributes(t *testing.T) {+ controlPlane := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)+ }))+ defer controlPlane.Close()++ srv, err := NewServer(Config{+ ControlPlaneURL: controlPlane.URL,+ AdminToken: "test-admin-token",+ StaticDir: t.TempDir(),+ BasePath: "/console",+ })+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to create server: %v", err)+ }++ req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/console/auth/logout", nil)+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ srv.HandleLogout(rec, req)++ var cookie *http.Cookie+ for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {+ if c.Name == "sam_session" {+ cookie = c+ }+ }+ if cookie == nil {+ t.Fatal("logout did not set a sam_session deletion cookie")+ }+ if cookie.MaxAge >= 0 {+ t.Errorf("MaxAge = %d, want negative to delete the cookie", cookie.MaxAge)+ }+ if !cookie.HttpOnly {+ t.Error("deletion cookie is not HttpOnly, unlike the session cookie it clears")+ }+ if cookie.SameSite != http.SameSiteLaxMode {+ t.Errorf("SameSite = %v, want Lax to match the session cookie", cookie.SameSite)+ }+ if cookie.Path != "/console/" {+ t.Errorf("cookie path = %q, want %q", cookie.Path, "/console/")+ }+}+// BasePath is concatenated into cookie paths, redirect URLs and mux patterns, so malformed// flag values (trailing slash, missing leading slash) must be normalized where the flag is read.func TestNormalizeBasePath(t *testing.T) {diff --git a/internal/identity/oidc.go b/internal/identity/oidc.goindex 67df8681..efc821e5 100644--- a/internal/identity/oidc.go+++ b/internal/identity/oidc.go@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ func VerifyJWT(ctx context.Context, jwtStr string, allowedAudiences []string, pr// Return claims decoded from the verified token, not the unverified// pre-parse used above only to route to the right issuer.- verifiedClaims := jwt.MapClaims{}+ var verifiedClaims jwt.MapClaimsif err := token.Claims(&verifiedClaims); err != nil {return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode verified claims: %w", err)}diff --git a/internal/identity/oidc_test.go b/internal/identity/oidc_test.goindex e418f621..ed9b1f17 100644--- a/internal/identity/oidc_test.go+++ b/internal/identity/oidc_test.go@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import ("math/big""net/http""net/http/httptest"+ "strings""testing""time"@@ -215,4 +216,31 @@ func TestVerifyJWT(t *testing.T) {t.Fatal("expected error for bad signature")}})++ t.Run("tampered payload yields no claims", func(t *testing.T) {+ // Forge a token by swapping the payload of a validly signed token+ // while keeping the original signature: the routing claims still+ // parse, but verification must reject it and no claims may escape.+ tokenStr := signToken(t, key, testKID, validClaims())+ parts := strings.Split(tokenStr, ".")+ forgedClaims := validClaims()+ forgedClaims["sub"] = "attacker"+ payload, err := json.Marshal(forgedClaims)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to marshal forged claims: %v", err)+ }+ parts[1] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)+ forged := strings.Join(parts, ".")++ claims, idToken, err := VerifyJWT(ctx, forged, allowedAudiences, providers)+ if err == nil {+ t.Fatal("expected error for tampered payload")+ }+ if claims != nil {+ t.Fatalf("claims leaked from an unverified token: %v", claims)+ }+ if idToken != nil {+ t.Fatal("ID token returned for an unverified token")+ }+ })}