Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
test(integration): verify identity evidence as owner
Antonio Ojea79e662a7c8bc
diff --git a/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.go b/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.goindex 60a5e188..6c10c377 100644--- a/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.go@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ package integration_testimport ("context"+ "crypto/ed25519"+ "crypto/rand"+ "crypto/x509"+ "encoding/hex"+ "fmt""io""net""net/http"@@ -26,7 +31,10 @@ import ("testing""time"+ "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2"+ "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/datalog""github.com/google/sam/api"+ "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto")@@ -37,7 +45,7 @@ import (// peer evidence before any provider request.func TestIdentityEvidenceOperatorFlow(t *testing.T) {nodeBin := buildBinary(t, "./cmd/sam-node")- _, controlPlaneURL := startMockRouter(t)+ _, controlPlaneURL, pinnedControlPlaneKey := startMockRouterWithControlPlaneKey(t)ownerHome := t.TempDir()providerHome := t.TempDir()@@ -77,18 +85,135 @@ func TestIdentityEvidenceOperatorFlow(t *testing.T) {var local api.IdentityEvidenceResponsegetIdentityEvidenceJSON(t, client, "/sam/identity", &local)- if local.PeerId == "" || len(local.Biscuit) == 0 || len(local.TrustedControlPlaneKeys) == 0 {- t.Fatalf("local identity evidence is incomplete: peer=%q biscuit=%d keys=%d", local.PeerId, len(local.Biscuit), len(local.TrustedControlPlaneKeys))- }- if local.ControlPlaneUrl != controlPlaneURL {- t.Fatalf("control plane URL = %q, want %q", local.ControlPlaneUrl, controlPlaneURL)- }var remote api.PeerEvidenceResponsegetIdentityEvidenceJSON(t, client, "/sam/peer/"+url.PathEscape(providerPeerID.String())+"/evidence", &remote)- if remote.PeerId != providerPeerID.String() || len(remote.Biscuit) == 0 || len(remote.VerifyingKey) == 0 {- t.Fatalf("remote handshake evidence is incomplete: peer=%q biscuit=%d key=%d", remote.PeerId, len(remote.Biscuit), len(remote.VerifyingKey))++ verifyIdentityEvidence(t, controlPlaneURL, pinnedControlPlaneKey, providerPeerID, &local, &remote)+}++// verifyIdentityEvidence models the trust decision of an owner application.+// It has only its pinned control-plane key and the two sidecar responses.+func verifyIdentityEvidence(t *testing.T, controlPlaneURL string, pinnedControlPlaneKey ed25519.PublicKey, expectedProvider peer.ID, local *api.IdentityEvidenceResponse, remote *api.PeerEvidenceResponse) {+ t.Helper()++ if local.ControlPlaneUrl != controlPlaneURL || len(local.Biscuit) == 0 || local.CheckedAt <= 0 || local.BiscuitExpiresAt < local.CheckedAt {+ t.Fatalf("invalid local identity evidence: %+v", local)+ }+ localPeer, err := peer.Decode(local.PeerId)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("decode local PeerID: %v", err)+ }+ trustedKeys := parseEvidenceKeys(t, local.TrustedControlPlaneKeys)+ if !containsEvidenceKey(trustedKeys, pinnedControlPlaneKey) {+ t.Fatal("local response does not contain the independently pinned control-plane key")+ }+ if _, err := verifyBiscuitForApplication(local.Biscuit, localPeer, []ed25519.PublicKey{pinnedControlPlaneKey}); err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("third-party verification of local Biscuit failed: %v", err)+ }++ if remote.PeerId != expectedProvider.String() || len(remote.Biscuit) == 0 || len(remote.VerifyingKey) == 0 || remote.CheckedAt <= 0 || remote.Expiration < remote.CheckedAt || len(remote.RevocationIds) == 0 {+ t.Fatalf("invalid remote identity evidence: %+v", remote)+ }+ if len(remote.Roles) != 1 || remote.Roles[0] != api.RoleNode || len(remote.Labels) != 0 {+ t.Fatalf("unexpected remote claims: roles=%v labels=%v", remote.Roles, remote.Labels)+ }+ remotePeer, err := peer.Decode(remote.PeerId)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("decode remote PeerID: %v", err)+ }+ verifyingKey := parseEvidenceKey(t, remote.VerifyingKey)+ if !containsEvidenceKey(trustedKeys, verifyingKey) {+ t.Fatal("remote verifying key is absent from the local trusted key set")+ }+ verifiedRemote, err := verifyBiscuitForApplication(remote.Biscuit, remotePeer, []ed25519.PublicKey{verifyingKey})+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("third-party verification of remote Biscuit failed: %v", err)+ }+ if !matchesRevocationIDs(remote.RevocationIds, verifiedRemote.RevocationIds()) {+ t.Fatalf("published revocation IDs %v do not match the verified Biscuit", remote.RevocationIds)+ }++ untrustedKey, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("generate unrelated verification key: %v", err)+ }+ if _, err := verifyBiscuitForApplication(remote.Biscuit, remotePeer, []ed25519.PublicKey{untrustedKey}); err == nil {+ t.Fatal("remote Biscuit verified with an unrelated control-plane key")+ }+}++func verifyBiscuitForApplication(encodedBiscuit []byte, expectedPeer peer.ID, trustedKeys []ed25519.PublicKey) (*biscuit.Biscuit, error) {+ parsed, err := biscuit.Unmarshal(encodedBiscuit)+ if err != nil {+ return nil, err+ }+ for _, trustedKey := range trustedKeys {+ authorizer, err := parsed.Authorizer(trustedKey, biscuit.WithWorldOptions(datalog.WithMaxDuration(5*time.Second)))+ if err != nil {+ continue+ }+ authorizer.AddFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: api.FactTime,+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now())},+ }})+ authorizer.AddCheck(api.ControlPlaneStaticTimeCheck)+ authorizer.AddPolicy(api.AllowIfTruePolicy)+ if err := authorizer.Authorize(); err != nil {+ continue+ }+ boundPeer := biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: api.FactNode,+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(expectedPeer.String())},+ }}+ if _, err := parsed.GetBlockID(boundPeer); err == nil {+ return parsed, nil+ }+ }+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("Biscuit is not valid for peer %s and the configured control-plane keys", expectedPeer)+}++func parseEvidenceKeys(t *testing.T, encodedKeys [][]byte) []ed25519.PublicKey {+ t.Helper()+ keys := make([]ed25519.PublicKey, 0, len(encodedKeys))+ for _, encodedKey := range encodedKeys {+ keys = append(keys, parseEvidenceKey(t, encodedKey))+ }+ return keys+}++func parseEvidenceKey(t *testing.T, encodedKey []byte) ed25519.PublicKey {+ t.Helper()+ parsed, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(encodedKey)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("parse control-plane SPKI: %v", err)+ }+ key, ok := parsed.(ed25519.PublicKey)+ if !ok {+ t.Fatalf("control-plane SPKI has type %T, want Ed25519", parsed)+ }+ return key+}++func containsEvidenceKey(keys []ed25519.PublicKey, expected ed25519.PublicKey) bool {+ for _, key := range keys {+ if key.Equal(expected) {+ return true+ }+ }+ return false+}++func matchesRevocationIDs(published []string, rawIDs [][]byte) bool {+ if len(published) != len(rawIDs) {+ return false+ }+ for index, rawID := range rawIDs {+ if published[index] != hex.EncodeToString(rawID) {+ return false+ }}+ return true}func identityEvidenceSocketClient(socketPath string) *http.Client {diff --git a/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go b/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.goindex 9e177bdd..9a15d735 100644--- a/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go@@ -211,6 +211,11 @@ func runCommandWithCallback(}func startMockRouter(t *testing.T) (peer.ID, string) {+ routerID, controlPlaneURL, _ := startMockRouterWithControlPlaneKey(t)+ return routerID, controlPlaneURL+}++func startMockRouterWithControlPlaneKey(t *testing.T) (peer.ID, string, ed25519.PublicKey) {t.Helper()pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)@@ -288,7 +293,7 @@ func startMockRouter(t *testing.T) (peer.ID, string) {_ = h.Close()})- return h.ID(), httpServer.URL+ return h.ID(), httpServer.URL, pub}func startMockRouterWithOIDC(t *testing.T, oidcIssuerURL string) (peer.ID, string) {