Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
fix: address PR review on Model Armor DNS SSRF and AllowedTargets peer ID canonicalization
Antonio Ojea7bd48bdb3b5d
diff --git a/api/policy_rules.go b/api/policy_rules.goindex b7b6b1a7..b66a2849 100644--- a/api/policy_rules.go+++ b/api/policy_rules.go@@ -237,10 +237,19 @@ func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*PolicyRole, bindings []*PolicyBinding) (rules []Pwarnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("Role %s target %q has invalid characters and is skipped", roleName, t))continue}- if tFact, tVal := ParseServiceTarget(t); tVal == "" || (tFact != "" && ValidateLabelKey(tFact) != nil) {+ tFact, tVal := ParseServiceTarget(t)+ if tVal == "" || (tFact != "" && ValidateLabelKey(tFact) != nil) {warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("Role %s target %q has invalid format and is skipped", roleName, t))continue}+ if tFact == FactNode && tVal != "*" {+ pID, err := peer.Decode(tVal)+ if err != nil {+ warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("Role %s target %q has invalid Peer ID and is skipped", roleName, t))+ continue+ }+ t = tFact + ":" + pID.String()+ }nonWildcardTargets = append(nonWildcardTargets, t)}if hasUnrestricted {diff --git a/api/policy_rules_test.go b/api/policy_rules_test.goindex 900708cb..bd0315de 100644--- a/api/policy_rules_test.go+++ b/api/policy_rules_test.go@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func TestBuildPolicyRules(t *testing.T) {roles := []*PolicyRole{{Name: "test-role",- AllowedTargets: []string{"*", "node:peer-abc", "custom-fact:custom-val", "legacy-peer"},+ AllowedTargets: []string{"*", "node:" + nodeCID, "node:not-a-peer-id", "custom-fact:custom-val", "legacy-peer"},AllowedServices: []string{"*:*", "mcp:*", "mcp:*.suffix", "mcp:prefix.*", "mcp:exact"},CustomDatalog: []string{"custom_rule($x) <- fact($x), $x > 3;",@@ -58,20 +58,20 @@ func TestBuildPolicyRules(t *testing.T) {rules, warnings := BuildPolicyRules(roles, bindings)expectedStrings := map[string]bool{- "role(\"test-role\") <- true": false,- "role(\"test-role\") <- user(\"alice\")": false,- "role(\"test-role\") <- node(\"" + nodeID + "\")": false,- "granted_service_all_types(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "granted_service_all(\"mcp\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "granted_service_suffix(\"mcp\", \".suffix\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "granted_service_prefix(\"mcp\", \"prefix.\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "granted_service_set(\"mcp\", [\"exact\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "target_unrestricted(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "target_restricted(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "granted_target_set(\"node\", [\"legacy-peer\", \"peer-abc\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "granted_target_set(\"custom-fact\", [\"custom-val\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,- "custom_rule($x) <- role(\"test-role\"), fact($x), $x > 3": false,- "custom_fact(\"hello\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "role(\"test-role\") <- true": false,+ "role(\"test-role\") <- user(\"alice\")": false,+ "role(\"test-role\") <- node(\"" + nodeID + "\")": false,+ "granted_service_all_types(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "granted_service_all(\"mcp\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "granted_service_suffix(\"mcp\", \".suffix\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "granted_service_prefix(\"mcp\", \"prefix.\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "granted_service_set(\"mcp\", [\"exact\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "target_unrestricted(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "target_restricted(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "granted_target_set(\"node\", [\"" + nodeID + "\", \"legacy-peer\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "granted_target_set(\"custom-fact\", [\"custom-val\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,+ "custom_rule($x) <- role(\"test-role\"), fact($x), $x > 3": false,+ "custom_fact(\"hello\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,}for _, rule := range rules {@@ -92,11 +92,11 @@ func TestBuildPolicyRules(t *testing.T) {}}- if len(warnings) != 2 {- t.Fatalf("warnings = %q, want one for the unparseable entry and one for the bad peer ID", warnings)+ if len(warnings) != 3 {+ t.Fatalf("warnings = %q, want one for the unparseable entry and two for the bad peer IDs", warnings)}if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(warnings, "\n"), `"node:not-a-peer-id"`) {- t.Errorf("warnings = %q, want one naming the member that is not a peer ID", warnings)+ t.Errorf("warnings = %q, want one naming the member/target that is not a peer ID", warnings)}// The text is the contract every member evaluates; it must yield the samediff --git a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go b/internal/node/egress_inspect.goindex 98356b1a..ae2ed629 100644--- a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go+++ b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import ("errors""fmt""io"+ "net""net/http""net/netip""net/url"@@ -650,6 +651,16 @@ func (s *EgressService) resolveModelArmorEndpoint(ctx context.Context, templateif isForbiddenEgressAddr(ip, s.allowsLocalTarget()) {return "", "", fmt.Errorf("model_armor.template URL host %q is in a forbidden IP range", u.Hostname())}+ } else {+ ips, lErr := net.DefaultResolver.LookupNetIP(ctx, "ip", u.Hostname())+ if lErr != nil {+ return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve model_armor.template URL host %q: %w", u.Hostname(), lErr)+ }+ for _, resolvedIP := range ips {+ if isForbiddenEgressAddr(resolvedIP, s.allowsLocalTarget()) {+ return "", "", fmt.Errorf("model_armor.template URL host %q resolves to forbidden IP %s", u.Hostname(), resolvedIP)+ }+ }}return tmpl, "", nil}diff --git a/internal/node/egress_inspect_test.go b/internal/node/egress_inspect_test.goindex eead8d21..9d819d42 100644--- a/internal/node/egress_inspect_test.go+++ b/internal/node/egress_inspect_test.go@@ -702,3 +702,39 @@ func TestReplaceInspectableTextMultiMessageNewlineAndFailClosed(t *testing.T) {t.Fatal("expected error when replacement cannot be mapped back into multi-message JSON")}}++func TestResolveModelArmorEndpointSSRF(t *testing.T) {+ ctx := context.Background()+ remoteSvc, err := newEgressService(&api.EgressDestination{+ Name: "api.openai.com",+ ServedBy: []string{api.RoleNode},+ }, t.TempDir())+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("newEgressService: %v", err)+ }++ for _, forbiddenURL := range []string{+ "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/projects/p/locations/us-central1/templates/t",+ "http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/",+ "http://localhost:8080/v1/projects/p/locations/us-central1/templates/t",+ } {+ if _, _, err := remoteSvc.resolveModelArmorEndpoint(ctx, forbiddenURL); err == nil {+ t.Errorf("expected resolveModelArmorEndpoint to reject %q when local target is not allowed", forbiddenURL)+ }+ }++ localSvc, err := newEgressService(&api.EgressDestination{+ Name: "api.openai.com",+ TargetUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8080",+ ServedBy: []string{api.RoleNode},+ }, t.TempDir())+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("newEgressService (local): %v", err)+ }+ if _, _, err := localSvc.resolveModelArmorEndpoint(ctx, "http://localhost:8080/v1/projects/p/locations/us-central1/templates/t"); err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("expected localhost URL to be allowed when target_url is local, got: %v", err)+ }+ if _, _, err := localSvc.resolveModelArmorEndpoint(ctx, "http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/"); err == nil {+ t.Fatal("expected link-local metadata IP to be rejected even when local target is allowed")+ }+}