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Agent Mesh

harden security

Antonio Ojea8fa18f505330
diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config.go
index ff657607..829c5af5 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config.go
@@ -40,5 +40,26 @@ func LoadPolicyConfig(path string) (*api.PolicyConfig, error) {
}
}
+ if err := ValidatePolicyConfig(&config); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
return &config, nil
}
+
+// ValidatePolicyConfig ensures that no wildcards are used in policies.
+func ValidatePolicyConfig(config *api.PolicyConfig) error {
+ for role, rolePolicy := range config.Roles {
+ for _, target := range rolePolicy.Network.AllowedTargets {
+ if target == "*" {
+ return fmt.Errorf("wildcard target '*' is not allowed in role %q", role)
+ }
+ }
+ for _, tool := range rolePolicy.MCP.AllowedTools {
+ if tool == "*" {
+ return fmt.Errorf("wildcard tool '*' is not allowed in role %q", role)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return nil
+}
diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go
index f37994e3..d6ceb225 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go
@@ -94,4 +94,22 @@ roles:
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for invalid custom datalog, got nil")
}
+
+ // 5. Test wildcard rejection
+ wildcardYAML := `
+version: "v1alpha1"
+roles:
+ admin:
+ network:
+ allowed_targets: ["*"]
+`
+ wildcardFile := filepath.Join(dir, "wildcard.yaml")
+ if err := os.WriteFile(wildcardFile, []byte(wildcardYAML), 0644); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ _, err = LoadPolicyConfig(wildcardFile)
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Error("expected error for wildcard target, got nil")
+ }
}
diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/main.go b/cmd/sam-hub/main.go
index c313bfc0..b152d212 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-hub/main.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/main.go
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ func (h *Hub) handleEnroll(s network.Stream) {
return
}
- verifier := provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: aud})
+ verifier := provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: clientID})
token, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), req.Jwt)
if err != nil {
@@ -280,6 +280,15 @@ func (h *Hub) handleEnroll(s network.Stream) {
return
}
+ if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
+ Name: "client_peer_id",
+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(remotePeer.String())},
+ }}); err != nil {
+ logger.Errorf("[Enroll] Failed to add client_peer_id fact: %v", err)
+ h.sendEnrollResponse(s, nil, "Failed to mint biscuit", 0, nil, nil)
+ return
+ }
+
for _, role := range roles {
if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: "group",
diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go b/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go
index 48f6351b..14f883b7 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go
@@ -69,6 +69,17 @@ func (n *SamNode) WithBiscuitAuth(next network.StreamHandler) network.StreamHand
writer := msgio.NewVarintWriter(s)
+ n.revocationMu.RLock()
+ isRevoked := n.revokedPeers[remotePeer.String()]
+ n.revocationMu.RUnlock()
+ if isRevoked {
+ logger.Warnf("[Auth] Peer %s is revoked", remotePeer)
+ resp := &api.AuthResponse{Success: false, Error: "Peer is revoked"}
+ respBytes, _ := proto.Marshal(resp)
+ _ = writer.WriteMsg(respBytes)
+ return
+ }
+
if err := n.Authorize(authFrame.Biscuit, reqCtx); err != nil {
logger.Warnf("[Auth] AuthZ Denied %s: %v", remotePeer, err)
resp := &api.AuthResponse{Success: false, Error: err.Error()}
@@ -117,6 +128,22 @@ func (n *SamNode) Authorize(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext) error {
},
})
+ // Inject connection_peer_id fact for replay defense
+ authorizer.AddFact(biscuit.Fact{
+ Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
+ Name: "connection_peer_id",
+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(req.PeerID.String())},
+ },
+ })
+
+ // Enforce client_peer_id matches connection_peer_id
+ replayCheckStr := `check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`
+ replayCheck, err := parser.FromStringCheck(replayCheckStr)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse replay check: %w", err)
+ }
+ authorizer.AddCheck(replayCheck)
+
// Apply Pre-compiled Local Attenuation
if n.LocalPolicy != nil {
for _, p := range n.LocalPolicy.Policies {
diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go b/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go
index ad76fc45..8732cfef 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ package main
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
+ "io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
@@ -23,8 +24,11 @@ import (
"github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2"
"github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser"
"github.com/google/sam/api"
+ "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network"
"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer"
"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol"
+ "github.com/libp2p/go-msgio"
+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
func TestAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
@@ -64,6 +68,15 @@ func TestAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
+ // Add client_peer_id for replay check
+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
+ Name: "client_peer_id",
+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
+ }})
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
// Add fact to match baseline rule
err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: api.FactMCPTool,
@@ -196,6 +209,15 @@ attenuation:
t.Fatal(err)
}
+ // Add client_peer_id for replay check
+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
+ Name: "client_peer_id",
+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
+ }})
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
tt.mintToken(t, builder)
b, err := builder.Build()
@@ -245,3 +267,88 @@ attenuation:
})
}
}
+
+func TestRevocation(t *testing.T) {
+ pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ dummyPeer := peer.ID("dummy-peer-id") // Must match mockStream.Conn().RemotePeer()
+
+ builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
+ Name: "node",
+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
+ }})
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
+ Name: "client_peer_id",
+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
+ }})
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ b, err := builder.Build()
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ tokenBytes, err := b.Serialize()
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ node := &SamNode{
+ HubPublicKey: pub,
+ revokedPeers: make(map[string]bool),
+ }
+
+ // Mark as revoked
+ node.revocationMu.Lock()
+ node.revokedPeers[dummyPeer.String()] = true
+ node.revocationMu.Unlock()
+
+ pr1, pw1 := io.Pipe()
+ pr2, pw2 := io.Pipe()
+
+ serverStream := &mockStream{r: pr1, w: pw2, protocol: protocol.ID("/test/proto")}
+
+ // Run handler in goroutine
+ go func() {
+ handler := node.WithBiscuitAuth(func(s network.Stream) {
+ t.Error("Handler should not be called for revoked peer")
+ })
+ handler(serverStream)
+ }()
+
+ // Send AuthFrame
+ writer := msgio.NewVarintWriter(pw1)
+ authFrame := &api.AuthFrame{Biscuit: tokenBytes}
+ data, _ := proto.Marshal(authFrame)
+ if err := writer.WriteMsg(data); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ // Read response
+ reader := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(pr2, 1024*64)
+ msg, err := reader.ReadMsg()
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("failed to read response: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ var resp api.AuthResponse
+ if err := proto.Unmarshal(msg, &resp); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ if resp.Success {
+ t.Error("expected failure for revoked peer, got success")
+ }
+ if resp.Error != "Peer is revoked" {
+ t.Errorf("expected error 'Peer is revoked', got %q", resp.Error)
+ }
+}
diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/node.go b/cmd/sam-node/node.go
index 6d30d74e..3f217cf1 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-node/node.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-node/node.go
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ type SamNode struct {
topics map[string]*pubsub.Topic
mu sync.Mutex
LocalPolicy *CompiledLocalPolicy
+ revokedPeers map[string]bool
+ revocationMu sync.RWMutex
}
// NewSamNode creates a new Agent instance secured with the 4-layer pipeline.
@@ -66,6 +68,7 @@ func NewSamNode(ctx context.Context, privKey crypto.PrivKey, hubPubKey ed25519.P
receivedMsgs: make(map[string][]string),
topics: make(map[string]*pubsub.Topic),
LocalPolicy: localPolicy,
+ revokedPeers: make(map[string]bool),
}
// Layer 2: Attach the Bouncer (Gater)
@@ -197,14 +200,26 @@ func (n *SamNode) listenForHubEvents(ctx context.Context) {
continue
}
+ if msg.ReceivedFrom != n.HubPeerID {
+ logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Ignored event from non-hub peer: %s", msg.ReceivedFrom)
+ continue
+ }
+
n.mu.Lock()
switch event.Type {
case api.MeshEvent_JOIN:
n.knownPeers[event.PeerId] = true
logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer joined: %s", event.PeerId)
- case api.MeshEvent_EXIT, api.MeshEvent_BANNED:
+ case api.MeshEvent_EXIT:
+ delete(n.knownPeers, event.PeerId)
+ logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer left: %s", event.PeerId)
+ case api.MeshEvent_BANNED:
delete(n.knownPeers, event.PeerId)
- logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer left/banned: %s", event.PeerId)
+ logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer banned: %s", event.PeerId)
+
+ n.revocationMu.Lock()
+ n.revokedPeers[event.PeerId] = true
+ n.revocationMu.Unlock()
}
n.mu.Unlock()
}