Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
harden security
Antonio Ojea8fa18f505330
diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config.goindex ff657607..829c5af5 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config.go@@ -40,5 +40,26 @@ func LoadPolicyConfig(path string) (*api.PolicyConfig, error) {}}+ if err := ValidatePolicyConfig(&config); err != nil {+ return nil, err+ }+return &config, nil}++// ValidatePolicyConfig ensures that no wildcards are used in policies.+func ValidatePolicyConfig(config *api.PolicyConfig) error {+ for role, rolePolicy := range config.Roles {+ for _, target := range rolePolicy.Network.AllowedTargets {+ if target == "*" {+ return fmt.Errorf("wildcard target '*' is not allowed in role %q", role)+ }+ }+ for _, tool := range rolePolicy.MCP.AllowedTools {+ if tool == "*" {+ return fmt.Errorf("wildcard tool '*' is not allowed in role %q", role)+ }+ }+ }+ return nil+}diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.goindex f37994e3..d6ceb225 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/config_test.go@@ -94,4 +94,22 @@ roles:if err == nil {t.Error("expected error for invalid custom datalog, got nil")}++ // 5. Test wildcard rejection+ wildcardYAML := `+version: "v1alpha1"+roles:+ admin:+ network:+ allowed_targets: ["*"]+`+ wildcardFile := filepath.Join(dir, "wildcard.yaml")+ if err := os.WriteFile(wildcardFile, []byte(wildcardYAML), 0644); err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ _, err = LoadPolicyConfig(wildcardFile)+ if err == nil {+ t.Error("expected error for wildcard target, got nil")+ }}diff --git a/cmd/sam-hub/main.go b/cmd/sam-hub/main.goindex c313bfc0..b152d212 100644--- a/cmd/sam-hub/main.go+++ b/cmd/sam-hub/main.go@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ func (h *Hub) handleEnroll(s network.Stream) {return}- verifier := provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: aud})+ verifier := provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: clientID})token, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), req.Jwt)if err != nil {@@ -280,6 +280,15 @@ func (h *Hub) handleEnroll(s network.Stream) {return}+ if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: "client_peer_id",+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(remotePeer.String())},+ }}); err != nil {+ logger.Errorf("[Enroll] Failed to add client_peer_id fact: %v", err)+ h.sendEnrollResponse(s, nil, "Failed to mint biscuit", 0, nil, nil)+ return+ }+for _, role := range roles {if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "group",diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go b/cmd/sam-node/middleware.goindex 48f6351b..14f883b7 100644--- a/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go+++ b/cmd/sam-node/middleware.go@@ -69,6 +69,17 @@ func (n *SamNode) WithBiscuitAuth(next network.StreamHandler) network.StreamHandwriter := msgio.NewVarintWriter(s)+ n.revocationMu.RLock()+ isRevoked := n.revokedPeers[remotePeer.String()]+ n.revocationMu.RUnlock()+ if isRevoked {+ logger.Warnf("[Auth] Peer %s is revoked", remotePeer)+ resp := &api.AuthResponse{Success: false, Error: "Peer is revoked"}+ respBytes, _ := proto.Marshal(resp)+ _ = writer.WriteMsg(respBytes)+ return+ }+if err := n.Authorize(authFrame.Biscuit, reqCtx); err != nil {logger.Warnf("[Auth] AuthZ Denied %s: %v", remotePeer, err)resp := &api.AuthResponse{Success: false, Error: err.Error()}@@ -117,6 +128,22 @@ func (n *SamNode) Authorize(rawToken []byte, req RequestContext) error {},})+ // Inject connection_peer_id fact for replay defense+ authorizer.AddFact(biscuit.Fact{+ Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: "connection_peer_id",+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(req.PeerID.String())},+ },+ })++ // Enforce client_peer_id matches connection_peer_id+ replayCheckStr := `check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`+ replayCheck, err := parser.FromStringCheck(replayCheckStr)+ if err != nil {+ return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse replay check: %w", err)+ }+ authorizer.AddCheck(replayCheck)+// Apply Pre-compiled Local Attenuationif n.LocalPolicy != nil {for _, p := range n.LocalPolicy.Policies {diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go b/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.goindex ad76fc45..8732cfef 100644--- a/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go+++ b/cmd/sam-node/middleware_test.go@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ package mainimport ("crypto/ed25519"+ "io""os""path/filepath""testing"@@ -23,8 +24,11 @@ import ("github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2""github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser""github.com/google/sam/api"+ "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/network""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/protocol"+ "github.com/libp2p/go-msgio"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto")func TestAuthorize(t *testing.T) {@@ -64,6 +68,15 @@ func TestAuthorize(t *testing.T) {t.Fatal(err)}+ // Add client_peer_id for replay check+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: "client_peer_id",+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},+ }})+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+// Add fact to match baseline ruleerr = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactMCPTool,@@ -196,6 +209,15 @@ attenuation:t.Fatal(err)}+ // Add client_peer_id for replay check+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: "client_peer_id",+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},+ }})+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+tt.mintToken(t, builder)b, err := builder.Build()@@ -245,3 +267,88 @@ attenuation:})}}++func TestRevocation(t *testing.T) {+ pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ dummyPeer := peer.ID("dummy-peer-id") // Must match mockStream.Conn().RemotePeer()++ builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: "node",+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},+ }})+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{+ Name: "client_peer_id",+ IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},+ }})+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ b, err := builder.Build()+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ tokenBytes, err := b.Serialize()+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ node := &SamNode{+ HubPublicKey: pub,+ revokedPeers: make(map[string]bool),+ }++ // Mark as revoked+ node.revocationMu.Lock()+ node.revokedPeers[dummyPeer.String()] = true+ node.revocationMu.Unlock()++ pr1, pw1 := io.Pipe()+ pr2, pw2 := io.Pipe()++ serverStream := &mockStream{r: pr1, w: pw2, protocol: protocol.ID("/test/proto")}++ // Run handler in goroutine+ go func() {+ handler := node.WithBiscuitAuth(func(s network.Stream) {+ t.Error("Handler should not be called for revoked peer")+ })+ handler(serverStream)+ }()++ // Send AuthFrame+ writer := msgio.NewVarintWriter(pw1)+ authFrame := &api.AuthFrame{Biscuit: tokenBytes}+ data, _ := proto.Marshal(authFrame)+ if err := writer.WriteMsg(data); err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ // Read response+ reader := msgio.NewVarintReaderSize(pr2, 1024*64)+ msg, err := reader.ReadMsg()+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("failed to read response: %v", err)+ }++ var resp api.AuthResponse+ if err := proto.Unmarshal(msg, &resp); err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }++ if resp.Success {+ t.Error("expected failure for revoked peer, got success")+ }+ if resp.Error != "Peer is revoked" {+ t.Errorf("expected error 'Peer is revoked', got %q", resp.Error)+ }+}diff --git a/cmd/sam-node/node.go b/cmd/sam-node/node.goindex 6d30d74e..3f217cf1 100644--- a/cmd/sam-node/node.go+++ b/cmd/sam-node/node.go@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ type SamNode struct {topics map[string]*pubsub.Topicmu sync.MutexLocalPolicy *CompiledLocalPolicy+ revokedPeers map[string]bool+ revocationMu sync.RWMutex}// NewSamNode creates a new Agent instance secured with the 4-layer pipeline.@@ -66,6 +68,7 @@ func NewSamNode(ctx context.Context, privKey crypto.PrivKey, hubPubKey ed25519.PreceivedMsgs: make(map[string][]string),topics: make(map[string]*pubsub.Topic),LocalPolicy: localPolicy,+ revokedPeers: make(map[string]bool),}// Layer 2: Attach the Bouncer (Gater)@@ -197,14 +200,26 @@ func (n *SamNode) listenForHubEvents(ctx context.Context) {continue}+ if msg.ReceivedFrom != n.HubPeerID {+ logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Ignored event from non-hub peer: %s", msg.ReceivedFrom)+ continue+ }+n.mu.Lock()switch event.Type {case api.MeshEvent_JOIN:n.knownPeers[event.PeerId] = truelogger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer joined: %s", event.PeerId)- case api.MeshEvent_EXIT, api.MeshEvent_BANNED:+ case api.MeshEvent_EXIT:+ delete(n.knownPeers, event.PeerId)+ logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer left: %s", event.PeerId)+ case api.MeshEvent_BANNED:delete(n.knownPeers, event.PeerId)- logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer left/banned: %s", event.PeerId)+ logger.Infof("[Mesh Event] Peer banned: %s", event.PeerId)++ n.revocationMu.Lock()+ n.revokedPeers[event.PeerId] = true+ n.revocationMu.Unlock()}n.mu.Unlock()}