Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
api: every instant on the wire is a Timestamp
Antonio Ojeab7893b271003
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.mdindex 8d8db18e..9a531302 100644--- a/AGENTS.md+++ b/AGENTS.md@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ You are an expert software engineering assistant helping to develop, maintain, a* **Decoupled Architecture:** The `sam-control-plane`, `sam-router` and `sam-node` components are strictly independent. They must not share internal state or tightly couple their logic.* **API Communication:** All data communication between `sam-control-plane`, `sam-router` and `sam-node` must happen exclusively via the common API defined in `api/sam.proto`.* **One schema, two encodings:** every request and response on any SAM surface is a message in `api/sam.proto`. The *mesh protocol* — anything a mesh component speaks (node, router, `sam-box`, the agent connector, the SDKs under `sdk/`): enrollment, refresh, keys, leases, auth streams, policy sync — is binary protobuf (`application/x-protobuf`). The *operator plane* — what humans, the web console and admin CLIs call (`/admin/*`, `/users/*`, `POST /policies`) — is protojson of the same messages, with `UseProtoNames` and unknown fields rejected. Never define a wire shape as a Go struct with `json` tags, an anonymous struct or `map[string]any`, and never serialize an `internal/storage` (or any other internal) type onto either surface. Clients in `cmd/`, `internal/console` and `sdk/` import `api/` or its generated bindings only.-* **Instants are `google.protobuf.Timestamp`, named `*_time`** (`expire_time`, `receive_time`), never `int64` seconds or milliseconds. `Timestamp` has fixed units, an explicit unset, renders as RFC 3339 in protojson (an `int64` renders as a quoted decimal string), and has a first-class conversion in Go, JavaScript, Python and Dart. The `int64` instants still in `api/sam.proto` predate this rule; converting them is a coordinated protocol change, not something to do one field at a time. What a member persists between runs is also a message here (`MemberCredential`), so a state directory written by one implementation loads in another.+* **Instants are `google.protobuf.Timestamp`, named `*_time`** (`expire_time`, `sign_time`, `event_time`), never `int64` seconds or milliseconds. `Timestamp` has fixed units, an explicit unset, renders as RFC 3339 in protojson (an `int64` renders as a quoted decimal string), and has a first-class conversion in Go, JavaScript, Python and Dart. A receiver treats an unset instant as invalid, never as the epoch. The one exception is a proof-of-possession value: it is the number that appears in the signed text (`sam:<endpoint>:<peer_id>:<n>`), so it stays an `int64` named `challenge_unix_ms`, the unit in the name. What a member persists between runs is also a message here (`MemberCredential`), so a state directory written by one implementation loads in another.* **Datalog text is the policy contract:** the control plane renders the mesh policy as Datalog rules (`PolicyConfigGetResponse.datalog_rules`); every member, in any language, adds that text to its authorizer and none derives rules from roles and bindings itself. Datalog must stay in the form every Biscuit implementation parses: a predicate carries at least one term (presence-only facts are `name(true)`, see `api.MarkerFact`).* **Secrets never travel as flag values:** binaries read credentials from a file (`--*-path`) or the environment, never from a command-line argument that would sit in `ps` output and shell history. Banners and logs name the source of an operator-supplied secret instead of echoing it.* **Sandbox Dataplane:** `sam-box` (one per sandbox) is the single egress policy enforcement point. It holds no libp2p host, no enrollment and no mesh identity, and reaches the mesh exclusively as a client of the local `sam-node` sidecar socket. `nano-init` (PID 1 inside the guest, its own Go module) owns the guest side; its datapath is the `tun2connect` library. The sandbox boundary is a Unix socket speaking named HTTP tunnels: CONNECT (TCP) and connect-udp (UDP) out, `CONNECT <port>` back in. The authoritative design is `site/content/docs/preview/agent-architecture.md`; do not contradict it.diff --git a/api/sam.pb.go b/api/sam.pb.goindex 9b44a6c3..291e6373 100644--- a/api/sam.pb.go+++ b/api/sam.pb.go@@ -314,10 +314,13 @@ func (x *AuthResponse) GetBiscuit() []byte {}type MeshEvent struct {- state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`- Type MeshEvent_Type `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=type,proto3,enum=sam.v1.MeshEvent_Type" json:"type,omitempty"`- PeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=peer_id,json=peerId,proto3" json:"peer_id,omitempty"`- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`+ Type MeshEvent_Type `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=type,proto3,enum=sam.v1.MeshEvent_Type" json:"type,omitempty"`+ PeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=peer_id,json=peerId,proto3" json:"peer_id,omitempty"`+ // When the control plane recorded the event. Receivers ignore an event+ // further than a few minutes from their clock and, for bans, one older+ // than the last they applied for the peer.+ EventTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=event_time,json=eventTime,proto3" json:"event_time,omitempty"`NewPublicKey []byte `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=new_public_key,json=newPublicKey,proto3" json:"new_public_key,omitempty"`Signature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=signature,proto3" json:"signature,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields@@ -368,11 +371,11 @@ func (x *MeshEvent) GetPeerId() string {return ""}-func (x *MeshEvent) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *MeshEvent) GetEventTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.EventTime}- return 0+ return nil}func (x *MeshEvent) GetNewPublicKey() []byte {@@ -400,13 +403,15 @@ type EnrollRequest struct {// enrollment flow's gates, minted as signed label() facts in the// biscuit. Empty means no claims.Labels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=labels,proto3" json:"labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"`- // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix- // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:register:<peer_id>:<timestamp>". Required, and peer_id must be- // derived from public_key. The JWT proves who is asking; this proves- // they hold the key they are asking to bind, so an identity cannot- // register (and overwrite) another node's peer_id.- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: challenge_unix_ms is+ // the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ // the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:register:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>". It is+ // an int64 because it is the number in the signed text, not an instant+ // for display. Required, and peer_id must be derived from public_key.+ // The JWT proves who is asking; this proves they hold the key they are+ // asking to bind, so an identity cannot register (and overwrite) another+ // node's peer_id.+ ChallengeUnixMs int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=challenge_unix_ms,json=challengeUnixMs,proto3" json:"challenge_unix_ms,omitempty"`ChallengeSignature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=challenge_signature,json=challengeSignature,proto3" json:"challenge_signature,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache@@ -477,9 +482,9 @@ func (x *EnrollRequest) GetLabels() map[string]string {return nil}-func (x *EnrollRequest) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *EnrollRequest) GetChallengeUnixMs() int64 {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.ChallengeUnixMs}return 0}@@ -497,7 +502,7 @@ type EnrollResponse struct {ErrorMessage string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=error_message,json=errorMessage,proto3" json:"error_message,omitempty"`ControlPlanePublicKey []byte `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=control_plane_public_key,json=controlPlanePublicKey,proto3" json:"control_plane_public_key,omitempty"`RouterAddresses []string `protobuf:"bytes,4,rep,name=router_addresses,json=routerAddresses,proto3" json:"router_addresses,omitempty"`- Expiration int64 `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=expiration,proto3" json:"expiration,omitempty"`+ ExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=expire_time,json=expireTime,proto3" json:"expire_time,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -560,11 +565,11 @@ func (x *EnrollResponse) GetRouterAddresses() []string {return nil}-func (x *EnrollResponse) GetExpiration() int64 {+func (x *EnrollResponse) GetExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.Expiration+ return x.ExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}type BootstrapEnrollRequest struct {@@ -576,13 +581,13 @@ type BootstrapEnrollRequest struct {// Operator-declared labels; the admin approving the enrollment attests// them (see EnrollRequest.labels).Labels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=labels,proto3" json:"labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"`- // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix- // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:enroll:<peer_id>:<timestamp>". Required, and peer_id must be- // derived from public_key: this is what entitles a repeated POST /enroll- // to re-fetch an existing enrollment's biscuit, so a bootstrap token- // alone must never satisfy it.- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: challenge_unix_ms is+ // the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ // the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:enroll:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>". Required,+ // and peer_id must be derived from public_key: this is what entitles a+ // repeated POST /enroll to re-fetch an existing enrollment's biscuit, so+ // a bootstrap token alone must never satisfy it.+ ChallengeUnixMs int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=challenge_unix_ms,json=challengeUnixMs,proto3" json:"challenge_unix_ms,omitempty"`ChallengeSignature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=challenge_signature,json=challengeSignature,proto3" json:"challenge_signature,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache@@ -653,9 +658,9 @@ func (x *BootstrapEnrollRequest) GetLabels() map[string]string {return nil}-func (x *BootstrapEnrollRequest) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *BootstrapEnrollRequest) GetChallengeUnixMs() int64 {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.ChallengeUnixMs}return 0}@@ -681,7 +686,7 @@ type BootstrapEnrollResponse struct {ErrorMessage string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=error_message,json=errorMessage,proto3" json:"error_message,omitempty"`ControlPlanePublicKey []byte `protobuf:"bytes,5,opt,name=control_plane_public_key,json=controlPlanePublicKey,proto3" json:"control_plane_public_key,omitempty"` // Populated only if APPROVEDRouterAddresses []string `protobuf:"bytes,6,rep,name=router_addresses,json=routerAddresses,proto3" json:"router_addresses,omitempty"` // Populated only if APPROVED- Expiration int64 `protobuf:"varint,7,opt,name=expiration,proto3" json:"expiration,omitempty"` // Populated only if APPROVED+ ExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=expire_time,json=expireTime,proto3" json:"expire_time,omitempty"` // Populated only if APPROVEDunknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -758,11 +763,11 @@ func (x *BootstrapEnrollResponse) GetRouterAddresses() []string {return nil}-func (x *BootstrapEnrollResponse) GetExpiration() int64 {+func (x *BootstrapEnrollResponse) GetExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.Expiration+ return x.ExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}type ServiceInfo struct {@@ -1051,9 +1056,9 @@ type ServiceAnnounce struct {// take precedence over runtime-derived values.Labels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=labels,proto3" json:"labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"`// Runtime load hints; zero values mean unknown.- ActiveRequests uint32 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=active_requests,json=activeRequests,proto3" json:"active_requests,omitempty"`- LatencyEwmaMs float64 `protobuf:"fixed64,7,opt,name=latency_ewma_ms,json=latencyEwmaMs,proto3" json:"latency_ewma_ms,omitempty"`- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,8,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ ActiveRequests uint32 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=active_requests,json=activeRequests,proto3" json:"active_requests,omitempty"`+ LatencyEwmaMs float64 `protobuf:"fixed64,7,opt,name=latency_ewma_ms,json=latencyEwmaMs,proto3" json:"latency_ewma_ms,omitempty"`+ AnnounceTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,8,opt,name=announce_time,json=announceTime,proto3" json:"announce_time,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -1137,11 +1142,11 @@ func (x *ServiceAnnounce) GetLatencyEwmaMs() float64 {return 0}-func (x *ServiceAnnounce) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *ServiceAnnounce) GetAnnounceTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.AnnounceTime}- return 0+ return nil}type ControlPlaneInfoResponse struct {@@ -1233,12 +1238,12 @@ type RouterLeaseRequest struct {Biscuit []byte `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=biscuit,proto3" json:"biscuit,omitempty"`ConnectedPeers []string `protobuf:"bytes,4,rep,name=connected_peers,json=connectedPeers,proto3" json:"connected_peers,omitempty"`DhtSize int32 `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=dht_size,json=dhtSize,proto3" json:"dht_size,omitempty"`- // Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: timestamp is unix- // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:routers-lease:<peer_id>:<timestamp>" with the key the router- // enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is not proof: routers hand- // theirs to every peer they authenticate.- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ // Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: challenge_unix_ms is+ // the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ // the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:routers-lease:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>"+ // with the key the router enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is+ // not proof: routers hand theirs to every peer they authenticate.+ ChallengeUnixMs int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=challenge_unix_ms,json=challengeUnixMs,proto3" json:"challenge_unix_ms,omitempty"`ChallengeSignature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,7,opt,name=challenge_signature,json=challengeSignature,proto3" json:"challenge_signature,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache@@ -1309,9 +1314,9 @@ func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) GetDhtSize() int32 {return 0}-func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *RouterLeaseRequest) GetChallengeUnixMs() int64 {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.ChallengeUnixMs}return 0}@@ -1327,7 +1332,7 @@ type RouterLeaseResponse struct {state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`Success bool `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=success,proto3" json:"success,omitempty"`Error string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=error,proto3" json:"error,omitempty"`- ExpiresAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=expires_at,json=expiresAt,proto3" json:"expires_at,omitempty"`+ ExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=expire_time,json=expireTime,proto3" json:"expire_time,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -1376,11 +1381,11 @@ func (x *RouterLeaseResponse) GetError() string {return ""}-func (x *RouterLeaseResponse) GetExpiresAt() int64 {+func (x *RouterLeaseResponse) GetExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.ExpiresAt+ return x.ExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}type PolicyRole struct {@@ -1721,9 +1726,9 @@ func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateResponse) GetError() string {type KeysResponse struct {state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`PublicKeys [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=public_keys,json=publicKeys,proto3" json:"public_keys,omitempty"`- // Unix milliseconds at which the set was signed; receivers reject responses- // outside a short freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed.- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ // When the set was signed; receivers reject responses outside a short+ // freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed.+ SignTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=sign_time,json=signTime,proto3" json:"sign_time,omitempty"`// One ed25519 signature per entry of public_keys, by that key, over the// deterministic encoding of this message with signatures cleared. A// receiver trusting any key still valid on the control plane can verify@@ -1770,11 +1775,11 @@ func (x *KeysResponse) GetPublicKeys() [][]byte {return nil}-func (x *KeysResponse) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *KeysResponse) GetSignTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.SignTime}- return 0+ return nil}func (x *KeysResponse) GetSignatures() [][]byte {@@ -1787,12 +1792,13 @@ func (x *KeysResponse) GetSignatures() [][]byte {type TokenRefreshRequest struct {state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`// Signature with the node key over the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<timestamp>", where peer_id is the one bound in- // the presented biscuit. Peer- and endpoint-bound so a captured signature- // verifies nowhere else.+ // "sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>", where peer_id is the one+ // bound in the presented biscuit. Peer- and endpoint-bound so a captured+ // signature verifies nowhere else.ChallengeSignature []byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=challenge_signature,json=challengeSignature,proto3" json:"challenge_signature,omitempty"`- // Unix milliseconds. Must be within the control plane's freshness window.- Timestamp int64 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=timestamp,proto3" json:"timestamp,omitempty"`+ // The caller's clock in unix milliseconds, the number in the signed text.+ // Must be within the control plane's freshness window.+ ChallengeUnixMs int64 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=challenge_unix_ms,json=challengeUnixMs,proto3" json:"challenge_unix_ms,omitempty"`// The caller's peer ID. Optional: the control plane normally reads it// from the verified biscuit. It is consulted only when the biscuit's// signing key has been retired, so the biscuit cannot be verified: the@@ -1842,9 +1848,9 @@ func (x *TokenRefreshRequest) GetChallengeSignature() []byte {return nil}-func (x *TokenRefreshRequest) GetTimestamp() int64 {+func (x *TokenRefreshRequest) GetChallengeUnixMs() int64 {if x != nil {- return x.Timestamp+ return x.ChallengeUnixMs}return 0}@@ -1859,7 +1865,7 @@ func (x *TokenRefreshRequest) GetPeerId() string {type TokenRefreshResponse struct {state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`BiscuitToken []byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=biscuit_token,json=biscuitToken,proto3" json:"biscuit_token,omitempty"`- ExpiresAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=expires_at,json=expiresAt,proto3" json:"expires_at,omitempty"`+ ExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=expire_time,json=expireTime,proto3" json:"expire_time,omitempty"`ErrorMessage string `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=error_message,json=errorMessage,proto3" json:"error_message,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache@@ -1902,11 +1908,11 @@ func (x *TokenRefreshResponse) GetBiscuitToken() []byte {return nil}-func (x *TokenRefreshResponse) GetExpiresAt() int64 {+func (x *TokenRefreshResponse) GetExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.ExpiresAt+ return x.ExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}func (x *TokenRefreshResponse) GetErrorMessage() string {@@ -2618,7 +2624,7 @@ type AgentRefreshResponse struct {state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`Success bool `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=success,proto3" json:"success,omitempty"`Error string `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=error,proto3" json:"error,omitempty"`- ExpiresAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=expires_at,json=expiresAt,proto3" json:"expires_at,omitempty"`+ ExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=expire_time,json=expireTime,proto3" json:"expire_time,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -2667,11 +2673,11 @@ func (x *AgentRefreshResponse) GetError() string {return ""}-func (x *AgentRefreshResponse) GetExpiresAt() int64 {+func (x *AgentRefreshResponse) GetExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.ExpiresAt+ return x.ExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}// AgentStatusRequest reports on one agent, or on all of them when agent_id is@@ -2721,13 +2727,13 @@ func (x *AgentStatusRequest) GetAgentId() string {}type AgentStatus struct {- state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`- AgentId string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=agent_id,json=agentId,proto3" json:"agent_id,omitempty"`- Attached bool `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=attached,proto3" json:"attached,omitempty"`- Ingress []*AgentIngress `protobuf:"bytes,3,rep,name=ingress,proto3" json:"ingress,omitempty"`- CredentialExpiresAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,4,opt,name=credential_expires_at,json=credentialExpiresAt,proto3" json:"credential_expires_at,omitempty"`- unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields- sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache+ state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`+ AgentId string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=agent_id,json=agentId,proto3" json:"agent_id,omitempty"`+ Attached bool `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=attached,proto3" json:"attached,omitempty"`+ Ingress []*AgentIngress `protobuf:"bytes,3,rep,name=ingress,proto3" json:"ingress,omitempty"`+ CredentialExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=credential_expire_time,json=credentialExpireTime,proto3" json:"credential_expire_time,omitempty"`+ unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields+ sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}func (x *AgentStatus) Reset() {@@ -2781,11 +2787,11 @@ func (x *AgentStatus) GetIngress() []*AgentIngress {return nil}-func (x *AgentStatus) GetCredentialExpiresAt() int64 {+func (x *AgentStatus) GetCredentialExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.CredentialExpiresAt+ return x.CredentialExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}type AgentStatusResponse struct {@@ -2844,10 +2850,10 @@ type IdentityEvidenceResponse struct {state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`PeerId string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=peer_id,json=peerId,proto3" json:"peer_id,omitempty"`Biscuit []byte `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=biscuit,proto3" json:"biscuit,omitempty"`- BiscuitExpiresAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=biscuit_expires_at,json=biscuitExpiresAt,proto3" json:"biscuit_expires_at,omitempty"`+ BiscuitExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=biscuit_expire_time,json=biscuitExpireTime,proto3" json:"biscuit_expire_time,omitempty"`ControlPlaneUrl string `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=control_plane_url,json=controlPlaneUrl,proto3" json:"control_plane_url,omitempty"`TrustedControlPlaneKeys [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=trusted_control_plane_keys,json=trustedControlPlaneKeys,proto3" json:"trusted_control_plane_keys,omitempty"` // Ed25519 SPKI DER- CheckedAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=checked_at,json=checkedAt,proto3" json:"checked_at,omitempty"`+ CheckTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=check_time,json=checkTime,proto3" json:"check_time,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -2896,11 +2902,11 @@ func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetBiscuit() []byte {return nil}-func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetBiscuitExpiresAt() int64 {+func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetBiscuitExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.BiscuitExpiresAt+ return x.BiscuitExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetControlPlaneUrl() string {@@ -2917,11 +2923,11 @@ func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetTrustedControlPlaneKeys() [][]byte {return nil}-func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetCheckedAt() int64 {+func (x *IdentityEvidenceResponse) GetCheckTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.CheckedAt+ return x.CheckTime}- return 0+ return nil}type PeerEvidenceResponse struct {@@ -2931,9 +2937,9 @@ type PeerEvidenceResponse struct {VerifyingKey []byte `protobuf:"bytes,3,opt,name=verifying_key,json=verifyingKey,proto3" json:"verifying_key,omitempty"` // Ed25519 SPKI DER, member of the trusted setRoles []string `protobuf:"bytes,4,rep,name=roles,proto3" json:"roles,omitempty"`Labels map[string]string `protobuf:"bytes,5,rep,name=labels,proto3" json:"labels,omitempty" protobuf_key:"bytes,1,opt,name=key" protobuf_val:"bytes,2,opt,name=value"`- Expiration int64 `protobuf:"varint,6,opt,name=expiration,proto3" json:"expiration,omitempty"`+ ExpireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,6,opt,name=expire_time,json=expireTime,proto3" json:"expire_time,omitempty"`RevocationIds []string `protobuf:"bytes,7,rep,name=revocation_ids,json=revocationIds,proto3" json:"revocation_ids,omitempty"` // hex- CheckedAt int64 `protobuf:"varint,8,opt,name=checked_at,json=checkedAt,proto3" json:"checked_at,omitempty"`+ CheckTime *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,8,opt,name=check_time,json=checkTime,proto3" json:"check_time,omitempty"`unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFieldssizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache}@@ -3003,11 +3009,11 @@ func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetLabels() map[string]string {return nil}-func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetExpiration() int64 {+func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetExpireTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.Expiration+ return x.ExpireTime}- return 0+ return nil}func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetRevocationIds() []string {@@ -3017,11 +3023,11 @@ func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetRevocationIds() []string {return nil}-func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetCheckedAt() int64 {+func (x *PeerEvidenceResponse) GetCheckTime() *timestamppb.Timestamp {if x != nil {- return x.CheckedAt+ return x.CheckTime}- return 0+ return nil}type MemberCredential struct {@@ -3262,60 +3268,59 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +"\fAuthResponse\x12\x18\n" +"\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" +"\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12\x18\n" +- "\abiscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\"\xeb\x01\n" ++ "\abiscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\"\x88\x02\n" +"\tMeshEvent\x12*\n" +"\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x16.sam.v1.MeshEvent.TypeR\x04type\x12\x17\n" +- "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\x03 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12$\n" ++ "\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x129\n" ++ "\n" ++ "event_time\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\teventTime\x12$\n" +"\x0enew_public_key\x18\x04 \x01(\fR\fnewPublicKey\x12\x1c\n" +"\tsignature\x18\x05 \x01(\fR\tsignature\"7\n" +"\x04Type\x12\n" +"\n" +"\x06BANNED\x10\x00\x12\x10\n" +"\fKEY_ROTATION\x10\x01\x12\x11\n" +- "\rPOLICY_UPDATE\x10\x02\"\xc5\x02\n" ++ "\rPOLICY_UPDATE\x10\x02\"\xd3\x02\n" +"\rEnrollRequest\x12\x10\n" +"\x03jwt\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03jwt\x12\x17\n" +"\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" +"\n" +"public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" +"\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x129\n" +- "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2!.sam.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12/\n" ++ "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2!.sam.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12*\n" ++ "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" +"\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" +"\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" +"\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" +- "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xde\x01\n" ++ "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xfb\x01\n" +"\x0eEnrollResponse\x12#\n" +"\rbiscuit_token\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x12#\n" +"\rerror_message\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\x127\n" +"\x18control_plane_public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\x15controlPlanePublicKey\x12)\n" +- "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12\x1e\n" +- "\n" +- "expiration\x18\x05 \x01(\x03R\n" +- "expiration\"\xee\x02\n" ++ "\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12;\n" ++ "\vexpire_time\x18\x05 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" ++ "expireTime\"\xfc\x02\n" +"\x16BootstrapEnrollRequest\x12'\n" +"\x0fbootstrap_token\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x0ebootstrapToken\x12\x17\n" +"\apeer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1d\n" +"\n" +"public_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\tpublicKey\x12%\n" +"\x0erequested_role\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\rrequestedRole\x12B\n" +- "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2*.sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12/\n" ++ "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2*.sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12*\n" ++ "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" +"\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x1a9\n" +"\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" +"\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" +- "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xcd\x02\n" ++ "\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xea\x02\n" +"\x17BootstrapEnrollResponse\x120\n" +"\x06status\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x18.sam.v1.EnrollmentStatusR\x06status\x12#\n" +"\rbiscuit_token\x18\x02 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x122\n" +"\x15poll_interval_seconds\x18\x03 \x01(\x05R\x13pollIntervalSeconds\x12#\n" +"\rerror_message\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\x127\n" +"\x18control_plane_public_key\x18\x05 \x01(\fR\x15controlPlanePublicKey\x12)\n" +- "\x10router_addresses\x18\x06 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12\x1e\n" +- "\n" +- "expiration\x18\a \x01(\x03R\n" +- "expiration\"l\n" ++ "\x10router_addresses\x18\x06 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12;\n" ++ "\vexpire_time\x18\a \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" ++ "expireTime\"l\n" +"\vServiceInfo\x12'\n" +"\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e2\x13.sam.v1.ServiceTypeR\x04type\x12\x12\n" +"\x04name\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x04name\x12 \n" +@@ -3336,7 +3341,7 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +"\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12&\n" +"\x0flocal_proxy_url\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\rlocalProxyUrl\x12\x19\n" +"\bsrv_name\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\asrvName\x12'\n" +- "\x0fsrv_description\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0esrvDescription\"\xf1\x02\n" ++ "\x0fsrv_description\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0esrvDescription\"\x94\x03\n" +"\x0fServiceAnnounce\x12\x17\n" +"\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12'\n" +"\x04type\x18\x02 \x01(\x0e2\x13.sam.v1.ServiceTypeR\x04type\x12!\n" +@@ -3344,8 +3349,8 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +"\x04keys\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x04keys\x12;\n" +"\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2#.sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12'\n" +"\x0factive_requests\x18\x06 \x01(\rR\x0eactiveRequests\x12&\n" +- "\x0flatency_ewma_ms\x18\a \x01(\x01R\rlatencyEwmaMs\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\b \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x1a9\n" ++ "\x0flatency_ewma_ms\x18\a \x01(\x01R\rlatencyEwmaMs\x12?\n" ++ "\rannounce_time\x18\b \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\fannounceTime\x1a9\n" +"\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" +"\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" +"\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xc7\x01\n" +@@ -3355,20 +3360,20 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +"\tclient_id\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\bclientId\x12\x1a\n" +"\baudience\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\baudience\x12)\n" +"\x10router_addresses\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0frouterAddresses\x12&\n" +- "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\"\xf8\x01\n" ++ "\x0fbanned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\tR\rbannedPeerIds\"\x86\x02\n" +"\x12RouterLeaseRequest\x12\x17\n" +"\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x1c\n" +"\taddresses\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\taddresses\x12\x18\n" +"\abiscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12'\n" +"\x0fconnected_peers\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x0econnectedPeers\x12\x19\n" +- "\bdht_size\x18\x05 \x01(\x05R\adhtSize\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12/\n" +- "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\"d\n" ++ "\bdht_size\x18\x05 \x01(\x05R\adhtSize\x12*\n" ++ "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12/\n" ++ "\x13challenge_signature\x18\a \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\"\x82\x01\n" +"\x13RouterLeaseResponse\x12\x18\n" +"\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" +- "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12\x1d\n" +- "\n" +- "expires_at\x18\x03 \x01(\x03R\texpiresAt\"\xe9\x01\n" ++ "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12;\n" ++ "\vexpire_time\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" ++ "expireTime\"\xe9\x01\n" +"\n" +"PolicyRole\x12\x12\n" +"\x04name\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x04name\x12'\n" +@@ -3388,22 +3393,22 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +"\rdatalog_rules\x18\x03 \x03(\tR\fdatalogRulesJ\x04\b\x01\x10\x02J\x04\b\x02\x10\x03R\x05rolesR\bbindings\"L\n" +"\x1aPolicyConfigUpdateResponse\x12\x18\n" +"\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" +- "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"m\n" ++ "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"\x88\x01\n" +"\fKeysResponse\x12\x1f\n" +"\vpublic_keys\x18\x01 \x03(\fR\n" +- "publicKeys\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\x02 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12\x1e\n" ++ "publicKeys\x127\n" ++ "\tsign_time\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\bsignTime\x12\x1e\n" +"\n" +"signatures\x18\x03 \x03(\fR\n" +- "signatures\"}\n" ++ "signatures\"\x8b\x01\n" +"\x13TokenRefreshRequest\x12/\n" +- "\x13challenge_signature\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x12\x1c\n" +- "\ttimestamp\x18\x02 \x01(\x03R\ttimestamp\x12\x17\n" +- "\apeer_id\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\"\x7f\n" ++ "\x13challenge_signature\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\x12challengeSignature\x12*\n" ++ "\x11challenge_unix_ms\x18\x02 \x01(\x03R\x0fchallengeUnixMs\x12\x17\n" ++ "\apeer_id\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\"\x9d\x01\n" +"\x14TokenRefreshResponse\x12#\n" +- "\rbiscuit_token\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x12\x1d\n" +- "\n" +- "expires_at\x18\x02 \x01(\x03R\texpiresAt\x12#\n" ++ "\rbiscuit_token\x18\x01 \x01(\fR\fbiscuitToken\x12;\n" ++ "\vexpire_time\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" ++ "expireTime\x12#\n" +"\rerror_message\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\ferrorMessage\"D\n" +"\x11NodeCatalogReport\x12/\n" +"\bservices\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x13.sam.v1.ServiceInfoR\bservices\"-\n" +@@ -3448,42 +3453,41 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +"\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"Y\n" +"\x13AgentRefreshRequest\x12\x19\n" +"\bagent_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\aagentId\x12'\n" +- "\x0fcredential_path\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x0ecredentialPath\"e\n" ++ "\x0fcredential_path\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x0ecredentialPath\"\x83\x01\n" +"\x14AgentRefreshResponse\x12\x18\n" +"\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" +- "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12\x1d\n" +- "\n" +- "expires_at\x18\x03 \x01(\x03R\texpiresAt\"/\n" ++ "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\x12;\n" ++ "\vexpire_time\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" ++ "expireTime\"/\n" +"\x12AgentStatusRequest\x12\x19\n" +- "\bagent_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\aagentId\"\xa8\x01\n" ++ "\bagent_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\aagentId\"\xc6\x01\n" +"\vAgentStatus\x12\x19\n" +"\bagent_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\aagentId\x12\x1a\n" +"\battached\x18\x02 \x01(\bR\battached\x12.\n" +- "\aingress\x18\x03 \x03(\v2\x14.sam.v1.AgentIngressR\aingress\x122\n" +- "\x15credential_expires_at\x18\x04 \x01(\x03R\x13credentialExpiresAt\"X\n" ++ "\aingress\x18\x03 \x03(\v2\x14.sam.v1.AgentIngressR\aingress\x12P\n" ++ "\x16credential_expire_time\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x14credentialExpireTime\"X\n" +"\x13AgentStatusResponse\x12+\n" +"\x06agents\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x13.sam.v1.AgentStatusR\x06agents\x12\x14\n" +- "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"\x83\x02\n" ++ "\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"\xbd\x02\n" +"\x18IdentityEvidenceResponse\x12\x17\n" +"\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x18\n" +- "\abiscuit\x18\x02 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12,\n" +- "\x12biscuit_expires_at\x18\x03 \x01(\x03R\x10biscuitExpiresAt\x12*\n" ++ "\abiscuit\x18\x02 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12J\n" ++ "\x13biscuit_expire_time\x18\x03 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x11biscuitExpireTime\x12*\n" +"\x11control_plane_url\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x0fcontrolPlaneUrl\x12;\n" +- "\x1atrusted_control_plane_keys\x18\x05 \x03(\fR\x17trustedControlPlaneKeys\x12\x1d\n" ++ "\x1atrusted_control_plane_keys\x18\x05 \x03(\fR\x17trustedControlPlaneKeys\x129\n" +"\n" +- "checked_at\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\tcheckedAt\"\xe7\x02\n" ++ "check_time\x18\x06 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\tcheckTime\"\xa0\x03\n" +"\x14PeerEvidenceResponse\x12\x17\n" +"\apeer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06peerId\x12\x18\n" +"\abiscuit\x18\x02 \x01(\fR\abiscuit\x12#\n" +"\rverifying_key\x18\x03 \x01(\fR\fverifyingKey\x12\x14\n" +"\x05roles\x18\x04 \x03(\tR\x05roles\x12@\n" +- "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2(.sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12\x1e\n" +- "\n" +- "expiration\x18\x06 \x01(\x03R\n" +- "expiration\x12%\n" +- "\x0erevocation_ids\x18\a \x03(\tR\rrevocationIds\x12\x1d\n" ++ "\x06labels\x18\x05 \x03(\v2(.sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntryR\x06labels\x12;\n" ++ "\vexpire_time\x18\x06 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\n" ++ "expireTime\x12%\n" ++ "\x0erevocation_ids\x18\a \x03(\tR\rrevocationIds\x129\n" +"\n" +- "checked_at\x18\b \x01(\x03R\tcheckedAt\x1a9\n" ++ "check_time\x18\b \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\tcheckTime\x1a9\n" +"\vLabelsEntry\x12\x10\n" +"\x03key\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x03key\x12\x14\n" +"\x05value\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05value:\x028\x01\"\xe2\x02\n" +@@ -3588,35 +3592,48 @@ var file_api_sam_proto_goTypes = []any{}var file_api_sam_proto_depIdxs = []int32{2, // 0: sam.v1.MeshEvent.type:type_name -> sam.v1.MeshEvent.Type- 48, // 1: sam.v1.EnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntry- 49, // 2: sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntry- 0, // 3: sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse.status:type_name -> sam.v1.EnrollmentStatus- 1, // 4: sam.v1.ServiceInfo.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType- 50, // 5: sam.v1.CommandBackend.env:type_name -> sam.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntry- 10, // 6: sam.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.service:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceInfo- 11, // 7: sam.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.command:type_name -> sam.v1.CommandBackend- 1, // 8: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType- 51, // 9: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.LabelsEntry- 18, // 10: sam.v1.PolicyConfig.roles:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyRole- 19, // 11: sam.v1.PolicyConfig.bindings:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyBinding- 10, // 12: sam.v1.NodeCatalogReport.services:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceInfo- 30, // 13: sam.v1.AgentEgress.secrets:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentSecret- 1, // 14: sam.v1.AgentIngress.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType- 31, // 15: sam.v1.AgentBundle.egress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentEgress- 32, // 16: sam.v1.AgentBundle.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress- 33, // 17: sam.v1.AgentAttachRequest.bundle:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentBundle- 32, // 18: sam.v1.AgentStatus.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress- 41, // 19: sam.v1.AgentStatusResponse.agents:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentStatus- 52, // 20: sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry- 53, // 21: sam.v1.MemberCredential.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp- 46, // 22: sam.v1.MemberCredential.trusted_keys:type_name -> sam.v1.TrustedSigningKey- 47, // 23: sam.v1.MemberCredential.oidc_session:type_name -> sam.v1.OIDCSession- 53, // 24: sam.v1.TrustedSigningKey.receive_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp- 25, // [25:25] is the sub-list for method output_type- 25, // [25:25] is the sub-list for method input_type- 25, // [25:25] is the sub-list for extension type_name- 25, // [25:25] is the sub-list for extension extendee- 0, // [0:25] is the sub-list for field type_name+ 53, // 1: sam.v1.MeshEvent.event_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 48, // 2: sam.v1.EnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.EnrollRequest.LabelsEntry+ 53, // 3: sam.v1.EnrollResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 49, // 4: sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest.LabelsEntry+ 0, // 5: sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse.status:type_name -> sam.v1.EnrollmentStatus+ 53, // 6: sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 1, // 7: sam.v1.ServiceInfo.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType+ 50, // 8: sam.v1.CommandBackend.env:type_name -> sam.v1.CommandBackend.EnvEntry+ 10, // 9: sam.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.service:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceInfo+ 11, // 10: sam.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.command:type_name -> sam.v1.CommandBackend+ 1, // 11: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType+ 51, // 12: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.LabelsEntry+ 53, // 13: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.announce_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 53, // 14: sam.v1.RouterLeaseResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 18, // 15: sam.v1.PolicyConfig.roles:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyRole+ 19, // 16: sam.v1.PolicyConfig.bindings:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyBinding+ 53, // 17: sam.v1.KeysResponse.sign_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 53, // 18: sam.v1.TokenRefreshResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 10, // 19: sam.v1.NodeCatalogReport.services:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceInfo+ 30, // 20: sam.v1.AgentEgress.secrets:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentSecret+ 1, // 21: sam.v1.AgentIngress.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType+ 31, // 22: sam.v1.AgentBundle.egress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentEgress+ 32, // 23: sam.v1.AgentBundle.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress+ 33, // 24: sam.v1.AgentAttachRequest.bundle:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentBundle+ 53, // 25: sam.v1.AgentRefreshResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 32, // 26: sam.v1.AgentStatus.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress+ 53, // 27: sam.v1.AgentStatus.credential_expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 41, // 28: sam.v1.AgentStatusResponse.agents:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentStatus+ 53, // 29: sam.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse.biscuit_expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 53, // 30: sam.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse.check_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 52, // 31: sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry+ 53, // 32: sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 53, // 33: sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.check_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 53, // 34: sam.v1.MemberCredential.expire_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 46, // 35: sam.v1.MemberCredential.trusted_keys:type_name -> sam.v1.TrustedSigningKey+ 47, // 36: sam.v1.MemberCredential.oidc_session:type_name -> sam.v1.OIDCSession+ 53, // 37: sam.v1.TrustedSigningKey.receive_time:type_name -> google.protobuf.Timestamp+ 38, // [38:38] is the sub-list for method output_type+ 38, // [38:38] is the sub-list for method input_type+ 38, // [38:38] is the sub-list for extension type_name+ 38, // [38:38] is the sub-list for extension extendee+ 0, // [0:38] is the sub-list for field type_name}func init() { file_api_sam_proto_init() }diff --git a/api/sam.proto b/api/sam.protoindex 91e2fe0a..04f9eed7 100644--- a/api/sam.proto+++ b/api/sam.proto@@ -47,7 +47,10 @@ message MeshEvent {}Type type = 1;string peer_id = 2;- int64 timestamp = 3;+ // When the control plane recorded the event. Receivers ignore an event+ // further than a few minutes from their clock and, for bans, one older+ // than the last they applied for the peer.+ google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 3;bytes new_public_key = 4;bytes signature = 5;}@@ -62,13 +65,15 @@ message EnrollRequest {// enrollment flow's gates, minted as signed label() facts in the// biscuit. Empty means no claims.map<string, string> labels = 5;- // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix- // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:register:<peer_id>:<timestamp>". Required, and peer_id must be- // derived from public_key. The JWT proves who is asking; this proves- // they hold the key they are asking to bind, so an identity cannot- // register (and overwrite) another node's peer_id.- int64 timestamp = 6;+ // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: challenge_unix_ms is+ // the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ // the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:register:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>". It is+ // an int64 because it is the number in the signed text, not an instant+ // for display. Required, and peer_id must be derived from public_key.+ // The JWT proves who is asking; this proves they hold the key they are+ // asking to bind, so an identity cannot register (and overwrite) another+ // node's peer_id.+ int64 challenge_unix_ms = 6;bytes challenge_signature = 7;}@@ -77,7 +82,7 @@ message EnrollResponse {string error_message = 2;bytes control_plane_public_key = 3;repeated string router_addresses = 4;- int64 expiration = 5;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 5;}enum EnrollmentStatus {@@ -95,13 +100,13 @@ message BootstrapEnrollRequest {// Operator-declared labels; the admin approving the enrollment attests// them (see EnrollRequest.labels).map<string, string> labels = 5;- // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix- // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:enroll:<peer_id>:<timestamp>". Required, and peer_id must be- // derived from public_key: this is what entitles a repeated POST /enroll- // to re-fetch an existing enrollment's biscuit, so a bootstrap token- // alone must never satisfy it.- int64 timestamp = 6;+ // Proof of possession of public_key's private half: challenge_unix_ms is+ // the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ // the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:enroll:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>". Required,+ // and peer_id must be derived from public_key: this is what entitles a+ // repeated POST /enroll to re-fetch an existing enrollment's biscuit, so+ // a bootstrap token alone must never satisfy it.+ int64 challenge_unix_ms = 6;bytes challenge_signature = 7;}@@ -118,7 +123,7 @@ message BootstrapEnrollResponse {string error_message = 4;bytes control_plane_public_key = 5; // Populated only if APPROVEDrepeated string router_addresses = 6; // Populated only if APPROVED- int64 expiration = 7; // Populated only if APPROVED+ google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 7; // Populated only if APPROVED}@@ -173,7 +178,7 @@ message ServiceAnnounce {// Runtime load hints; zero values mean unknown.uint32 active_requests = 6;double latency_ewma_ms = 7;- int64 timestamp = 8;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp announce_time = 8;}message ControlPlaneInfoResponse {@@ -196,19 +201,19 @@ message RouterLeaseRequest {bytes biscuit = 3;repeated string connected_peers = 4;int32 dht_size = 5;- // Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: timestamp is unix- // milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:routers-lease:<peer_id>:<timestamp>" with the key the router- // enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is not proof: routers hand- // theirs to every peer they authenticate.- int64 timestamp = 6;+ // Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: challenge_unix_ms is+ // the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ // the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:routers-lease:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>"+ // with the key the router enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is+ // not proof: routers hand theirs to every peer they authenticate.+ int64 challenge_unix_ms = 6;bytes challenge_signature = 7;}message RouterLeaseResponse {bool success = 1;string error = 2;- int64 expires_at = 3;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 3;}message PolicyRole {@@ -262,9 +267,9 @@ message PolicyConfigUpdateResponse {message KeysResponse {repeated bytes public_keys = 1;- // Unix milliseconds at which the set was signed; receivers reject responses- // outside a short freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed.- int64 timestamp = 2;+ // When the set was signed; receivers reject responses outside a short+ // freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed.+ google.protobuf.Timestamp sign_time = 2;// One ed25519 signature per entry of public_keys, by that key, over the// deterministic encoding of this message with signatures cleared. A// receiver trusting any key still valid on the control plane can verify@@ -274,12 +279,13 @@ message KeysResponse {message TokenRefreshRequest {// Signature with the node key over the UTF-8 bytes of- // "sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<timestamp>", where peer_id is the one bound in- // the presented biscuit. Peer- and endpoint-bound so a captured signature- // verifies nowhere else.+ // "sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>", where peer_id is the one+ // bound in the presented biscuit. Peer- and endpoint-bound so a captured+ // signature verifies nowhere else.bytes challenge_signature = 1;- // Unix milliseconds. Must be within the control plane's freshness window.- int64 timestamp = 2;+ // The caller's clock in unix milliseconds, the number in the signed text.+ // Must be within the control plane's freshness window.+ int64 challenge_unix_ms = 2;// The caller's peer ID. Optional: the control plane normally reads it// from the verified biscuit. It is consulted only when the biscuit's// signing key has been retired, so the biscuit cannot be verified: the@@ -292,7 +298,7 @@ message TokenRefreshRequest {message TokenRefreshResponse {bytes biscuit_token = 1;- int64 expires_at = 2;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 2;string error_message = 3;}@@ -412,7 +418,7 @@ message AgentRefreshRequest {message AgentRefreshResponse {bool success = 1;string error = 2;- int64 expires_at = 3;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 3;}// AgentStatusRequest reports on one agent, or on all of them when agent_id is@@ -425,7 +431,7 @@ message AgentStatus {string agent_id = 1;bool attached = 2;repeated AgentIngress ingress = 3;- int64 credential_expires_at = 4;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp credential_expire_time = 4;}message AgentStatusResponse {@@ -441,15 +447,15 @@ message AgentStatusResponse {// GET /sam/identity and GET /sam/peer/{peer_id}/evidence. Only reachable// over the filesystem-protected Unix socket or verified mTLS. A 200 asserts// the node verified the biscuit, its PeerID binding, and revocation state at-// checked_at; independent verifiers recompute from the raw biscuit and keys.+// check_time; independent verifiers recompute from the raw biscuit and keys.message IdentityEvidenceResponse {string peer_id = 1;bytes biscuit = 2;- int64 biscuit_expires_at = 3;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp biscuit_expire_time = 3;string control_plane_url = 4;repeated bytes trusted_control_plane_keys = 5; // Ed25519 SPKI DER- int64 checked_at = 6;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp check_time = 6;}message PeerEvidenceResponse {@@ -458,9 +464,9 @@ message PeerEvidenceResponse {bytes verifying_key = 3; // Ed25519 SPKI DER, member of the trusted setrepeated string roles = 4;map<string, string> labels = 5;- int64 expiration = 6;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 6;repeated string revocation_ids = 7; // hex- int64 checked_at = 8;+ google.protobuf.Timestamp check_time = 8;}// ============================================================================diff --git a/api/trust.go b/api/trust.goindex ac72787f..f7884539 100644--- a/api/trust.go+++ b/api/trust.go@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import ("time""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// ErrInsecureControlPlaneURL marks a plaintext control-plane URL to a host@@ -67,21 +68,21 @@ func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool {const KeysResponseFreshness = 5 * time.Minute// KeysResponsePayload is the bytes each signature in a KeysResponse covers:-// the key set and the timestamp, deterministically encoded, signatures+// the key set and the signing time, deterministically encoded, signatures// cleared.func KeysResponsePayload(resp *KeysResponse) ([]byte, error) {- unsigned := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: resp.PublicKeys, Timestamp: resp.Timestamp}+ unsigned := &KeysResponse{PublicKeys: resp.PublicKeys, SignTime: resp.SignTime}return proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(unsigned)}-// SignKeysResponse sets Timestamp and one signature per key pair, so a+// SignKeysResponse sets SignTime and one signature per key pair, so a// receiver that trusts any key still valid on the control plane can verify// the set. Private keys must be in the same order as resp.PublicKeys.func SignKeysResponse(resp *KeysResponse, privateKeys []ed25519.PrivateKey, now time.Time) error {if len(privateKeys) != len(resp.PublicKeys) {return fmt.Errorf("keys response has %d public keys but %d signing keys", len(resp.PublicKeys), len(privateKeys))}- resp.Timestamp = now.UnixMilli()+ resp.SignTime = timestamppb.New(now)payload, err := KeysResponsePayload(resp)if err != nil {return err@@ -109,9 +110,12 @@ func VerifyKeysResponse(resp *KeysResponse, trusted []ed25519.PublicKey, now timif len(resp.Signatures) != len(resp.PublicKeys) {return nil, fmt.Errorf("keys response carries %d signatures for %d keys", len(resp.Signatures), len(resp.PublicKeys))}- issued := time.UnixMilli(resp.Timestamp)+ if resp.SignTime == nil {+ return nil, errors.New("keys response carries no sign_time")+ }+ issued := resp.SignTime.AsTime()if now.Sub(issued) > KeysResponseFreshness || issued.Sub(now) > KeysResponseFreshness {- return nil, fmt.Errorf("keys response timestamp %s is outside the freshness window", issued.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("keys response sign_time %s is outside the freshness window", issued.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))}payload, err := KeysResponsePayload(resp)if err != nil {diff --git a/api/validation.go b/api/validation.goindex 01e6f117..27864bde 100644--- a/api/validation.go+++ b/api/validation.go@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ func ValidateServiceAnnounce(a *ServiceAnnounce) error {return fmt.Errorf("invalid label %q", k)}}- if a.GetTimestamp() <= 0 {- return fmt.Errorf("missing timestamp")+ if a.GetAnnounceTime() == nil {+ return fmt.Errorf("missing announce_time")}return nil}diff --git a/internal/controlplane/approval_labels_test.go b/internal/controlplane/approval_labels_test.goindex 5e0c0459..0c18a6ff 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/approval_labels_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/approval_labels_test.go@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func TestApprovalRefusesLabelsTheRoleDoesNotGrant(t *testing.T) {PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,Labels: labels,- Timestamp: enrollTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: enrollTS,ChallengeSignature: enrollSig,})if err != nil {diff --git a/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go b/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.goindex 96e3b5ac..8ac606d7 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/biscuit_ttl_test.go@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func registerNode(t *testing.T, cpURL, jwtToken string) (crypto.PrivKey, peer.IDPeerId: peerID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ func postRefresh(t *testing.T, cpURL string, priv crypto.PrivKey, currentBiscuitt.Fatal(err)}reqData, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshRequest{- Timestamp: timestamp,+ ChallengeUnixMs: timestamp,ChallengeSignature: sig,PeerId: peerID,})@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsCappedByItsVoucher(t *testing.T) {cpPubKey := ed25519.PublicKey(resp.ControlPlanePublicKey)assertNear(t, "biscuit expiration()", biscuitExpiration(t, resp.BiscuitToken, cpPubKey, srv.config.BiscuitTimeout), oidcExpiry)- assertNear(t, "EnrollResponse.Expiration", time.Unix(resp.Expiration, 0), oidcExpiry)+ assertNear(t, "EnrollResponse.expire_time", resp.GetExpireTime().AsTime(), oidcExpiry)})t.Run("register uses the configured TTL when it expires first", func(t *testing.T) {@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsCappedByItsVoucher(t *testing.T) {cpPubKey := ed25519.PublicKey(resp.ControlPlanePublicKey)assertNear(t, "biscuit expiration()", biscuitExpiration(t, resp.BiscuitToken, cpPubKey, srv.config.BiscuitTimeout), want)- assertNear(t, "EnrollResponse.Expiration", time.Unix(resp.Expiration, 0), want)+ assertNear(t, "EnrollResponse.expire_time", resp.GetExpireTime().AsTime(), want)})t.Run("refresh clamps to the end of the OIDC session", func(t *testing.T) {@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsCappedByItsVoucher(t *testing.T) {refreshed := refreshNode(t, cpURL, priv, resp.BiscuitToken)assertNear(t, "refreshed biscuit expiration()", biscuitExpiration(t, refreshed.BiscuitToken, cpPubKey, srv.config.BiscuitTimeout), sessionEnd)- assertNear(t, "TokenRefreshResponse.ExpiresAt", time.Unix(refreshed.ExpiresAt, 0), sessionEnd)+ assertNear(t, "TokenRefreshResponse.expire_time", refreshed.GetExpireTime().AsTime(), sessionEnd)})t.Run("refresh uses the configured TTL when the session never expires", func(t *testing.T) {diff --git a/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go b/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.goindex 6ecb1eec..fc31d03b 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (h *lifecycleHarness) register(sub string) (crypto.PrivKey, peer.ID) {ts, sig := registerPoP(h.t, priv, id.String())data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: h.mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": sub}), PeerId: id.String(), PublicKey: pub,- RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,+ RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {h.t.Fatal(err)@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func (h *lifecycleHarness) enroll(token string) (api.EnrollmentStatus, int, strits, sig := enrollPoP(h.t, priv, id.String())data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.BootstrapEnrollRequest{BootstrapToken: token, PeerId: id.String(), PublicKey: pub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {h.t.Fatal(err)@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ func TestUnverifiedEmailAndIssuerCollision(t *testing.T) {claims["sub"] = id.String() // distinct subjects, so only the email can binddata, err := proto.Marshal(&api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: h.mintToken(claims), PeerId: id.String(), PublicKey: pub,- RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,+ RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)diff --git a/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go b/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.goindex 94741699..13d79ace 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/label_grants_test.go@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestRegisterRefusesLabelsTheRoleDoesNotGrant(t *testing.T) {PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,Labels: labels,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {diff --git a/internal/controlplane/mesh.go b/internal/controlplane/mesh.goindex 152e9f1f..a964cd49 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/mesh.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/mesh.go@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb""github.com/google/sam/api""github.com/google/sam/internal/storage"@@ -272,7 +273,7 @@ func (p *P2PMeshAdapter) PublishEvent(ctx context.Context, eventType api.MeshEveevent := &api.MeshEvent{Type: eventType,PeerId: canonical,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),NewPublicKey: payload,}diff --git a/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go b/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.goindex 8575fe9d..64e9e79f 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/peer_id_canonicalization_test.go@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestBannedNodeCannotRegisterUnderAnAlias(t *testing.T) {PeerId: peerID,PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {diff --git a/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go b/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.goindex 9b146044..2b64678c 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func TestPoliciesRequiresAnAdmissibleNode(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeer.String(),PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}reqData, err := proto.Marshal(enrollReq)diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.goindex 60bf8f60..bbda0e60 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/server.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ import ("golang.org/x/time/rate""google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")var logger = golog.Logger("sam-control-plane")@@ -555,7 +556,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {http.Error(w, "peer_id is not derived from public_key", http.StatusBadRequest)return}- if err := verifyFreshChallenge(enrolleeKey, api.RegisterChallenge(canonical, req.Timestamp), req.Timestamp, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {+ if err := verifyFreshChallenge(enrolleeKey, api.RegisterChallenge(canonical, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeUnixMs, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {logger.Warnw("Register challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err)http.Error(w, "Invalid registration challenge: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)return@@ -710,7 +711,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {BiscuitToken: biscuitData,ControlPlanePublicKey: pubKey,RouterAddresses: routerAddrs, // routers nodes multiaddresses- Expiration: biscuitExpiry.Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(biscuitExpiry),}respData, err := proto.Marshal(resp)@@ -840,7 +841,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {return}- if err := verifyFreshChallenge(pubKey, api.RefreshChallenge(canonical, req.Timestamp), req.Timestamp, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {+ if err := verifyFreshChallenge(pubKey, api.RefreshChallenge(canonical, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeUnixMs, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {logger.Warnw("Refresh challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err)unauthorized("Challenge verification failed: " + err.Error())return@@ -953,7 +954,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRefresh(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {// Write responseresp := &api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: biscuitBytes,- ExpiresAt: biscuitExpiry.Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(biscuitExpiry),}respData, err := proto.Marshal(resp)@@ -1097,7 +1098,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRouterLease(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)return}- if err := verifyFreshChallenge(routerKey, api.RouterLeaseChallenge(canonical, req.Timestamp), req.Timestamp, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {+ if err := verifyFreshChallenge(routerKey, api.RouterLeaseChallenge(canonical, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeUnixMs, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {logger.Warnw("Router lease challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err)http.Error(w, "Invalid lease challenge: "+err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)return@@ -1136,8 +1137,8 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRouterLease(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {}resp := &api.RouterLeaseResponse{- Success: true,- ExpiresAt: expiresAt.Unix(),+ Success: true,+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(expiresAt),}respData, err := proto.Marshal(resp)@@ -1450,7 +1451,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "peer_id is not derived from public_key")return}- if err := verifyFreshChallenge(enrolleeKey, api.EnrollChallenge(canonical, req.Timestamp), req.Timestamp, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {+ if err := verifyFreshChallenge(enrolleeKey, api.EnrollChallenge(canonical, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeUnixMs, req.ChallengeSignature); err != nil {logger.Warnw("Enroll challenge verification failed", "peer_id", canonical, "error", err)s.writeEnrollError(w, api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED, "Invalid enrollment challenge: "+err.Error())return@@ -2446,9 +2447,9 @@ func (s *Server) buildApprovedBootstrapEnrollResponse(ctx context.Context, biscurouterAddrs = append(routerAddrs, r.Addresses...)}- expiration := time.Now().Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL).Unix()+ expiration := time.Now().Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL)if resolvedAt != nil {- expiration = resolvedAt.Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL).Unix()+ expiration = resolvedAt.Add(s.config.BiscuitTTL)}return &api.BootstrapEnrollResponse{@@ -2456,7 +2457,7 @@ func (s *Server) buildApprovedBootstrapEnrollResponse(ctx context.Context, biscuBiscuitToken: biscuitToken,ControlPlanePublicKey: pubKey,RouterAddresses: routerAddrs,- Expiration: expiration,+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(expiration),}, nil}diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go b/internal/controlplane/server_test.goindex f66ab779..8c4633ae 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeer.String(),PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: nodeTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: nodeTS,ChallengeSignature: nodeSig,}reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq)@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),PublicKey: routerPubKeyBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: routerTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: routerTS,ChallengeSignature: routerSig,}reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(enrollRouterReq)@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),Addresses: routerAddresses,Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken,- Timestamp: leaseTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: leaseTS,ChallengeSignature: leaseSig,}reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(leaseReq)@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),Addresses: []string{badAddr},Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken,- Timestamp: badTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: badTS,ChallengeSignature: badSig,}reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(badLease)@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeer.String(),Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/6001/p2p/" + nodePeer.String()},Biscuit: enrollNodeResp.BiscuitToken, // Node biscuit doesn't have router role- Timestamp: rogueTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: rogueTS,ChallengeSignature: rogueSig,}reqData, _ = proto.Marshal(rogueLeaseReq)@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),Addresses: []string{"/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()},Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}}(),@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ func TestNodeAndRouterRegistrationFlow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),Addresses: []string{},Biscuit: enrollRouterResp.BiscuitToken,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}}(),@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ func TestEnrollmentWorkflow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: enrollTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: enrollTS,ChallengeSignature: enrollSig,}enrollReqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollReq)@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ func TestEnrollmentWorkflow(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID2.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes2,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: enrollTS2,+ ChallengeUnixMs: enrollTS2,ChallengeSignature: enrollSig2,}enrollReqData2, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollReq2)@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ func TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {ts, sig := registerPoP(t, victimPriv, victimID.String())if status, body := post(&api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: mintToken(map[string]interface{}{"sub": "victim"}), PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: victimPub,- RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,+ RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,}); status != http.StatusOK {t.Fatalf("victim registration: got %d (%s), want 200", status, body)}@@ -1202,14 +1202,14 @@ func TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {"victim peer_id and public key, challenge signed by the attacker": {req: func() *api.EnrollRequest {ts, sig := registerPoP(t, attackerPriv, victimID.String())- return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: victimPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig}+ return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: victimID.String(), PublicKey: victimPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig}}(),want: http.StatusUnauthorized,},"own key, challenge for another endpoint": {req: func() *api.EnrollRequest {ts, sig := enrollPoP(t, attackerPriv, attackerID.String())- return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig}+ return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig}}(),want: http.StatusUnauthorized,},@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ func TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)}- return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig}+ return &api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub, RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig}}(),want: http.StatusUnauthorized,},@@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ func TestRegisterRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {ts, sig = registerPoP(t, attackerPriv, attackerID.String())if status, body := post(&api.EnrollRequest{Jwt: attackerJWT, PeerId: attackerID.String(), PublicKey: attackerPub,- RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,+ RequestedRole: api.RoleNode, ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig,}); status != http.StatusOK {t.Fatalf("honest registration: got %d (%s), want 200", status, body)}@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ func TestBootstrapEnrollmentRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: enrollTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: enrollTS,ChallengeSignature: enrollSig,})resp, err = client.Post(baseURL+"/enroll", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(enrollData))@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ func TestBootstrapEnrollmentRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: crossTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: crossTS,ChallengeSignature: crossSig,},"peer_id not derived from public_key": {@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ func TestBootstrapEnrollmentRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: otherPubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: crossTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: crossTS,ChallengeSignature: crossSig,},"missing challenge": {@@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ func TestBootstrapEnrollmentRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: retryTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: retryTS,ChallengeSignature: retrySig,})r := postEnroll("enrollee retry", retryData)@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ func TestBootstrapEnrollmentRequiresProofOfPossession(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleRouter,- Timestamp: crossEndpointTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: crossEndpointTS,ChallengeSignature: statusSig, // valid /enroll/status signature, wrong endpoint})if r := postEnroll("cross-endpoint replay", replayData); r.Status != api.EnrollmentStatus_ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED || len(r.BiscuitToken) != 0 {@@ -1563,7 +1563,7 @@ func TestRouterLeaseRevocation(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()},Biscuit: routerBiscuit,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/routers/lease", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(leaseData))@@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@ func TestRouterLeaseUnderRotatedKey(t *testing.T) {PeerId: routerPeer.String(),Addresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001/p2p/" + routerPeer.String()},Biscuit: routerBiscuit,- Timestamp: leaseTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: leaseTS,ChallengeSignature: leaseSig,})if err != nil {@@ -1750,7 +1750,7 @@ func signedRefreshRequest(t *testing.T, priv crypto.PrivKey, timestamp int64) []}data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshRequest{ChallengeSignature: sig,- Timestamp: timestamp,+ ChallengeUnixMs: timestamp,})if err != nil {t.Fatalf("Marshal: %v", err)@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ func TestTokenRefreshAndRevocation(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeer.String(),PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: nodeTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: nodeTS,ChallengeSignature: nodeSig,}reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq)@@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ func TestTokenRefreshAndRevocation(t *testing.T) {refreshReq := &api.TokenRefreshRequest{ChallengeSignature: challengeSig,- Timestamp: timestamp,+ ChallengeUnixMs: timestamp,}refreshData, _ := proto.Marshal(refreshReq)@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ func TestNodeProactiveTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeer.String(),PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: nodeTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: nodeTS,ChallengeSignature: nodeSig,}reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq)@@ -2088,7 +2088,7 @@ func TestNodeProactiveTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {if err := nStore.SaveIdentity(biscuitToken); err != nil {t.Fatalf("failed to save initial identity: %v", err)}- if err := nStore.SaveIdentityExpiration(enrollNodeResp.Expiration); err != nil {+ if err := nStore.SaveIdentityExpiration(enrollNodeResp.GetExpireTime().AsTime().Unix()); err != nil {t.Fatalf("failed to save initial expiration: %v", err)}@@ -2123,8 +2123,8 @@ func TestNodeProactiveTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {if bytes.Equal(refreshedToken, biscuitToken) {t.Error("biscuit token did not change after refresh")}- if refreshedExpiration <= enrollNodeResp.Expiration {- t.Errorf("expected refreshed expiration %d to be after initial expiration %d", refreshedExpiration, enrollNodeResp.Expiration)+ if refreshedExpiration <= enrollNodeResp.GetExpireTime().AsTime().Unix() {+ t.Errorf("expected refreshed expiration %d to be after initial expiration %d", refreshedExpiration, enrollNodeResp.GetExpireTime().AsTime().Unix())}}@@ -2500,7 +2500,7 @@ func TestAuthDenialPaths(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})return reqData@@ -2651,7 +2651,7 @@ func TestOIDCSessionTTLIsConfigurable(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeer.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: regTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: regTS,ChallengeSignature: regSig,})resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData))@@ -2677,7 +2677,7 @@ func TestOIDCSessionTTLIsConfigurable(t *testing.T) {if skew := nodeRecord.ExpiresAt.Sub(enrolledAt.Add(sessionTTL)); skew < -2*time.Second || skew > 2*time.Second {t.Errorf("session ExpiresAt is %v, want ~%v", nodeRecord.ExpiresAt, enrolledAt.Add(sessionTTL))}- if reported := time.Unix(enrollResp.Expiration, 0); reported.After(nodeRecord.ExpiresAt.Add(2 * time.Second)) {+ if reported := enrollResp.GetExpireTime().AsTime(); reported.After(nodeRecord.ExpiresAt.Add(2 * time.Second)) {t.Errorf("biscuit expiration %v outlives the session %v", reported, nodeRecord.ExpiresAt)}@@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ func TestOIDCSessionTTLIsConfigurable(t *testing.T) {}refreshData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshRequest{ChallengeSignature: challengeSig,- Timestamp: timestamp,+ ChallengeUnixMs: timestamp,})req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", baseURL+"/refresh", bytes.NewReader(refreshData))req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(enrollResp.BiscuitToken))@@ -2746,7 +2746,7 @@ func TestBanSurvivesKeypairRegeneration(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})resp, err := client.Post(baseURL+"/register", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewReader(reqData))@@ -2926,7 +2926,7 @@ func TestBootstrapTokenOwnerPropagatesToNode(t *testing.T) {PeerId: pID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ownerTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ownerTS,ChallengeSignature: ownerSig,})resp, err = client.Post(baseURL+"/enroll", "application/x-protobuf", bytes.NewBuffer(enrollData))@@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ func bootstrapEnroll(t *testing.T, baseURL, token string, priv crypto.PrivKey, pPublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: role,Labels: labels,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {@@ -3820,7 +3820,7 @@ func TestAutonomousRecovery(t *testing.T) {if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)}- reqData, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshRequest{Timestamp: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, PeerId: f.pID.String()})+ reqData, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshRequest{ChallengeUnixMs: ts, ChallengeSignature: sig, PeerId: f.pID.String()})if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)}diff --git a/internal/node/discovery/announcer.go b/internal/node/discovery/announcer.goindex 8eb427ce..c993001e 100644--- a/internal/node/discovery/announcer.go+++ b/internal/node/discovery/announcer.go@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (pubsub "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-pubsub""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// Discovery is the node-facing handle: it announces local services@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ func (d *Discovery) announceOnce(ctx context.Context, anns []Announcement) {Labels: ann.Labels,ActiveRequests: ann.Load.ActiveRequests,LatencyEwmaMs: ann.Load.LatencyEWMAMs,- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}if err := api.ValidateServiceAnnounce(msg); err != nil {logger.Warnf("[Discovery] skipping invalid announcement for %q: %v", ann.Name, err)diff --git a/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go b/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.goindex 0cbd0df1..4307d29a 100644--- a/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go+++ b/internal/node/discovery/discovery_test.go@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer"mocknet "github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/p2p/net/mock""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// newPair builds two connected in-memory hosts with gossipsub and Discovery.@@ -181,11 +182,11 @@ func TestObserveRejectsForgedAndStale(t *testing.T) {other := testPeerID(t)valid := &api.ServiceAnnounce{- PeerId: signer.String(),- Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,- ServiceName: "llm",- Keys: []string{"m1"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ PeerId: signer.String(),+ Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,+ ServiceName: "llm",+ Keys: []string{"m1"},+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}tests := []struct {@@ -198,12 +199,12 @@ func TestObserveRejectsForgedAndStale(t *testing.T) {{"stale timestamp dropped", rawMessage(t, signer, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: signer.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute).Unix(),+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute)),}), 0},{"future timestamp dropped", rawMessage(t, signer, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: signer.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute).Unix(),+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)),}), 0},{"invalid payload dropped", &pubsub.Message{Message: &pubsub_pb.Message{From: []byte(signer), Data: []byte("junk")},@@ -227,7 +228,7 @@ func TestProviderTableIsBounded(t *testing.T) {d.observe(rawMessage(t, signer, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: signer.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}))}if got := len(d.providers); got != 2 {@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ func TestProviderTableCapsEntriesPerSigner(t *testing.T) {d.observe(rawMessage(t, honest, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: honest.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}))loud := testPeerID(t)@@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ func TestProviderTableCapsEntriesPerSigner(t *testing.T) {d.observe(rawMessage(t, loud, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: loud.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,ServiceName: "svc-" + string(rune('a'+i%26)) + string(rune('a'+i/26)), Keys: []string{"m1"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}))}@@ -273,8 +274,8 @@ func TestPeerLabels(t *testing.T) {d.observe(rawMessage(t, signer, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: signer.String(), Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_MCP,ServiceName: "reviewer", Keys: []string{"review_pr"},- Labels: map[string]string{"region": "eu"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ Labels: map[string]string{"region": "eu"},+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}))if got := d.PeerLabels(signer.String()); got["region"] != "eu" {@@ -289,7 +290,7 @@ func TestValidateServiceAnnounceCaps(t *testing.T) {base := func() *api.ServiceAnnounce {return &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: "12D3KooWTest", Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,- ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"}, Timestamp: 1,+ ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"}, AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}}tooMany := make([]string, api.MaxAnnounceKeys+1)@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ func TestValidateServiceAnnounceCaps(t *testing.T) {{"too many keys", func(a *api.ServiceAnnounce) { a.Keys = tooMany }, true},{"empty peer", func(a *api.ServiceAnnounce) { a.PeerId = "" }, true},{"unspecified type", func(a *api.ServiceAnnounce) { a.Type = api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED }, true},- {"no timestamp", func(a *api.ServiceAnnounce) { a.Timestamp = 0 }, true},+ {"no announce time", func(a *api.ServiceAnnounce) { a.AnnounceTime = nil }, true},{"oversized label", func(a *api.ServiceAnnounce) {a.Labels = map[string]string{"k": string(make([]byte, api.MaxAnnounceStringLen+1))}}, true},@@ -347,8 +348,8 @@ func TestObserveKeysOnTheCanonicalPeerID(t *testing.T) {d.observe(rawMessage(t, signer, &api.ServiceAnnounce{PeerId: spelling, Type: api.ServiceType_SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE,ServiceName: "llm", Keys: []string{"m1"},- Labels: map[string]string{"region": "eu"},- Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),+ Labels: map[string]string{"region": "eu"},+ AnnounceTime: timestamppb.Now(),}))}diff --git a/internal/node/discovery/view.go b/internal/node/discovery/view.goindex c5f18cc5..88bddf72 100644--- a/internal/node/discovery/view.go+++ b/internal/node/discovery/view.go@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ func (d *Discovery) observe(msg *pubsub.Message) {logger.Warnf("[Discovery] dropping announce with peer_id %q not matching signer %s", ann.GetPeerId(), msg.GetFrom())return}- ts := time.Unix(ann.GetTimestamp(), 0)+ ts := ann.GetAnnounceTime().AsTime()if age := time.Since(ts); age > maxAnnounceSkew || age < -maxAnnounceSkew {logger.Debugf("[Discovery] dropping stale/future announce from %s (age %v)", msg.GetFrom(), time.Since(ts))returndiff --git a/internal/node/enroll.go b/internal/node/enroll.goindex 6f93e3e5..0b7e88cc 100644--- a/internal/node/enroll.go+++ b/internal/node/enroll.go@@ -35,10 +35,21 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")var logger = golog.Logger("sam-node")+// expireUnix is the unix seconds of a control plane's expire_time for the+// store; an unset one is 0, an already-expired credential, so the node+// refreshes at once instead of trusting a token of unknown lifetime.+func expireUnix(t *timestamppb.Timestamp) int64 {+ if t == nil {+ return 0+ }+ return t.AsTime().Unix()+}+// GetOrGenerateKey retrieves a persistent private key or creates one if it's the first runfunc GetOrGenerateKey(s *Store) crypto.PrivKey {kb, _ := s.LoadKey()@@ -107,7 +118,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) enrollHTTP(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL, jwt string, pPublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: n.config.RequiredRole,Labels: n.labels(),- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}data, err := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -204,7 +215,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) processEnrollResponse(resp *http.Response) (*api.EnrollRespons}n.SetIdentityCache(enrollResp.BiscuitToken)- if err := n.Store.SaveIdentityExpiration(enrollResp.Expiration); err != nil {+ if err := n.Store.SaveIdentityExpiration(expireUnix(enrollResp.ExpireTime)); err != nil {return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to save identity expiration: %v", err)}if err := n.Store.SaveMeshConfig(enrollResp.ControlPlanePublicKey, enrollResp.RouterAddresses); err != nil {@@ -259,7 +270,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) EnrollBootstrap(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, bPublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: n.config.RequiredRole,Labels: n.labels(),- Timestamp: enrollTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: enrollTS,ChallengeSignature: enrollSig,}data, err := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -397,7 +408,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) EnrollBootstrap(ctx context.Context, controlPlaneURL string, b}n.SetIdentityCache(enrollResp.BiscuitToken)- if err := n.Store.SaveIdentityExpiration(enrollResp.Expiration); err != nil {+ if err := n.Store.SaveIdentityExpiration(expireUnix(enrollResp.ExpireTime)); err != nil {return fmt.Errorf("failed to save identity expiration: %v", err)}diff --git a/internal/node/enroll_test.go b/internal/node/enroll_test.goindex b5eae163..fbddab9f 100644--- a/internal/node/enroll_test.go+++ b/internal/node/enroll_test.go@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/libp2p/go-msgio""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// Enrollment hands out a biscuit signed by the current key and then learns@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ func TestEnrollmentPinsIdentityKeySet(t *testing.T) {mux.HandleFunc("/register", protoHandler(t, &api.EnrollResponse{BiscuitToken: credential,ControlPlanePublicKey: currentPub,- Expiration: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)),}))mux.HandleFunc("/keys", keysHandler(t, []ed25519.PublicKey{gracePub, currentPub}, []ed25519.PrivateKey{gracePriv, currentPriv}))mux.HandleFunc("/info", protoHandler(t, &api.ControlPlaneInfoResponse{}))@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ func TestStartRecoversStaleIdentityViaRefreshToken(t *testing.T) {BiscuitToken: mint(cpPriv, req.PeerId),ControlPlanePublicKey: cpPub,RouterAddresses: []string{routerAddr},- Expiration: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)),}data, _ := proto.Marshal(resp)w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-protobuf")@@ -400,14 +401,14 @@ func TestStartRecoversStaleIdentityViaAutonomousRefresh(t *testing.T) {http.Error(w, "Invalid biscuit", http.StatusUnauthorized)return}- ok, err := privKey.GetPublic().Verify(api.RefreshChallenge(req.PeerId, req.Timestamp), req.ChallengeSignature)+ ok, err := privKey.GetPublic().Verify(api.RefreshChallenge(req.PeerId, req.ChallengeUnixMs), req.ChallengeSignature)if err != nil || !ok {http.Error(w, "Challenge verification failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)return}data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: mint(cpPriv, req.PeerId),- ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)),})if err != nil {t.Errorf("marshal TokenRefreshResponse: %v", err)@@ -558,7 +559,7 @@ func TestEnroll_InvalidControlPlanePublicKeySize(t *testing.T) {}resp := &api.EnrollResponse{BiscuitToken: []byte("mock-token"),- Expiration: time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),ControlPlanePublicKey: invalidKey,RouterAddresses: []string{"/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/4001"},}@@ -644,7 +645,7 @@ func TestEnrollTrustsRouterSignedByGraceKey(t *testing.T) {BiscuitToken: mintRoleBiscuit(t, currentPriv, peerID, api.RoleNode),ControlPlanePublicKey: currentPub,RouterAddresses: []string{routerAddr},- Expiration: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)),})(w, r)})mux.HandleFunc("/keys", keysHandler(t, []ed25519.PublicKey{retiredPub, currentPub}, []ed25519.PrivateKey{retiredPriv, currentPriv}))diff --git a/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go b/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.goindex 7b5c7886..fccf90b0 100644--- a/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go+++ b/internal/node/gossip_hardening_test.go@@ -33,13 +33,14 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/host""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// signedMeshEvent returns a BANNED event for target signed by cpPriv, as the// control plane would publish it.func signedMeshEvent(t *testing.T, cpPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, target peer.ID, at time.Time) []byte {t.Helper()- event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, PeerId: target.String(), Timestamp: at.UnixMilli()}+ event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, PeerId: target.String(), EventTime: timestamppb.New(at)}unsigned, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)diff --git a/internal/node/identity_evidence.go b/internal/node/identity_evidence.goindex f9a40fda..9a435c85 100644--- a/internal/node/identity_evidence.go+++ b/internal/node/identity_evidence.go@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")type trustedKeySnapshot struct {@@ -248,10 +249,10 @@ func (n *SamNode) buildIdentityEvidence(checkedAt time.Time) (*api.IdentityEvidereturn &api.IdentityEvidenceResponse{PeerId: n.Host.ID().String(),Biscuit: append([]byte(nil), biscuitBytes...),- BiscuitExpiresAt: claims.Expiration.Unix(),+ BiscuitExpireTime: timestamppb.New(claims.Expiration),ControlPlaneUrl: controlPlaneURL,TrustedControlPlaneKeys: keyEvidence,- CheckedAt: checkedAt.Unix(),+ CheckTime: timestamppb.New(checkedAt),}, nil}@@ -289,9 +290,9 @@ func (n *SamNode) buildPeerEvidence(requested peer.ID, observation peerBiscuitObVerifyingKey: append([]byte(nil), selected.SPKIDER...),Roles: append([]string(nil), claims.Roles...),Labels: claims.Labels,- Expiration: claims.Expiration.Unix(),+ ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(claims.Expiration),RevocationIds: revocationIDs,- CheckedAt: checkedAt.Unix(),+ CheckTime: timestamppb.New(checkedAt),}, nil}diff --git a/internal/node/identity_evidence_test.go b/internal/node/identity_evidence_test.goindex 21e691f3..d499364c 100644--- a/internal/node/identity_evidence_test.go+++ b/internal/node/identity_evidence_test.go@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ func TestIdentityEvidenceReturnsVerifiableClosedResponse(t *testing.T) {if response.PeerId != node.Host.ID().String() || len(response.Biscuit) == 0 {t.Fatalf("unexpected identity response: peer=%q biscuit=%d", response.PeerId, len(response.Biscuit))}- if response.BiscuitExpiresAt != expiresAt.Unix() || len(response.TrustedControlPlaneKeys) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("unexpected expiry or key set: expiry=%d keys=%d", response.BiscuitExpiresAt, len(response.TrustedControlPlaneKeys))+ if response.GetBiscuitExpireTime().AsTime().Unix() != expiresAt.Unix() || len(response.TrustedControlPlaneKeys) != 1 {+ t.Fatalf("unexpected expiry or key set: expiry=%v keys=%d", response.GetBiscuitExpireTime().AsTime(), len(response.TrustedControlPlaneKeys))}parsedKey, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(response.TrustedControlPlaneKeys[0])if err != nil {@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ func TestIdentityEvidenceReturnsVerifiableClosedResponse(t *testing.T) {if !ok || !publicKey.Equal(node.trustedKeys[0].Key) {t.Fatalf("trusted control-plane key is not the enrolled key")}- if response.CheckedAt <= 0 || response.CheckedAt > response.BiscuitExpiresAt {- t.Fatalf("invalid checked/expiry timestamps: checked=%d expiry=%d", response.CheckedAt, response.BiscuitExpiresAt)+ if response.CheckTime == nil || response.CheckTime.AsTime().After(response.GetBiscuitExpireTime().AsTime()) {+ t.Fatalf("invalid check/expiry times: check=%v expiry=%v", response.GetCheckTime().AsTime(), response.GetBiscuitExpireTime().AsTime())}}@@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ func TestBuildPeerEvidenceBindsRequestedConnectionAndBiscuitPeers(t *testing.T)if response.Labels["region"] != "us-east-1" || len(response.RevocationIds) == 0 {t.Fatalf("missing attestation or revocation evidence: %+v", response)}- if response.Expiration != expiresAt.Unix() || response.CheckedAt <= 0 || response.CheckedAt > response.Expiration {- t.Fatalf("invalid checked/expiry timestamps: checked=%d expiry=%d", response.CheckedAt, response.Expiration)+ if response.GetExpireTime().AsTime().Unix() != expiresAt.Unix() || response.CheckTime == nil || response.CheckTime.AsTime().After(response.GetExpireTime().AsTime()) {+ t.Fatalf("invalid check/expiry times: check=%v expiry=%v", response.GetCheckTime().AsTime(), response.GetExpireTime().AsTime())}parsedKey, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(response.VerifyingKey)if err != nil {diff --git a/internal/node/middleware_test.go b/internal/node/middleware_test.goindex 5c23f2ba..b6fecee5 100644--- a/internal/node/middleware_test.go+++ b/internal/node/middleware_test.go@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-msgio""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")type mockConn struct {@@ -812,7 +813,7 @@ func TestVerifyEvent(t *testing.T) {event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,PeerId: "attacker-peer",- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),}// Sign itdiff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.goindex e45dce19..af908022 100644--- a/internal/node/node.go+++ b/internal/node/node.go@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error {// server-side); it is cross-checked against the biscuit otherwise.req := &api.TokenRefreshRequest{ChallengeSignature: sig,- Timestamp: timestamp,+ ChallengeUnixMs: timestamp,PeerId: peerID.String(),}reqData, err := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error {return fmt.Errorf("failed to save refreshed identity: %w", err)}n.SetIdentityCache(refreshResp.BiscuitToken)- if err := n.Store.SaveIdentityExpiration(refreshResp.ExpiresAt); err != nil {+ if err := n.Store.SaveIdentityExpiration(expireUnix(refreshResp.ExpireTime)); err != nil {return fmt.Errorf("failed to save refreshed expiration: %w", err)}n.recordIdentityKeySet()@@ -1376,22 +1376,23 @@ func (n *SamNode) handleBannedEvent(event *api.MeshEvent) {}canonicalID := p.String()+ eventMs := event.GetEventTime().AsTime().UnixMilli()n.mu.Lock()if n.peerLastEventTime == nil {n.peerLastEventTime = make(map[string]int64)}- if event.Timestamp < n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID] {- logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Dropping out-of-order BANNED event for peer %s (event timestamp: %d, last processed: %d)", canonicalID, event.Timestamp, n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID])+ if eventMs < n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID] {+ logger.Warnf("[Mesh Event] Dropping out-of-order BANNED event for peer %s (event time: %d, last processed: %d)", canonicalID, eventMs, n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID])n.mu.Unlock()return}- n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID] = event.Timestamp+ n.peerLastEventTime[canonicalID] = eventMsn.mu.Unlock()logger.Infow("[Mesh Event] peer banned", "event", meshEventBanned, "peer", canonicalID)// Not written to disk: a restarted node picks the ban back up from the// control plane's ban set in /info, which is also how an unban reaches it.- n.banPeer(p, event.Timestamp)+ n.banPeer(p, eventMs)}func containsTrustedKey(keys []TrustedKey, key ed25519.PublicKey) bool {@@ -1527,9 +1528,13 @@ func (n *SamNode) validateMeshEvent(_ context.Context, from peer.ID, msg *pubsublogger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] potential spoofing attempt: invalid event signature", "event", meshEventSpoofingAttempt, "peer", from.String())return pubsub.ValidationReject}- eventTime := time.UnixMilli(event.Timestamp)+ if event.EventTime == nil {+ logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] dropping event without event_time", "event", meshEventStaleEvent, "peer", from.String())+ return pubsub.ValidationReject+ }+ eventTime := event.EventTime.AsTime()if time.Since(eventTime) > FreshnessThreshold || time.Until(eventTime) > FreshnessThreshold {- logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] dropping stale or future event", "event", meshEventStaleEvent, "peer", from.String(), "timestamp", event.Timestamp)+ logger.Warnw("[Mesh Event] dropping stale or future event", "event", meshEventStaleEvent, "peer", from.String(), "event_time", eventTime.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))return pubsub.ValidationIgnore}return pubsub.ValidationAcceptdiff --git a/internal/node/node_test.go b/internal/node/node_test.goindex a22bcaef..2a77c93d 100644--- a/internal/node/node_test.go+++ b/internal/node/node_test.go@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-msgio""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")func TestAnnounceFilter(t *testing.T) {@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ func TestHandleBannedEvent(t *testing.T) {node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,PeerId: spelling,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),})if !node.revokedPeers.Contains(banned.String()) {@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ func TestBannedPeerCanonicalisation(t *testing.T) {node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,PeerId: cidv1ID,- Timestamp: ts,+ EventTime: timestamppb.New(time.UnixMilli(ts)),})if !node.revokedPeers.Contains(canonicalID) {@@ -194,7 +195,7 @@ func TestHandleKeyRotationEvent(t *testing.T) {event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_KEY_ROTATION,NewPublicKey: pub,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),}node.handleKeyRotationEvent(event)@@ -224,13 +225,13 @@ func TestKeyRotationEventSurvivesRestart(t *testing.T) {node.handleKeyRotationEvent(&api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_KEY_ROTATION,NewPublicKey: rotatedKey,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),})// Duplicate event must not grow the persisted setnode.handleKeyRotationEvent(&api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_KEY_ROTATION,NewPublicKey: rotatedKey,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),})// "Restart": a fresh node built from the same store must trust the rotated keydiff --git a/internal/node/refresh_test.go b/internal/node/refresh_test.goindex 38d61e5f..abc9086f 100644--- a/internal/node/refresh_test.go+++ b/internal/node/refresh_test.go@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import ("github.com/google/sam/api""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// refreshHarness is a node with a stored identity and a mock control plane@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ func newRefreshHarness(t *testing.T, refresh http.HandlerFunc) *refreshHarness {func writeRefreshResponse(t *testing.T, w http.ResponseWriter, token []byte) {t.Helper()- data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: token, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix()})+ data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: token, ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))})if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)}diff --git a/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go b/internal/node/relay_acl_test.goindex 94d86574..2f78cbac 100644--- a/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go+++ b/internal/node/relay_acl_test.go@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")func TestNodeRelayACL_AllowConnect(t *testing.T) {@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ func TestBannedPeerLosesRelayRights(t *testing.T) {node.handleBannedEvent(&api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,PeerId: peerID.String(),- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),})if acl.AllowReserve(peerID, addr) {diff --git a/internal/router/relay_acl_test.go b/internal/router/relay_acl_test.goindex ac6bc2c4..e6b8b4a3 100644--- a/internal/router/relay_acl_test.go+++ b/internal/router/relay_acl_test.go@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")func newTestPeerID(t *testing.T) peer.ID {@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ func TestRouterValidateMeshEvent(t *testing.T) {from, target := newTestPeerID(t), newTestPeerID(t)signed := func(key ed25519.PrivateKey, at time.Time) []byte {- event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, PeerId: target.String(), Timestamp: at.UnixMilli()}+ event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED, PeerId: target.String(), EventTime: timestamppb.New(at)}unsigned, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)diff --git a/internal/router/router.go b/internal/router/router.goindex 87d35778..425b4a90 100644--- a/internal/router/router.go+++ b/internal/router/router.go@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ import ("github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr"madns "github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr-dns""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")var logger = golog.Logger("sam-router")@@ -122,10 +123,16 @@ type credential struct {issuedUnder []ed25519.PublicKey}-func newCredential(biscuit []byte, expiresAt int64, issuedUnder []ed25519.PublicKey) credential {+// newCredential builds the router's credential; an unset expire_time is an+// expired credential, so a control plane that sent none forces a refresh.+func newCredential(biscuit []byte, expireTime *timestamppb.Timestamp, issuedUnder []ed25519.PublicKey) credential {+ var expiration time.Time+ if expireTime != nil {+ expiration = expireTime.AsTime()+ }return credential{biscuit: biscuit,- expiration: time.Unix(expiresAt, 0),+ expiration: expiration,issuedUnder: append([]ed25519.PublicKey(nil), issuedUnder...),}}@@ -479,7 +486,7 @@ func (r *Router) enroll(peerID peer.ID) error {PeerId: peerID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: r.config.RequiredRole,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}data, err := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -510,7 +517,7 @@ func (r *Router) enroll(peerID peer.ID) error {}r.keysMu.Lock()- r.credential = newCredential(enrollResp.BiscuitToken, enrollResp.Expiration, nil)+ r.credential = newCredential(enrollResp.BiscuitToken, enrollResp.ExpireTime, nil)r.trustedPublicKeys = []ed25519.PublicKey{enrollResp.ControlPlanePublicKey}r.keysMu.Unlock()@@ -539,7 +546,7 @@ func (r *Router) enrollBootstrap(peerID peer.ID) error {PeerId: peerID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: r.config.RequiredRole,- Timestamp: enrollTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: enrollTS,ChallengeSignature: enrollSig,}data, err := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -654,7 +661,7 @@ func (r *Router) enrollBootstrap(peerID peer.ID) error {}r.keysMu.Lock()- r.credential = newCredential(enrollResp.BiscuitToken, enrollResp.Expiration, nil)+ r.credential = newCredential(enrollResp.BiscuitToken, enrollResp.ExpireTime, nil)r.trustedPublicKeys = []ed25519.PublicKey{enrollResp.ControlPlanePublicKey}r.keysMu.Unlock()@@ -809,7 +816,11 @@ func (r *Router) validateMeshEvent(_ context.Context, from peer.ID, msg *pubsub.logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Potential spoofing attempt: invalid signature on event from %s", from)return pubsub.ValidationReject}- eventTime := time.UnixMilli(event.Timestamp)+ if event.EventTime == nil {+ logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Dropping event without event_time from %s", from)+ return pubsub.ValidationReject+ }+ eventTime := event.EventTime.AsTime()if time.Since(eventTime) > meshEventFreshness || time.Until(eventTime) > meshEventFreshness {logger.Warnf("[Router Event] Dropping stale or future event from %s", from)return pubsub.ValidationIgnore@@ -955,7 +966,7 @@ func (r *Router) renewLease() {Biscuit: biscuit,ConnectedPeers: connectedPeers,DhtSize: dhtSize,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}data, _ := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -1004,7 +1015,7 @@ func (r *Router) renewLease() {logger.Errorf("Lease renewal failed: %s", leaseResp.Error)leaseRenewalsTotal.WithLabelValues(leaseRejected).Inc()} else {- logger.Debugf("Lease renewed successfully. Expires at: %s", time.Unix(leaseResp.ExpiresAt, 0))+ logger.Debugf("Lease renewed successfully. Expires at: %s", leaseResp.GetExpireTime().AsTime().Format(time.RFC3339))leaseRenewalsTotal.WithLabelValues(leaseOK).Inc()}return@@ -1397,7 +1408,7 @@ func (r *Router) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error {// opt-in server-side); it is cross-checked against the biscuit otherwise.req := &api.TokenRefreshRequest{ChallengeSignature: sig,- Timestamp: timestamp,+ ChallengeUnixMs: timestamp,PeerId: peerID.String(),}reqData, err := proto.Marshal(req)@@ -1462,7 +1473,7 @@ func (r *Router) RefreshEnrollment(ctx context.Context) error {// Update local biscuit token and expiration under lockr.keysMu.Lock()- r.credential = newCredential(refreshResp.BiscuitToken, refreshResp.ExpiresAt, r.trustedPublicKeys)+ r.credential = newCredential(refreshResp.BiscuitToken, refreshResp.ExpireTime, r.trustedPublicKeys)r.keysMu.Unlock()logger.Infof("Router biscuit token refreshed successfully.")diff --git a/internal/router/router_test.go b/internal/router/router_test.goindex e817c825..1a870c0d 100644--- a/internal/router/router_test.go+++ b/internal/router/router_test.go@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-msgio""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")func startCustomMockOIDC(t *testing.T) (string, func(claims map[string]interface{}) string) {@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ func TestRouterIntegration(t *testing.T) {PeerId: nodePeerID.String(),PublicKey: nodePubKeyBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: regTS,+ ChallengeUnixMs: regTS,ChallengeSignature: regSig,}reqData, _ := proto.Marshal(enrollNodeReq)@@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ func TestRouterGossipSubBannedEvent(t *testing.T) {event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,PeerId: bannedPeerIDStr,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),}eventData, err := proto.MarshalOptions{Deterministic: true}.Marshal(event)if err != nil {diff --git a/internal/router/trust_test.go b/internal/router/trust_test.goindex d4eab4fd..e7f33ce4 100644--- a/internal/router/trust_test.go+++ b/internal/router/trust_test.go@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto""github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")// A router pointed at a plaintext control plane on another host has no way@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ func TestSyncKeysRequiresTrustedSignature(t *testing.T) {})t.Run("empty set preserves trusted keys", func(t *testing.T) {- body = marshal(&api.KeysResponse{Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli()})+ body = marshal(&api.KeysResponse{SignTime: timestamppb.Now()})router := newRouter()if err := router.syncKeys(); err == nil {t.Fatal("an empty /keys answer must not be adopted")@@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ func TestSyncKeysRefreshesOnRotation(t *testing.T) {http.Error(w, "temporarily unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)return}- response = &api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: fresh, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Unix()}+ response = &api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: fresh, ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))}default:t.Errorf("unexpected request to %s", request.URL.Path)http.NotFound(w, request)@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ func TestRouterConcurrentRefreshesAreSerialized(t *testing.T) {return}lastIssued = mintRouterBiscuit(t, cpPriv, peerID, api.RoleRouter)- body, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: lastIssued, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix()})+ body, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: lastIssued, ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))})if err != nil {t.Error(err)return@@ -441,7 +442,7 @@ func TestRouterRefreshEnrollmentHardening(t *testing.T) {}tokenResponse := func(token []byte) func(http.ResponseWriter) {return func(w http.ResponseWriter) {- data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: token, ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix()})+ data, err := proto.Marshal(&api.TokenRefreshResponse{BiscuitToken: token, ExpireTime: timestamppb.New(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))})if err != nil {t.Fatal(err)}diff --git a/sdk/README.md b/sdk/README.mdindex 6e89f18c..b3d1cf7f 100644--- a/sdk/README.md+++ b/sdk/README.md@@ -162,9 +162,13 @@ messages in `api/sam.proto`. Bodies are capped at 1 MiB on both sides.| `GET /policies` | header `Authorization: Bearer <base64 biscuit>` | `PolicyConfigGetResponse{datalog_rules}` | none; the biscuit must belong to an admitted node || `POST /nodes/catalog` | `NodeCatalogReport`, header `Authorization: Bearer <base64 biscuit>` | `204` | none; the reporting peer is read from the biscuit |-- `<ts>` is unix milliseconds and must be within 5 minutes of the control- plane's clock (`challengeMaxAge`). Challenges are defined in- `api/network.go`.+- `<ts>` is the request's `challenge_unix_ms`, unix milliseconds, and must+ be within 5 minutes of the control plane's clock (`challengeMaxAge`).+ Challenges are defined in `api/network.go`. It is the one instant on the+ wire that is an `int64`: it is the number in the signed text. Every other+ instant (`expire_time`, `sign_time`, `event_time`, `announce_time`) is a+ `google.protobuf.Timestamp`, and a receiver rejects a message whose+ required instant is unset.- A bootstrap enrollment answers `PENDING` until an operator approves it,unless the control plane runs with auto-approval. The client polls`/enroll/status` at the returned `poll_interval_seconds`.@@ -172,9 +176,9 @@ messages in `api/sam.proto`. Bodies are capped at 1 MiB on both sides.peer. A client must persist the new biscuit before using it; losing itmeans re-enrolling.- `/keys` signatures cover the deterministic protobuf encoding of- `KeysResponse{public_keys, timestamp}` with `signatures` cleared, one+ `KeysResponse{public_keys, sign_time}` with `signatures` cleared, onesignature per key by that key. The receiver accepts the set when a key it- already trusts (the enrollment key) vouches for it and the timestamp is+ already trusts (the enrollment key) vouches for it and `sign_time` iswithin 5 minutes (`api/trust.go`). Rotation keeps several keys valid, soa member must trust the whole set to verify peers enrolled under aretiring key.diff --git a/sdk/js/src/controlplane.test.ts b/sdk/js/src/controlplane.test.tsindex 6a2efb5f..a368ae55 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/controlplane.test.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/controlplane.test.ts@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@// tests/integration/sdk_enroll_test.go.import { create, fromBinary, toBinary } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";+import { timestampFromMs } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import assert from "node:assert/strict";import { test } from "node:test";import { enrollChallenge, enrollStatusChallenge, refreshChallenge, registerChallenge } from "./challenges.ts";@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ function fakeFetch(routes: Record<string, Handler>): typeof fetch {/** Signs a KeysResponse the way api.SignKeysResponse does. */function signedKeys(signers: Identity[], timestamp = Date.now()): KeysResponse {- const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: signers.map((s) => s.publicKeyRaw), timestamp: BigInt(timestamp) });+ const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: signers.map((s) => s.publicKeyRaw), signTime: timestampFromMs(timestamp) });const payload = toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, unsigned);return create(KeysResponseSchema, { ...unsigned, signatures: signers.map((s) => s.sign(payload)) });}@@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ test("enrollBootstrap sends a bound proof of possession and polls until approvedassert.deepEqual(r.publicKey, id.libp2pPublicKey);assert.equal(r.requestedRole, ROLE_NODE);assert.deepEqual(r.labels, { region: "eu" });- assert.ok(Math.abs(Number(r.timestamp) - Date.now()) < 5000);- assert.ok(verifyEd25519(id.publicKeyRaw, enrollChallenge(r.peerId, Number(r.timestamp)), r.challengeSignature));+ assert.ok(Math.abs(Number(r.challengeUnixMs) - Date.now()) < 5000);+ assert.ok(verifyEd25519(id.publicKeyRaw, enrollChallenge(r.peerId, Number(r.challengeUnixMs)), r.challengeSignature));seen.push("enroll");return proto(toBinary(BootstrapEnrollResponseSchema, create(BootstrapEnrollResponseSchema, { status: EnrollmentStatus.PENDING, pollIntervalSeconds: 30 })));},@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ test("enrollBootstrap sends a bound proof of possession and polls until approvedbiscuitToken: biscuit,controlPlanePublicKey: cpKey.publicKeyRaw,routerAddresses: routerAddrs,- expiration: 1_800_000_000n,+ expireTime: timestampFromMs(1_800_000_000_000),}): create(BootstrapEnrollResponseSchema, { status: EnrollmentStatus.PENDING, pollIntervalSeconds: 30 }),),@@ -187,8 +188,8 @@ test("register carries the JWT and the register-bound challenge", async () => {assert.equal(r.jwt, "eyJ.fake.jwt");assert.equal(r.peerId, id.peerId);assert.equal(r.requestedRole, "sam:role:custom");- assert.ok(verifyEd25519(id.publicKeyRaw, registerChallenge(r.peerId, Number(r.timestamp)), r.challengeSignature));- return proto(toBinary(EnrollResponseSchema, create(EnrollResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: biscuit, controlPlanePublicKey: cpKey.publicKeyRaw, expiration: 7n })));+ assert.ok(verifyEd25519(id.publicKeyRaw, registerChallenge(r.peerId, Number(r.challengeUnixMs)), r.challengeSignature));+ return proto(toBinary(EnrollResponseSchema, create(EnrollResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: biscuit, controlPlanePublicKey: cpKey.publicKeyRaw, expireTime: timestampFromMs(7_000) })));},}),});@@ -213,8 +214,8 @@ test("refresh presents the biscuit as a bearer and signs the refresh challenge",assert.equal(req.headers.get("authorization"), `Bearer ${Buffer.from(biscuit).toString("base64")}`);const r = fromBinary(TokenRefreshRequestSchema, body);assert.equal(r.peerId, id.peerId);- assert.ok(verifyEd25519(id.publicKeyRaw, refreshChallenge(id.peerId, Number(r.timestamp)), r.challengeSignature));- return proto(toBinary(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, create(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: fresh, expiresAt: 99n })));+ assert.ok(verifyEd25519(id.publicKeyRaw, refreshChallenge(id.peerId, Number(r.challengeUnixMs)), r.challengeSignature));+ return proto(toBinary(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, create(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: fresh, expireTime: timestampFromMs(99_000) })));},}),});@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ test("verifyKeysResponse accepts a set vouched for by a trusted key and nothingconst forged = create(KeysResponseSchema, { ...resp, publicKeys: [Identity.generate().publicKeyRaw, retiring.publicKeyRaw] });assert.throws(() => verifyKeysResponse(forged, [retiring.publicKeyRaw]), /not signed by any trusted/);- const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: resp.publicKeys, timestamp: resp.timestamp });+ const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: resp.publicKeys, signTime: resp.signTime });assert.throws(() => verifyKeysResponse(unsigned, [cpKey.publicKeyRaw]), /carries 0 signatures for 2 keys/);});diff --git a/sdk/js/src/controlplane.ts b/sdk/js/src/controlplane.tsindex a624b5f6..cc7c90ce 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/controlplane.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/controlplane.ts@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@// (api/sam.proto). The operator plane (/admin/*, JSON) is out of scope.import { create, fromBinary, toBinary } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";+import { timestampMs, type Timestamp } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import { enrollChallenge, enrollStatusChallenge, refreshChallenge, registerChallenge } from "./challenges.ts";import {BootstrapEnrollRequestSchema,@@ -171,13 +172,16 @@ export function verifyKeysResponse(resp: KeysResponse, trusted: Uint8Array[], noif (resp.signatures.length !== resp.publicKeys.length) {throw new Error(`keys response carries ${resp.signatures.length} signatures for ${resp.publicKeys.length} keys`);}- const issued = Number(resp.timestamp);+ if (resp.signTime === undefined) {+ throw new Error("keys response carries no sign_time");+ }+ const issued = timestampMs(resp.signTime);if (Math.abs(nowMs - issued) > KEYS_RESPONSE_FRESHNESS_MS) {- throw new Error(`keys response timestamp ${new Date(issued).toISOString()} is outside the freshness window`);+ throw new Error(`keys response sign_time ${new Date(issued).toISOString()} is outside the freshness window`);}- // Each signature covers the set and the timestamp, deterministically+ // Each signature covers the set and the signing time, deterministically// encoded with the signatures cleared.- const payload = toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: resp.publicKeys, timestamp: resp.timestamp }));+ const payload = toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: resp.publicKeys, signTime: resp.signTime }));const keys: Uint8Array[] = [];let verified = false;resp.publicKeys.forEach((pub, i) => {@@ -261,7 +265,7 @@ export class ControlPlaneClient {publicKey: identity.libp2pPublicKey,requestedRole: role,labels: params.labels ?? {},- timestamp: BigInt(ts),+ challengeUnixMs: BigInt(ts),challengeSignature: identity.sign(enrollChallenge(identity.peerId, ts)),});let resp = fromBinary(BootstrapEnrollResponseSchema, await this.#request("POST", "/enroll", toBinary(BootstrapEnrollRequestSchema, req)));@@ -294,7 +298,7 @@ export class ControlPlaneClient {publicKey: identity.libp2pPublicKey,requestedRole: params.role ?? ROLE_NODE,labels: params.labels ?? {},- timestamp: BigInt(ts),+ challengeUnixMs: BigInt(ts),challengeSignature: identity.sign(registerChallenge(identity.peerId, ts)),});const resp = fromBinary(EnrollResponseSchema, await this.#request("POST", "/register", toBinary(EnrollRequestSchema, req)));@@ -303,10 +307,9 @@ export class ControlPlaneClient {}return checkedEnrollment({biscuit: resp.biscuitToken,- expiration: Number(resp.expiration),controlPlanePublicKey: resp.controlPlanePublicKey,routerAddresses: resp.routerAddresses,- });+ }, resp.expireTime);}/**@@ -317,7 +320,7 @@ export class ControlPlaneClient {const { identity } = params;const ts = Date.now();const req = create(TokenRefreshRequestSchema, {- timestamp: BigInt(ts),+ challengeUnixMs: BigInt(ts),challengeSignature: identity.sign(refreshChallenge(identity.peerId, ts)),peerId: identity.peerId,});@@ -331,7 +334,7 @@ export class ControlPlaneClient {if (resp.biscuitToken.length === 0) {throw new Error("refresh returned an empty biscuit");}- return { biscuit: resp.biscuitToken, expiration: Number(resp.expiresAt) };+ return { biscuit: resp.biscuitToken, expiration: expirationSeconds(resp.expireTime, "refresh") };}/**@@ -397,10 +400,9 @@ function enrollmentFromBootstrapResponse(resp: BootstrapEnrollResponse): Enrollmcase EnrollmentStatus.APPROVED:return checkedEnrollment({biscuit: resp.biscuitToken,- expiration: Number(resp.expiration),controlPlanePublicKey: resp.controlPlanePublicKey,routerAddresses: resp.routerAddresses,- });+ }, resp.expireTime);case EnrollmentStatus.REJECTED:throw new EnrollmentRejectedError(`enrollment rejected: ${resp.errorMessage || "no reason given"}`);default:@@ -408,12 +410,20 @@ function enrollmentFromBootstrapResponse(resp: BootstrapEnrollResponse): Enrollm}}-function checkedEnrollment(e: Enrollment): Enrollment {+function checkedEnrollment(e: Omit<Enrollment, "expiration">, expireTime: Timestamp | undefined): Enrollment {if (e.biscuit.length === 0) {throw new Error("received empty biscuit token");}if (e.controlPlanePublicKey.length !== ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE) {throw new Error(`received invalid control plane public key size: ${e.controlPlanePublicKey.length} bytes (expected ${ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE})`);}- return e;+ return { ...e, expiration: expirationSeconds(expireTime, "enrollment") };+}++/** A biscuit of unknown lifetime cannot be kept fresh; the control plane must say when it expires. */+function expirationSeconds(expireTime: Timestamp | undefined, what: string): number {+ if (expireTime === undefined) {+ throw new Error(`${what} response carries no expire_time`);+ }+ return Math.floor(timestampMs(expireTime) / 1000);}diff --git a/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts b/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.tsindex 17bbd358..94d899a9 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import type { Message } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";* Describes the file sam.proto.*/export const file_sam: GenFile = /*@__PURE__*/- fileDesc("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[file_google_protobuf_timestamp]);+ 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[file_google_protobuf_timestamp]);/*** @generated from message sam.v1.AuthFrame@@ -108,9 +108,13 @@ export type MeshEvent = Message<"sam.v1.MeshEvent"> & {peerId: string;/**- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 3;+ * When the control plane recorded the event. Receivers ignore an event+ * further than a few minutes from their clock and, for bans, one older+ * than the last they applied for the peer.+ *+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp event_time = 3;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ eventTime?: Timestamp | undefined;/*** @generated from field: bytes new_public_key = 4;@@ -191,16 +195,18 @@ export type EnrollRequest = Message<"sam.v1.EnrollRequest"> & {labels: { [key: string]: string };/**- * Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix- * milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- * "sam:register:<peer_id>:<timestamp>". Required, and peer_id must be- * derived from public_key. The JWT proves who is asking; this proves- * they hold the key they are asking to bind, so an identity cannot- * register (and overwrite) another node's peer_id.+ * Proof of possession of public_key's private half: challenge_unix_ms is+ * the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ * the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:register:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>". It is+ * an int64 because it is the number in the signed text, not an instant+ * for display. Required, and peer_id must be derived from public_key.+ * The JWT proves who is asking; this proves they hold the key they are+ * asking to bind, so an identity cannot register (and overwrite) another+ * node's peer_id.*- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 6;+ * @generated from field: int64 challenge_unix_ms = 6;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ challengeUnixMs: bigint;/*** @generated from field: bytes challenge_signature = 7;@@ -240,9 +246,9 @@ export type EnrollResponse = Message<"sam.v1.EnrollResponse"> & {routerAddresses: string[];/**- * @generated from field: int64 expiration = 5;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 5;*/- expiration: bigint;+ expireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -285,16 +291,16 @@ export type BootstrapEnrollRequest = Message<"sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollRequest"> &labels: { [key: string]: string };/**- * Proof of possession of public_key's private half: timestamp is unix- * milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- * "sam:enroll:<peer_id>:<timestamp>". Required, and peer_id must be- * derived from public_key: this is what entitles a repeated POST /enroll- * to re-fetch an existing enrollment's biscuit, so a bootstrap token- * alone must never satisfy it.+ * Proof of possession of public_key's private half: challenge_unix_ms is+ * the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ * the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:enroll:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>". Required,+ * and peer_id must be derived from public_key: this is what entitles a+ * repeated POST /enroll to re-fetch an existing enrollment's biscuit, so+ * a bootstrap token alone must never satisfy it.*- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 6;+ * @generated from field: int64 challenge_unix_ms = 6;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ challengeUnixMs: bigint;/*** @generated from field: bytes challenge_signature = 7;@@ -361,9 +367,9 @@ export type BootstrapEnrollResponse = Message<"sam.v1.BootstrapEnrollResponse">/*** Populated only if APPROVED*- * @generated from field: int64 expiration = 7;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 7;*/- expiration: bigint;+ expireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -541,9 +547,9 @@ export type ServiceAnnounce = Message<"sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce"> & {latencyEwmaMs: number;/**- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 8;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp announce_time = 8;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ announceTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -627,15 +633,15 @@ export type RouterLeaseRequest = Message<"sam.v1.RouterLeaseRequest"> & {dhtSize: number;/**- * Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: timestamp is unix- * milliseconds and challenge_signature signs the UTF-8 bytes of- * "sam:routers-lease:<peer_id>:<timestamp>" with the key the router- * enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is not proof: routers hand- * theirs to every peer they authenticate.+ * Proof of possession of the router's enrolled key: challenge_unix_ms is+ * the caller's clock in unix milliseconds and challenge_signature signs+ * the UTF-8 bytes of "sam:routers-lease:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>"+ * with the key the router enrolled with. Required. The biscuit alone is+ * not proof: routers hand theirs to every peer they authenticate.*- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 6;+ * @generated from field: int64 challenge_unix_ms = 6;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ challengeUnixMs: bigint;/*** @generated from field: bytes challenge_signature = 7;@@ -665,9 +671,9 @@ export type RouterLeaseResponse = Message<"sam.v1.RouterLeaseResponse"> & {error: string;/**- * @generated from field: int64 expires_at = 3;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 3;*/- expiresAt: bigint;+ expireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -845,12 +851,12 @@ export type KeysResponse = Message<"sam.v1.KeysResponse"> & {publicKeys: Uint8Array[];/**- * Unix milliseconds at which the set was signed; receivers reject responses- * outside a short freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed.+ * When the set was signed; receivers reject responses outside a short+ * freshness window so a captured set cannot be replayed.*- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 2;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp sign_time = 2;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ signTime?: Timestamp | undefined;/*** One ed25519 signature per entry of public_keys, by that key, over the@@ -876,20 +882,21 @@ export const KeysResponseSchema: GenMessage<KeysResponse> = /*@__PURE__*/export type TokenRefreshRequest = Message<"sam.v1.TokenRefreshRequest"> & {/*** Signature with the node key over the UTF-8 bytes of- * "sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<timestamp>", where peer_id is the one bound in- * the presented biscuit. Peer- and endpoint-bound so a captured signature- * verifies nowhere else.+ * "sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>", where peer_id is the one+ * bound in the presented biscuit. Peer- and endpoint-bound so a captured+ * signature verifies nowhere else.** @generated from field: bytes challenge_signature = 1;*/challengeSignature: Uint8Array;/**- * Unix milliseconds. Must be within the control plane's freshness window.+ * The caller's clock in unix milliseconds, the number in the signed text.+ * Must be within the control plane's freshness window.*- * @generated from field: int64 timestamp = 2;+ * @generated from field: int64 challenge_unix_ms = 2;*/- timestamp: bigint;+ challengeUnixMs: bigint;/*** The caller's peer ID. Optional: the control plane normally reads it@@ -922,9 +929,9 @@ export type TokenRefreshResponse = Message<"sam.v1.TokenRefreshResponse"> & {biscuitToken: Uint8Array;/**- * @generated from field: int64 expires_at = 2;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 2;*/- expiresAt: bigint;+ expireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;/*** @generated from field: string error_message = 3;@@ -1293,9 +1300,9 @@ export type AgentRefreshResponse = Message<"sam.v1.AgentRefreshResponse"> & {error: string;/**- * @generated from field: int64 expires_at = 3;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 3;*/- expiresAt: bigint;+ expireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -1345,9 +1352,9 @@ export type AgentStatus = Message<"sam.v1.AgentStatus"> & {ingress: AgentIngress[];/**- * @generated from field: int64 credential_expires_at = 4;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp credential_expire_time = 4;*/- credentialExpiresAt: bigint;+ credentialExpireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -1394,9 +1401,9 @@ export type IdentityEvidenceResponse = Message<"sam.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse"biscuit: Uint8Array;/**- * @generated from field: int64 biscuit_expires_at = 3;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp biscuit_expire_time = 3;*/- biscuitExpiresAt: bigint;+ biscuitExpireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;/*** @generated from field: string control_plane_url = 4;@@ -1411,9 +1418,9 @@ export type IdentityEvidenceResponse = Message<"sam.v1.IdentityEvidenceResponse"trustedControlPlaneKeys: Uint8Array[];/**- * @generated from field: int64 checked_at = 6;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp check_time = 6;*/- checkedAt: bigint;+ checkTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**@@ -1455,9 +1462,9 @@ export type PeerEvidenceResponse = Message<"sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse"> & {labels: { [key: string]: string };/**- * @generated from field: int64 expiration = 6;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp expire_time = 6;*/- expiration: bigint;+ expireTime?: Timestamp | undefined;/*** hex@@ -1467,9 +1474,9 @@ export type PeerEvidenceResponse = Message<"sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse"> & {revocationIds: string[];/**- * @generated from field: int64 checked_at = 8;+ * @generated from field: google.protobuf.Timestamp check_time = 8;*/- checkedAt: bigint;+ checkTime?: Timestamp | undefined;};/**diff --git a/sdk/js/src/index.ts b/sdk/js/src/index.tsindex 42db0ac6..a5fc1441 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/index.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/index.ts@@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ export {type ServiceSpec,} from "./serve.ts";export { BASELINE_DATALOG } from "./gen/datalog.ts";-export { BanSet, EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS, GOSSIP_EVENTS_TOPIC, verifyMeshEvent } from "./sync.ts";+export { BanSet, EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS, GOSSIP_EVENTS_TOPIC, verifyMeshEvent, type VerifiedMeshEvent } from "./sync.ts";diff --git a/sdk/js/src/mesh.test.ts b/sdk/js/src/mesh.test.tsindex bffefb24..500234bd 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/mesh.test.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/mesh.test.ts@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@// limitations under the License.import { create, fromBinary, toBinary } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";+import { timestampFromMs } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import assert from "node:assert/strict";import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";import { tmpdir } from "node:os";@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ function proto(bytes: Uint8Array): Response {function fakeControlPlane(keysOk = true): { fetch: typeof fetch; issued: number } {const state = { issued: 0 };const signedKeys = () => {- const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: [cpKey.publicKeyRaw], timestamp: BigInt(Date.now()) });+ const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: [cpKey.publicKeyRaw], signTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now()) });return create(KeysResponseSchema, { ...unsigned, signatures: [cpKey.sign(toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, unsigned))] });};const fetch: typeof globalThis.fetch = (async (input: Parameters<typeof globalThis.fetch>[0], init?: RequestInit) => {@@ -58,13 +59,13 @@ function fakeControlPlane(keysOk = true): { fetch: typeof fetch; issued: numberbiscuitToken: text(`biscuit-${state.issued}`),controlPlanePublicKey: cpKey.publicKeyRaw,routerAddresses: ["/dns4/router.example/tcp/4001/p2p/12D3KooWP8iKhDf3iCMo2H3butNVfdTUtYwYWYQ75jTGnynXPFMp"],- expiration: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600),+ expireTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now() + 3600_000),}),),);case "POST /refresh":state.issued++;- return proto(toBinary(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, create(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: text(`biscuit-${state.issued}`), expiresAt: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 7200) })));+ return proto(toBinary(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, create(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: text(`biscuit-${state.issued}`), expireTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now() + 7200_000) })));case "GET /keys":return keysOk ? proto(toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, signedKeys())) : new Response("boom", { status: 500 });default:diff --git a/sdk/js/src/session.test.ts b/sdk/js/src/session.test.tsindex 42b537a7..17bf632d 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/session.test.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/session.test.ts@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@// plane are exercised by tests/integration/sdk_join_test.go.import { create, fromBinary, toBinary } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";+import { timestampFromMs } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import { yamux } from "@chainsafe/libp2p-yamux";import { circuitRelayServer, circuitRelayTransport } from "@libp2p/circuit-relay-v2";import { privateKeyFromProtobuf } from "@libp2p/crypto/keys";@@ -72,14 +73,14 @@ function fakeControlPlane(routerAddresses: string[]): typeof fetch {biscuitToken: mint(enroll.peerId, ROLE_NODE),controlPlanePublicKey: cpKey,routerAddresses,- expiration: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600),+ expireTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now() + 3600_000),}),),);}if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/keys") {// Unsigned: the client keeps the enrollment key when /keys cannot be verified.- return proto(toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: [cpKey], timestamp: BigInt(Date.now()) })));+ return proto(toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: [cpKey], signTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now()) })));}return new Response(`no route for ${req.method} ${path}`, { status: 404 });}) as typeof fetch;diff --git a/sdk/js/src/session.ts b/sdk/js/src/session.tsindex 4d9f468f..0d93a4e5 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/session.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/session.ts@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@// limitations under the License.import type { Connection } from "@libp2p/interface";+import { timestampMs } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import { TopicValidatorResult } from "@libp2p/gossipsub";import { peerIdFromString } from "@libp2p/peer-id";import { isMultiaddr, multiaddr, type Multiaddr } from "@multiformats/multiaddr";@@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ export class MeshSession {switch (event.type) {case MeshEvent_Type.BANNED:// Not persisted: a restarted member picks the ban back up from /info.- if (this.banned.add(event.peerId, Number(event.timestamp))) {+ if (this.banned.add(event.peerId, timestampMs(event.eventTime))) {void this.#evict(event.peerId);}break;diff --git a/sdk/js/src/sync.test.ts b/sdk/js/src/sync.test.tsindex 15f6594b..9f9ae5fe 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/sync.test.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/sync.test.ts@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@// router are exercised by tests/integration/sdk_mesh_test.go.import { create, fromBinary, toBinary } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";+import { timestampFromMs } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import { yamux } from "@chainsafe/libp2p-yamux";import { circuitRelayServer, circuitRelayTransport } from "@libp2p/circuit-relay-v2";import { privateKeyFromProtobuf } from "@libp2p/crypto/keys";@@ -101,14 +102,14 @@ class FakeControlPlane {biscuitToken: this.current.mint(enroll.peerId, ROLE_NODE),controlPlanePublicKey: this.current.pub,routerAddresses: [routerAddr],- expiration: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600),+ expireTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now() + 3600_000),}),),);}if (req.method === "GET" && path === "/keys") {// Signed as api.VerifyKeysResponse expects: each key over the set with signatures cleared.- const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: this.keys.map((k) => k.pub), timestamp: BigInt(Date.now()) });+ const unsigned = create(KeysResponseSchema, { publicKeys: this.keys.map((k) => k.pub), signTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now()) });const payload = toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, unsigned);return proto(toBinary(KeysResponseSchema, create(KeysResponseSchema, { ...unsigned, signatures: this.keys.map((k) => k.identity.sign(payload)) })));}@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ class FakeControlPlane {return proto(toBinary(TokenRefreshResponseSchema,- create(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: this.current.mint(peerId, ROLE_NODE), expiresAt: BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 7200) }),+ create(TokenRefreshResponseSchema, { biscuitToken: this.current.mint(peerId, ROLE_NODE), expireTime: timestampFromMs(Date.now() + 7200_000) }),),);}@@ -189,13 +190,13 @@ test("a mesh event verifies only under a trusted key and only when fresh", () =>return toBinary(MeshEventSchema, { ...event, signature: key.identity.sign(unsigned) });};const now = new Date();- const banned = sign(create(MeshEventSchema, { type: MeshEvent_Type.BANNED, peerId: "12D3KooWx", timestamp: BigInt(now.getTime()) }));+ const banned = sign(create(MeshEventSchema, { type: MeshEvent_Type.BANNED, peerId: "12D3KooWx", eventTime: timestampFromMs(now.getTime()) }));assert.equal(verifyMeshEvent(banned, [key.pub], now)?.peerId, "12D3KooWx");assert.equal(verifyMeshEvent(banned, [new SigningKey().pub], now), undefined, "untrusted key");const tampered = new Uint8Array(banned);tampered[tampered.length - 1] = (tampered[tampered.length - 1] ?? 0) ^ 1;assert.equal(verifyMeshEvent(tampered, [key.pub], now), undefined, "tampered signature");- const stale = sign(create(MeshEventSchema, { type: MeshEvent_Type.BANNED, peerId: "12D3KooWx", timestamp: BigInt(now.getTime() - EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS - 1) }));+ const stale = sign(create(MeshEventSchema, { type: MeshEvent_Type.BANNED, peerId: "12D3KooWx", eventTime: timestampFromMs(now.getTime() - EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS - 1) }));assert.equal(verifyMeshEvent(stale, [key.pub], now), undefined, "stale");assert.equal(verifyMeshEvent(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]), [key.pub], now), undefined, "garbage");});diff --git a/sdk/js/src/sync.ts b/sdk/js/src/sync.tsindex a56e0f64..c720ec68 100644--- a/sdk/js/src/sync.ts+++ b/sdk/js/src/sync.ts@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@// the gossip events that bring the next pull forward.import { fromBinary, toBinary } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";+import { timestampMs, type Timestamp } from "@bufbuild/protobuf/wkt";import { verifyEd25519 } from "./identity.ts";import { MeshEvent_Type, MeshEventSchema, type MeshEvent } from "./gen/sam_pb.ts";@@ -81,13 +82,16 @@ export class BanSet {}}+/** A MeshEvent that verified: signed by a trusted key and carrying a fresh event_time. */+export type VerifiedMeshEvent = MeshEvent & { eventTime: Timestamp };+/*** Verifies a MeshEvent as sam-node's verifyEvent does: the signature covers* the deterministic encoding of the event with the signature cleared, under* any trusted control plane key. Returns the event, or undefined when it* does not verify or is not fresh.*/-export function verifyMeshEvent(data: Uint8Array, trustedKeys: Uint8Array[], now: Date = new Date()): MeshEvent | undefined {+export function verifyMeshEvent(data: Uint8Array, trustedKeys: Uint8Array[], now: Date = new Date()): VerifiedMeshEvent | undefined {let event: MeshEvent;try {event = fromBinary(MeshEventSchema, data);@@ -99,11 +103,14 @@ export function verifyMeshEvent(data: Uint8Array, trustedKeys: Uint8Array[], nowif (!trustedKeys.some((key) => verifyEd25519(key, unsigned, signature))) {return undefined;}- const skew = Math.abs(now.getTime() - Number(event.timestamp));+ if (event.eventTime === undefined) {+ return undefined;+ }+ const skew = Math.abs(now.getTime() - timestampMs(event.eventTime));if (skew > EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS) {return undefined;}- return event;+ return event as VerifiedMeshEvent;}export { MeshEvent_Type };diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyindex a4cde925..05f2781d 100644--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ _sym_db = _symbol_database.Default()from google.protobuf import timestamp_pb2 as google_dot_protobuf_dot_timestamp__pb2-DESCRIPTOR = _descriptor_pool.Default().AddSerializedFile(b'\n\tsam.proto\x12\x06sam.v1\x1a\x1fgoogle/protobuf/timestamp.proto\"C\n\tAuthFrame\x12\x0f\n\x07\x62iscuit\x18\x01 \x01(\x0c\x12\x16\n\x0etarget_service\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\r\n\x05\x61gent\x18\x03 \x01(\t\"?\n\x0c\x41uthResponse\x12\x0f\n\x07success\x18\x01 \x01(\x08\x12\r\n\x05\x65rror\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x0f\n\x07\x62iscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\"\xb9\x01\n\tMeshEvent\x12$\n\x04type\x18\x01 \x01(\x0e\x32\x16.sam.v1.MeshEvent.Type\x12\x0f\n\x07peer_id\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x11\n\ttimestamp\x18\x03 \x01(\x03\x12\x16\n\x0enew_public_key\x18\x04 \x01(\x0c\x12\x11\n\tsignature\x18\x05 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_AGENTREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=4306+ _AGENTSTATUSREQUEST._serialized_start=4308+ _AGENTSTATUSREQUEST._serialized_end=4346+ _AGENTSTATUS._serialized_start=4349+ _AGENTSTATUS._serialized_end=4497+ _AGENTSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=4499+ _AGENTSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=4572+ _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=4575+ _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=4803+ _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=4806+ _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=5126+ _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=604+ _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=649+ _MEMBERCREDENTIAL._serialized_start=5129+ _MEMBERCREDENTIAL._serialized_end=5385+ _TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY._serialized_start=5387+ _TRUSTEDSIGNINGKEY._serialized_end=5476+ _OIDCSESSION._serialized_start=5478+ _OIDCSESSION._serialized_end=5567# @@protoc_insertion_point(module_scope)diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyiindex 52c7c1ca..ce8a269b 100644--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi@@ -90,14 +90,14 @@ class AgentRefreshRequest(_message.Message):def __init__(self, agent_id: _Optional[str] = ..., credential_path: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class AgentRefreshResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["error", "expires_at", "success"]+ __slots__ = ["error", "expire_time", "success"]ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- EXPIRES_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]error: str- expires_at: int+ expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampsuccess: bool- def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expires_at: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class AgentSecret(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["header_name", "host", "kind", "value_path"]@@ -112,16 +112,16 @@ class AgentSecret(_message.Message):def __init__(self, host: _Optional[str] = ..., kind: _Optional[str] = ..., header_name: _Optional[str] = ..., value_path: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class AgentStatus(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["agent_id", "attached", "credential_expires_at", "ingress"]+ __slots__ = ["agent_id", "attached", "credential_expire_time", "ingress"]AGENT_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ATTACHED_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- CREDENTIAL_EXPIRES_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CREDENTIAL_EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]INGRESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]agent_id: strattached: bool- credential_expires_at: int+ credential_expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampingress: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[AgentIngress]- def __init__(self, agent_id: _Optional[str] = ..., attached: bool = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[AgentIngress, _Mapping]]] = ..., credential_expires_at: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, agent_id: _Optional[str] = ..., attached: bool = ..., ingress: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[AgentIngress, _Mapping]]] = ..., credential_expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class AgentStatusRequest(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["agent_id"]@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ class AuthResponse(_message.Message):def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...class BootstrapEnrollRequest(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["bootstrap_token", "challenge_signature", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role", "timestamp"]+ __slots__ = ["bootstrap_token", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role"]class LabelsEntry(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["key", "value"]KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]@@ -168,37 +168,37 @@ class BootstrapEnrollRequest(_message.Message):def __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]bootstrap_token: strchallenge_signature: bytes+ challenge_unix_ms: intlabels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str]peer_id: strpublic_key: bytesrequested_role: str- timestamp: int- def __init__(self, bootstrap_token: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, bootstrap_token: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...class BootstrapEnrollResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expiration", "poll_interval_seconds", "router_addresses", "status"]+ __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expire_time", "poll_interval_seconds", "router_addresses", "status"]BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- EXPIRATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]STATUS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]biscuit_token: bytescontrol_plane_public_key: byteserror_message: str- expiration: int+ expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamppoll_interval_seconds: introuter_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]status: EnrollmentStatus- def __init__(self, status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., poll_interval_seconds: _Optional[int] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expiration: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, status: _Optional[_Union[EnrollmentStatus, str]] = ..., biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., poll_interval_seconds: _Optional[int] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class CommandBackend(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["command", "env"]@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ class DiscoveredProvider(_message.Message):def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., local_proxy_url: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_name: _Optional[str] = ..., srv_description: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class EnrollRequest(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "jwt", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role", "timestamp"]+ __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "jwt", "labels", "peer_id", "public_key", "requested_role"]class LabelsEntry(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["key", "value"]KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]@@ -251,60 +251,60 @@ class EnrollRequest(_message.Message):value: strdef __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]JWT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]REQUESTED_ROLE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]challenge_signature: bytes+ challenge_unix_ms: intjwt: strlabels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str]peer_id: strpublic_key: bytesrequested_role: str- timestamp: int- def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, jwt: _Optional[str] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., requested_role: _Optional[str] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...class EnrollResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expiration", "router_addresses"]+ __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "control_plane_public_key", "error_message", "expire_time", "router_addresses"]BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]CONTROL_PLANE_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- EXPIRATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ROUTER_ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]biscuit_token: bytescontrol_plane_public_key: byteserror_message: str- expiration: int+ expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamprouter_addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]- def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expiration: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ..., control_plane_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class IdentityEvidenceResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["biscuit", "biscuit_expires_at", "checked_at", "control_plane_url", "peer_id", "trusted_control_plane_keys"]- BISCUIT_EXPIRES_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ __slots__ = ["biscuit", "biscuit_expire_time", "check_time", "control_plane_url", "peer_id", "trusted_control_plane_keys"]+ BISCUIT_EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- CHECKED_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]CONTROL_PLANE_URL_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]TRUSTED_CONTROL_PLANE_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]biscuit: bytes- biscuit_expires_at: int- checked_at: int+ biscuit_expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp+ check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampcontrol_plane_url: strpeer_id: strtrusted_control_plane_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes]- def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., biscuit_expires_at: _Optional[int] = ..., control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., trusted_control_plane_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., checked_at: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., biscuit_expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., trusted_control_plane_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class KeysResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["public_keys", "signatures", "timestamp"]+ __slots__ = ["public_keys", "sign_time", "signatures"]PUBLIC_KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]SIGNATURES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ SIGN_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]public_keys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes]+ sign_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampsignatures: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[bytes]- timestamp: int- def __init__(self, public_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ..., signatures: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, public_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., sign_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., signatures: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ...) -> None: ...class MemberCredential(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["biscuit", "control_plane_url", "expire_time", "issued_under_keys", "oidc_session", "router_addresses", "trusted_keys"]@@ -325,23 +325,23 @@ class MemberCredential(_message.Message):def __init__(self, control_plane_url: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., trusted_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[TrustedSigningKey, _Mapping]]] = ..., issued_under_keys: _Optional[_Iterable[bytes]] = ..., router_addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., oidc_session: _Optional[_Union[OIDCSession, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class MeshEvent(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["new_public_key", "peer_id", "signature", "timestamp", "type"]+ __slots__ = ["event_time", "new_public_key", "peer_id", "signature", "type"]class Type(int, metaclass=_enum_type_wrapper.EnumTypeWrapper):__slots__ = []BANNED: MeshEvent.Type+ EVENT_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]KEY_ROTATION: MeshEvent.TypeNEW_PUBLIC_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]POLICY_UPDATE: MeshEvent.TypeSIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ event_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampnew_public_key: bytespeer_id: strsignature: bytes- timestamp: inttype: MeshEvent.Type- def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[MeshEvent.Type, str]] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ..., new_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[MeshEvent.Type, str]] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., event_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., new_public_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...class NodeCatalogReport(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["services"]@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ class OIDCSession(_message.Message):def __init__(self, issuer: _Optional[str] = ..., client_id: _Optional[str] = ..., audience: _Optional[str] = ..., refresh_token: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class PeerEvidenceResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["biscuit", "checked_at", "expiration", "labels", "peer_id", "revocation_ids", "roles", "verifying_key"]+ __slots__ = ["biscuit", "check_time", "expire_time", "labels", "peer_id", "revocation_ids", "roles", "verifying_key"]class LabelsEntry(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["key", "value"]KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]@@ -371,22 +371,22 @@ class PeerEvidenceResponse(_message.Message):value: strdef __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- CHECKED_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- EXPIRATION_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CHECK_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]REVOCATION_IDS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]VERIFYING_KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]biscuit: bytes- checked_at: int- expiration: int+ check_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp+ expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamplabels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str]peer_id: strrevocation_ids: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]roles: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]verifying_key: bytes- def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., verifying_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., expiration: _Optional[int] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., checked_at: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., verifying_key: _Optional[bytes] = ..., roles: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., revocation_ids: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., check_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class PolicyBinding(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["members", "role"]@@ -449,35 +449,35 @@ class RegisterServiceRequest(_message.Message):def __init__(self, service: _Optional[_Union[ServiceInfo, _Mapping]] = ..., target_url: _Optional[str] = ..., command: _Optional[_Union[CommandBackend, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class RouterLeaseRequest(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["addresses", "biscuit", "challenge_signature", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "peer_id", "timestamp"]+ __slots__ = ["addresses", "biscuit", "challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "connected_peers", "dht_size", "peer_id"]ADDRESSES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]BISCUIT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]CONNECTED_PEERS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]DHT_SIZE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]addresses: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]biscuit: byteschallenge_signature: bytes+ challenge_unix_ms: intconnected_peers: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]dht_size: intpeer_id: str- timestamp: int- def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., addresses: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., biscuit: _Optional[bytes] = ..., connected_peers: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., dht_size: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ...) -> None: ...class RouterLeaseResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["error", "expires_at", "success"]+ __slots__ = ["error", "expire_time", "success"]ERROR_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- EXPIRES_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]SUCCESS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]error: str- expires_at: int+ expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampsuccess: bool- def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expires_at: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, success: bool = ..., error: _Optional[str] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class ServiceAnnounce(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["active_requests", "keys", "labels", "latency_ewma_ms", "peer_id", "service_name", "timestamp", "type"]+ __slots__ = ["active_requests", "announce_time", "keys", "labels", "latency_ewma_ms", "peer_id", "service_name", "type"]class LabelsEntry(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["key", "value"]KEY_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]@@ -486,22 +486,22 @@ class ServiceAnnounce(_message.Message):value: strdef __init__(self, key: _Optional[str] = ..., value: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...ACTIVE_REQUESTS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ ANNOUNCE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]KEYS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]LABELS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]LATENCY_EWMA_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]SERVICE_NAME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]TYPE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]active_requests: int+ announce_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestampkeys: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]labels: _containers.ScalarMap[str, str]latency_ewma_ms: floatpeer_id: strservice_name: str- timestamp: inttype: ServiceType- def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., service_name: _Optional[str] = ..., keys: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., active_requests: _Optional[int] = ..., latency_ewma_ms: _Optional[float] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, peer_id: _Optional[str] = ..., type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., service_name: _Optional[str] = ..., keys: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ..., labels: _Optional[_Mapping[str, str]] = ..., active_requests: _Optional[int] = ..., latency_ewma_ms: _Optional[float] = ..., announce_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ...) -> None: ...class ServiceInfo(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["description", "name", "type"]@@ -514,24 +514,24 @@ class ServiceInfo(_message.Message):def __init__(self, type: _Optional[_Union[ServiceType, str]] = ..., name: _Optional[str] = ..., description: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class TokenRefreshRequest(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "peer_id", "timestamp"]+ __slots__ = ["challenge_signature", "challenge_unix_ms", "peer_id"]CHALLENGE_SIGNATURE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ CHALLENGE_UNIX_MS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]PEER_ID_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- TIMESTAMP_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]challenge_signature: bytes+ challenge_unix_ms: intpeer_id: str- timestamp: int- def __init__(self, challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., timestamp: _Optional[int] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...+ def __init__(self, challenge_signature: _Optional[bytes] = ..., challenge_unix_ms: _Optional[int] = ..., peer_id: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class TokenRefreshResponse(_message.Message):- __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "error_message", "expires_at"]+ __slots__ = ["biscuit_token", "error_message", "expire_time"]BISCUIT_TOKEN_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]ERROR_MESSAGE_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]- EXPIRES_AT_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]+ EXPIRE_TIME_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]biscuit_token: byteserror_message: str- expires_at: int- def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expires_at: _Optional[int] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...+ expire_time: _timestamp_pb2.Timestamp+ def __init__(self, biscuit_token: _Optional[bytes] = ..., expire_time: _Optional[_Union[_timestamp_pb2.Timestamp, _Mapping]] = ..., error_message: _Optional[str] = ...) -> None: ...class TokenRevokeRequest(_message.Message):__slots__ = ["peer_id"]diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/controlplane.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/controlplane.pyindex 4c504cdb..b9c53a41 100644--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/controlplane.py+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/controlplane.py@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import urllib.requestfrom dataclasses import dataclass, fieldfrom typing import Callable, Mapping, Optional, Sequence+from google.protobuf.timestamp_pb2 import Timestampfrom google.protobuf.unknown_fields import UnknownFieldSetfrom . import challenges@@ -123,11 +124,14 @@ def verify_keys_response(resp: pb.KeysResponse, trusted: Sequence[bytes], now_msif len(resp.signatures) != len(resp.public_keys):raise ValueError(f"keys response carries {len(resp.signatures)} signatures for {len(resp.public_keys)} keys")now_ms = int(time.time() * 1000) if now_ms is None else now_ms- if abs(now_ms - resp.timestamp) > KEYS_RESPONSE_FRESHNESS_MS:- raise ValueError(f"keys response timestamp {resp.timestamp} is outside the freshness window")- # Each signature covers the set and the timestamp, deterministically+ if not resp.HasField("sign_time"):+ raise ValueError("keys response carries no sign_time")+ issued_ms = resp.sign_time.ToMilliseconds()+ if abs(now_ms - issued_ms) > KEYS_RESPONSE_FRESHNESS_MS:+ raise ValueError(f"keys response sign_time {resp.sign_time.ToJsonString()} is outside the freshness window")+ # Each signature covers the set and the signing time, deterministically# encoded with the signatures cleared.- payload = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=list(resp.public_keys), timestamp=resp.timestamp).SerializeToString(deterministic=True)+ payload = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=list(resp.public_keys), sign_time=resp.sign_time).SerializeToString(deterministic=True)keys: list[bytes] = []verified = Falsefor pub, sig in zip(resp.public_keys, resp.signatures):@@ -194,7 +198,7 @@ class ControlPlaneClient:public_key=identity.libp2p_public_key,requested_role=role,labels=dict(labels or {}),- timestamp=ts,+ challenge_unix_ms=ts,challenge_signature=identity.sign(challenges.enroll_challenge(identity.peer_id, ts)),)resp = pb.BootstrapEnrollResponse.FromString(self._request("POST", "/enroll", req.SerializeToString()))@@ -237,19 +241,17 @@ class ControlPlaneClient:public_key=identity.libp2p_public_key,requested_role=role,labels=dict(labels or {}),- timestamp=ts,+ challenge_unix_ms=ts,challenge_signature=identity.sign(challenges.register_challenge(identity.peer_id, ts)),)resp = pb.EnrollResponse.FromString(self._request("POST", "/register", req.SerializeToString()))if resp.error_message:raise EnrollmentRejectedError(f"enrollment failed: {resp.error_message}")return _checked_enrollment(- Enrollment(- biscuit=resp.biscuit_token,- expiration=resp.expiration,- control_plane_public_key=resp.control_plane_public_key,- router_addresses=list(resp.router_addresses),- )+ biscuit=resp.biscuit_token,+ expire_time=resp.expire_time if resp.HasField("expire_time") else None,+ control_plane_public_key=resp.control_plane_public_key,+ router_addresses=list(resp.router_addresses),)def refresh(self, identity: Identity, biscuit: bytes) -> RefreshResult:@@ -257,7 +259,7 @@ class ControlPlaneClient:spent by this call; callers must persist the result before using it."""ts = _now_ms()req = pb.TokenRefreshRequest(- timestamp=ts,+ challenge_unix_ms=ts,challenge_signature=identity.sign(challenges.refresh_challenge(identity.peer_id, ts)),peer_id=identity.peer_id,)@@ -272,7 +274,9 @@ class ControlPlaneClient:raise EnrollmentRejectedError(f"refresh failed: {resp.error_message}")if not resp.biscuit_token:raise ValueError("refresh returned an empty biscuit")- return RefreshResult(biscuit=resp.biscuit_token, expiration=resp.expires_at)+ if not resp.HasField("expire_time"):+ raise ValueError("refresh response carries no expire_time")+ return RefreshResult(biscuit=resp.biscuit_token, expiration=resp.expire_time.ToSeconds())def policy_rules(self, biscuit: bytes) -> list[str]:"""GET /policies: the mesh policy as the Datalog rules a provider adds@@ -316,23 +320,31 @@ def _now_ms() -> int:def _enrollment_from_bootstrap_response(resp: pb.BootstrapEnrollResponse) -> Enrollment:if resp.status == pb.ENROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED:return _checked_enrollment(- Enrollment(- biscuit=resp.biscuit_token,- expiration=resp.expiration,- control_plane_public_key=resp.control_plane_public_key,- router_addresses=list(resp.router_addresses),- )+ biscuit=resp.biscuit_token,+ expire_time=resp.expire_time if resp.HasField("expire_time") else None,+ control_plane_public_key=resp.control_plane_public_key,+ router_addresses=list(resp.router_addresses),)if resp.status == pb.ENROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED:raise EnrollmentRejectedError(f"enrollment rejected: {resp.error_message or 'no reason given'}")raise ValueError(f"unexpected enrollment status {resp.status}: {resp.error_message}")-def _checked_enrollment(e: Enrollment) -> Enrollment:- if not e.biscuit:+def _checked_enrollment(+ *, biscuit: bytes, expire_time: Optional[Timestamp], control_plane_public_key: bytes, router_addresses: list[str]+) -> Enrollment:+ if not biscuit:raise ValueError("received empty biscuit token")- if len(e.control_plane_public_key) != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE:+ if len(control_plane_public_key) != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE:raise ValueError(- f"received invalid control plane public key size: {len(e.control_plane_public_key)} bytes (expected {PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE})"+ f"received invalid control plane public key size: {len(control_plane_public_key)} bytes (expected {PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE})")- return e+ # A biscuit of unknown lifetime cannot be kept fresh; the control plane must say when it expires.+ if expire_time is None:+ raise ValueError("enrollment response carries no expire_time")+ return Enrollment(+ biscuit=biscuit,+ expiration=expire_time.ToSeconds(),+ control_plane_public_key=control_plane_public_key,+ router_addresses=router_addresses,+ )diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/session.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/session.pyindex a3e00579..6d227263 100644--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/session.py+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/session.py@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ class MeshSession:continueif event.type == pb.MeshEvent.BANNED:# Not persisted: a restarted member picks the ban back up from /info.- if self.banned.add(event.peer_id, event.timestamp):+ if self.banned.add(event.peer_id, event.event_time.ToMilliseconds()):logger.info("peer %s banned by the control plane", event.peer_id)await self._evict(event.peer_id)elif event.type == pb.MeshEvent.KEY_ROTATION:diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/sync.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/sync.pyindex 104ecc2d..70841576 100644--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/sync.py+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/sync.py@@ -85,6 +85,6 @@ def verify_mesh_event(data: bytes, trusted_keys: Sequence[bytes], now_ms: Optionif not any(verify_ed25519(key, payload, signature) for key in trusted_keys):return Nonenow_ms = int(time.time() * 1000) if now_ms is None else now_ms- if abs(now_ms - event.timestamp) > EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS:+ if not event.HasField("event_time") or abs(now_ms - event.event_time.ToMilliseconds()) > EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS:return Nonereturn eventdiff --git a/sdk/python/tests/test_controlplane.py b/sdk/python/tests/test_controlplane.pyindex 530654cb..d38e7eea 100644--- a/sdk/python/tests/test_controlplane.py+++ b/sdk/python/tests/test_controlplane.py@@ -39,6 +39,19 @@ from agent_mesh.controlplane import (verify_keys_response,)from agent_mesh.identity import Identity, verify_ed25519+from google.protobuf.timestamp_pb2 import Timestamp+++def _ts_ms(ms: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromMilliseconds(int(ms))+ return t+++def _ts_s(seconds: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromSeconds(int(seconds))+ return tCP_KEY = Identity.generate()BISCUIT = b"not-really-a-biscuit"@@ -60,9 +73,9 @@ def fake_transport(routes):def signed_keys(signers, timestamp=None):"""Signs a KeysResponse the way api.SignKeysResponse does."""ts = int(time.time() * 1000) if timestamp is None else timestamp- unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[s.public_key_raw for s in signers], timestamp=ts)+ unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[s.public_key_raw for s in signers], sign_time=_ts_ms(ts))payload = unsigned.SerializeToString(deterministic=True)- return pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=list(unsigned.public_keys), timestamp=ts, signatures=[s.sign(payload) for s in signers])+ return pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=list(unsigned.public_keys), sign_time=_ts_ms(ts), signatures=[s.sign(payload) for s in signers])def test_validate_control_plane_url():@@ -92,8 +105,8 @@ def test_enroll_bootstrap_sends_bound_proof_and_polls_until_approved():assert r.public_key == identity.libp2p_public_keyassert r.requested_role == ROLE_NODEassert dict(r.labels) == {"region": "eu"}- assert abs(r.timestamp - time.time() * 1000) < 5000- assert verify_ed25519(identity.public_key_raw, challenges.enroll_challenge(r.peer_id, r.timestamp), r.challenge_signature)+ assert abs(r.challenge_unix_ms - time.time() * 1000) < 5000+ assert verify_ed25519(identity.public_key_raw, challenges.enroll_challenge(r.peer_id, r.challenge_unix_ms), r.challenge_signature)seen.append("enroll")return 200, pb.BootstrapEnrollResponse(status=pb.ENROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING, poll_interval_seconds=30).SerializeToString()@@ -110,7 +123,7 @@ def test_enroll_bootstrap_sends_bound_proof_and_polls_until_approved():biscuit_token=BISCUIT,control_plane_public_key=CP_KEY.public_key_raw,router_addresses=router_addrs,- expiration=1_800_000_000,+ expire_time=_ts_s(1_800_000_000),).SerializeToString()client = ControlPlaneClient("http://127.0.0.1:1", transport=fake_transport({"POST /enroll": enroll, "GET /enroll/status": status}))@@ -166,8 +179,8 @@ def test_register_carries_jwt_and_register_bound_challenge():assert r.jwt == "eyJ.fake.jwt"assert r.peer_id == identity.peer_idassert r.requested_role == "sam:role:custom"- assert verify_ed25519(identity.public_key_raw, challenges.register_challenge(r.peer_id, r.timestamp), r.challenge_signature)- return 200, pb.EnrollResponse(biscuit_token=BISCUIT, control_plane_public_key=CP_KEY.public_key_raw, expiration=7).SerializeToString()+ assert verify_ed25519(identity.public_key_raw, challenges.register_challenge(r.peer_id, r.challenge_unix_ms), r.challenge_signature)+ return 200, pb.EnrollResponse(biscuit_token=BISCUIT, control_plane_public_key=CP_KEY.public_key_raw, expire_time=_ts_s(7)).SerializeToString()e = ControlPlaneClient("http://127.0.0.1:1", transport=fake_transport({"POST /register": register})).register(identity, "eyJ.fake.jwt", role="sam:role:custom"@@ -187,8 +200,8 @@ def test_refresh_presents_bearer_biscuit_and_signs_refresh_challenge():assert headers["Authorization"] == "Bearer " + base64.b64encode(BISCUIT).decode()r = pb.TokenRefreshRequest.FromString(body)assert r.peer_id == identity.peer_id- assert verify_ed25519(identity.public_key_raw, challenges.refresh_challenge(identity.peer_id, r.timestamp), r.challenge_signature)- return 200, pb.TokenRefreshResponse(biscuit_token=b"fresher-biscuit", expires_at=99).SerializeToString()+ assert verify_ed25519(identity.public_key_raw, challenges.refresh_challenge(identity.peer_id, r.challenge_unix_ms), r.challenge_signature)+ return 200, pb.TokenRefreshResponse(biscuit_token=b"fresher-biscuit", expire_time=_ts_s(99)).SerializeToString()result = ControlPlaneClient("http://127.0.0.1:1", transport=fake_transport({"POST /refresh": refresh})).refresh(identity, BISCUIT)assert result.biscuit == b"fresher-biscuit"@@ -213,13 +226,13 @@ def test_verify_keys_response_accepts_only_a_set_vouched_for_by_a_trusted_key():with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not signed by any trusted"):verify_keys_response(resp, [Identity.generate().public_key_raw])with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="freshness window"):- verify_keys_response(resp, [CP_KEY.public_key_raw], now_ms=resp.timestamp + KEYS_RESPONSE_FRESHNESS_MS + 1000)+ verify_keys_response(resp, [CP_KEY.public_key_raw], now_ms=resp.sign_time.ToMilliseconds() + KEYS_RESPONSE_FRESHNESS_MS + 1000)- forged = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[Identity.generate().public_key_raw, retiring.public_key_raw], timestamp=resp.timestamp, signatures=list(resp.signatures))+ forged = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[Identity.generate().public_key_raw, retiring.public_key_raw], sign_time=resp.sign_time, signatures=list(resp.signatures))with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not signed by any trusted"):verify_keys_response(forged, [retiring.public_key_raw])- unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=list(resp.public_keys), timestamp=resp.timestamp)+ unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=list(resp.public_keys), sign_time=resp.sign_time)with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="carries 0 signatures for 2 keys"):verify_keys_response(unsigned, [CP_KEY.public_key_raw])diff --git a/sdk/python/tests/test_mesh.py b/sdk/python/tests/test_mesh.pyindex a19bc29c..ead4917d 100644--- a/sdk/python/tests/test_mesh.py+++ b/sdk/python/tests/test_mesh.py@@ -24,6 +24,19 @@ from agent_mesh._proto import sam_pb2 as pbfrom agent_mesh.credential import decode_auth_responsefrom agent_mesh.identity import Identityfrom agent_mesh.mesh import AgentMesh+from google.protobuf.timestamp_pb2 import Timestamp+++def _ts_ms(ms: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromMilliseconds(int(ms))+ return t+++def _ts_s(seconds: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromSeconds(int(seconds))+ return tCP_KEY = Identity.generate()@@ -37,8 +50,8 @@ class FakeControlPlane:def _signed_keys(self):ts = int(time.time() * 1000)- unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[CP_KEY.public_key_raw], timestamp=ts)- return pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[CP_KEY.public_key_raw], timestamp=ts, signatures=[CP_KEY.sign(unsigned.SerializeToString(deterministic=True))])+ unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[CP_KEY.public_key_raw], sign_time=_ts_ms(ts))+ return pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[CP_KEY.public_key_raw], sign_time=_ts_ms(ts), signatures=[CP_KEY.sign(unsigned.SerializeToString(deterministic=True))])def transport(self, method, url, headers, body):path = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url).path@@ -49,11 +62,11 @@ class FakeControlPlane:biscuit_token=f"biscuit-{self.issued}".encode(),control_plane_public_key=CP_KEY.public_key_raw,router_addresses=["/dns4/router.example/tcp/4001/p2p/12D3KooWP8iKhDf3iCMo2H3butNVfdTUtYwYWYQ75jTGnynXPFMp"],- expiration=int(time.time()) + 3600,+ expire_time=_ts_s(int(time.time()) + 3600),).SerializeToString()if (method, path) == ("POST", "/refresh"):self.issued += 1- return 200, pb.TokenRefreshResponse(biscuit_token=f"biscuit-{self.issued}".encode(), expires_at=int(time.time()) + 7200).SerializeToString()+ return 200, pb.TokenRefreshResponse(biscuit_token=f"biscuit-{self.issued}".encode(), expire_time=_ts_s(int(time.time()) + 7200)).SerializeToString()if (method, path) == ("GET", "/keys"):return (200, self._signed_keys().SerializeToString()) if self.keys_ok else (500, b"boom")return 404, f"no route for {method} {path}".encode()diff --git a/sdk/python/tests/test_session.py b/sdk/python/tests/test_session.pyindex 9308bfc9..a334164c 100644--- a/sdk/python/tests/test_session.py+++ b/sdk/python/tests/test_session.py@@ -42,6 +42,19 @@ from agent_mesh.controlplane import ROLE_NODEfrom agent_mesh.identity import Identityfrom agent_mesh.mesh import AgentMeshfrom agent_mesh.relay import HOP_PROTOCOL as RELAY_HOP_PROTOCOL+from google.protobuf.timestamp_pb2 import Timestamp+++def _ts_ms(ms: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromMilliseconds(int(ms))+ return t+++def _ts_s(seconds: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromSeconds(int(seconds))+ return tCP = ba.KeyPair()CP_KEY = CP.public_key.to_bytes()@@ -65,11 +78,11 @@ def fake_control_plane(router_addresses):biscuit_token=mint(req.peer_id, ROLE_NODE),control_plane_public_key=CP_KEY,router_addresses=router_addresses,- expiration=int(time.time()) + 3600,+ expire_time=_ts_s(int(time.time()) + 3600),).SerializeToString()if (method, path) == ("GET", "/keys"):# Unsigned: the client keeps the enrollment key when /keys cannot be verified.- return 200, pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[CP_KEY], timestamp=int(time.time() * 1000)).SerializeToString()+ return 200, pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[CP_KEY], sign_time=_ts_ms(int(time.time() * 1000))).SerializeToString()return 404, f"no route for {method} {path}".encode()return transportdiff --git a/sdk/python/tests/test_sync.py b/sdk/python/tests/test_sync.pyindex e33ce4d7..bcf46907 100644--- a/sdk/python/tests/test_sync.py+++ b/sdk/python/tests/test_sync.py@@ -38,6 +38,19 @@ from agent_mesh.relay import HOP_PROTOCOL as RELAY_HOP_PROTOCOLfrom agent_mesh.sync import EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS, BanSet, verify_mesh_eventfrom .test_session import hop_handler, libp2p_host+from google.protobuf.timestamp_pb2 import Timestamp+++def _ts_ms(ms: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromMilliseconds(int(ms))+ return t+++def _ts_s(seconds: int) -> Timestamp:+ t = Timestamp()+ t.FromSeconds(int(seconds))+ return tclass SigningKey:@@ -77,12 +90,12 @@ class FakeControlPlane:biscuit_token=self.current.mint(req.peer_id, ROLE_NODE),control_plane_public_key=self.current.pub,router_addresses=[self.router_addr],- expiration=int(time.time()) + 3600,+ expire_time=_ts_s(int(time.time()) + 3600),).SerializeToString()if (method, path) == ("GET", "/keys"):- unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[k.pub for k in self.keys], timestamp=int(time.time() * 1000))+ unsigned = pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[k.pub for k in self.keys], sign_time=_ts_ms(int(time.time() * 1000)))payload = unsigned.SerializeToString(deterministic=True)- return 200, pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[k.pub for k in self.keys], timestamp=unsigned.timestamp, signatures=[k.identity.sign(payload) for k in self.keys]).SerializeToString()+ return 200, pb.KeysResponse(public_keys=[k.pub for k in self.keys], sign_time=unsigned.sign_time, signatures=[k.identity.sign(payload) for k in self.keys]).SerializeToString()if (method, path) == ("GET", "/info"):return 200, pb.ControlPlaneInfoResponse(router_addresses=[self.router_addr], banned_peer_ids=self.banned).SerializeToString()if (method, path) == ("POST", "/refresh"):@@ -93,7 +106,7 @@ class FakeControlPlane:verified = verify_peer_biscuit_any(presented, key.pub)except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - try the next keycontinue- return 200, pb.TokenRefreshResponse(biscuit_token=self.current.mint(verified, ROLE_NODE), expires_at=int(time.time()) + 7200).SerializeToString()+ return 200, pb.TokenRefreshResponse(biscuit_token=self.current.mint(verified, ROLE_NODE), expire_time=_ts_s(int(time.time()) + 7200)).SerializeToString()return 401, b"unverifiable biscuit"return 404, f"no route for {method} {path}".encode()@@ -151,13 +164,13 @@ def test_mesh_event_verifies_only_under_a_trusted_key_and_only_when_fresh():return event.SerializeToString(deterministic=True)now_ms = int(time.time() * 1000)- banned = sign(pb.MeshEvent(type=pb.MeshEvent.BANNED, peer_id="12D3KooWx", timestamp=now_ms))+ banned = sign(pb.MeshEvent(type=pb.MeshEvent.BANNED, peer_id="12D3KooWx", event_time=_ts_ms(now_ms)))assert verify_mesh_event(banned, [key.pub], now_ms).peer_id == "12D3KooWx"assert verify_mesh_event(banned, [SigningKey().pub], now_ms) is Nonetampered = bytearray(banned)tampered[-1] ^= 1assert verify_mesh_event(bytes(tampered), [key.pub], now_ms) is None- stale = sign(pb.MeshEvent(type=pb.MeshEvent.BANNED, peer_id="12D3KooWx", timestamp=now_ms - EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS - 1))+ stale = sign(pb.MeshEvent(type=pb.MeshEvent.BANNED, peer_id="12D3KooWx", event_time=_ts_ms(now_ms - EVENT_FRESHNESS_MS - 1)))assert verify_mesh_event(stale, [key.pub], now_ms) is Noneassert verify_mesh_event(b"\x01\x02\x03", [key.pub], now_ms) is Nonediff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md b/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.mdindex 0f517032..d2da9b0f 100644--- a/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md+++ b/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md@@ -61,10 +61,12 @@ Responses that carry credentials are sent with `Cache-Control: no-store`.### Enrollment and refresh-Every request below carries a `timestamp` and a `challenge_signature`. The-enrollee signs `sam:<endpoint>:<peer_id>:<unix-millis>` with its key, and the-control plane accepts the signature within five minutes. This proves that the-caller holds the key behind the peer ID it names.+Every request below carries a `challenge_unix_ms` and a `challenge_signature`.+The enrollee signs `sam:<endpoint>:<peer_id>:<challenge_unix_ms>` with its+key, and the control plane accepts the signature within five minutes of that+instant. This proves that the caller holds the key behind the peer ID it+names. Every instant in a response (`expire_time` and the like) is a+`google.protobuf.Timestamp`, an RFC 3339 string in JSON.| Route | Body | Purpose ||---|---|---|diff --git a/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go b/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.goindex 6af4a691..4c853149 100644--- a/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ const expiryMargin = 2 * time.Second// expiration check reads.//// It also pins the second half of the fix: the biscuit's lifetime is the-// admin-configured --biscuit-ttl, and EnrollResponse.Expiration (which drives+// admin-configured --biscuit-ttl, and EnrollResponse.expire_time (which drives// the node's proactive refresh) reports that same instant rather than the OIDC// token's own, much later, expiry.func TestBiscuitExpiryIsEnforcedOnEveryPath(t *testing.T) {@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsEnforcedOnEveryPath(t *testing.T) {cpPubKey := ed25519.PublicKey(enrollResp.ControlPlanePublicKey)// The advertised expiration is the biscuit's, not the OIDC token's (1h).- reported := time.Unix(enrollResp.Expiration, 0)+ reported := enrollResp.GetExpireTime().AsTime()if skew := reported.Sub(mintedAt.Add(testBiscuitTTL)); skew < -2*time.Second || skew > 2*time.Second {- t.Errorf("EnrollResponse.Expiration is %v, want ~%v (--biscuit-ttl %v after minting)",+ t.Errorf("EnrollResponse.expire_time is %v, want ~%v (--biscuit-ttl %v after minting)",reported, mintedAt.Add(testBiscuitTTL), testBiscuitTTL)}@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ func registerOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, privKeyPeerId: clientID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {diff --git a/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.go b/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.goindex af0d22db..efa27c8c 100644--- a/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/identity_evidence_test.go@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func TestIdentityEvidenceOperatorFlow(t *testing.T) {func verifyIdentityEvidence(t *testing.T, controlPlaneURL string, pinnedControlPlaneKey ed25519.PublicKey, expectedProvider peer.ID, local *api.IdentityEvidenceResponse, remote *api.PeerEvidenceResponse) {t.Helper()- if local.ControlPlaneUrl != controlPlaneURL || len(local.Biscuit) == 0 || local.CheckedAt <= 0 || local.BiscuitExpiresAt < local.CheckedAt {+ if local.ControlPlaneUrl != controlPlaneURL || len(local.Biscuit) == 0 || local.CheckTime == nil || local.BiscuitExpireTime == nil || local.BiscuitExpireTime.AsTime().Before(local.CheckTime.AsTime()) {t.Fatalf("invalid local identity evidence: %+v", local)}localPeer, err := peer.Decode(local.PeerId)@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ func verifyIdentityEvidence(t *testing.T, controlPlaneURL string, pinnedControlPt.Fatalf("third-party verification of local Biscuit failed: %v", err)}- if remote.PeerId != expectedProvider.String() || len(remote.Biscuit) == 0 || len(remote.VerifyingKey) == 0 || remote.CheckedAt <= 0 || remote.Expiration < remote.CheckedAt || len(remote.RevocationIds) == 0 {+ if remote.PeerId != expectedProvider.String() || len(remote.Biscuit) == 0 || len(remote.VerifyingKey) == 0 || remote.CheckTime == nil || remote.ExpireTime == nil || remote.ExpireTime.AsTime().Before(remote.CheckTime.AsTime()) || len(remote.RevocationIds) == 0 {t.Fatalf("invalid remote identity evidence: %+v", remote)}if len(remote.Roles) != 1 || remote.Roles[0] != api.RoleNode || len(remote.Labels) != 0 {diff --git a/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go b/tests/integration/multimaster_test.goindex 572d3270..8901af74 100644--- a/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/multimaster_test.go@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func enrollClientOnControlPlane(t *testing.T, cpPort int, clientID peer.ID, privPeerId: clientID.String(),PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,}reqBytes, err := proto.Marshal(req)diff --git a/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go b/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.goindex fe4d9367..e18077f2 100644--- a/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ func TestPolicyGrantsReachTheMintedToken(t *testing.T) {PublicKey: pubBytes,RequestedRole: api.RoleNode,Labels: labels,- Timestamp: ts,+ ChallengeUnixMs: ts,ChallengeSignature: sig,})if err != nil {diff --git a/tests/integration/revocation_test.go b/tests/integration/revocation_test.goindex 3767843b..9ab46f79 100644--- a/tests/integration/revocation_test.go+++ b/tests/integration/revocation_test.go@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import ("github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer""github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr""google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb")func TestNodeRevocationIntegration(t *testing.T) {@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ roles:event := &api.MeshEvent{Type: api.MeshEvent_BANNED,PeerId: node2PeerID,- Timestamp: time.Now().UnixMilli(),+ EventTime: timestamppb.Now(),}eventData, err := proto.Marshal(event)if err != nil {