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Agent Mesh

policy: Datalog text is the contract every member evaluates

Antonio Ojeac036700e1e95
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 9fc0b954..16f900bb 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ You are an expert software engineering assistant helping to develop, maintain, a
## 1. Architecture & Component Independence
* **Decoupled Architecture:** The `sam-control-plane`, `sam-router` and `sam-node` components are strictly independent. They must not share internal state or tightly couple their logic.
* **API Communication:** All data communication between `sam-control-plane`, `sam-router` and `sam-node` must happen exclusively via the common API defined in `api/sam.proto`.
-* **Two API surfaces, two encodings:** the *mesh protocol* — anything a mesh component speaks (node, router, `sam-box`, the agent connector): enrollment, refresh, keys, leases, auth streams, policy sync — is protobuf from `api/sam.proto` (`application/x-protobuf`). The *operator plane* — what humans, the web console and admin CLIs call (`/admin/*`, `/users/*`) — is JSON, with its request and response types declared as Go structs in `api/` (e.g. `api.BootstrapTokenRequest`). Never define a wire shape as an anonymous struct or `map[string]any` inside a handler, and never serialize an `internal/storage` (or any other internal) type onto either surface; clients in `cmd/` and `internal/console` import `api/` only. A message that a mesh component consumes goes in the proto even if a console also reads it.
+* **One schema, two encodings:** every request and response on any SAM surface is a message in `api/sam.proto`. The *mesh protocol* — anything a mesh component speaks (node, router, `sam-box`, the agent connector, the SDKs under `sdk/`): enrollment, refresh, keys, leases, auth streams, policy sync — is binary protobuf (`application/x-protobuf`). The *operator plane* — what humans, the web console and admin CLIs call (`/admin/*`, `/users/*`, `POST /policies`) — is protojson of the same messages, with `UseProtoNames` and unknown fields rejected. Never define a wire shape as a Go struct with `json` tags, an anonymous struct or `map[string]any`, and never serialize an `internal/storage` (or any other internal) type onto either surface. Use `google.protobuf.Timestamp` for instants so protojson renders them as RFC 3339. Clients in `cmd/`, `internal/console` and `sdk/` import `api/` or its generated bindings only.
+* **Datalog text is the policy contract:** the control plane renders the mesh policy as Datalog rules (`PolicyConfigGetResponse.datalog_rules`); every member, in any language, adds that text to its authorizer and none derives rules from roles and bindings itself. Datalog must stay in the form every Biscuit implementation parses: a predicate carries at least one term (presence-only facts are `name(true)`, see `api.MarkerFact`).
* **Secrets never travel as flag values:** binaries read credentials from a file (`--*-path`) or the environment, never from a command-line argument that would sit in `ps` output and shell history. Banners and logs name the source of an operator-supplied secret instead of echoing it.
* **Sandbox Dataplane:** `sam-box` (one per sandbox) is the single egress policy enforcement point. It holds no libp2p host, no enrollment and no mesh identity, and reaches the mesh exclusively as a client of the local `sam-node` sidecar socket. `nano-init` (PID 1 inside the guest, its own Go module) owns the guest side; its datapath is the `tun2connect` library. The sandbox boundary is a Unix socket speaking named HTTP tunnels: CONNECT (TCP) and connect-udp (UDP) out, `CONNECT <port>` back in. The authoritative design is `site/content/docs/preview/agent-architecture.md`; do not contradict it.
* **Enforcement over Convention:** never gate sandbox traffic on the agent's cooperation — no proxy environment variables, no `LD_PRELOAD` shims, no DNS spoofing. The agent harness stays unmodified and mesh-unaware; confinement is a route and a socket, built by the userspace launcher (`nano-init`) and judged in `sam-box`. An agent that must cooperate with its own confinement is not confined.
diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.go
index 36f479e2..72a85102 100644
--- a/api/datalog.go
+++ b/api/datalog.go
@@ -49,10 +49,17 @@ import (
// - target_unrestricted: Fact injected in the token by the control plane indicating that
// the client has unrestricted network access and bypasses target constraints.
// - Target Check: Verified using the check:
-// `check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) or target_unrestricted()`
+// `check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) or target_unrestricted(true)`
// If target_unrestricted is present, target checking succeeds immediately.
// Otherwise, it requires a matching allow_network_target rule to succeed.
//
+// 3. Marker Facts:
+// Facts that only signal presence (target_unrestricted, granted_service_all_types,
+// agent_authorized, ...) carry the single term `true`, see MarkerFact. The Biscuit
+// grammar requires at least one term per predicate; biscuit-go accepts an empty term
+// list but the Rust, Python and JavaScript implementations reject it, and the SDKs
+// evaluate this same Datalog.
+//
// ============================================================================
// Biscuit fact names represent the Datalog predicates used in auth tokens and policy evaluation.
@@ -129,8 +136,8 @@ const (
FactEmail = "email"
// FactGrantedServiceAllTypes allows access to all service types (e.g., mcp, inference) and all targets.
- // Contains: (no terms)
- // Example Datalog: allow if granted_service_all_types()
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
+ // Example Datalog: allow if granted_service_all_types(true)
FactGrantedServiceAllTypes = "granted_service_all_types"
// FactGrantedServiceAll allows access to all targets under a specific service type.
@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ const (
FactGrantedServiceSet = "granted_service_set"
// FactGrantedTargetAllTypes allows target access to all network targets (unrestricted).
- // Contains: (no terms)
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
FactGrantedTargetAllTypes = "granted_target_all_types"
// FactGrantedTargetAll allows target access to all values of a specific fact.
@@ -180,7 +187,7 @@ const (
FactGrantedTargetExact = "granted_target_exact"
// FactGrantedTargetAllFacts allows target access to any fact name and value combination.
- // Contains: (no terms)
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
FactGrantedTargetAllFacts = "granted_target_all_facts"
// FactGrantedTargetSet allows target access to a Set of exact values for a specific fact name.
@@ -217,12 +224,12 @@ const (
FactGrantedAgentSuffix = "granted_agent_suffix"
// FactGrantedAgentAll allows the holder to act for any agent at all.
- // Contains: (no terms)
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
FactGrantedAgentAll = "granted_agent_all"
// FactAgentAuthorized is derived when an agent claim falls inside one of the
// holder's granted_agent_* namespaces.
- // Contains: (no terms)
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
FactAgentAuthorized = "agent_authorized"
// FactConnectionPeerID defines the actual PeerID of the remote peer making the connection.
@@ -241,12 +248,12 @@ const (
FactAllowNetworkTarget = "allow_network_target"
// FactTargetUnrestricted indicates that target authorization checks are bypassed.
- // Contains: (no terms)
- // Example Datalog: check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) or target_unrestricted()
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
+ // Example Datalog: check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) or target_unrestricted(true)
FactTargetUnrestricted = "target_unrestricted"
// FactTargetRestricted indicates that target authorization checks must be enforced.
- // Contains: (no terms)
+ // Contains: biscuit.Bool(true) (marker fact)
FactTargetRestricted = "target_restricted"
// FactService represents the service target that a node is requesting access to.
@@ -272,6 +279,17 @@ const (
FactTime = "time"
)
+// MarkerTerm is the single term every marker fact carries, written `true` in
+// Datalog text. See MarkerFact.
+var MarkerTerm biscuit.Term = biscuit.Bool(true)
+
+// MarkerFact returns the presence-only fact name(true). The Biscuit grammar
+// requires at least one term per predicate, so a fact whose only meaning is
+// "this grant exists" carries MarkerTerm and is matched as name(true).
+func MarkerFact(name string) biscuit.Fact {
+ return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: name, IDs: []biscuit.Term{MarkerTerm}}}
+}
+
var oidcClaimToFact = map[string]string{
"sub": FactUser,
"email": FactEmail,
@@ -343,11 +361,39 @@ var (
// AllowIfTruePolicy is the static policy "allow if true" used during token verification.
AllowIfTruePolicy biscuit.Policy
+
+ // BaselineSources is the Datalog text every variable above is parsed from.
+ // The SDKs embed this text (see hack/gen-sdk-datalog) so that a provider
+ // written in another language evaluates the same authorizer as sam-node.
+ BaselineSources DatalogSources
)
+// DatalogSources is the source text of the baseline Datalog, one string per
+// item, in the form every Biscuit implementation parses.
+type DatalogSources struct {
+ // Policies are the service allow policies (BaselinePolicies).
+ Policies []string `json:"policies"`
+ // Rules derive allow_network_target from target grants (BaselineRules).
+ Rules []string `json:"rules"`
+ // AgentRules derive agent_authorized from agent grants (BaselineAgentRules).
+ AgentRules []string `json:"agent_rules"`
+ // TargetFactRules map identity facts to target_fact (TargetFactRules).
+ TargetFactRules []string `json:"target_fact_rules"`
+ // ReplayCheck is BaselineReplayCheck.
+ ReplayCheck string `json:"replay_check"`
+ // TargetCheck is BaselineTargetCheck.
+ TargetCheck string `json:"target_check"`
+ // AgentCheck is BaselineAgentCheck.
+ AgentCheck string `json:"agent_check"`
+ // TimeCheck is ControlPlaneStaticTimeCheck.
+ TimeCheck string `json:"time_check"`
+ // AllowIfTrue is AllowIfTruePolicy.
+ AllowIfTrue string `json:"allow_if_true"`
+}
+
func init() {
// 1. Service Allow Policies
- policyStrs := []string{
+ BaselineSources.Policies = []string{
// Exact Match: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_exact fact
// that perfectly matches both the protocol type (e.g. "mcp") and the service name (e.g. "calculator").
fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s($type, $name)`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceExact),
@@ -370,10 +416,10 @@ func init() {
// Global Wildcard: Allows access if the token possesses a granted_service_all_types fact,
// granting access to literally any service in any namespace (equivalent to '*').
- fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s()`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceAllTypes),
+ fmt.Sprintf(`allow if %s($type, $name), %s(true)`, FactService, FactGrantedServiceAllTypes),
}
- for i, pStr := range policyStrs {
+ for i, pStr := range BaselineSources.Policies {
p, err := parser.FromStringPolicy(pStr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse baseline policy %d: %v", i, err))
@@ -383,7 +429,7 @@ func init() {
// 2. Target Evaluation Rules
// These rules satisfy the check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) injected by the control plane.
- ruleStrs := []string{
+ BaselineSources.Rules = []string{
// Exact Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_exact fact matching a target_fact exactly.
fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s($fact, $val)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetExact),
@@ -401,10 +447,10 @@ func init() {
fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s($fact)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetAll),
// Global Wildcard Match: Derives allow_network_target if the token has a granted_target_all_facts fact, unconditionally allowing any target_fact.
- fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s()`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetAllFacts),
+ fmt.Sprintf(`%s($fact, $val) <- %s($fact, $val), %s(true)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetFact, FactGrantedTargetAllFacts),
}
- for i, rStr := range ruleStrs {
+ for i, rStr := range BaselineSources.Rules {
r, err := parser.FromStringRule(rStr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse baseline rule %d: %v", i, err))
@@ -416,14 +462,16 @@ func init() {
// BaselineReplayCheck prevents token theft/replay by ensuring the client_peer_id fact (embedded by the control plane during issuance)
// perfectly matches the connection_peer_id fact (provided by the local node verifying the incoming libp2p connection).
- BaselineReplayCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($id), %s($id)`, FactClientPeerID, FactConnectionPeerID))
+ BaselineSources.ReplayCheck = fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($id), %s($id)`, FactClientPeerID, FactConnectionPeerID)
+ BaselineReplayCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(BaselineSources.ReplayCheck)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse replay check: %v", err))
}
// BaselineTargetCheck enforces network target restrictions. The token must either have an unrestricted target,
// or one of the Target Evaluation Rules must have successfully derived an allow_network_target fact.
- BaselineTargetCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($fact, $val) or %s()`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetUnrestricted))
+ BaselineSources.TargetCheck = fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($fact, $val) or %s(true)`, FactAllowNetworkTarget, FactTargetUnrestricted)
+ BaselineTargetCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(BaselineSources.TargetCheck)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse target check: %v", err))
}
@@ -432,14 +480,14 @@ func init() {
// An agent claim is the calling node's word, so it is only worth what the
// control plane attested about that node. These derive agent_authorized when
// the claim falls inside a namespace the caller's own token grants.
- agentRuleStrs := []string{
- fmt.Sprintf(`%s() <- %s($a), %s($a)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentExact),
- fmt.Sprintf(`%s() <- %s($a), %s($set), $set.contains($a)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentSet),
- fmt.Sprintf(`%s() <- %s($a), %s($prefix), $a.starts_with($prefix)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentPrefix),
- fmt.Sprintf(`%s() <- %s($a), %s($suffix), $a.ends_with($suffix)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentSuffix),
- fmt.Sprintf(`%s() <- %s($a), %s()`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentAll),
- }
- for i, rStr := range agentRuleStrs {
+ BaselineSources.AgentRules = []string{
+ fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true) <- %s($a), %s($a)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentExact),
+ fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true) <- %s($a), %s($set), $set.contains($a)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentSet),
+ fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true) <- %s($a), %s($prefix), $a.starts_with($prefix)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentPrefix),
+ fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true) <- %s($a), %s($suffix), $a.ends_with($suffix)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentSuffix),
+ fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true) <- %s($a), %s(true)`, FactAgentAuthorized, FactAgent, FactGrantedAgentAll),
+ }
+ for i, rStr := range BaselineSources.AgentRules {
r, err := parser.FromStringRule(rStr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse baseline agent rule %d: %v", i, err))
@@ -449,15 +497,19 @@ func init() {
// A token carrying no granted_agent_* fact derives nothing, so this fails
// closed: naming an agent you were never granted denies the request.
- BaselineAgentCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s()`, FactAgentAuthorized))
+ BaselineSources.AgentCheck = fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s(true)`, FactAgentAuthorized)
+ BaselineAgentCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(BaselineSources.AgentCheck)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse agent check: %v", err))
}
// OIDC Claims to Target Facts: Maps dynamically generated OIDC facts (like `user("alice")`)
// into standard `target_fact("user", "alice")` facts for unified evaluation against network target policies.
- for _, val := range OIDCClaimToFact() {
- ruleStr := fmt.Sprintf(`%s(%q, $val) <- %s($val)`, FactTargetFact, val, val)
+ // Node PeerID Target Fact: Ensures the target node's PeerID is also evaluated as a standard target_fact.
+ for _, name := range TargetFactNames() {
+ BaselineSources.TargetFactRules = append(BaselineSources.TargetFactRules, fmt.Sprintf(`%s(%q, $val) <- %s($val)`, FactTargetFact, name, name))
+ }
+ for _, ruleStr := range BaselineSources.TargetFactRules {
r, err := parser.FromStringRule(ruleStr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse target fact rule: %v", err))
@@ -465,15 +517,9 @@ func init() {
TargetFactRules = append(TargetFactRules, r)
}
- // Node PeerID Target Fact: Ensures the target node's PeerID is also evaluated as a standard target_fact.
- r, err := parser.FromStringRule(fmt.Sprintf(`%s(%q, $val) <- %s($val)`, FactTargetFact, FactNode, FactNode))
- if err != nil {
- panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse node fact rule: %v", err))
- }
- TargetFactRules = append(TargetFactRules, r)
-
// ControlPlaneStaticTimeCheck ensures the token is not expired at the time of evaluation.
- ControlPlaneStaticTimeCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($time), %s($exp), $time <= $exp`, FactTime, FactExpiration))
+ BaselineSources.TimeCheck = fmt.Sprintf(`check if %s($time), %s($exp), $time <= $exp`, FactTime, FactExpiration)
+ ControlPlaneStaticTimeCheck, err = parser.FromStringCheck(BaselineSources.TimeCheck)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse static time check: %v", err))
}
@@ -482,7 +528,8 @@ func init() {
// Note that this does NOT mean all requests are automatically allowed. Biscuit requires at least one policy
// to evaluate to true AND all checks to pass. This simply satisfies the policy requirement, effectively
// deferring entirely to the control plane's checks and granted facts without imposing extra local restrictions.
- AllowIfTruePolicy, err = parser.FromStringPolicy("allow if true")
+ BaselineSources.AllowIfTrue = "allow if true"
+ AllowIfTruePolicy, err = parser.FromStringPolicy(BaselineSources.AllowIfTrue)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse static allow policy: %v", err))
}
@@ -492,10 +539,7 @@ func init() {
func BuildServiceDatalogFact(serviceStr string) biscuit.Fact {
svcType, svcName := ParseServiceTarget(serviceStr)
if svcType == "*" && svcName == "*" {
- return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: FactGrantedServiceAllTypes,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},
- }}
+ return MarkerFact(FactGrantedServiceAllTypes)
} else if svcName == "*" {
return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: FactGrantedServiceAll,
@@ -525,10 +569,7 @@ func BuildTargetDatalogFact(targetStr string) biscuit.Fact {
tFact = FactNode
}
if tFact == "*" && tVal == "*" {
- return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: FactGrantedTargetAllFacts,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},
- }}
+ return MarkerFact(FactGrantedTargetAllFacts)
} else if tVal == "*" {
return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: FactGrantedTargetAll,
@@ -696,7 +737,7 @@ func BuildAgentDatalogFact(pattern string) biscuit.Fact {
pattern = strings.TrimPrefix(pattern, FactAgent+":")
switch {
case pattern == "*":
- return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedAgentAll}}
+ return MarkerFact(FactGrantedAgentAll)
case strings.HasPrefix(pattern, "*."):
return biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: FactGrantedAgentSuffix,
diff --git a/api/datalog_test.go b/api/datalog_test.go
index 1f784ed5..cee99186 100644
--- a/api/datalog_test.go
+++ b/api/datalog_test.go
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestBaselinePolicies(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Global wildcard allows everything",
tokenFacts: []biscuit.Fact{
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedServiceAllTypes, IDs: []biscuit.Term{}}},
+ MarkerFact(FactGrantedServiceAllTypes),
},
requestTarget: "mcp://calculator",
expectAllow: true,
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ func TestBaselineTargetCheck(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Exact target matching allows",
tokenFacts: []biscuit.Fact{
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactTargetRestricted}},
+ MarkerFact(FactTargetRestricted),
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedTargetExact, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String("group"), biscuit.String("backend")}}},
},
targetFact: "group",
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func TestBaselineTargetCheck(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Mismatched target denied when restricted",
tokenFacts: []biscuit.Fact{
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactTargetRestricted}},
+ MarkerFact(FactTargetRestricted),
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedTargetExact, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String("group"), biscuit.String("backend")}}},
},
targetFact: "group",
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ func TestBaselineTargetCheck(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Any target allowed when target_unrestricted",
tokenFacts: []biscuit.Fact{
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactTargetUnrestricted}},
+ MarkerFact(FactTargetUnrestricted),
},
targetFact: "group",
targetVal: "any-group",
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ func TestBuildServiceDatalogFact(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
input: "*",
- expected: biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedServiceAllTypes, IDs: []biscuit.Term{}}},
+ expected: MarkerFact(FactGrantedServiceAllTypes),
},
{
input: "mcp://*",
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ func TestBuildTargetDatalogFact(t *testing.T) {
}{
{
input: "*",
- expected: biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactGrantedTargetAllFacts, IDs: []biscuit.Term{}}},
+ expected: MarkerFact(FactGrantedTargetAllFacts),
},
{
input: "user:*",
diff --git a/api/policy_rules.go b/api/policy_rules.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..092b3622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/api/policy_rules.go
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package api
+
+import (
+ "fmt"
+ "strings"
+
+ "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2"
+ "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser"
+)
+
+// PolicyRule is one mesh policy rule in both the form biscuit-go evaluates
+// and the Datalog text every other Biscuit implementation parses.
+type PolicyRule struct {
+ Rule biscuit.Rule
+ Text string
+}
+
+// BuildPolicyRules turns the mesh policy into the Datalog rules a provider
+// adds to its authorizer: bindings grant role() from attested identity facts,
+// roles grant granted_* facts from role(). Warnings name entries that were
+// skipped or that widen the mesh more than an operator may expect; the caller
+// decides how to surface them.
+func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*PolicyRole, bindings []*PolicyBinding) (rules []PolicyRule, warnings []string) {
+ add := func(head biscuit.Predicate, body ...biscuit.Predicate) {
+ r := biscuit.Rule{Head: head, Body: body}
+ rules = append(rules, PolicyRule{Rule: r, Text: renderRule(r)})
+ }
+
+ // A binding member becomes the body of a rule that grants a mesh role,
+ // so only facts the control plane attests in the authority block may
+ // appear there: agent() is the caller's own claim, and role() would
+ // grant a role from a role.
+ allowedMemberPrefix := make(map[string]bool)
+ for _, p := range BindingMemberPrefixes() {
+ allowedMemberPrefix[p] = true
+ }
+
+ for _, b := range bindings {
+ if b == nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ roleHead := biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(b.Role)}}
+ for _, m := range b.Members {
+ if m == SystemAuthenticated {
+ add(roleHead)
+ continue
+ }
+ parts := strings.SplitN(m, ":", 2)
+ if len(parts) == 2 && allowedMemberPrefix[parts[0]] {
+ add(roleHead, biscuit.Predicate{Name: parts[0], IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(parts[1])}})
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for _, role := range roles {
+ if role == nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ roleName := role.Name
+ fromRole := biscuit.Predicate{Name: FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}}
+
+ for _, fact := range BuildServiceDatalogFacts(role.AllowedServices) {
+ add(fact.Predicate, fromRole)
+ }
+
+ hasUnrestricted := false
+ var nonWildcardTargets []string
+ for _, t := range role.AllowedTargets {
+ if t == "*" {
+ hasUnrestricted = true
+ } else {
+ nonWildcardTargets = append(nonWildcardTargets, t)
+ }
+ }
+ if hasUnrestricted {
+ add(MarkerFact(FactTargetUnrestricted).Predicate, fromRole)
+ }
+ if len(nonWildcardTargets) > 0 {
+ add(MarkerFact(FactTargetRestricted).Predicate, fromRole)
+ }
+ for _, fact := range BuildTargetDatalogFacts(nonWildcardTargets) {
+ add(fact.Predicate, fromRole)
+ }
+
+ for _, fact := range BuildAgentDatalogFacts(role.AllowedAgents) {
+ if fact.Name == FactGrantedAgentAll {
+ warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("Role %s may speak for any agent; any peer holding it can name any agent identity in the mesh", roleName))
+ }
+ add(fact.Predicate, fromRole)
+ }
+
+ // Custom entries keep their source text: it may carry expressions,
+ // which biscuit-go cannot print back.
+ for _, dl := range role.CustomDatalog {
+ trimmed := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(dl), ";")
+ if trimmed == "" {
+ continue
+ }
+ r, err := parser.FromStringRule(trimmed)
+ if err == nil {
+ rules = append(rules, PolicyRule{Rule: r, Text: trimmed})
+ continue
+ }
+ f, err2 := parser.FromStringFact(trimmed)
+ if err2 == nil {
+ add(f.Predicate)
+ continue
+ }
+ warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to parse custom Datalog rule/fact %q for role %s: rule_err=%v, fact_err=%v", dl, roleName, err, err2))
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rules, warnings
+}
+
+// renderRule writes a predicate-only rule as Datalog text. An unconditional
+// rule is written `head <- true` so that it stays a rule for every parser.
+func renderRule(r biscuit.Rule) string {
+ if len(r.Body) == 0 {
+ return r.Head.String() + " <- true"
+ }
+ parts := make([]string, 0, len(r.Body))
+ for _, p := range r.Body {
+ parts = append(parts, p.String())
+ }
+ return r.Head.String() + " <- " + strings.Join(parts, ", ")
+}
+
+// PolicyRuleTexts is the Datalog text of rules, one entry per rule.
+func PolicyRuleTexts(rules []PolicyRule) []string {
+ out := make([]string, 0, len(rules))
+ for _, r := range rules {
+ out = append(out, r.Text)
+ }
+ return out
+}
+
+// ParseDatalogRules parses PolicyConfigGetResponse.datalog_rules. One
+// unparseable entry fails the whole set: a provider that silently dropped a
+// rule would enforce a policy the operator never wrote.
+func ParseDatalogRules(texts []string) ([]biscuit.Rule, error) {
+ rules := make([]biscuit.Rule, 0, len(texts))
+ for i, text := range texts {
+ r, err := parser.FromStringRule(text)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("datalog_rules[%d] %q: %w", i, text, err)
+ }
+ rules = append(rules, r)
+ }
+ return rules, nil
+}
diff --git a/api/policy_rules_test.go b/api/policy_rules_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6f44a550
--- /dev/null
+++ b/api/policy_rules_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package api
+
+import (
+ "testing"
+
+ "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser"
+)
+
+func TestBuildPolicyRules(t *testing.T) {
+ roles := []*PolicyRole{
+ {
+ Name: "test-role",
+ AllowedTargets: []string{"*", "node:peer-abc", "custom-fact:custom-val", "legacy-peer"},
+ AllowedServices: []string{"*:*", "mcp:*", "mcp:*.suffix", "mcp:prefix.*", "mcp:exact"},
+ AllowedAgents: []string{"*"},
+ CustomDatalog: []string{
+ "custom_rule($x) <- fact($x), $x > 3;",
+ "custom_fact(\"hello\")",
+ "not datalog at all(",
+ },
+ },
+ }
+ bindings := []*PolicyBinding{
+ {
+ Role: "test-role",
+ Members: []string{"sam:system:authenticated", "user:alice", "role:admin", "agent:spoofed"},
+ },
+ }
+
+ rules, warnings := BuildPolicyRules(roles, bindings)
+
+ expectedStrings := map[string]bool{
+ "role(\"test-role\") <- true": false,
+ "role(\"test-role\") <- user(\"alice\")": false,
+ "granted_service_all_types(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_service_all(\"mcp\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_service_suffix(\"mcp\", \".suffix\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_service_prefix(\"mcp\", \"prefix.\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_service_set(\"mcp\", [\"exact\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "target_unrestricted(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "target_restricted(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_target_set(\"node\", [\"legacy-peer\", \"peer-abc\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_target_set(\"custom-fact\", [\"custom-val\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "granted_agent_all(true) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
+ "custom_rule($x) <- fact($x), $x > 3": false,
+ "custom_fact(\"hello\") <- true": false,
+ }
+
+ for _, rule := range rules {
+ if _, ok := expectedStrings[rule.Text]; !ok {
+ t.Errorf("Unexpected rule generated: %q", rule.Text)
+ continue
+ }
+ expectedStrings[rule.Text] = true
+ // The text is what other implementations parse; it must round-trip here too.
+ if _, err := parser.FromStringRule(rule.Text); err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("rendered rule %q does not parse: %v", rule.Text, err)
+ }
+ }
+
+ for k, v := range expectedStrings {
+ if !v {
+ t.Errorf("Expected rule was not generated: %q", k)
+ }
+ }
+
+ if len(warnings) != 2 {
+ t.Fatalf("warnings = %q, want one for granted_agent_all and one for the unparseable entry", warnings)
+ }
+
+ // The text is the contract every member evaluates; it must yield the same
+ // rules here as the structured form does.
+ parsed, err := ParseDatalogRules(PolicyRuleTexts(rules))
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("ParseDatalogRules: %v", err)
+ }
+ if len(parsed) != len(rules) {
+ t.Fatalf("parsed %d rules from text, built %d", len(parsed), len(rules))
+ }
+ for i := range rules {
+ if parsed[i].Head.String() != rules[i].Rule.Head.String() {
+ t.Errorf("rule %d head: text %s, built %s", i, parsed[i].Head.String(), rules[i].Rule.Head.String())
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+func TestParseDatalogRulesRejectsWholeSet(t *testing.T) {
+ _, err := ParseDatalogRules([]string{`role("a") <- user("b")`, `broken(`})
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Fatal("expected an error for an unparseable rule")
+ }
+}
diff --git a/api/sam.pb.go b/api/sam.pb.go
index 3ab2d1fe..f0cd4e4d 100644
--- a/api/sam.pb.go
+++ b/api/sam.pb.go
@@ -1525,26 +1525,32 @@ func (x *PolicyBinding) GetMembers() []string {
return nil
}
-type PolicyConfigGetRequest struct {
+// PolicyConfig is the mesh policy as the operator writes it: roles and
+// bindings. It is the body of POST /policies and the answer of
+// GET /admin/policy, both protojson. Only the control plane reads it, to
+// mint tokens and to render PolicyConfigGetResponse.
+type PolicyConfig struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
+ Roles []*PolicyRole `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=roles,proto3" json:"roles,omitempty"`
+ Bindings []*PolicyBinding `protobuf:"bytes,2,rep,name=bindings,proto3" json:"bindings,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) Reset() {
- *x = PolicyConfigGetRequest{}
+func (x *PolicyConfig) Reset() {
+ *x = PolicyConfig{}
mi := &file_api_sam_proto_msgTypes[17]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) String() string {
+func (x *PolicyConfig) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
-func (*PolicyConfigGetRequest) ProtoMessage() {}
+func (*PolicyConfig) ProtoMessage() {}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
+func (x *PolicyConfig) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_api_sam_proto_msgTypes[17]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
@@ -1556,33 +1562,45 @@ func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
-// Deprecated: Use PolicyConfigGetRequest.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
-func (*PolicyConfigGetRequest) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
+// Deprecated: Use PolicyConfig.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
+func (*PolicyConfig) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_api_sam_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{17}
}
-type PolicyConfigGetResponse struct {
+func (x *PolicyConfig) GetRoles() []*PolicyRole {
+ if x != nil {
+ return x.Roles
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (x *PolicyConfig) GetBindings() []*PolicyBinding {
+ if x != nil {
+ return x.Bindings
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+type PolicyConfigGetRequest struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
- Roles []*PolicyRole `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=roles,proto3" json:"roles,omitempty"`
- Bindings []*PolicyBinding `protobuf:"bytes,2,rep,name=bindings,proto3" json:"bindings,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) Reset() {
- *x = PolicyConfigGetResponse{}
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) Reset() {
+ *x = PolicyConfigGetRequest{}
mi := &file_api_sam_proto_msgTypes[18]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) String() string {
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
-func (*PolicyConfigGetResponse) ProtoMessage() {}
+func (*PolicyConfigGetRequest) ProtoMessage() {}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_api_sam_proto_msgTypes[18]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
@@ -1594,47 +1612,36 @@ func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
-// Deprecated: Use PolicyConfigGetResponse.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
-func (*PolicyConfigGetResponse) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
+// Deprecated: Use PolicyConfigGetRequest.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
+func (*PolicyConfigGetRequest) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_api_sam_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{18}
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) GetRoles() []*PolicyRole {
- if x != nil {
- return x.Roles
- }
- return nil
-}
-
-func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) GetBindings() []*PolicyBinding {
- if x != nil {
- return x.Bindings
- }
- return nil
-}
-
-type PolicyConfigUpdateRequest struct {
- state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
- Roles []*PolicyRole `protobuf:"bytes,1,rep,name=roles,proto3" json:"roles,omitempty"`
- Bindings []*PolicyBinding `protobuf:"bytes,2,rep,name=bindings,proto3" json:"bindings,omitempty"`
+// PolicyConfigGetResponse answers GET /policies for a mesh member holding a
+// biscuit. It carries the policy only as Datalog text: this is the contract
+// every member evaluates, and none derives rules from roles and bindings.
+type PolicyConfigGetResponse struct {
+ state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
+ // One rule per entry, rendered by the control plane with api.BuildPolicyRules.
+ DatalogRules []string `protobuf:"bytes,3,rep,name=datalog_rules,json=datalogRules,proto3" json:"datalog_rules,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) Reset() {
- *x = PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{}
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) Reset() {
+ *x = PolicyConfigGetResponse{}
mi := &file_api_sam_proto_msgTypes[19]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) String() string {
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
-func (*PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) ProtoMessage() {}
+func (*PolicyConfigGetResponse) ProtoMessage() {}
-func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_api_sam_proto_msgTypes[19]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
@@ -1646,21 +1653,14 @@ func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
-// Deprecated: Use PolicyConfigUpdateRequest.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
-func (*PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
+// Deprecated: Use PolicyConfigGetResponse.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
+func (*PolicyConfigGetResponse) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_api_sam_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{19}
}
-func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) GetRoles() []*PolicyRole {
+func (x *PolicyConfigGetResponse) GetDatalogRules() []string {
if x != nil {
- return x.Roles
- }
- return nil
-}
-
-func (x *PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) GetBindings() []*PolicyBinding {
- if x != nil {
- return x.Bindings
+ return x.DatalogRules
}
return nil
}
@@ -3152,14 +3152,13 @@ const file_api_sam_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x0eallowed_labels\x18\x06 \x03(\tR\rallowedLabels\"=\n" +
"\rPolicyBinding\x12\x12\n" +
"\x04role\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x04role\x12\x18\n" +
- "\amembers\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\amembers\"\x18\n" +
- "\x16PolicyConfigGetRequest\"v\n" +
- "\x17PolicyConfigGetResponse\x12(\n" +
- "\x05roles\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x12.sam.v1.PolicyRoleR\x05roles\x121\n" +
- "\bbindings\x18\x02 \x03(\v2\x15.sam.v1.PolicyBindingR\bbindings\"x\n" +
- "\x19PolicyConfigUpdateRequest\x12(\n" +
+ "\amembers\x18\x02 \x03(\tR\amembers\"k\n" +
+ "\fPolicyConfig\x12(\n" +
"\x05roles\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x12.sam.v1.PolicyRoleR\x05roles\x121\n" +
- "\bbindings\x18\x02 \x03(\v2\x15.sam.v1.PolicyBindingR\bbindings\"L\n" +
+ "\bbindings\x18\x02 \x03(\v2\x15.sam.v1.PolicyBindingR\bbindings\"\x18\n" +
+ "\x16PolicyConfigGetRequest\"[\n" +
+ "\x17PolicyConfigGetResponse\x12#\n" +
+ "\rdatalog_rules\x18\x03 \x03(\tR\fdatalogRulesJ\x04\b\x01\x10\x02J\x04\b\x02\x10\x03R\x05rolesR\bbindings\"L\n" +
"\x1aPolicyConfigUpdateResponse\x12\x18\n" +
"\asuccess\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\asuccess\x12\x14\n" +
"\x05error\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x05error\"m\n" +
@@ -3307,9 +3306,9 @@ var file_api_sam_proto_goTypes = []any{
(*RouterLeaseResponse)(nil), // 17: sam.v1.RouterLeaseResponse
(*PolicyRole)(nil), // 18: sam.v1.PolicyRole
(*PolicyBinding)(nil), // 19: sam.v1.PolicyBinding
- (*PolicyConfigGetRequest)(nil), // 20: sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest
- (*PolicyConfigGetResponse)(nil), // 21: sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse
- (*PolicyConfigUpdateRequest)(nil), // 22: sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest
+ (*PolicyConfig)(nil), // 20: sam.v1.PolicyConfig
+ (*PolicyConfigGetRequest)(nil), // 21: sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest
+ (*PolicyConfigGetResponse)(nil), // 22: sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse
(*PolicyConfigUpdateResponse)(nil), // 23: sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateResponse
(*KeysResponse)(nil), // 24: sam.v1.KeysResponse
(*TokenRefreshRequest)(nil), // 25: sam.v1.TokenRefreshRequest
@@ -3349,24 +3348,22 @@ var file_api_sam_proto_depIdxs = []int32{
11, // 7: sam.v1.RegisterServiceRequest.command:type_name -> sam.v1.CommandBackend
1, // 8: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType
48, // 9: sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceAnnounce.LabelsEntry
- 18, // 10: sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse.roles:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyRole
- 19, // 11: sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse.bindings:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyBinding
- 18, // 12: sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest.roles:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyRole
- 19, // 13: sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest.bindings:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyBinding
- 10, // 14: sam.v1.NodeCatalogReport.services:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceInfo
- 30, // 15: sam.v1.AgentEgress.secrets:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentSecret
- 1, // 16: sam.v1.AgentIngress.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType
- 31, // 17: sam.v1.AgentBundle.egress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentEgress
- 32, // 18: sam.v1.AgentBundle.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress
- 33, // 19: sam.v1.AgentAttachRequest.bundle:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentBundle
- 32, // 20: sam.v1.AgentStatus.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress
- 41, // 21: sam.v1.AgentStatusResponse.agents:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentStatus
- 49, // 22: sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry
- 23, // [23:23] is the sub-list for method output_type
- 23, // [23:23] is the sub-list for method input_type
- 23, // [23:23] is the sub-list for extension type_name
- 23, // [23:23] is the sub-list for extension extendee
- 0, // [0:23] is the sub-list for field type_name
+ 18, // 10: sam.v1.PolicyConfig.roles:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyRole
+ 19, // 11: sam.v1.PolicyConfig.bindings:type_name -> sam.v1.PolicyBinding
+ 10, // 12: sam.v1.NodeCatalogReport.services:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceInfo
+ 30, // 13: sam.v1.AgentEgress.secrets:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentSecret
+ 1, // 14: sam.v1.AgentIngress.type:type_name -> sam.v1.ServiceType
+ 31, // 15: sam.v1.AgentBundle.egress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentEgress
+ 32, // 16: sam.v1.AgentBundle.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress
+ 33, // 17: sam.v1.AgentAttachRequest.bundle:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentBundle
+ 32, // 18: sam.v1.AgentStatus.ingress:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentIngress
+ 41, // 19: sam.v1.AgentStatusResponse.agents:type_name -> sam.v1.AgentStatus
+ 49, // 20: sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.labels:type_name -> sam.v1.PeerEvidenceResponse.LabelsEntry
+ 21, // [21:21] is the sub-list for method output_type
+ 21, // [21:21] is the sub-list for method input_type
+ 21, // [21:21] is the sub-list for extension type_name
+ 21, // [21:21] is the sub-list for extension extendee
+ 0, // [0:21] is the sub-list for field type_name
}
func init() { file_api_sam_proto_init() }
diff --git a/api/sam.proto b/api/sam.proto
index b89bb3ad..6610b10b 100644
--- a/api/sam.proto
+++ b/api/sam.proto
@@ -230,16 +230,27 @@ message PolicyBinding {
repeated string members = 2;
}
-message PolicyConfigGetRequest {}
-
-message PolicyConfigGetResponse {
+// PolicyConfig is the mesh policy as the operator writes it: roles and
+// bindings. It is the body of POST /policies and the answer of
+// GET /admin/policy, both protojson. Only the control plane reads it, to
+// mint tokens and to render PolicyConfigGetResponse.
+message PolicyConfig {
repeated PolicyRole roles = 1;
repeated PolicyBinding bindings = 2;
}
-message PolicyConfigUpdateRequest {
- repeated PolicyRole roles = 1;
- repeated PolicyBinding bindings = 2;
+message PolicyConfigGetRequest {}
+
+// PolicyConfigGetResponse answers GET /policies for a mesh member holding a
+// biscuit. It carries the policy only as Datalog text: this is the contract
+// every member evaluates, and none derives rules from roles and bindings.
+message PolicyConfigGetResponse {
+ // roles and bindings once travelled here; they are the operator's document
+ // now (PolicyConfig). Reserved so an old sender is detected, not misread.
+ reserved 1, 2;
+ reserved "roles", "bindings";
+ // One rule per entry, rendered by the control plane with api.BuildPolicyRules.
+ repeated string datalog_rules = 3;
}
message PolicyConfigUpdateResponse {
diff --git a/cmd/sam-one/main.go b/cmd/sam-one/main.go
index 8a859f78..0eeebb0f 100644
--- a/cmd/sam-one/main.go
+++ b/cmd/sam-one/main.go
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func main() {
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&joinTokenPath, "token-path", "", "File containing the cluster join token (or env SAM_TOKEN; auto-generated and persisted in --data-dir if neither is set)")
rootCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&noJoinToken, "no-join-token", false, "Run without a standing join token; devices enroll only with minted bootstrap tokens (token create/qr) or OIDC")
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&adminTokenPath, "admin-token-path", "", "File containing the admin API bearer token (or env SAM_ADMIN_TOKEN; auto-generated and persisted in --data-dir if neither is set)")
- rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&policyFile, "policy-file", "", "Path to a protojson PolicyConfigUpdateRequest seeding the mesh policy on first boot only")
+ rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&policyFile, "policy-file", "", "Path to a protojson PolicyConfig seeding the mesh policy on first boot only")
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&oidcIssuer, "issuer", "", "Optional external OIDC issuer URL (comma-separated)")
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&oidcClientID, "oidc-client-id", "", "OAuth client id advertised via /info (defaults to the first allowed audience)")
rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&allowedAudiencesFlag, "allowed-audiences", api.DefaultAudience, "Comma-separated list of allowed OIDC audiences")
diff --git a/hack/gen-sdk-datalog/main.go b/hack/gen-sdk-datalog/main.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..39172347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hack/gen-sdk-datalog/main.go
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Google LLC
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+// Command gen-sdk-datalog writes the baseline Datalog a mesh member evaluates
+// when it authorizes a caller, as api/datalog.go defines it, into the JSON
+// artifact the native SDKs embed. Go stays the source of truth;
+// hack/verify-sdk-generated.sh fails when the artifact is stale.
+package main
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "fmt"
+ "os"
+ "strings"
+
+ "github.com/google/sam/api"
+)
+
+type artifact struct {
+ Comment string `json:"_comment"`
+ api.DatalogSources
+ FactService string `json:"fact_service"`
+ FactConnectionPeer string `json:"fact_connection_peer_id"`
+ FactAgent string `json:"fact_agent"`
+ FactTime string `json:"fact_time"`
+ FactRole string `json:"fact_role"`
+ FactTargetFact string `json:"fact_target_fact"`
+ MarkerTerm string `json:"marker_term"`
+ SystemNamespace string `json:"system_namespace"`
+ BindingPrefixes []string `json:"binding_member_prefixes"`
+ SystemAuthenticated string `json:"system_authenticated_member"`
+}
+
+func main() {
+ if len(os.Args) != 3 {
+ fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "usage: gen-sdk-datalog <output.json> <output.ts>")
+ os.Exit(2)
+ }
+ a := artifact{
+ Comment: "Generated by hack/gen-sdk-datalog from api/datalog.go; do not edit.",
+ DatalogSources: api.BaselineSources,
+ FactService: api.FactService,
+ FactConnectionPeer: api.FactConnectionPeerID,
+ FactAgent: api.FactAgent,
+ FactTime: api.FactTime,
+ FactRole: api.FactRole,
+ FactTargetFact: api.FactTargetFact,
+ MarkerTerm: api.MarkerTerm.String(),
+ SystemNamespace: api.SystemNamespace,
+ BindingPrefixes: api.BindingMemberPrefixes(),
+ SystemAuthenticated: api.SystemAuthenticated,
+ }
+ var buf bytes.Buffer
+ enc := json.NewEncoder(&buf)
+ enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
+ enc.SetIndent("", " ")
+ if err := enc.Encode(a); err != nil {
+ fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+ os.Exit(1)
+ }
+ if err := os.WriteFile(os.Args[1], buf.Bytes(), 0o644); err != nil {
+ fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+ os.Exit(1)
+ }
+ ts := "// Code generated by hack/gen-sdk-datalog from api/datalog.go; DO NOT EDIT.\n\n" +
+ "/** The Datalog a provider evaluates against a caller's biscuit. */\n" +
+ "export const BASELINE_DATALOG = " + strings.TrimRight(buf.String(), "\n") + " as const;\n"
+ if err := os.WriteFile(os.Args[2], []byte(ts), 0o644); err != nil {
+ fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+ os.Exit(1)
+ }
+}
diff --git a/hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh b/hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh
index 1ee24c46..f2edf889 100755
--- a/hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh
+++ b/hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh
@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@
# limitations under the License.
# Regenerates the protobuf bindings the native SDKs under sdk/ ship for
-# api/sam.proto. The Go bindings are gen-proto.sh's job. Requires protoc
-# and, for JavaScript, an `npm install` in sdk/js (protoc-gen-es).
+# api/sam.proto, and the baseline Datalog artifact from api/datalog.go. The
+# Go bindings are gen-proto.sh's job. Requires protoc and, for JavaScript,
+# an `npm install` in sdk/js (protoc-gen-es).
set -o errexit
set -o nounset
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
JS_GEN_DIR="sdk/js/src/gen"
PY_GEN_DIR="sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto"
+PY_DATALOG_DIR="sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen"
PROTOC_GEN_ES="sdk/js/node_modules/.bin/protoc-gen-es"
if [[ ! -x "${PROTOC_GEN_ES}" ]]; then
@@ -54,4 +56,8 @@ protoc -I sdk/python/proto \
--pyi_out="${PY_GEN_DIR}" \
sdk/python/proto/circuit.proto
+echo "Generating baseline Datalog artifact..."
+mkdir -p "${PY_DATALOG_DIR}"
+go run ./hack/gen-sdk-datalog "${PY_DATALOG_DIR}/datalog.json" "${JS_GEN_DIR}/datalog.ts"
+
echo "SDK protobuf generation complete."
diff --git a/hack/verify-sdk-generated.sh b/hack/verify-sdk-generated.sh
index 24763980..1c469ad7 100755
--- a/hack/verify-sdk-generated.sh
+++ b/hack/verify-sdk-generated.sh
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
-# Fails when the protobuf bindings the SDKs ship are stale relative to
-# api/sam.proto. Regenerates in place, so run it on a clean checkout.
+# Fails when the protobuf bindings or the baseline Datalog artifact the SDKs
+# ship are stale relative to api/. Regenerates in place, so run it on a
+# clean checkout.
set -o errexit
set -o nounset
@@ -23,13 +24,13 @@ set -o pipefail
REPO_ROOT=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)
cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
-GENERATED=(sdk/js/src/gen sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto)
+GENERATED=(sdk/js/src/gen sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen)
./hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh
if ! git diff --exit-code -- "${GENERATED[@]}"; then
- echo "ERROR: SDK protobuf bindings are not up to date."
+ echo "ERROR: SDK generated files are not up to date."
echo "Run ./hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh and commit the result."
exit 1
fi
-echo "SDK protobuf bindings are up to date."
+echo "SDK generated files are up to date."
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/client/client.go b/internal/controlplane/client/client.go
index 723cbdf0..4aa46304 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/client/client.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/client/client.go
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ func (c *Client) FetchKeys(ctx context.Context, trusted []ed25519.PublicKey) ([]
}
// FetchPolicy is GET /policies, authenticated with the caller's biscuit: the
-// roles and bindings a node compiles into its authorization rules.
+// mesh policy as the Datalog rules a member adds to its authorizer.
func (c *Client) FetchPolicy(ctx context.Context, biscuit []byte) (*api.PolicyConfigGetResponse, error) {
var policy api.PolicyConfigGetResponse
if err := c.get(ctx, "/policies", biscuit, &policy); err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/client/client_test.go b/internal/controlplane/client/client_test.go
index cd949070..8bcd3978 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/client/client_test.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/client/client_test.go
@@ -268,8 +268,7 @@ func TestLargeAnswersArriveWhole(t *testing.T) {
func TestFetchPolicy(t *testing.T) {
want := &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{
- Roles: []*api.PolicyRole{{Name: "developer", AllowedServices: []string{"mcp://*"}}},
- Bindings: []*api.PolicyBinding{{Role: "developer", Members: []string{"group:eng"}}},
+ DatalogRules: []string{`role("developer") <- group("eng")`, `granted_service_all("mcp") <- role("developer")`},
}
var gotAuth string
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go b/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go
index 441a6d14..6ecb1eec 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/identity_lifecycle_test.go
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ func TestNoPolicyMintsNoGrants(t *testing.T) {
}
for _, open := range []string{api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes, api.FactTargetUnrestricted} {
if authorityHasFact(t, data, open+"(") {
- t.Errorf("token minted under an empty policy carries %s()", open)
+ t.Errorf("token minted under an empty policy carries %s(true)", open)
}
}
if !authorityHasFact(t, data, api.FactRole+`("`+api.RoleNode+`")`) {
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go b/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go
index bf034161..9b146044 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/policies_admission_test.go
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
"encoding/base64"
"io"
"net/http"
+ "slices"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -104,7 +105,21 @@ func TestPoliciesRequiresAnAdmissibleNode(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GET /policies failed: %v", err)
}
+ body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
_ = resp.Body.Close()
+ if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
+ // What a member receives is the policy as Datalog text and nothing else.
+ var policy api.PolicyConfigGetResponse
+ if err := proto.Unmarshal(body, &policy); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("decoding PolicyConfigGetResponse: %v", err)
+ }
+ if want := `role("sam:role:node") <- group("users")`; !slices.Contains(policy.DatalogRules, want) {
+ t.Errorf("datalog_rules = %q, want it to contain %q", policy.DatalogRules, want)
+ }
+ if len(policy.ProtoReflect().GetUnknown()) > 0 {
+ t.Errorf("policy response carries fields outside the contract: %x", policy.ProtoReflect().GetUnknown())
+ }
+ }
return resp.StatusCode
}
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/policy_scale_test.go b/internal/controlplane/policy_scale_test.go
index 3dc277c9..974f6f86 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/policy_scale_test.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/policy_scale_test.go
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func TestPolicyScale(t *testing.T) {
Members: []string{"node:" + nodePeer.String()},
})
}
- req := &api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}
+ req := &api.PolicyConfig{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}
start := time.Now()
if err := validatePolicyConfig(req); err != nil {
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ func TestPolicyScaleSetEncoding(t *testing.T) {
// admin-time fact budget guard, since Set-based encoding collapses it
// to a couple of facts regardless of entry count.
bindings := []*api.PolicyBinding{{Role: "bulk-role", Members: []string{"node:" + nodePeer.String()}}}
- if err := validatePolicyConfig(&api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}); err != nil {
+ if err := validatePolicyConfig(&api.PolicyConfig{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validatePolicyConfig unexpectedly rejected a single bulk role with n=%d exact entries: %v", n, err)
}
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ func TestValidatePolicyConfigFactBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("rejects a config that could push a single identity over the fact budget", func(t *testing.T) {
roles, bindings := newRoles(500)
- err := validatePolicyConfig(&api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings})
+ err := validatePolicyConfig(&api.PolicyConfig{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected validatePolicyConfig to reject an over-budget config, got nil error")
}
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ func TestValidatePolicyConfigFactBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("accepts a config comfortably under the fact budget", func(t *testing.T) {
roles, bindings := newRoles(50)
- if err := validatePolicyConfig(&api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}); err != nil {
+ if err := validatePolicyConfig(&api.PolicyConfig{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected a small config to pass validation, got: %v", err)
}
})
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server.go b/internal/controlplane/server.go
index 54023db8..60bf8f60 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/server.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/server.go
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ func (s *Server) RegisterRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux) {
handle("/admin/nodes/", noStore(s.HandleAdminNodeAction))
handle("/admin/revoke", noStore(s.HandleAdminRevoke))
handle("/admin/status", noStore(s.HandleAdminStatus))
+ handle("/admin/policy", noStore(s.HandleAdminPolicy))
handle("/user/status", noStore(s.HandleUserStatus))
handle("/user/bootstrap-tokens", noStore(s.HandleUserBootstrapTokens))
handle("/user/revoke", noStore(s.HandleUserRevoke))
@@ -1152,36 +1153,13 @@ func (s *Server) HandleRouterLease(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// HandlePolicies HTTP GET/POST/PUT `/policies`
func (s *Server) HandlePolicies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
- // Simple HTTP admin methods for policies
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
- // Nodes fetch policies with their biscuit, admins with the admin token
- // or an ID token. The biscuit is tried first: running OIDC
- // verification on a biscuit logs a failure and would auto-register
- // whoever's ID token lands here.
- isNode := false
- if authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
- if biscuitBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")); err == nil {
- if trustedKeys, err := s.store.GetAllValidPublicKeys(r.Context()); err == nil {
- if peerID, err := identity.VerifyAndExtractPeerID(trustedKeys, biscuitBytes, s.config.BiscuitTimeout); err == nil {
- nodeRecord, nodeErr := s.store.GetNode(r.Context(), peerID.String())
- if nodeErr == nil && nodeRecord != nil && nodeRecord.CheckAdmission(time.Now()) == nil {
- isNode = true
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- isAdmin := false
- if !isNode {
- if user, err := s.authenticateUser(r); err == nil && user.Role == "admin" {
- isAdmin = true
- }
- }
-
- if !isAdmin && !isNode {
- http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: Admin or Node authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+ // Mesh protocol: an admitted member fetches the policy with its biscuit
+ // and receives it as Datalog text only. Operators read the document at
+ // GET /admin/policy.
+ if !s.isAdmittedNodeRequest(r) {
+ http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: node credential required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
@@ -1192,11 +1170,11 @@ func (s *Server) HandlePolicies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
- resp := &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{
- Roles: roles,
- Bindings: bindings,
+ policyRules, warnings := api.BuildPolicyRules(roles, bindings)
+ for _, warning := range warnings {
+ logger.Warnf("mesh policy: %s", warning)
}
- respData, _ := proto.Marshal(resp)
+ respData, _ := proto.Marshal(&api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{DatalogRules: api.PolicyRuleTexts(policyRules)})
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-protobuf")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write(respData)
@@ -1213,8 +1191,9 @@ func (s *Server) HandlePolicies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
- req := &api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{}
- if strings.HasPrefix(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "application/json") {
+ req := &api.PolicyConfig{}
+ isJSON := strings.HasPrefix(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "application/json")
+ if isJSON {
// Strict: an unknown field here is a typo like "allowed_service", and
// discarding it would quietly drop the permission it was meant to grant.
if err := protojson.Unmarshal(body, req); err != nil {
@@ -1244,6 +1223,10 @@ func (s *Server) HandlePolicies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
resp := &api.PolicyConfigUpdateResponse{Success: true}
+ if isJSON {
+ writeProtoJSON(w, resp)
+ return
+ }
respData, _ := proto.Marshal(resp)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-protobuf")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
@@ -1254,6 +1237,64 @@ func (s *Server) HandlePolicies(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
+// isAdmittedNodeRequest reports whether the bearer credential is a biscuit of
+// an enrolled, admitted node. It never falls through to OIDC: running ID token
+// verification on a biscuit logs a failure and would auto-register whoever's
+// ID token lands here.
+func (s *Server) isAdmittedNodeRequest(r *http.Request) bool {
+ authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+ if !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
+ return false
+ }
+ biscuitBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer "))
+ if err != nil {
+ return false
+ }
+ trustedKeys, err := s.store.GetAllValidPublicKeys(r.Context())
+ if err != nil {
+ return false
+ }
+ peerID, err := identity.VerifyAndExtractPeerID(trustedKeys, biscuitBytes, s.config.BiscuitTimeout)
+ if err != nil {
+ return false
+ }
+ nodeRecord, err := s.store.GetNode(r.Context(), peerID.String())
+ return err == nil && nodeRecord != nil && nodeRecord.CheckAdmission(time.Now()) == nil
+}
+
+// HandleAdminPolicy HTTP GET `/admin/policy`: the mesh policy as the operator
+// wrote it, protojson of PolicyConfig, the same document POST /policies takes.
+func (s *Server) HandleAdminPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
+ http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+ return
+ }
+ if !s.checkAdminAuth(w, r) {
+ return
+ }
+ roles, bindings, err := s.store.GetMeshPolicy(r.Context())
+ if err != nil && err != storage.ErrNotFound {
+ logger.Errorf("Failed to load policy: %v", err)
+ http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+ return
+ }
+ writeProtoJSON(w, &api.PolicyConfig{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings})
+}
+
+// writeProtoJSON answers an operator-plane request with protojson of msg,
+// using the proto field names the console and the docs show.
+func writeProtoJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, msg proto.Message) {
+ out, err := protojson.MarshalOptions{UseProtoNames: true}.Marshal(msg)
+ if err != nil {
+ logger.Errorf("Failed to render %T: %v", msg, err)
+ http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+ return
+ }
+ w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+ _, _ = w.Write(out)
+}
+
// Close shuts down background loops and HTTP server.
func (s *Server) Close() error {
s.shutdown = true
@@ -2845,7 +2886,7 @@ func toStringSlice(val any) []string {
// PolicyRole silently drops any field it forgets, which is how custom_datalog
// went missing from the console for so long.
func marshalPolicyJSON(roles []*api.PolicyRole, bindings []*api.PolicyBinding) (string, error) {
- resp := &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}
+ resp := &api.PolicyConfig{Roles: roles, Bindings: bindings}
marshaler := protojson.MarshalOptions{UseProtoNames: true, Multiline: true, Indent: " "}
out, err := marshaler.Marshal(resp)
if err != nil {
@@ -2864,11 +2905,11 @@ const maxIdentityFactBudget = 900
// ValidatePolicyConfig checks a mesh policy the way POST /policies does; any
// other writer of the policy (e.g. a seed file) must run it too.
-func ValidatePolicyConfig(req *api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) error {
+func ValidatePolicyConfig(req *api.PolicyConfig) error {
return validatePolicyConfig(req)
}
-func validatePolicyConfig(req *api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest) error {
+func validatePolicyConfig(req *api.PolicyConfig) error {
roleNames := make(map[string]bool)
factBudget := 0
for _, r := range req.Roles {
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go
index a36407a0..f66ab779 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/server_test.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/server_test.go
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ func TestMarshalPolicyJSONRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
}
// Exactly what the console posts back.
- parsed := &api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{}
+ parsed := &api.PolicyConfig{}
if err := protojson.Unmarshal([]byte(rendered), parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parsing back the rendered policy: %v\n%s", err, rendered)
}
@@ -768,20 +768,42 @@ func TestPoliciesConfigurationREST(t *testing.T) {
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
- // 3. Get policies with correct token (should return 404 since none exists)
+ // 3. The admin token is not a node credential: GET /policies is the mesh
+ // protocol, operators read the document at GET /admin/policy.
req, _ = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/policies", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer super-secret-admin-token")
resp, err = client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GET /policies failed: %v", err)
}
+ if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+ t.Errorf("expected 401 for admin token at GET /policies, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+ }
+ _ = resp.Body.Close()
+
+ req, _ = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/admin/policy", nil)
+ resp, err = client.Do(req)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("GET /admin/policy failed: %v", err)
+ }
+ if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+ t.Errorf("expected 401 for unauthenticated GET /admin/policy, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+ }
+ _ = resp.Body.Close()
+
+ req, _ = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/admin/policy", nil)
+ req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer super-secret-admin-token")
+ resp, err = client.Do(req)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("GET /admin/policy failed: %v", err)
+ }
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for empty policy, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
// 4. Put policies (should succeed)
- updateReq := &api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{
+ updateReq := &api.PolicyConfig{
Roles: []*api.PolicyRole{
{
Name: "dev",
@@ -807,29 +829,32 @@ func TestPoliciesConfigurationREST(t *testing.T) {
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
- // 5. Get policies again with correct token (verify content)
- req, _ = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/policies", nil)
+ // 5. Read the document back as the operator sees it: protojson of
+ // PolicyConfig, which is exactly what POST /policies accepts.
+ req, _ = http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/admin/policy", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer super-secret-admin-token")
resp, err = client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
- t.Fatalf("GET /policies failed: %v", err)
+ t.Fatalf("GET /admin/policy failed: %v", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
- t.Fatalf("GET /policies status failed: %s", resp.Status)
+ t.Fatalf("GET /admin/policy status failed: %s", resp.Status)
+ }
+ if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
+ t.Errorf("GET /admin/policy Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
_ = resp.Body.Close()
- var getResp api.PolicyConfigGetResponse
- if err := proto.Unmarshal(body, &getResp); err != nil {
- t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal PolicyConfigGetResponse: %v", err)
+ var getResp api.PolicyConfig
+ if err := protojson.Unmarshal(body, &getResp); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal PolicyConfig: %v\n%s", err, body)
}
-
- if len(getResp.Roles) == 0 || getResp.Roles[0].Name != "dev" {
- t.Errorf("returned policy content mismatch: %+v", getResp.Roles)
+ if !strings.Contains(string(body), "allowed_services") {
+ t.Errorf("GET /admin/policy does not use proto field names:\n%s", body)
}
- if len(getResp.Bindings) == 0 || getResp.Bindings[0].Members[0] != "group:developers" {
- t.Errorf("returned policy content mismatch: %+v", getResp.Bindings)
+ if !proto.Equal(&getResp, updateReq) {
+ t.Errorf("GET /admin/policy = %v, want the posted document %v", &getResp, updateReq)
}
}
diff --git a/internal/identity/biscuit.go b/internal/identity/biscuit.go
index 73247c39..f4556274 100644
--- a/internal/identity/biscuit.go
+++ b/internal/identity/biscuit.go
@@ -258,10 +258,7 @@ func mintBiscuit(signingKey ed25519.PrivateKey, remotePeer peer.ID, roles []stri
}}); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to add relay right: %w", err))
}
- if err := addFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},
- }}); err != nil {
+ if err := addFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted)); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to add target unrestricted: %w", err))
}
continue
diff --git a/internal/identity/biscuit_test.go b/internal/identity/biscuit_test.go
index aef24b6b..ec523f6d 100644
--- a/internal/identity/biscuit_test.go
+++ b/internal/identity/biscuit_test.go
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ func TestMintBiscuitToken_WithPolicyRoles(t *testing.T) {
// Verify target_unrestricted and granted_service_all_types are NOT present
authorizer.AddCheck(biscuit.Check{Queries: []biscuit.Rule{
- {Body: []biscuit.Predicate{{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted, IDs: []biscuit.Term{}}}},
+ {Body: []biscuit.Predicate{api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted).Predicate}},
}})
authorizer.AddPolicy(api.AllowIfTruePolicy)
diff --git a/internal/node/agent_namespace_test.go b/internal/node/agent_namespace_test.go
index 8c668ab2..f899dbbe 100644
--- a/internal/node/agent_namespace_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/agent_namespace_test.go
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestAuthorizeBoundsTheAgentClaimToTheGrantedNamespace(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
facts := []biscuit.Fact{
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted}},
+ api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted),
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(callerPeer.String())}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactClientPeerID, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(callerPeer.String())}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactGrantedServiceExact, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(api.SystemNamespace), biscuit.String("/test/proto")}}},
diff --git a/internal/node/controlplane_test.go b/internal/node/controlplane_test.go
index 97b491c7..5c7e4154 100644
--- a/internal/node/controlplane_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/controlplane_test.go
@@ -283,6 +283,84 @@ func TestSyncControlPlane(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+// datalog_rules is the only source of mesh policy rules: the node evaluates
+// the text as it arrives and never derives rules from roles and bindings, so
+// a control plane that still sends those is reported instead of tolerated.
+func TestSyncMeshPolicyUsesDatalogRules(t *testing.T) {
+ // What a control plane from before the contract sends: roles and bindings
+ // in the field numbers PolicyConfigGetResponse now reserves.
+ oldPolicy := &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{}
+ oldWire, err := proto.Marshal(&api.PolicyConfig{
+ Roles: []*api.PolicyRole{{Name: "dev", AllowedServices: []string{"mcp://git"}}},
+ Bindings: []*api.PolicyBinding{{Role: "dev", Members: []string{"group:developers"}}},
+ })
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ oldPolicy.ProtoReflect().SetUnknown(oldWire)
+
+ tests := []struct {
+ name string
+ resp *api.PolicyConfigGetResponse
+ wantRules int
+ wantErr string
+ }{
+ {
+ name: "text rules are adopted as sent",
+ resp: &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{DatalogRules: []string{`role("dev") <- group("developers")`}},
+ wantRules: 1,
+ },
+ {
+ name: "roles and bindings name an old control plane",
+ resp: oldPolicy,
+ wantErr: "predates datalog_rules",
+ },
+ {
+ name: "one unparseable rule rejects the whole set",
+ resp: &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{DatalogRules: []string{`role("dev") <- group("developers")`, `broken(`}},
+ wantErr: "unparseable rule",
+ },
+ {
+ name: "empty policy is empty",
+ resp: &api.PolicyConfigGetResponse{},
+ wantRules: 0,
+ },
+ }
+ for _, tt := range tests {
+ t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ mux := http.NewServeMux()
+ mux.HandleFunc("/policies", protoHandler(t, tt.resp))
+ srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+ defer srv.Close()
+
+ store, err := NewStore(t.TempDir())
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ defer func() { _ = store.Close() }()
+ if err := store.SaveControlPlaneURL(srv.URL); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ n := &SamNode{Store: store}
+ n.SetIdentityCache([]byte("identity"))
+
+ err = n.syncMeshPolicy(context.Background())
+ if tt.wantErr != "" {
+ if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
+ t.Fatalf("syncMeshPolicy error = %v, want one containing %q", err, tt.wantErr)
+ }
+ return
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("syncMeshPolicy: %v", err)
+ }
+ if got := len(n.MeshPolicyRules); got != tt.wantRules {
+ t.Fatalf("adopted %d rules, want %d", got, tt.wantRules)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
// The loop is what turns a missed gossip event into a delay rather than a
// permanent split: a running node picks the successor key up on its own, and
// a trigger brings the next pull forward.
diff --git a/internal/node/enroll_test.go b/internal/node/enroll_test.go
index 4e8628a5..b5eae163 100644
--- a/internal/node/enroll_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/enroll_test.go
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ func startMockRouterWithKey(t *testing.T, cpPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, role string
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(h.ID().String())}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(role)}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactExpiration, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))}}},
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted}},
+ api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted),
} {
if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(f); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to add router fact: %v", err)
diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go
index f53f66fa..ade4e0de 100644
--- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import (
func buildAndSaveBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey) error {
callerID := node.Host.ID().String()
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(rootPriv)
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: "node",
IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(callerID)},
@@ -62,10 +62,7 @@ func buildAndSaveBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey) error {
}}); err != nil {
return err
}
- if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: "granted_service_all_types",
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},
- }}); err != nil {
+ if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes)); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
@@ -440,7 +437,7 @@ func TestHandleFindRemoteTools_PartialFailure(t *testing.T) {
func buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, allowedServices []string) error {
callerID := node.Host.ID().String()
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(rootPriv)
- err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}})
+ err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
if err != nil {
return err
}
diff --git a/internal/node/middleware_test.go b/internal/node/middleware_test.go
index 374cdd40..5c23f2ba 100644
--- a/internal/node/middleware_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/middleware_test.go
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
}
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
dummyPeer := peer.ID("dummy-peer")
// Bind to peer
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ func TestAuthorizeRejectsExpiredBiscuit(t *testing.T) {
dummyPeer := peer.ID("dummy-peer")
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted}})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
_ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: "node",
IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ func TestAuthorizeRejectsAppendedPeerBinding(t *testing.T) {
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
for _, f := range []biscuit.Fact{
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted}},
+ api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted),
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(victim.String())}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactClientPeerID, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(attacker.String())}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactGrantedServiceExact, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(api.SystemNamespace), biscuit.String("/test/proto")}}},
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func TestBaselineRules(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Baseline Rule 2: Global Wildcard",
mintToken: func(t *testing.T, builder biscuit.Builder) {
- factStr := fmt.Sprintf(`%s()`, api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes)
+ factStr := fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true)`, api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes)
fact, _ := parser.FromStringFact(factStr)
_ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(fact)
},
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ func TestBaselineRules(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
_ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: "node",
IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ func TestEnterprisePolicyEngine(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Case 3 (Wildcard Access)",
mintToken: func(t *testing.T, builder biscuit.Builder) {
- fact, err := parser.FromStringFact(fmt.Sprintf(`%s()`, api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes))
+ fact, err := parser.FromStringFact(fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true)`, api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ func TestEnterprisePolicyEngine(t *testing.T) {
{
name: "Case 4 (Local Attenuation Override)",
mintToken: func(t *testing.T, builder biscuit.Builder) {
- fact1, err := parser.FromStringFact(fmt.Sprintf(`%s()`, api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes))
+ fact1, err := parser.FromStringFact(fmt.Sprintf(`%s(true)`, api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ attenuation:
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted}})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: api.FactNode,
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ func TestRevocation(t *testing.T) {
dummyPeer := peer.ID("dummy-peer-id") // Must match mockStream.Conn().RemotePeer()
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
Name: "node",
IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(dummyPeer.String())},
@@ -724,8 +724,8 @@ func TestWithBiscuitAuth_MutualBiscuit(t *testing.T) {
for _, f := range []biscuit.Fact{
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "node", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(clientPeer.String())}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "client_peer_id", IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(clientPeer.String())}}},
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "granted_service_all_types"}},
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}},
+ api.MarkerFact(api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes),
+ api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted),
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactExpiration, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))}}},
} {
if err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(f); err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go
index 972011eb..e45dce19 100644
--- a/internal/node/node.go
+++ b/internal/node/node.go
@@ -2303,13 +2303,22 @@ func (n *SamNode) syncMeshPolicy(ctx context.Context) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch mesh policy: %w", err)
}
- rules := BuildPolicyRules(policyResp.Roles, policyResp.Bindings)
+ // The rendered text is the contract every member evaluates; a node does
+ // not derive rules from roles and bindings itself. A control plane that
+ // still sends those fields predates the contract.
+ if len(policyResp.ProtoReflect().GetUnknown()) > 0 {
+ return fmt.Errorf("control plane %s predates datalog_rules in its policy response; upgrade the control plane", controlPlaneURL)
+ }
+ rules, err := api.ParseDatalogRules(policyResp.DatalogRules)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("mesh policy carries an unparseable rule: %w", err)
+ }
n.MeshPolicyMu.Lock()
n.MeshPolicyRules = rules
n.MeshPolicyMu.Unlock()
- logger.Infof("Successfully synchronized mesh policy (generated %d rules)", len(rules))
+ logger.Infof("Successfully synchronized mesh policy (%d rules)", len(rules))
return nil
}
diff --git a/internal/node/policy.go b/internal/node/policy.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 112a4c7c..00000000
--- a/internal/node/policy.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2026 Google LLC
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-package node
-
-import (
- "strings"
-
- "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2"
- "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2/parser"
- "github.com/google/sam/api"
-)
-
-func BuildPolicyRules(roles []*api.PolicyRole, bindings []*api.PolicyBinding) []biscuit.Rule {
- var rules []biscuit.Rule
-
- // A binding member becomes the body of a rule that grants a mesh role,
- // so only facts the control plane attests in the authority block may
- // appear there: agent() is the caller's own claim, and role() would
- // grant a role from a role.
- allowedMemberPrefix := make(map[string]bool)
- for _, p := range api.BindingMemberPrefixes() {
- allowedMemberPrefix[p] = true
- }
-
- for _, b := range bindings {
- if b == nil {
- continue
- }
- for _, m := range b.Members {
- if m == api.SystemAuthenticated {
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: api.FactRole,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(b.Role)},
- },
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{},
- })
- continue
- }
- parts := strings.SplitN(m, ":", 2)
- if len(parts) == 2 && allowedMemberPrefix[parts[0]] {
- memberType := parts[0]
- memberVal := parts[1]
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: api.FactRole,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(b.Role)},
- },
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{
- {Name: memberType, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(memberVal)}},
- },
- })
- }
- }
- }
-
- for _, role := range roles {
- if role == nil {
- continue
- }
- roleName := role.Name
-
- for _, fact := range api.BuildServiceDatalogFacts(role.AllowedServices) {
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: fact.Predicate,
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{
- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},
- },
- })
- }
-
- hasUnrestricted := false
- hasSpecificTargets := false
- for _, t := range role.AllowedTargets {
- if t == "*" {
- hasUnrestricted = true
- } else {
- hasSpecificTargets = true
- }
- }
-
- if hasUnrestricted {
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},
- },
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{
- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},
- },
- })
- }
-
- if hasSpecificTargets {
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: api.FactTargetRestricted,
- IDs: []biscuit.Term{},
- },
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{
- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},
- },
- })
- }
-
- nonWildcardTargets := make([]string, 0, len(role.AllowedTargets))
- for _, t := range role.AllowedTargets {
- if t != "*" {
- nonWildcardTargets = append(nonWildcardTargets, t)
- }
- }
- for _, fact := range api.BuildTargetDatalogFacts(nonWildcardTargets) {
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: fact.Predicate,
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{
- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},
- },
- })
- }
-
- for _, fact := range api.BuildAgentDatalogFacts(role.AllowedAgents) {
- if fact.Name == api.FactGrantedAgentAll {
- logger.Warnf("Role %s may speak for any agent; any peer holding it can name any agent identity in the mesh", roleName)
- }
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: fact.Predicate,
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{
- {Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(roleName)}},
- },
- })
- }
-
- for _, dl := range role.CustomDatalog {
- trimmed := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(dl), ";")
- if trimmed == "" {
- continue
- }
- r, err := parser.FromStringRule(trimmed)
- if err == nil {
- rules = append(rules, r)
- } else {
- f, err2 := parser.FromStringFact(trimmed)
- if err2 == nil {
- rules = append(rules, biscuit.Rule{
- Head: f.Predicate,
- Body: []biscuit.Predicate{},
- })
- } else {
- logger.Warnf("Failed to parse custom Datalog rule/fact %q for role %s: rule_err=%v, fact_err=%v", dl, roleName, err, err2)
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- return rules
-}
diff --git a/internal/node/policy_test.go b/internal/node/policy_test.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 916bfde5..00000000
--- a/internal/node/policy_test.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2026 Google LLC
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-package node
-
-import (
- "strings"
- "testing"
-
- "github.com/biscuit-auth/biscuit-go/v2"
- "github.com/google/sam/api"
-)
-
-func ruleToString(r biscuit.Rule) string {
- head := r.Head.String()
- if len(r.Body) == 0 {
- return head
- }
- var bodyParts []string
- for _, b := range r.Body {
- bodyParts = append(bodyParts, b.String())
- }
- return head + " <- " + strings.Join(bodyParts, ", ")
-}
-
-func TestBuildPolicyRules(t *testing.T) {
- roles := []*api.PolicyRole{
- {
- Name: "test-role",
- AllowedTargets: []string{"*", "node:peer-abc", "custom-fact:custom-val", "legacy-peer"},
- AllowedServices: []string{"*:*", "mcp:*", "mcp:*.suffix", "mcp:prefix.*", "mcp:exact"},
- CustomDatalog: []string{
- "custom_rule($x) <- fact($x);",
- "custom_fact(\"hello\")",
- },
- },
- }
- bindings := []*api.PolicyBinding{
- {
- Role: "test-role",
- Members: []string{"sam:system:authenticated", "user:alice"},
- },
- }
-
- rules := BuildPolicyRules(roles, bindings)
-
- expectedStrings := map[string]bool{
- "role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "role(\"test-role\") <- user(\"alice\")": false,
- "granted_service_all_types() <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "granted_service_all(\"mcp\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "granted_service_suffix(\"mcp\", \".suffix\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "granted_service_prefix(\"mcp\", \"prefix.\") <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "granted_service_set(\"mcp\", [\"exact\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "target_unrestricted() <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "target_restricted() <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "granted_target_set(\"node\", [\"legacy-peer\", \"peer-abc\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "granted_target_set(\"custom-fact\", [\"custom-val\"]) <- role(\"test-role\")": false,
- "custom_rule($x) <- fact($x)": false,
- "custom_fact(\"hello\")": false,
- }
-
- for _, rule := range rules {
- rStr := ruleToString(rule)
- found := false
- for k := range expectedStrings {
- if rStr == k {
- expectedStrings[k] = true
- found = true
- break
- }
- }
- if !found {
- t.Errorf("Unexpected rule generated: %q", rStr)
- }
- }
-
- for k, v := range expectedStrings {
- if !v {
- t.Errorf("Expected rule was not generated: %q", k)
- }
- }
-}
diff --git a/internal/node/router_auth_dedupe_test.go b/internal/node/router_auth_dedupe_test.go
index 5f47a4bf..13207618 100644
--- a/internal/node/router_auth_dedupe_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/router_auth_dedupe_test.go
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ func newFakeRouter(t *testing.T, listenAddrs ...string) *fakeRouter {
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactNode, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(peerID)}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactRole, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.String(role)}}},
{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactExpiration, IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))}}},
- {Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted}},
+ api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted),
} {
if err := b.AddAuthorityFact(f); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
diff --git a/internal/node/static_service_test.go b/internal/node/static_service_test.go
index 3a6c0e7e..94e12448 100644
--- a/internal/node/static_service_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/static_service_test.go
@@ -71,9 +71,7 @@ func startMockRouter(t *testing.T) (peer.ID, string) {
Name: api.FactExpiration,
IDs: []biscuit.Term{biscuit.Date(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour))},
}})
- _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: api.FactTargetUnrestricted,
- }})
+ _ = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
tok, err := builder.Build()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to build mock router biscuit: %v", err)
diff --git a/internal/standalone/standalone.go b/internal/standalone/standalone.go
index 9bcc8ee6..1578b32e 100644
--- a/internal/standalone/standalone.go
+++ b/internal/standalone/standalone.go
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ type Options struct {
// DataDir when empty.
AdminToken string
// PolicyFile optionally seeds the mesh policy on first boot from a
- // protojson PolicyConfigUpdateRequest payload.
+ // protojson PolicyConfig payload.
PolicyFile string
// OIDCIssuer optionally enables full OIDC enrollment.
OIDCIssuer string
@@ -457,14 +457,14 @@ func (s *Server) seedPolicyOnFirstBoot(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
- var seed api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest
+ var seed api.PolicyConfig
if s.opts.PolicyFile != "" {
data, err := os.ReadFile(s.opts.PolicyFile)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read policy file: %w", err)
}
if err := protojson.Unmarshal(data, &seed); err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse policy file %s (expects protojson PolicyConfigUpdateRequest): %w", s.opts.PolicyFile, err)
+ return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse policy file %s (expects protojson PolicyConfig): %w", s.opts.PolicyFile, err)
}
logger.Infof("Seeding mesh policy from %s", s.opts.PolicyFile)
} else {
diff --git a/sdk/README.md b/sdk/README.md
index 6ca2fb48..71f4287a 100644
--- a/sdk/README.md
+++ b/sdk/README.md
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ messages in `api/sam.proto`. Bodies are capped at 1 MiB on both sides.
| `POST /register` | `EnrollRequest` | `EnrollResponse` | sign `sam:register:<peer_id>:<ts>` |
| `POST /refresh` | `TokenRefreshRequest`, header `Authorization: Bearer <base64 biscuit>` | `TokenRefreshResponse` | sign `sam:refresh:<peer_id>:<ts>` |
| `GET /keys` | — | `KeysResponse` | none; see below |
+| `GET /policies` | header `Authorization: Bearer <base64 biscuit>` | `PolicyConfigGetResponse{datalog_rules}` | none; the biscuit must belong to an admitted node |
- `<ts>` is unix milliseconds and must be within 5 minutes of the control
plane's clock (`challengeMaxAge`). Challenges are defined in
@@ -181,11 +182,30 @@ interest-scoped updates; the DHT is the source of truth.
A node that serves a tool evaluates the caller's biscuit with an authorizer
that has, in this order: the biscuit's own authority facts (`node`, `role`,
`label`, `agent`), injected facts `service(<type>, <name>)`,
-`connection_peer_id(<peer>)` and optionally `agent(<claim>)`, the baseline
-checks, rules and policies from `api/datalog.go`, the facts from the
-provider's own biscuit, and the mesh policy rules the control plane
-publishes (`BuildPolicyRules` over `PolicyConfigGetResponse`). Deny by
-default.
+`connection_peer_id(<peer>)`, `time(<now>)` and optionally `agent(<claim>)`,
+the baseline checks, rules and policies from `api/datalog.go`, the
+`target_fact` facts derived from the provider's own biscuit, and the mesh
+policy rules. Deny by default.
+
+All of that Datalog is text every Biscuit implementation parses, and none
+of it is derived in the SDK:
+
+- The baseline (checks, rules, policies, fact names) is generated from
+ `api/datalog.go` by `hack/gen-sdk-datalog` into `sdk/js/src/gen/datalog.ts`
+ and `sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/datalog.json`;
+ `hack/verify-sdk-generated.sh` fails when they are stale.
+- The mesh policy arrives rendered: `GET /policies` answers
+ `PolicyConfigGetResponse{datalog_rules}`, one rule per entry, rendered by
+ the control plane with `api.BuildPolicyRules`. `sam-node` adds the same
+ text; no member compiles roles and bindings itself. An unparseable entry
+ rejects the whole response.
+- Presence-only facts carry the single term `true`
+ (`target_unrestricted(true)`, `granted_service_all_types(true)`,
+ `agent_authorized(true)`, …). biscuit-go accepts a predicate with no
+ terms; biscuit-rust, and so biscuit-python and biscuit-wasm, do not.
+- An unconditional rule is written `head <- true`, which every parser
+ accepts as a rule (`role("dev") <- true` for a
+ `sam:system:authenticated` binding).
## Plan
@@ -264,16 +284,21 @@ holds against the control plane's records.
### Milestone 4 — serve tools
+- Datalog as the contract (done, Go side): the baseline moved into a
+ generated artifact both SDKs embed, the control plane renders the mesh
+ policy as `datalog_rules`, and `sam-node` consumes that text like any
+ other member. See the authorization section above.
+- Provider authorizer in each SDK, built from the artifact and
+ `datalog_rules`, evaluated on every inbound `AuthFrame`.
- `/sam/mcp/1.0.0` server: read the `AuthFrame`, run the authorizer, answer,
then hand the stream to an in-process MCP server.
-- The authorizer needs the baseline Datalog from `api/datalog.go` and the
- mesh policy from `GET /policies`. Before this milestone the baseline
- Datalog moves out of Go string constants into a language-neutral artifact
- that the Go build and both SDKs embed, so it is written once.
+- `/libp2p-http` ingress for inference and A2A backends, forwarding
+ authorized requests to a local URL, and the client side to call them.
- DHT provide for each registered service, reprovided on the node's
interval; `POST /nodes/catalog` self-report.
-- Test: a `sam-node` calls a tool served by the SDK member, and a denied
- caller is refused at the `AuthResponse`.
+- Test: a `sam-node` calls a tool and an inference endpoint served by each
+ SDK member, the SDK members call each other, and a caller whose role
+ grants nothing is refused at the `AuthResponse`.
### Milestone 5 — parity and release
@@ -297,7 +322,8 @@ holds against the control plane's records.
## Working on the SDKs
```bash
-# Regenerate protobuf bindings after editing api/sam.proto
+# Regenerate protobuf bindings and the Datalog artifact after editing
+# api/sam.proto or api/datalog.go
./hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh
# JavaScript
diff --git a/sdk/js/src/gen/datalog.ts b/sdk/js/src/gen/datalog.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..547b732b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sdk/js/src/gen/datalog.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Code generated by hack/gen-sdk-datalog from api/datalog.go; DO NOT EDIT.
+
+/** The Datalog a provider evaluates against a caller's biscuit. */
+export const BASELINE_DATALOG = {
+ "_comment": "Generated by hack/gen-sdk-datalog from api/datalog.go; do not edit.",
+ "policies": [
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_exact($type, $name)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_set($type, $set), $set.contains($name)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_prefix($type, $prefix), $name.starts_with($prefix)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_suffix($type, $suffix), $name.ends_with($suffix)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_all($type)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_all_types(true)"
+ ],
+ "rules": [
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_exact($fact, $val)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_set($fact, $set), $set.contains($val)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_prefix($fact, $prefix), $val.starts_with($prefix)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_suffix($fact, $suffix), $val.ends_with($suffix)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_all($fact)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_all_facts(true)"
+ ],
+ "agent_rules": [
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_exact($a)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_set($set), $set.contains($a)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_prefix($prefix), $a.starts_with($prefix)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_suffix($suffix), $a.ends_with($suffix)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_all(true)"
+ ],
+ "target_fact_rules": [
+ "target_fact(\"email\", $val) <- email($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"group\", $val) <- group($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"idp_role\", $val) <- idp_role($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"node\", $val) <- node($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"user\", $val) <- user($val)"
+ ],
+ "replay_check": "check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)",
+ "target_check": "check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) or target_unrestricted(true)",
+ "agent_check": "check if agent_authorized(true)",
+ "time_check": "check if time($time), expiration($exp), $time <= $exp",
+ "allow_if_true": "allow if true",
+ "fact_service": "service",
+ "fact_connection_peer_id": "connection_peer_id",
+ "fact_agent": "agent",
+ "fact_time": "time",
+ "fact_role": "role",
+ "fact_target_fact": "target_fact",
+ "marker_term": "true",
+ "system_namespace": "sam:system",
+ "binding_member_prefixes": [
+ "email",
+ "group",
+ "idp_role",
+ "node",
+ "user"
+ ],
+ "system_authenticated_member": "sam:system:authenticated"
+} as const;
diff --git a/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts b/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts
index 62354e6c..d7b4bd9c 100644
--- a/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts
+++ b/sdk/js/src/gen/sam_pb.ts
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import type { Message } from "@bufbuild/protobuf";
* Describes the file sam.proto.
*/
export const file_sam: GenFile = /*@__PURE__*/
- fileDesc("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");
+ fileDesc("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");
/**
* @generated from message sam.v1.AuthFrame
@@ -749,22 +749,14 @@ export const PolicyBindingSchema: GenMessage<PolicyBinding> = /*@__PURE__*/
messageDesc(file_sam, 16);
/**
- * @generated from message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest
- */
-export type PolicyConfigGetRequest = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest"> & {
-};
-
-/**
- * Describes the message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest.
- * Use `create(PolicyConfigGetRequestSchema)` to create a new message.
- */
-export const PolicyConfigGetRequestSchema: GenMessage<PolicyConfigGetRequest> = /*@__PURE__*/
- messageDesc(file_sam, 17);
-
-/**
- * @generated from message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse
+ * PolicyConfig is the mesh policy as the operator writes it: roles and
+ * bindings. It is the body of POST /policies and the answer of
+ * GET /admin/policy, both protojson. Only the control plane reads it, to
+ * mint tokens and to render PolicyConfigGetResponse.
+ *
+ * @generated from message sam.v1.PolicyConfig
*/
-export type PolicyConfigGetResponse = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse"> & {
+export type PolicyConfig = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfig"> & {
/**
* @generated from field: repeated sam.v1.PolicyRole roles = 1;
*/
@@ -777,32 +769,46 @@ export type PolicyConfigGetResponse = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse">
};
/**
- * Describes the message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse.
- * Use `create(PolicyConfigGetResponseSchema)` to create a new message.
+ * Describes the message sam.v1.PolicyConfig.
+ * Use `create(PolicyConfigSchema)` to create a new message.
*/
-export const PolicyConfigGetResponseSchema: GenMessage<PolicyConfigGetResponse> = /*@__PURE__*/
- messageDesc(file_sam, 18);
+export const PolicyConfigSchema: GenMessage<PolicyConfig> = /*@__PURE__*/
+ messageDesc(file_sam, 17);
/**
- * @generated from message sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest
+ * @generated from message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest
*/
-export type PolicyConfigUpdateRequest = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest"> & {
- /**
- * @generated from field: repeated sam.v1.PolicyRole roles = 1;
- */
- roles: PolicyRole[];
+export type PolicyConfigGetRequest = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest"> & {
+};
+
+/**
+ * Describes the message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetRequest.
+ * Use `create(PolicyConfigGetRequestSchema)` to create a new message.
+ */
+export const PolicyConfigGetRequestSchema: GenMessage<PolicyConfigGetRequest> = /*@__PURE__*/
+ messageDesc(file_sam, 18);
+/**
+ * PolicyConfigGetResponse answers GET /policies for a mesh member holding a
+ * biscuit. It carries the policy only as Datalog text: this is the contract
+ * every member evaluates, and none derives rules from roles and bindings.
+ *
+ * @generated from message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse
+ */
+export type PolicyConfigGetResponse = Message<"sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse"> & {
/**
- * @generated from field: repeated sam.v1.PolicyBinding bindings = 2;
+ * One rule per entry, rendered by the control plane with api.BuildPolicyRules.
+ *
+ * @generated from field: repeated string datalog_rules = 3;
*/
- bindings: PolicyBinding[];
+ datalogRules: string[];
};
/**
- * Describes the message sam.v1.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest.
- * Use `create(PolicyConfigUpdateRequestSchema)` to create a new message.
+ * Describes the message sam.v1.PolicyConfigGetResponse.
+ * Use `create(PolicyConfigGetResponseSchema)` to create a new message.
*/
-export const PolicyConfigUpdateRequestSchema: GenMessage<PolicyConfigUpdateRequest> = /*@__PURE__*/
+export const PolicyConfigGetResponseSchema: GenMessage<PolicyConfigGetResponse> = /*@__PURE__*/
messageDesc(file_sam, 19);
/**
diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/__init__.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..09bac1cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"""Generated artifacts; see hack/gen-sdk-proto.sh."""
diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/datalog.json b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/datalog.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f7d67abf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_gen/datalog.json
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+ "_comment": "Generated by hack/gen-sdk-datalog from api/datalog.go; do not edit.",
+ "policies": [
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_exact($type, $name)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_set($type, $set), $set.contains($name)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_prefix($type, $prefix), $name.starts_with($prefix)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_suffix($type, $suffix), $name.ends_with($suffix)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_all($type)",
+ "allow if service($type, $name), granted_service_all_types(true)"
+ ],
+ "rules": [
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_exact($fact, $val)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_set($fact, $set), $set.contains($val)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_prefix($fact, $prefix), $val.starts_with($prefix)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_suffix($fact, $suffix), $val.ends_with($suffix)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_all($fact)",
+ "allow_network_target($fact, $val) <- target_fact($fact, $val), granted_target_all_facts(true)"
+ ],
+ "agent_rules": [
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_exact($a)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_set($set), $set.contains($a)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_prefix($prefix), $a.starts_with($prefix)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_suffix($suffix), $a.ends_with($suffix)",
+ "agent_authorized(true) <- agent($a), granted_agent_all(true)"
+ ],
+ "target_fact_rules": [
+ "target_fact(\"email\", $val) <- email($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"group\", $val) <- group($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"idp_role\", $val) <- idp_role($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"node\", $val) <- node($val)",
+ "target_fact(\"user\", $val) <- user($val)"
+ ],
+ "replay_check": "check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)",
+ "target_check": "check if allow_network_target($fact, $val) or target_unrestricted(true)",
+ "agent_check": "check if agent_authorized(true)",
+ "time_check": "check if time($time), expiration($exp), $time <= $exp",
+ "allow_if_true": "allow if true",
+ "fact_service": "service",
+ "fact_connection_peer_id": "connection_peer_id",
+ "fact_agent": "agent",
+ "fact_time": "time",
+ "fact_role": "role",
+ "fact_target_fact": "target_fact",
+ "marker_term": "true",
+ "system_namespace": "sam:system",
+ "binding_member_prefixes": [
+ "email",
+ "group",
+ "idp_role",
+ "node",
+ "user"
+ ],
+ "system_authenticated_member": "sam:system:authenticated"
+}
diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py
index 450b8e74..f3fa586e 100644
--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py
+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.py
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ _sym_db = _symbol_database.Default()
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\x03(\t\x12\x17\n\x0f\x62\x61nned_peer_ids\x18\x05 \x03(\t\"\xa4\x01\n\x12RouterLeaseRequest\x12\x0f\n\x07peer_id\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x11\n\taddresses\x18\x02 \x03(\t\x12\x0f\n\x07\x62iscuit\x18\x03 \x01(\x0c\x12\x17\n\x0f\x63onnected_peers\x18\x04 \x03(\t\x12\x10\n\x08\x64ht_size\x18\x05 \x01(\x05\x12\x11\n\ttimestamp\x18\x06 \x01(\x03\x12\x1b\n\x13\x63hallenge_signature\x18\x07 \x01(\x0c\"I\n\x13RouterLeaseResponse\x12\x0f\n\x07success\x18\x01 \x01(\x08\x12\r\n\x05\x65rror\x18\x02 \x01(\t\x12\x12\n\nexpires_at\x18\x03 \x01(\x03\"\x95\x01\n\nPolicyRole\x12\x0c\n\x04name\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x17\n\x0f\x61llowed_targets\x18\x02 \x03(\t\x12\x18\n\x10\x61llowed_services\x18\x03 \x03(\t\x12\x16\n\x0e\x63ustom_datalog\x18\x04 \x03(\t\x12\x16\n\x0e\x61llowed_agents\x18\x05 \x03(\t\x12\x16\n\x0e\x61llowed_labels\x18\x06 \x03(\t\".\n\rPolicyBinding\x12\x0c\n\x04role\x18\x01 \x01(\t\x12\x0f\n\x07members\x18\x02 \x03(\t\"Z\n\x0cPolicyConfig\x12!\n\x05roles\x18\x01 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\x01(\t:\x02\x38\x01*\x94\x01\n\x10\x45nrollmentStatus\x12!\n\x1d\x45NROLLMENT_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x1d\n\x19\x45NROLLMENT_STATUS_PENDING\x10\x01\x12\x1e\n\x1a\x45NROLLMENT_STATUS_APPROVED\x10\x02\x12\x1e\n\x1a\x45NROLLMENT_STATUS_REJECTED\x10\x03*s\n\x0bServiceType\x12\x1c\n\x18SERVICE_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED\x10\x00\x12\x14\n\x10SERVICE_TYPE_MCP\x10\x01\x12\x1a\n\x16SERVICE_TYPE_INFERENCE\x10\x02\x12\x14\n\x10SERVICE_TYPE_A2A\x10\x03\x42\x1bZ\x19github.com/google/sam/apib\x06proto3')
_builder.BuildMessageAndEnumDescriptors(DESCRIPTOR, globals())
_builder.BuildTopDescriptorsAndMessages(DESCRIPTOR, 'sam_pb2', globals())
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ if _descriptor._USE_C_DESCRIPTORS == False:
_SERVICEANNOUNCE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001'
_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._options = None
_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_options = b'8\001'
- _ENROLLMENTSTATUS._serialized_start=4723
- _ENROLLMENTSTATUS._serialized_end=4871
- _SERVICETYPE._serialized_start=4873
- _SERVICETYPE._serialized_end=4988
+ _ENROLLMENTSTATUS._serialized_start=4686
+ _ENROLLMENTSTATUS._serialized_end=4834
+ _SERVICETYPE._serialized_start=4836
+ _SERVICETYPE._serialized_end=4951
_AUTHFRAME._serialized_start=21
_AUTHFRAME._serialized_end=88
_AUTHRESPONSE._serialized_start=90
@@ -79,56 +79,56 @@ if _descriptor._USE_C_DESCRIPTORS == False:
_POLICYROLE._serialized_end=2486
_POLICYBINDING._serialized_start=2488
_POLICYBINDING._serialized_end=2534
- _POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST._serialized_start=2536
- _POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST._serialized_end=2560
- _POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE._serialized_start=2562
- _POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE._serialized_end=2663
- _POLICYCONFIGUPDATEREQUEST._serialized_start=2665
- _POLICYCONFIGUPDATEREQUEST._serialized_end=2768
- _POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE._serialized_start=2770
- _POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE._serialized_end=2830
- _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_start=2832
- _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_end=2906
- _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_start=2908
- _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_end=2994
- _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_start=2996
- _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=3084
- _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_start=3086
- _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_end=3144
- _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_start=3146
- _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_end=3183
- _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_start=3185
- _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_end=3238
- _AGENTSECRET._serialized_start=3240
- _AGENTSECRET._serialized_end=3322
- _AGENTEGRESS._serialized_start=3324
- _AGENTEGRESS._serialized_end=3390
- _AGENTINGRESS._serialized_start=3392
- _AGENTINGRESS._serialized_end=3490
- _AGENTBUNDLE._serialized_start=3493
- _AGENTBUNDLE._serialized_end=3663
- _AGENTATTACHREQUEST._serialized_start=3665
- _AGENTATTACHREQUEST._serialized_end=3722
- _AGENTATTACHRESPONSE._serialized_start=3724
- _AGENTATTACHRESPONSE._serialized_end=3807
- _AGENTDETACHREQUEST._serialized_start=3809
- _AGENTDETACHREQUEST._serialized_end=3847
- _AGENTDETACHRESPONSE._serialized_start=3849
- _AGENTDETACHRESPONSE._serialized_end=3902
- _AGENTREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_start=3904
- _AGENTREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_end=3968
- _AGENTREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_start=3970
- _AGENTREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=4044
- _AGENTSTATUSREQUEST._serialized_start=4046
- _AGENTSTATUSREQUEST._serialized_end=4084
- _AGENTSTATUS._serialized_start=4086
- _AGENTSTATUS._serialized_end=4205
- _AGENTSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=4207
- _AGENTSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=4280
- _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=4283
- _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=4454
- _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=4457
- _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=4720
+ _POLICYCONFIG._serialized_start=2536
+ _POLICYCONFIG._serialized_end=2626
+ _POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST._serialized_start=2628
+ _POLICYCONFIGGETREQUEST._serialized_end=2652
+ _POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE._serialized_start=2654
+ _POLICYCONFIGGETRESPONSE._serialized_end=2731
+ _POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE._serialized_start=2733
+ _POLICYCONFIGUPDATERESPONSE._serialized_end=2793
+ _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_start=2795
+ _KEYSRESPONSE._serialized_end=2869
+ _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_start=2871
+ _TOKENREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_end=2957
+ _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_start=2959
+ _TOKENREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=3047
+ _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_start=3049
+ _NODECATALOGREPORT._serialized_end=3107
+ _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_start=3109
+ _TOKENREVOKEREQUEST._serialized_end=3146
+ _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_start=3148
+ _TOKENREVOKERESPONSE._serialized_end=3201
+ _AGENTSECRET._serialized_start=3203
+ _AGENTSECRET._serialized_end=3285
+ _AGENTEGRESS._serialized_start=3287
+ _AGENTEGRESS._serialized_end=3353
+ _AGENTINGRESS._serialized_start=3355
+ _AGENTINGRESS._serialized_end=3453
+ _AGENTBUNDLE._serialized_start=3456
+ _AGENTBUNDLE._serialized_end=3626
+ _AGENTATTACHREQUEST._serialized_start=3628
+ _AGENTATTACHREQUEST._serialized_end=3685
+ _AGENTATTACHRESPONSE._serialized_start=3687
+ _AGENTATTACHRESPONSE._serialized_end=3770
+ _AGENTDETACHREQUEST._serialized_start=3772
+ _AGENTDETACHREQUEST._serialized_end=3810
+ _AGENTDETACHRESPONSE._serialized_start=3812
+ _AGENTDETACHRESPONSE._serialized_end=3865
+ _AGENTREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_start=3867
+ _AGENTREFRESHREQUEST._serialized_end=3931
+ _AGENTREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_start=3933
+ _AGENTREFRESHRESPONSE._serialized_end=4007
+ _AGENTSTATUSREQUEST._serialized_start=4009
+ _AGENTSTATUSREQUEST._serialized_end=4047
+ _AGENTSTATUS._serialized_start=4049
+ _AGENTSTATUS._serialized_end=4168
+ _AGENTSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_start=4170
+ _AGENTSTATUSRESPONSE._serialized_end=4243
+ _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=4246
+ _IDENTITYEVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=4417
+ _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_start=4420
+ _PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE._serialized_end=4683
_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_start=534
_PEEREVIDENCERESPONSE_LABELSENTRY._serialized_end=579
# @@protoc_insertion_point(module_scope)
diff --git a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi
index a3a8d51e..5e2c4816 100644
--- a/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi
+++ b/sdk/python/src/agent_mesh/_proto/sam_pb2.pyi
@@ -365,11 +365,7 @@ class PolicyBinding(_message.Message):
role: str
def __init__(self, role: _Optional[str] = ..., members: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ...
-class PolicyConfigGetRequest(_message.Message):
- __slots__ = []
- def __init__(self) -> None: ...
-
-class PolicyConfigGetResponse(_message.Message):
+class PolicyConfig(_message.Message):
__slots__ = ["bindings", "roles"]
BINDINGS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]
ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]
@@ -377,13 +373,15 @@ class PolicyConfigGetResponse(_message.Message):
roles: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyRole]
def __init__(self, roles: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyRole, _Mapping]]] = ..., bindings: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyBinding, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ...
-class PolicyConfigUpdateRequest(_message.Message):
- __slots__ = ["bindings", "roles"]
- BINDINGS_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]
- ROLES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]
- bindings: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyBinding]
- roles: _containers.RepeatedCompositeFieldContainer[PolicyRole]
- def __init__(self, roles: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyRole, _Mapping]]] = ..., bindings: _Optional[_Iterable[_Union[PolicyBinding, _Mapping]]] = ...) -> None: ...
+class PolicyConfigGetRequest(_message.Message):
+ __slots__ = []
+ def __init__(self) -> None: ...
+
+class PolicyConfigGetResponse(_message.Message):
+ __slots__ = ["datalog_rules"]
+ DATALOG_RULES_FIELD_NUMBER: _ClassVar[int]
+ datalog_rules: _containers.RepeatedScalarFieldContainer[str]
+ def __init__(self, datalog_rules: _Optional[_Iterable[str]] = ...) -> None: ...
class PolicyConfigUpdateResponse(_message.Message):
__slots__ = ["error", "success"]
diff --git a/site/content/docs/concepts/authorization.md b/site/content/docs/concepts/authorization.md
index 6de4c2ad..e698e18e 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/concepts/authorization.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/concepts/authorization.md
@@ -93,16 +93,17 @@ becomes `granted_service_exact("mcp", "calculator")`, `mcp://*` becomes
`granted_service_suffix("mcp", ".internal")`. Wildcards keep their dot, so
`*.acme.example` matches `svc.acme.example` but not `evil-acme.example`.
-Nodes also fetch the policy themselves, every `--control-plane-sync-interval`
-(15 minutes by default, sooner when a policy update event reaches them), and
-compile it into rules such as
+The control plane also renders the policy as Datalog rules such as
`role("developer") <- group("eng")` and
-`granted_service_exact("mcp", "calculator") <- role("developer")`. When a
-node verifies a credential, these rules run against the identity facts in it.
-A grant added to the policy therefore reaches every node within the sync
-interval, with no need to reissue credentials. Removing a grant takes effect
-through the credential instead: the facts already in a token stay valid until
-the token is refreshed, which happens within its TTL (24 hours by default).
+`granted_service_exact("mcp", "calculator") <- role("developer")`. Nodes
+fetch this text every `--control-plane-sync-interval` (15 minutes by default,
+sooner when a policy update event reaches them) and add it to their
+authorizer as it arrives. When a node verifies a credential, these rules run
+against the identity facts in it. A grant added to the policy therefore
+reaches every node within the sync interval, with no need to reissue
+credentials. Removing a grant takes effect through the credential instead:
+the facts already in a token stay valid until the token is refreshed, which
+happens within its TTL (24 hours by default).
## What the hosting node checks
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ Biscuit authorizer and adds the following, in this order:
5. **The baseline policies**: `allow if service($t,$n), granted_service_exact($t,$n)`
and the equivalent policies for sets, prefixes, suffixes, per-type and
global wildcards, plus the target check
- `allow_network_target(...) or target_unrestricted()`.
+ `allow_network_target(...) or target_unrestricted(true)`.
6. **The synced mesh policy rules** described above.
Biscuit evaluates every `check` and requires all of them to pass. It then
diff --git a/site/content/docs/preview/agent-architecture.md b/site/content/docs/preview/agent-architecture.md
index 0f5a4788..7a8b679e 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/preview/agent-architecture.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/preview/agent-architecture.md
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ round trip and no central state.
**Policy is written over namespaces.** The same machinery that compiles
`allowed_services` wildcards compiles `allowed_agents` into
`granted_agent_prefix`, `_suffix`, `_set` and `_exact`, and the destination
-derives `agent_authorized()` from them. "Foo yes, bar no" is a namespace, a
+derives `agent_authorized(true)` from them. "Foo yes, bar no" is a namespace, a
set or a prefix, never a list of a billion names.
**Revocation has three levels.**
diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md b/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md
index 074ee299..0f517032 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/reference/control-plane.md
@@ -40,9 +40,12 @@ sam-control-plane admin unban --peer <id> lift a ban
## HTTP API
-Two encodings are in use. Routes that mesh components call use protobuf
-(`application/x-protobuf`), with messages defined in `api/sam.proto`. Routes
-for operators and the console use JSON. `POST /policies` accepts either.
+Every request and response is a message in `api/sam.proto`, in one of two
+encodings. Routes that mesh components call use binary protobuf
+(`application/x-protobuf`). Routes for operators and the console use
+protojson of the same messages, with proto field names; unknown fields are
+rejected. `POST /policies` accepts either and answers in the encoding of the
+request.
Responses that carry credentials are sent with `Cache-Control: no-store`.
@@ -70,7 +73,7 @@ caller holds the key behind the peer ID it names.
| `GET /enroll/status?peer_id=` | headers `X-Sam-Challenge-Ts`, `X-Sam-Challenge-Sig` | Poll a pending enrollment. Any authentication failure answers `401`, so the credential is released only to the enrollee. |
| `POST /refresh` | `TokenRefreshRequest`, current credential as `Authorization: Bearer <base64>` | Exchange a credential for a new one. Refuses a replayed (superseded) credential, a banned node, an expired session, and a credential signed by a retired key unless the node has `autonomous_recovery`. |
| `POST /routers/lease` | `RouterLeaseRequest` (credential, addresses, telemetry) | Register or renew a router lease. Requires `role("sam:role:router")`. Announced addresses must end in the router's own peer ID. |
-| `GET /policies` | credential as `Authorization: Bearer <base64>` | The mesh policy as `PolicyConfigGetResponse`. Also accepts the admin token. |
+| `GET /policies` | credential as `Authorization: Bearer <base64>` | The mesh policy as `PolicyConfigGetResponse`: the Datalog rules a member adds to its authorizer, one per entry. Operators read the document at `GET /admin/policy`. |
| `POST /nodes/catalog` | `NodeCatalogReport`, credential as bearer | A node's report of the services it publishes, for the console. Display only. Never used for authorization. |
### Admin
@@ -80,7 +83,8 @@ All routes require `Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>` and use JSON.
| Route | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `GET /admin/status` | Everything the console shows: routers, nodes, enrollment requests, tokens, users, and the policy as JSON. |
-| `POST /policies`, `PUT /policies` | Replace the mesh policy. The JSON body is protojson of `PolicyConfigUpdateRequest`. Unknown fields are rejected, so a misspelt grant fails instead of being dropped. |
+| `GET /admin/policy` | The mesh policy as protojson of `PolicyConfig`, the same document `POST /policies` takes. |
+| `POST /policies`, `PUT /policies` | Replace the mesh policy. The JSON body is protojson of `PolicyConfig`. Unknown fields are rejected, so a misspelt grant fails instead of being dropped. |
| `POST /admin/bootstrap-tokens` | Mint a token. Body: `role` (required), `ttl_hours` (default 24), `max_usages` (default 1), `description`, `autonomous_recovery` (default false). Returns `201` with `id`, `token` (shown once), `role`, `expires_at`. |
| `DELETE /admin/bootstrap-tokens/{id}` | Revoke a token. Can be repeated. The token stays in the list, marked as revoked. |
| `GET /admin/enrollments` | Pending bootstrap enrollment requests. |
diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/policy.md b/site/content/docs/reference/policy.md
index cc752b4f..11157ad9 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/reference/policy.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/reference/policy.md
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ aliases:
---
The mesh policy is one document held by the control plane: a list of roles
-and a list of bindings. It is posted as JSON (protojson of
-`PolicyConfigUpdateRequest` in `api/sam.proto`) to `POST /policies`, edited
-in the console, or given to `sam-one --policy-file` for first boot.
+and a list of bindings. It is posted as JSON (protojson of `PolicyConfig` in
+`api/sam.proto`) to `POST /policies`, read back from `GET /admin/policy`,
+edited in the console, or given to `sam-one --policy-file` for first boot.
```json
{
@@ -60,7 +60,12 @@ notice.
| `mcp://*.internal` | `granted_service_suffix("mcp", ".internal")` | `a.internal` and `b.c.internal`, but not `xinternal` |
| `mcp://build.*` | `granted_service_prefix("mcp", "build.")` | `build.runner`, but not `builder` |
| `mcp://*` | `granted_service_all("mcp")` | every MCP service |
-| `*` | `granted_service_all_types()` | every service |
+| `*` | `granted_service_all_types(true)` | every service |
+
+A fact whose only meaning is that a grant exists carries the single term
+`true`, because the Biscuit grammar requires at least one term per predicate.
+The same holds for `target_unrestricted(true)`, `granted_agent_all(true)` and
+`agent_authorized(true)` below.
`system://sam.catalog` is the built-in discovery service that every node
runs. A role that should be able to list the tools of a node needs it.
@@ -144,25 +149,29 @@ must be on the role itself.
At enrollment and at refresh, the control plane resolves the identity's roles
from the bindings and mints into the credential one `role()` fact per role
-and the compiled `granted_*` facts of every role. Nodes also fetch the policy
-(`--control-plane-sync-interval`, 15 minutes) and compile it into rules such as
+and the compiled `granted_*` facts of every role. The control plane also
+renders the policy as Datalog rules such as
`role("developer") <- group("engineering")` and
-`granted_service_exact("mcp","code-reviewer") <- role("developer")`. These
-rules run at verification time. Additions therefore reach nodes within the
-sync interval, and removals within the credential TTL.
+`granted_service_exact("mcp","code-reviewer") <- role("developer")`, served
+as `datalog_rules` at `GET /policies`. Nodes fetch this text
+(`--control-plane-sync-interval`, 15 minutes) and add it to their authorizer
+as it arrives; no member derives rules from roles and bindings itself, so a
+node written in any language evaluates the same rules. These rules run at
+verification time. Additions therefore reach nodes within the sync interval,
+and removals within the credential TTL.
At the destination node, in this order:
1. Facts for the request: `service($type, $name)`, `connection_peer_id($id)`,
`time($now)`, and `agent($id)` if a claim was made.
2. Checks that always apply: `client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`,
- `time($t), expiration($e), $t <= $e`, and `agent_authorized()` when an
+ `time($t), expiration($e), $t <= $e`, and `agent_authorized(true)` when an
agent was named.
3. The node's own identity as `target_fact($name, $value)` facts.
4. The node's `attenuation` rules, checks and policies.
5. Baseline policies: `allow if service($t,$n), granted_service_exact($t,$n)`
and the set, prefix, suffix, per-type and global variants; the check
- `allow_network_target($f,$v) or target_unrestricted()`.
+ `allow_network_target($f,$v) or target_unrestricted(true)`.
6. The synced mesh policy rules.
All checks must hold, and the first matching policy decides. Without a
diff --git a/site/content/docs/reference/sam-one.md b/site/content/docs/reference/sam-one.md
index cf52425e..10217f02 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/reference/sam-one.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/reference/sam-one.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ downloaded tunnel connector.
| `--token-path` | | File containing the standing join token. Can also be set with `SAM_TOKEN`. Generated and saved to the data directory when neither is set. |
| `--no-join-token` | `false` | Run without a standing join token. Devices can then enroll only with minted tokens or OIDC. |
| `--admin-token-path` | | File containing the admin token. Can also be set with `SAM_ADMIN_TOKEN`. Generated and saved to the data directory when neither is set. |
-| `--policy-file` | | Protojson `PolicyConfigUpdateRequest` that seeds the mesh policy on first boot. Ignored once the database has a policy. Without it, first boot seeds an open development policy and logs a warning. |
+| `--policy-file` | | Protojson `PolicyConfig` that seeds the mesh policy on first boot. Ignored once the database has a policy. Without it, first boot seeds an open development policy and logs a warning. |
| `--issuer` | | External OIDC issuer(s), comma-separated. Optional. Without an issuer, enrollment works by token only. |
| `--oidc-client-id` | first audience | Client ID advertised on `/info`. |
| `--allowed-audiences` | `sam-mesh-audience` | Accepted OIDC audiences. |
diff --git a/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go b/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go
index 1e0eb464..6af4a691 100644
--- a/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go
+++ b/tests/integration/biscuit_expiry_test.go
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func TestBiscuitExpiryIsEnforcedOnEveryPath(t *testing.T) {
// The grants mirror the shape this test always ran with (the no-policy
// mint fallback): unrestricted, because the subject here is expiry.
policyFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "policies.yaml")
- policyYAML := "roles:\n - name: sam:role:node\n allowed_services: [\"*\"]\n allowed_targets: []\n custom_datalog: [\"target_unrestricted();\"]\nbindings:\n - role: sam:role:node\n members: [\"user:expiry-user\"]\n"
+ policyYAML := "roles:\n - name: sam:role:node\n allowed_services: [\"*\"]\n allowed_targets: []\n custom_datalog: [\"target_unrestricted(true);\"]\nbindings:\n - role: sam:role:node\n members: [\"user:expiry-user\"]\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(policyFile, []byte(policyYAML), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
diff --git a/tests/integration/controlplane_pubsub_integration_test.go b/tests/integration/controlplane_pubsub_integration_test.go
index 2af22112..b545d170 100644
--- a/tests/integration/controlplane_pubsub_integration_test.go
+++ b/tests/integration/controlplane_pubsub_integration_test.go
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestControlPlanePubSubEventIntegration(t *testing.T) {
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
// 4. Trigger POST /policies on Control Plane
- policyReq := &api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{
+ policyReq := &api.PolicyConfig{
Roles: []*api.PolicyRole{
{
Name: "developer",
diff --git a/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go b/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go
index abb51d21..770df890 100644
--- a/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go
+++ b/tests/integration/minimal_helpers_test.go
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ func startMockRouterWithControlPlaneKey(t *testing.T) (peer.ID, string, ed25519.
func createMockBiscuitToken(t *testing.T, peerID string, priv ed25519.PrivateKey, role string, labels map[string]string) []byte {
builder := biscuit.NewBuilder(priv)
- err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{Name: "target_unrestricted"}})
+ err := builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactTargetUnrestricted))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to add target_unrestricted: %v", err)
}
@@ -384,9 +384,7 @@ func createMockBiscuitToken(t *testing.T, peerID string, priv ed25519.PrivateKey
t.Fatalf("failed to add client_peer_id fact: %v", err)
}
- err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(biscuit.Fact{Predicate: biscuit.Predicate{
- Name: "granted_service_all_types",
- }})
+ err = builder.AddAuthorityFact(api.MarkerFact(api.FactGrantedServiceAllTypes))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to add granted_service_all_types fact: %v", err)
}
diff --git a/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go b/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go
index b04f87a4..fe4d9367 100644
--- a/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go
+++ b/tests/integration/policy_grants_test.go
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import (
"github.com/google/sam/internal/identity"
"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/crypto"
"github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/core/peer"
+ "google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ func TestPolicyGrantsReachTheMintedToken(t *testing.T) {
AllowedAgents: []string{"*.prod.acme.example"},
AllowedLabels: []string{"region=*"},
}
- policyBody, err := proto.Marshal(&api.PolicyConfigUpdateRequest{
+ policyBody, err := proto.Marshal(&api.PolicyConfig{
Roles: []*api.PolicyRole{wantRole},
Bindings: []*api.PolicyBinding{{
Role: api.RoleNode,
@@ -114,23 +115,23 @@ func TestPolicyGrantsReachTheMintedToken(t *testing.T) {
}
t.Run("every grant survives the policy store", func(t *testing.T) {
- req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/policies", nil)
+ req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/admin/policy", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+adminToken)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
- t.Fatalf("GET /policies: %v", err)
+ t.Fatalf("GET /admin/policy: %v", err)
}
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
_ = resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
- t.Fatalf("GET /policies status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
+ t.Fatalf("GET /admin/policy status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
}
- var got api.PolicyConfigGetResponse
- if err := proto.Unmarshal(body, &got); err != nil {
+ var got api.PolicyConfig
+ if err := protojson.Unmarshal(body, &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal policy: %v", err)
}
if len(got.Roles) != 1 {