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Agent Mesh

fix(node): stamp verified X-Peer-Id on mesh service ingress

Antonio Ojeac11d9e58dd74
diff --git a/api/network.go b/api/network.go
index 7fabf454..53afa43a 100644
--- a/api/network.go
+++ b/api/network.go
@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ const (
// are forwarded to backend services.
HeaderSamBiscuit = "X-Sam-Biscuit"
+ // HeaderPeerID carries the authenticated libp2p peer ID of the caller.
+ // The mesh ingress handler stamps it after authorization succeeds,
+ // overwriting any inbound value, so backend services get verified caller
+ // attribution without parsing biscuits. The inference facade sets it the
+ // same way for locally served requests.
+ HeaderPeerID = "X-Peer-Id"
+
// HeaderSamAgent names the agent a request is made on behalf of, as a
// canonical agent identifier (see api/agent.go). It is set by the sandbox
// gateway on the node's local API socket, and honoured by the node only
diff --git a/internal/node/inference_service.go b/internal/node/inference_service.go
index 4f4a9acf..3d27ae0d 100644
--- a/internal/node/inference_service.go
+++ b/internal/node/inference_service.go
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ func getPeerID(r *http.Request) string {
}
// Only trust X-Peer-Id if request comes from local loopback / trusted localhost source
if host == "127.0.0.1" || host == "::1" || host == "localhost" {
- if peerHeader := r.Header.Get("X-Peer-Id"); peerHeader != "" {
+ if peerHeader := r.Header.Get(api.HeaderPeerID); peerHeader != "" {
return peerHeader
}
}
diff --git a/internal/node/node.go b/internal/node/node.go
index c2d6402d..bf1834ad 100644
--- a/internal/node/node.go
+++ b/internal/node/node.go
@@ -1937,6 +1937,9 @@ func (n *SamNode) StartIngressServer(ctx context.Context) error {
// The agent is for policy, not for the backend, which has no way to
// judge it.
r.Header.Del(api.HeaderSamAgent)
+ // Set, not Add: an inbound value is a spoof attempt, only the
+ // transport-verified identity may reach the backend.
+ r.Header.Set(api.HeaderPeerID, remotePeer.String())
svc, ok := n.services.Get(serviceName)
if !ok {
diff --git a/internal/node/openai_facade.go b/internal/node/openai_facade.go
index fee4c635..a55c31a4 100644
--- a/internal/node/openai_facade.go
+++ b/internal/node/openai_facade.go
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ func (f *openAIFacade) serveLocal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, servic
}
// Attribute locally served tokens to this node in usage metrics.
if id := f.localPeerID(); id != "" {
- r.Header.Set("X-Peer-Id", id)
+ r.Header.Set(api.HeaderPeerID, id)
}
svc.Handler().ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
diff --git a/internal/node/proxy_test.go b/internal/node/proxy_test.go
index c42c8eb3..1bc33ef2 100644
--- a/internal/node/proxy_test.go
+++ b/internal/node/proxy_test.go
@@ -748,13 +748,26 @@ func TestDatapathHeadersAndRoutingTable(t *testing.T) {
},
wantReceivedHeaders: map[string]string{
"Authorization": "Bearer upstream-token",
- api.HeaderSamAuthentication: "", // Must be stripped, local-only
- api.HeaderSamBiscuit: "", // Must be stripped
- api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash: "", // Must be stripped
+ api.HeaderSamAuthentication: "", // Must be stripped, local-only
+ api.HeaderSamBiscuit: "", // Must be stripped
+ api.HeaderSamNoTrailingSlash: "", // Must be stripped
+ api.HeaderPeerID: nodeB.Host.ID().String(), // Verified caller stamped by ingress
"X-Test-Request": "yes",
},
wantReceivedPathSuffix: "/api/v1/test",
},
+ {
+ name: "Inbound X-Peer-Id is overwritten with the verified caller",
+ pathSuffix: "/api/v1/test",
+ requestHeaders: map[string]string{
+ api.HeaderSamAuthentication: "Bearer local-token",
+ api.HeaderPeerID: "spoofed-peer-id",
+ },
+ wantReceivedHeaders: map[string]string{
+ api.HeaderPeerID: nodeB.Host.ID().String(),
+ },
+ wantReceivedPathSuffix: "/api/v1/test",
+ },
{
name: "Local gate header stripped, no Authorization to pass through",
pathSuffix: "/api/v1/test",
diff --git a/tests/integration/datapath_test.go b/tests/integration/datapath_test.go
index 68105bcd..57911a22 100644
--- a/tests/integration/datapath_test.go
+++ b/tests/integration/datapath_test.go
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
+ "sync"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -194,13 +195,26 @@ func TestIntegrationHTTPDatapath(t *testing.T) {
addrA := waitForPeerInfoInLog(t, filepath.Join(homeA, "node.log"))
peerIDA := getPeerIDFromAddr(addrA)
+ addrB := waitForPeerInfoInLog(t, filepath.Join(homeB, "node.log"))
+ peerIDB := getPeerIDFromAddr(addrB)
// Connect Node B to Node A
callMCP(t, actualApiAddrB, "connect_peer", map[string]any{"peer_addr": addrA})
- // Start a dummy HTTP server on Node A's host (simulating local service)
+ // Start a dummy HTTP server on Node A's host (simulating local service).
+ // It captures the headers it receives so we can assert what actually
+ // crosses the mesh: verified caller identity in, biscuit stripped.
expectedBody := `{"status":"success"}`
+ var (
+ hdrMu sync.Mutex
+ gotPeerID string
+ gotBiscuit string
+ )
dummyServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ hdrMu.Lock()
+ gotPeerID = r.Header.Get(api.HeaderPeerID)
+ gotBiscuit = r.Header.Get(api.HeaderSamBiscuit)
+ hdrMu.Unlock()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(expectedBody))
@@ -246,6 +260,8 @@ func TestIntegrationHTTPDatapath(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Set(api.HeaderSamAuthentication, "Bearer "+apiToken)
+ // Spoof attempt: the backend must see the verified peer id, not this.
+ req.Header.Set(api.HeaderPeerID, "spoofed-peer")
req.Close = true // Force close the connection so the libp2p stream terminates and flushed accounting logs
httpResp, err = client.Do(req)
if err == nil && httpResp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
@@ -273,6 +289,15 @@ func TestIntegrationHTTPDatapath(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("Expected body %s, got %s", expectedBody, string(bodyBytes))
}
+ hdrMu.Lock()
+ if gotPeerID != peerIDB.String() {
+ t.Errorf("backend %s: got %q, want verified caller %q (spoofed inbound value must be overwritten)", api.HeaderPeerID, gotPeerID, peerIDB)
+ }
+ if gotBiscuit != "" {
+ t.Errorf("%s leaked to backend: %q", api.HeaderSamBiscuit, gotBiscuit)
+ }
+ hdrMu.Unlock()
+
// Verify Audit Traceability and Stream Accounting logs were emitted
assertLogInFile(t, filepath.Join(homeA, "node.log"), "Audit Traceability")
assertLogInFile(t, filepath.Join(homeA, "node.log"), "Stream Accounting")