Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
controlplane: the Border Crossing line names the origin peer; act.sub is the egress node
Ignacio Janeirodea96794552c
diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.goindex a9dc15d4..6a153b86 100644--- a/api/datalog.go+++ b/api/datalog.go@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ const (FactClientPeerID = "client_peer_id"// FactActorNode names the origin agentmesh-node PeerID that exchanged a delegated- // subject credential at POST /token/exchange, for audit logs, for act.sub in- // border JWTs, and for ext_proc attributes["mesh"].actor_node. It grants- // nothing: no baseline rule and no policy binding reads it.+ // subject credential at POST /token/exchange, for audit logs and for ext_proc+ // attributes["mesh"].actor_node. It grants nothing: no baseline rule and no+ // policy binding reads it.FactActorNode = "actor_node"// FactGroup defines the group claim extracted from the OIDC token.diff --git a/internal/controlplane/sts.go b/internal/controlplane/sts.goindex 898ab035..1b38116e 100644--- a/internal/controlplane/sts.go+++ b/internal/controlplane/sts.go@@ -1098,6 +1098,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleSTSToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {"endpoint", "/sts/token","decision", "allow","actor_node", nodeRecord.PeerID,+ "client_peer_id", claims.ClientPeerID,"subject", subject,"audience", audience,"destination", req.Destination,diff --git a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.mdindex ffb965b5..c41e7240 100644--- a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md+++ b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md@@ -306,9 +306,8 @@ minted statelessly on the control plane with zero database writes:- `client_peer_id("<origin_node_peer_id>")` binds the token to the originnode's libp2p connection (`check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`),so an exfiltrated token cannot be replayed from another peer.-- `actor_node("<origin_node_peer_id>")` records the acting node for audit logs,- `act.sub` in outbound border JWTs, and `ext_proc` attributes. No policy rule- grants permissions on `actor_node`.+- `actor_node("<origin_node_peer_id>")` records the acting node for audit logs+ and `ext_proc` attributes. No policy rule grants permissions on `actor_node`.- `user(...)`, `email(...)`, `group(...)`, `idp_role(...)`, and `role(...)` areresolved strictly from the caller's `subject_token`.- No `node()` fact is minted, which prevents `node:<peer_id>` policy bindings on