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Agent Mesh

controlplane: the Border Crossing line names the origin peer; act.sub is the egress node

Ignacio Janeirodea96794552c
diff --git a/api/datalog.go b/api/datalog.go
index a9dc15d4..6a153b86 100644
--- a/api/datalog.go
+++ b/api/datalog.go
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ const (
FactClientPeerID = "client_peer_id"
// FactActorNode names the origin agentmesh-node PeerID that exchanged a delegated
- // subject credential at POST /token/exchange, for audit logs, for act.sub in
- // border JWTs, and for ext_proc attributes["mesh"].actor_node. It grants
- // nothing: no baseline rule and no policy binding reads it.
+ // subject credential at POST /token/exchange, for audit logs and for ext_proc
+ // attributes["mesh"].actor_node. It grants nothing: no baseline rule and no
+ // policy binding reads it.
FactActorNode = "actor_node"
// FactGroup defines the group claim extracted from the OIDC token.
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/sts.go b/internal/controlplane/sts.go
index 898ab035..1b38116e 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/sts.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/sts.go
@@ -1098,6 +1098,7 @@ func (s *Server) HandleSTSToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
"endpoint", "/sts/token",
"decision", "allow",
"actor_node", nodeRecord.PeerID,
+ "client_peer_id", claims.ClientPeerID,
"subject", subject,
"audience", audience,
"destination", req.Destination,
diff --git a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md
index ffb965b5..c41e7240 100644
--- a/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md
+++ b/site/content/docs/contributing/security-architecture.md
@@ -306,9 +306,8 @@ minted statelessly on the control plane with zero database writes:
- `client_peer_id("<origin_node_peer_id>")` binds the token to the origin
node's libp2p connection (`check if client_peer_id($id), connection_peer_id($id)`),
so an exfiltrated token cannot be replayed from another peer.
-- `actor_node("<origin_node_peer_id>")` records the acting node for audit logs,
- `act.sub` in outbound border JWTs, and `ext_proc` attributes. No policy rule
- grants permissions on `actor_node`.
+- `actor_node("<origin_node_peer_id>")` records the acting node for audit logs
+ and `ext_proc` attributes. No policy rule grants permissions on `actor_node`.
- `user(...)`, `email(...)`, `group(...)`, `idp_role(...)`, and `role(...)` are
resolved strictly from the caller's `subject_token`.
- No `node()` fact is minted, which prevents `node:<peer_id>` policy bindings on