Agent Mesh
Go a2aa2a-protocolagent-meshagentic-aiinferencemcpmeshmesh-networknetwork-securitynetworking-aip2p-network
better unauth mcp error
Antonio Ojeae70a549aad43
diff --git a/internal/node/mcp.go b/internal/node/mcp.goindex 1787ff44..571bf907 100644--- a/internal/node/mcp.go+++ b/internal/node/mcp.go@@ -258,6 +258,12 @@ func (n *SamNode) CallMCPTool(ctx context.Context, targetPeer peer.ID, toolNamereturn nil, fmt.Errorf("failed after %d retries: %w", maxRetries, err)}+// ErrAuthRejected marks a service-level authorization denial from a remote peer,+// as opposed to a transport/connectivity failure. Callers use errors.Is to tell+// "you're not allowed" apart from "the service is unreachable" so that discovery+// (find_remote_tools) can hide forbidden services instead of leaking their names.+var ErrAuthRejected = errors.New("auth rejected")+func (n *SamNode) ConnectMCPSession(ctx context.Context, targetPeer peer.ID, targetService string) (*mcp.ClientSession, func(), error) {// Open streamlogger.Debugf("Dialing %s for MCP...\n", targetPeer)@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@ func (n *SamNode) ConnectMCPSession(ctx context.Context, targetPeer peer.ID, tarif !resp.Success {cleanup()- return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("auth rejected by %s: %s", targetPeer, resp.Error)+ return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w by %s: %s", ErrAuthRejected, targetPeer, resp.Error)}// Handoff to SDK using custom transportdiff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers.goindex bb19b3f5..d7c84405 100644--- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go+++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers.go@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package nodeimport ("context""encoding/json"+ "errors""fmt""strings""sync"@@ -388,6 +389,12 @@ func (n *SamNode) fetchRemoteToolCatalogue(ctx context.Context, targetPeer peer.n.preparePeerAddrs(ctx, targetPeer)session, cleanup, err := n.ConnectMCPSession(ctx, targetPeer, connectService)if err != nil {+ if errors.Is(err, ErrAuthRejected) {+ // Not authorized for this service: omit it entirely rather than+ // leaking its existence ("what you see is what you can do", #176).+ logger.Debugf("Hiding unauthorized service %s from discovery: %v", targetService, err)+ continue+ }logger.Debugf("Failed to connect MCP session for service %s: %v", targetService, err)if serviceNameFilter == "" || connectService == serviceNameFilter || strings.HasPrefix(connectService, serviceNameFilter+".") {rows = append(rows, remoteToolRow{diff --git a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.goindex 22cd6f9b..5392f004 100644--- a/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go+++ b/internal/node/mcp_handlers_test.go@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ func buildAndSaveCustomBiscuit(node *SamNode, rootPriv ed25519.PrivateKey, allowreturn node.Store.SaveIdentity(biscBytes)}-func TestFetchRemoteToolCatalogue_AuthRejected(t *testing.T) {+func TestFetchRemoteToolCatalogue_AuthRejectedHidden(t *testing.T) {ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)defer cancel()@@ -502,22 +502,16 @@ func TestFetchRemoteToolCatalogue_AuthRejected(t *testing.T) {t.Fatalf("RegisterService: %v", err)}- // Fetching tools from C should succeed for the catalog, but fail auth for "summarizer"+ // Fetching tools from C should succeed for the catalog, but the unauthorized+ // "summarizer" service must be hidden entirely rather than leaked as an error+ // row (issue #176: discovery should only ever show what the caller can call).rows, err := nodeA.fetchRemoteToolCatalogue(ctx, nodeC.Host.ID(), "")if err != nil {t.Fatalf("fetchRemoteToolCatalogue returned unexpected overall error: %v", err)}- if len(rows) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 row with error, got %d: %+v", len(rows), rows)- }-- row := rows[0]- if row.ToolName != "mcp://summarizer" {- t.Errorf("expected ToolName 'mcp://summarizer', got %q", row.ToolName)- }- if !strings.Contains(row.Error, "auth rejected") {- t.Errorf("expected Error to contain 'auth rejected', got %q", row.Error)+ if len(rows) != 0 {+ t.Fatalf("expected unauthorized service to be hidden (0 rows), got %d: %+v", len(rows), rows)}}