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Agent Mesh

fix(security): address second round of review comments

Antonio Ojeaee178ead5c44
diff --git a/internal/controlplane/sts.go b/internal/controlplane/sts.go
index 1a6b0e9e..b6cd076a 100644
--- a/internal/controlplane/sts.go
+++ b/internal/controlplane/sts.go
@@ -89,13 +89,16 @@ type es256KeyEntry struct {
expiresAt time.Time // zero for the currently active signing key
}
+const oidcKeyCacheTTL = time.Minute
+
// LocalES256Signer is the default OIDCSigner using P-256 (ES256) keys
// with overlap grace-period support and optional SQLStore persistence.
type LocalES256Signer struct {
- mu sync.RWMutex
- store storage.Store
- current es256KeyEntry
- retired []es256KeyEntry
+ mu sync.RWMutex
+ store storage.Store
+ current es256KeyEntry
+ retired []es256KeyEntry
+ loadedAt time.Time
}
// NewLocalES256SignerWithStore creates a LocalES256Signer backed by store when non-nil.
@@ -119,9 +122,10 @@ func NewLocalES256SignerWithStore(store storage.Store) (*LocalES256Signer, error
}
if current != nil {
return &LocalES256Signer{
- store: store,
- current: *current,
- retired: retired,
+ store: store,
+ current: *current,
+ retired: retired,
+ loadedAt: time.Now(),
}, nil
}
}
@@ -144,7 +148,7 @@ func NewLocalES256SignerWithStore(store storage.Store) (*LocalES256Signer, error
}
}
}
- return &LocalES256Signer{store: store, current: entry}, nil
+ return &LocalES256Signer{store: store, current: entry, loadedAt: time.Now()}, nil
}
func decodeOIDCKeyPair(k storage.OIDCKeyPair) (es256KeyEntry, error) {
@@ -238,23 +242,28 @@ func (s *LocalES256Signer) Rotate(gracePeriod time.Duration) (string, error) {
}
s.retired = kept
s.current = next
+ s.loadedAt = now
return next.kid, nil
}
// SignJWT signs claims with the active ES256 key and sets the "kid" header.
func (s *LocalES256Signer) SignJWT(ctx context.Context, claims jwt.MapClaims) (string, error) {
- if s.store != nil {
+ s.mu.RLock()
+ active := s.current
+ stale := s.store != nil && time.Since(s.loadedAt) >= oidcKeyCacheTTL
+ s.mu.RUnlock()
+
+ if stale {
if cur, err := s.store.GetCurrentOIDCKey(ctx); err == nil && cur != nil {
if loaded, dErr := decodeOIDCKeyPair(*cur); dErr == nil {
s.mu.Lock()
s.current = loaded
+ s.loadedAt = time.Now()
+ active = loaded
s.mu.Unlock()
}
}
}
- s.mu.RLock()
- active := s.current
- s.mu.RUnlock()
tok := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
tok.Header["kid"] = active.kid
diff --git a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go
index 941cb5e4..6f5698a1 100644
--- a/internal/node/egress_inspect.go
+++ b/internal/node/egress_inspect.go
@@ -405,13 +405,20 @@ func (s *EgressService) serveInspectedEgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
} else {
decompressed, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(gz, maxBytes+1))
_ = gz.Close()
- if readErr != nil || int64(len(decompressed)) > maxBytes {
+ if int64(len(decompressed)) > maxBytes {
refuse(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "decompressed upstream response exceeds max_buffered_bytes", proxyStatusDenied)
return
}
- respBody = decompressed
- respHeader.Del("Content-Encoding")
- respHeader.Del("Content-Length")
+ if readErr != nil {
+ if !ma.GetFailOpen() {
+ refuse(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "invalid gzip upstream response body", proxyStatusDenied)
+ return
+ }
+ } else {
+ respBody = decompressed
+ respHeader.Del("Content-Encoding")
+ respHeader.Del("Content-Length")
+ }
}
} else if !ma.GetFailOpen() {
refuse(w, http.StatusBadGateway, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported upstream Content-Encoding %q for Model Armor response inspection", ce), proxyStatusDenied)
diff --git a/internal/node/enroll.go b/internal/node/enroll.go
index 67f55bcb..e98bd3b5 100644
--- a/internal/node/enroll.go
+++ b/internal/node/enroll.go
@@ -63,10 +63,6 @@ func GetOrGenerateKey(s *Store) crypto.PrivKey {
if genErr != nil {
logger.Fatalf("Failed to generate key: %v", genErr)
}
- if err != nil {
- logger.Warnf("Skipping key persistence because store is unavailable: %v", err)
- return priv
- }
raw, marshalErr := crypto.MarshalPrivateKey(priv)
if marshalErr != nil {
logger.Fatalf("Failed to marshal private key: %v", marshalErr)
diff --git a/internal/node/ext_authz.go b/internal/node/ext_authz.go
index 6d62c920..aea472f8 100644
--- a/internal/node/ext_authz.go
+++ b/internal/node/ext_authz.go
@@ -106,9 +106,15 @@ func evaluateExtAuthz(ctx context.Context, node *SamNode, in extAuthzCheckInput)
}
callerPeer := localPID
if len(claims.TaskRules) > 0 && claims.ClientPeerID != "" {
- if pid, decErr := peer.Decode(claims.ClientPeerID); decErr == nil {
- callerPeer = pid
+ pid, decErr := peer.Decode(claims.ClientPeerID)
+ if decErr != nil {
+ return extAuthzCheckResult{
+ Allowed: false,
+ HTTPStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
+ Message: "Invalid client_peer_id in token",
+ }
}
+ callerPeer = pid
}
isLocal := callerPeer == localPID